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BASIC PRINCIPLES OF BUILDING EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE NEED FOR TRANSFORMATION

The study is devoted to the analysis of the basic principles on which the system of collective European security is built. It was found that most of these principles cannot be implemented effectively enough in modern conditions. The Russian aggression against Ukraine dealt a devastating blow to these principles. It has been proven that the system of European collective security needs not only its improvement, but the replacement of the paradigms on which it was built. This applies, in particular, to issues of transatlantic cooperation, energy security, expansion of the EU and NATO, institutional restructuring of the main security organizations.

Key words: collective security system, NATO, EU, energy security, transatlantic cooperation

The majority of experts who study the Russian aggression against Ukraine agree that the aggressor did not count on the complete inability of our country to resist him and the passivity and division in the camp of Western countries. This did not happen. Ukraine, with the support of its partner countries, is not only resisting, but also gradually approaching victory. Therefore, it can be considered that the European system of collective security passed the test of strength.

However, it does not pass the test of effectiveness. Neither the global nor the European collective security systems have proven to be capable of preventing aggression, stopping it once it has begun, and waging a protracted war imposed by Russia. And the problems are tracked in different areas and take different forms: from bureaucratic decision-making to the physical absence of the necessary weapons. Ukraine is paying for all this with the lives of its citizens.

The crisis of the European system of collective security actualizes a deeper study of the fundamental principles on which it is built and an assessment of the need for their adjustment. Most likely, there is a need to revise these principles or, in any case, fundamentally supplement them with new paradigms.

What are the main principles laid down in the construction of the European security system and why do they fail in the new geostrategic realities?

1. **Partnership and cooperation.** This is the basic paradigm for building the entire European collective security system. Unlike previous models (the Holy Alliance after the Napoleonic Wars, the Versailles Peace Treaty after the First World War, and even the United Nations), which were built on the principle of "winner takes all", the main security institutions of modern Europe (NATO and the EU) are built on principles of equality and cooperation [1]. In these organizations, all members have equal rights and decisions are made by consensus.

However, even this most democratic form of decision-making is not ideal. It worked quite effectively when the number of members was insignificant and the differences of interests were not significant. Today, consensus decision-making is used by some participants to advance their interests to the detriment of the organization as a whole. There are numerous facts of blackmail by individual members and blocking of important decisions. Such a situation is absolutely unacceptable in the conditions of war, when decisions must be made quickly, because a lot depends on them.

Therefore, in November 2023, the European Parliament adopted a resolution that contains a proposal to introduce the principle of "qualified majority" when making some decisions instead of consensus. This mechanism should be used when making decisions regarding:

- issues of the EU's common foreign, security and defense policy, including decisions on the application of sanctions;
- internal procedures in the process of EU enlargement;
- joint management of borders and other foreign policy issues [2].

At the same time, the complexity of the situation lies in the fact that it is necessary to make a decision by consensus to refuse consensus in the future. And some countries would not like to lose such a tool of influence on the organization.

The principle of partnership and cooperation also extends to third countries. It was through partnership that the EU and NATO solved problems with post-socialist countries, which over the years became members of these organizations. This principle is also implemented in relation to the Balkan countries.

There was hope that through cooperation and partnership, conflicts with Russia would be resolved. But in this case, the principle did not work. Moreover, the focus on cooperation and insufficient attention to the development of defense and the defense industry affected Europe's ability to counter the Russian threat and provide aid to Ukraine. Therefore, without denying the principle of partnership and cooperation, it should be

supplemented with the principle of sufficient defense capability. Of course, this will require quite significant costs, but there is no security without costs.

2. *Transatlantic cooperation.* For a long time, the entire system of European collective security assumed the leading role of the United States of America in it. This is confirmed by the data on the share of NATO member countries' defense spending in GDP (Table 1).

Table 1

The share of defense spending in the GDP of NATO member countries (2023)

| Country | % in GDP | Country | % in GDP |
|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| Poland | 3.90 | Croatia | 1.76 |
| United State | 3.49 | Albania | 1.74 |
| Greece | 3.01 | Netherlands | 1.70 |
| Estonia | 2.73 | Norway | 1.67 |
| Lithuania | 2.54 | Denmark | 1.65 |
| Finland | 2.45 | Germany | 1.57 |
| Romania | 2.44 | Czech Republic | 1.50 |
| Hungary | 2.43 | Portugal | 1.48 |
| Latvia | 2.27 | Italy | 1.46 |
| United Kingdom | 2.07 | Canada | 1.38 |
| Slovakia | 2.03 | Slovenia | 1.35 |
| France | 1.90 | Turky | 1.31 |
| North Macedonia | 1.87 | Spain | 1.26 |
| Montenegro | 1.87 | Belgium | 1.13 |
| Bulgaria | 1.84 | Luxemburg | 0.76 |

Source: [3]

Only 11 countries out of 30 that have armies (Iceland does not have its own army) spent more than 2% on defense needs (the norm, which is established by agreement for NATO member countries). It is significant that this group includes all the countries located on NATO's eastern border. However, the main burden of costs is borne by the United States. And this situation suited most European countries.

At the same time, already during the previous presidency of D. Trump, the first signals were sounded regarding the possible refusal of the USA to fulfill the role of a security umbrella for Europe. With a new force, such signals began to sound now from the Republicans in the course of the election campaign in the United States. This prompts the European Union to intensify the discussion of the defense autonomy of Europe. In Europe, there was even

talk of creating its own nuclear potential [4]. However, first of all, it will contradict international agreements on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. And secondly, Europe does not have a single management center. Therefore, it is not clear who should be the person who will decide on the use of nuclear weapons. A more likely scenario is that closer cooperation in this field is expected not only with the USA, but also with European countries that possess nuclear weapons (France and United Kingdom). In any case, the principle of transatlantic cooperation will fundamentally change. As Josep Borrell noted, "we must take more responsibility, in particular in guaranteeing our own security. There is no longer a world in which the US cares about our security" [5].

3. ***Security of energy sources.*** For a long time, the engine of European development was cheap energy resources from Russia and the available Chinese market for cheap goods. Today, both of these sources have been exhausted. With some losses for itself, Europe has almost overcome its dependence on Russian gas. However, it may be replaced by a new dependence on liquefied gas. Therefore, the European Union is changing its energy policy. The following tasks come to the fore:

- *development of domestic energy resources.* The EU focuses not only on diversifying the supply of energy resources externally, but also on the development of "green" energy within European countries. The attitude towards nuclear energy is changing. If after the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, European countries began to limit the construction of nuclear power units, then in November 2023 the European Parliament voted to include nuclear energy in the list of 17 so-called "green" technologies specified in the EU Law on Industry with Zero Emissions [6]. But here, too, the problem of dependence on Russia arises: the aggressor country controls 38% of the global uranium enrichment market, 17% of the supply of nuclear fuel and ranks first in the construction of nuclear power plants abroad [7]. Even during a full-scale war, Russian companies continue to build nuclear power units in European countries and receive advisory services from European partners;

- *energy efficiency policy.* Reducing energy dependence is possible by improving energy efficiency. Efficient use of energy allows you to reduce the total amount of energy consumed and make the economy less sensitive to changes in the supply of energy resources. The European Union has a number of programs that directly or indirectly contribute to increasing energy efficiency ("European Energy Efficiency", "Digital Europe", "Smart Cities and Communities", etc.).

4. *EU enlargement policy*. The criteria that must be met by a country intending to join the EU have not changed for 30 years since their adoption at the Copenhagen EU Summit in 1993. However, their interpretation and emphasis have changed depending on the situation in the world, Europe and the European Union. For example, as of 1999, the economic and financial indicators of a number of countries did not meet the criteria of monetary and financial convergence, compliance with which is a condition for joining the Eurozone. However, this did not prevent the introduction of a common European currency [8].

The European Union actively responded to the possibility of eastward expansion as a result of the collapse of the socialist system. A special program of cooperation with the Balkan countries was also adopted. And this despite the fact that the new members of the EU had a much lower level of economic development than the "old" members of the European Union. Cyprus became a member of the EU despite the fact that it is divided.

Today, the European Union has to decide on new members. 9 countries are considered official candidates for EU membership. However, in essence, the process concerns 4 countries of the Southern Balkans and 3 countries of the Eastern Partnership. The decision regarding Ukraine is particularly difficult. Of course, Ukraine's accession to the EU carries with it serious threats to the European economy and security, which we explored earlier [9]. However, the potential rewards can far outweigh the risks. Such winnings can be:

1. *Emergence of internal energy to accelerate EU development*. Unfortunately, the EU loses to world leaders in terms of economic growth. The entry into this organization of Ukraine with its 40 million population will create additional product markets and areas of investment, which can be a driver for European growth. In Ukraine, a repetition of the "economic miracle" observed in Germany and Japan after the Second World War is possible. And this will accelerate the economic development of the whole of Europe.

2. *Solving the problem of Europe's dependence on the supply of raw materials from other countries*. We may be talking about lithium and uranium ores, which are rich in the territory of Ukraine. These two resources fit well into the energy security program discussed earlier.

3. *Creation of a European defense industry hub on the territory of Ukraine*. It has already been noted that the policy of partnership and cooperation needs to be supplemented by strengthening the military power of the European Union. During the war with Russia, Ukraine not only created its own modern defense industry, but also concluded a number of agreements on the organization of joint production of weapons with a number of European and American concerns.

But obtaining these advantages is possible only if the decision regarding Ukraine's accession to the EU is not based on formal compliance with certain criteria or fears of some countries about the appearance of a new competitor for receiving EU funds, but based on the interests of the entire integration association. In other words, the principle of expediency should prevail in this case.

Thus, the implementation of each of the principles of building collective European security faces certain obstacles and problems. In most cases, these obstacles are not external, but are generated by the principles themselves. In other words, it is not the form of implementation of this or that principle that needs to be changed, but the very paradigm laid in its foundation. Therefore, the further development of events will largely depend on the readiness of the European Union to fundamentally revise a number of principles of its functioning.

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