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ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ ЕКОНОМІЧНИХ СИСТЕМ ТА ІНСТИТУТІВ У НОВИХ ГЕОСТРАТЕГІЧНИХ РЕАЛІЯХ

XI Міжнародна науково-практична
конференція молодих вчених і студентів

TRANSFORMATION OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE NEW GEOSTRATEGIC REALITIES

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for Young Scientists and Students

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Доповіді

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ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES AND RISKS OF FRANCHISING FOR INTERNATIONAL MARKET ENTRY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

This paper examines the economic advantages and potential risks of franchising as a strategy for entering the European Union market. Franchising facilitates rapid expansion with reduced initial capital requirements, as franchisees assume local operational costs while the franchisor generates revenue from initial fees, ongoing royalties, and, in some cases, product supply agreements. Major advantages include accelerated market access, risk-sharing with local partners, utilization of local knowledge and networks, brand reinforcement, and a higher likelihood of success due to the application of an established business model. The EU single market further supports franchising by removing trade barriers and simplifying cross-border operations, thereby contributing to economic growth through job creation and business development. Nevertheless, franchising entails certain risks. Companies may incur additional costs to comply with EU regulations, face potential loss of operational control, and experience adverse impacts from underperforming partners, economic fluctuations, cultural differences, or intense competition. Successful market entry requires careful partner selection, regulatory compliance, and robust ongoing support to mitigate risks while capitalizing on opportunities.

Keywords: franchising, international market entry, European Union, economic advantages, economic risks, single market, franchise expansion, regulatory compliance, risk minimization, digitalization.

Introduction

Franchising is a popular way for companies to expand their business into new countries, including those in the European Union. Franchising is based on a contractual relationship between two parties. The franchisor is the owner of an established brand, trademark, business model, and business experience. The franchisee is an independent entrepreneur. Under the agreement, the franchisor gives the franchisee the right to use these elements in order to operate a business. In return, the franchisee pays initial fees, ongoing royalties (usually a percentage of sales), and sometimes follows strict guidelines on operations, marketing, and quality. This setup creates a partnership where both sides benefit: the franchisor grows without owning every location, and the

franchisee gets a proven system to start with less risk than building from scratch.

There are several main types of franchising. The most common is business format franchising, where the franchisor provides not just the brand and products but a complete package: operating manuals, training, marketing support, supply chains, and ongoing help. This is what people usually think of with chains like fast-food restaurants or coffee shops. Another type is product or distribution franchising. In this case, the main focus is on selling the franchisor’s branded products. Less attention is given to transferring the full business system. This model is common in car dealerships and soft drink bottling companies. A third important type for international growth is master franchising, where the franchisor gives one master franchisee rights to a large territory (like a whole country or region in the EU), and that master then recruits and supports sub-franchisees. This helps speed up expansion in diverse markets.

When companies want to enter international markets, they choose from several modes: exporting (shipping products abroad), licensing (letting others use intellectual property for a fee), joint ventures (partnering with a local firm to create a new entity), or foreign direct investment (FDI, like building wholly owned subsidiaries). Franchising stands out as economically advantageous in many cases, especially for the EU. Compared to exporting, it avoids high transport costs and tariffs while building local presence faster. Unlike licensing, franchising gives more control over brand standards and quality. Joint ventures and FDI require much heavier capital investment, shared profits, and higher risks from political or economic changes in the host country. Franchising lowers these barriers: the franchisor invests little upfront capital since franchisees fund local openings, reduces financial exposure by sharing risks, and allows rapid scaling across the EU's single market with its free movement of goods, services, and people. This makes franchising particularly attractive for service-based or retail businesses aiming for quick, low-risk growth in Europe while keeping steady income from royalties (Direct, 2025), (iFA, 2026), (Kennedy et al., 2020), (George, 2026).

Table 1

Comparison of international market entry modes*

Mode	Control	Risk	Investment	Profit Share
Export	Low	Low	Low	High
Joint Venture	Medium	Medium	Medium	Shared
Franchising	Medium	Low	Low	Royalties
Direct Investment	High	High	High	Full

**Source: created by the author.*

Franchising market in the EU

The franchising sector in the European Union represents a substantial and mature component of the region's economy. Across Europe, there are approximately 180,000 franchised outlets operated under roughly 24,600 active franchise brands (*Franchise growth – the European advantage* 2026).

Table 2

Number of Franchise Systems*

Country	Franchise Systems
UK	1,009 (2024, +8% since 2018), doubled since 1995
France	2,035 (2023, +3.2% vs 2022)
Germany	910 (2023), ~1,000 expected 2025
Italy	931 (2024)
Portugal	542 (2024), 66% Portuguese
Spain	1384 (2024)
Sweden	600-650
Norway	400-500
Denmark	140-200
Netherlands	917 (2023)
Romania	440 (55% international / 45% national)

*Source: (Farrah, 2024).

The annual turnover (total revenue or sales generated by franchise networks) exceeds €300 billion. This figure highlights franchising's role as a major economic driver, supporting millions of jobs, with estimates around 2.6 million people employed directly and indirectly in the sector.

Table 3

Number of franchisees / franchised units*

Country	Franchisees / Units	Notes
UK	50,421 units	Provides jobs for ~770,000 individuals
France	92,132 outlets	Supports 951,620 direct and indirect jobs
Germany	193,920 outlets, 148,577 franchise entrepreneurs	Employs ~830,000 people
Italy	67,275 points of sale	293,791 employees in networks (2024)
Portugal	-	Supports over 185,000 jobs (27% of employment)
Spain	77,819 outlets Estimated 39-44,000 franchisees	-
Sweden	30,000–32,000	-
Norway	~10,000	-
Denmark	5,500 outlets	-
Netherlands	34,849 outlets	410,500 employees (2023)

*Source: (Farrah, 2024).

Over the past decade, the franchising market in the European Union has demonstrated steady growth and structural evolution. The total number of franchise outlets and brands has continued to rise, driven by sustained demand across major economies such as Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands.

Several trends show that the franchising market in the EU is growing. In France, the number of franchise outlets increased by about 9 % in 2023 compared to the previous year, and franchise-related sales grew by more than 15 %, showing both more stores and higher revenue. In Germany, the franchise sector also grew steadily, with sales rising nearly 5 % year-on-year and generating billions in turnover, which reflects strong investor confidence. At the same time, emerging markets in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Poland and Romania, are growing even faster, often faster than in Western Europe, showing that franchising is developing actively across the whole region (Farrah, 2024).

Table 4

Franchising industries*

Sector	EU Outlet Share	Example Brands
Food & Beverage	42%	Burger King, Carrefour
Services/Wellness	28%	Basic-Fit, RE/MAX
Retail/Fashion	18%	Spar, Calzedonia

**Source: (Bomba, 2025).*

Franchising in the European Union works well in many different industries, but some sectors are much more developed than others. The top sectors is food and beverage, services, and retail – make up a big part of the market, often more than 70% of all franchise outlets.

The food and beverage sector is the strongest and most common one. It includes fast food places, restaurants, coffee shops, and quick-service chains. Globally and in Europe, this category often takes up around 42% of franchise outlets. In France, for example, this sector brought in a lot of sales in recent years, with big growth from brands like McDonald's and Subway. In Germany and Spain, there are also many local and international chains, plus some supermarket franchises that sell groceries. People like eating out, especially in tourist areas, so this industry stays very active and creates a lot of jobs.

Services and wellness come next, usually taking 25–30% of the market share. This covers things like hair salons, beauty treatments, fitness gyms, cleaning services, and education centers. In France, personal services grew a lot in outlets and sales recently. Fitness brands like Basic-Fit have expanded to thousands of gyms across the EU, and education franchises like Kumon are popular too. B2B services, such as cleaning or logistics, and real estate agencies like RE/MAX also do well and bring in significant money overall.

These areas grow fast because people want convenient help with health, home, and daily life.

Retail and fashion take about 15–20% of franchises. This includes clothing stores, accessory shops, convenience outlets, and auto services. Brands like Kiabi or C&A are common for apparel, while supermarket chains like Spar have thousands of stores. Some auto repair places like Norauto are staples too. In countries like Italy and Portugal, there is also growth in online-hybrid retail concepts. This sector benefits from steady shopping habits and brand recognition (Bomba, 2025).

Economic advantages of franchising

Franchising has a lot of economic advantages for companies that want to enter the international market, especially in the European Union. It is a smarter and lower-risk way to expand, which is very useful in the EU's single market of over 450 million consumers.

One of the main benefits is that franchising does not require a lot of capital from the company. Instead of opening new stores or offices themselves, the franchisor lets franchisees invest in most of the startup costs, like rent, equipment, staff, and local marketing. The franchisor mainly provides the brand, business model, training, and support, and earns money from initial fees, ongoing royalties (usually 4-8% of sales), and sometimes supply fees. This allows the company to grow fast without spending too much of its own money or taking on heavy debt. In the EU, this is especially helpful because the single market removes many trade barriers, so once a brand is established in one country, it can expand to others more easily (*Franchise growth – the European advantage* 2026).

Another advantage is fast market growth. Franchising lets companies expand quickly across different EU countries because local franchisees know the market, culture, rules, and customers better than an outside company. They manage daily operations, which reduces mistakes and helps the brand become recognized faster. Research shows that franchised outlets often perform better than company-owned ones, sometimes making more revenue because local owners are more motivated (Bąbik, 2024).

Franchising also spreads the risks. Instead of the company taking all financial and operational risks, they are shared with the franchisees. If one store faces problems because of local economic conditions, it does not affect the whole network as much. This is important in the EU, where countries can have different economic situations or consumer habits, but the unified market makes managing everything easier. It also protects the company from risks like currency changes or regional slowdowns compared to full ownership (Bayer, 2025).

Finally, franchising creates stable income through royalties, which grow as sales increase. It also helps save costs through economies of scale in marketing, branding, and supply chains - the more stores, the stronger the brand and the lower the costs per unit. In Europe, franchising also supports job creation and overall economic activity, as networks of franchises often employ millions and contribute billions to the economy (*The hidden costs of franchising (and how to plan for them)* - FMS franchise EU 2025) (byfranchisemarketingsystems, 2025), (*Franchise Industries Europe: Sector expansion opportunities: FMS franchise europe 2025*).




Fig. 1. Market Share of Franchising in Europe by Country (Percentage)*

*Source: created by the author based on (*Franchise growth – the European advantage 2026*), (*Selfin et al., 2025*).

Compared to other entry modes, franchising has clear economic advantages for entering the EU market.

- Exporting is low-risk and cheap at first (no big investments abroad), but it involves shipping costs, limited local presence, and slower growth. Franchising wins by building faster local networks without transport issues.

- Licensing is also low-cost with quick entry and minimal risk, but it offers even less control over brand standards. Franchising is better because it provides a full business system, training, and ongoing support, leading to more consistent quality and higher royalties.

- Joint ventures share costs and bring local knowledge, but they require more investment, split profits, and can lead to partner conflicts. Franchising avoids these issues by keeping the franchisor more independent while still getting local input from motivated franchisees.

- Foreign direct investment (FDI) gives full control and all profits, but it demands heavy capital, higher risk, and complex management in the EU's regulatory environment. Franchising is much cheaper and lower-risk since franchisees fund local openings.

Economic risks of franchising

Franchising brings several economic risks when companies use it to enter the European Union market. While it offers low upfront costs and fast growth, these risks can lead to financial losses, lower profits, or even failure if not managed well.

One major risk is high initial adaptation and compliance costs. The EU has strict rules on things like data protection (GDPR), competition law (under the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation), labor standards, and consumer rights. Franchisors often need to spend extra money on legal advice, updating contracts, training, and making sure the business model fits these regulations across different countries. Since there's no single EU-wide franchising law, rules vary by member state, which adds complexity and expense, especially for cross-border expansion. Non-compliance can result in big fines, legal battles, or forced changes that hurt cash flow.

Another key risk is loss of control and dependency on franchisees. The franchisor relies on independent franchisees to run locations, but if a franchisee underperforms, damages the brand (poor service, quality issues), or fails to pay royalties, it can cause reputational harm and reduced income. Enforcing standards or collecting payments can be difficult and costly, leading to revenue shortfalls or extra spending on monitoring and support. In bad cases, one weak franchisee can affect the whole network's image and sales.

Economic and market volatility adds uncertainty. Changes like currency fluctuations (euro vs. other currencies), inflation, recessions in certain countries, or events such as Brexit (which complicated trade and rules between the UK and EU) can lower consumer spending and franchisee profits. This reduces royalty income for the franchisor and increases the chance of franchisee defaults or closures. Market saturation in big cities or cultural differences between EU states can also make it hard to achieve expected sales, leading to lower returns.

From 2019 to 2026, inflation in the eurozone changed significantly. In 2019, it was relatively low, around 1.5%. In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns, inflation decreased to about 0.3-0.7%. In 2021, it started to grow and reached approximately 2.5–2.9%. The highest level was observed in 2022, when inflation increased to 8.4-10.6%. This growth was caused by supply chain disruptions, rising energy and food prices, and the war in Ukraine. In 2023, inflation began to decline to about 5.4-6.4%. In 2024, it

fell further to 2.1–2.6%, and in 2025–2026 it stabilized at around 1.7–2.0% (*Euro area inflation rate 2026*).



Fig. 2. Annual inflation in the Euro Area (Percentage)*

**Source: (Euro area inflation rate 2026).*

These changes had a strong impact on franchising, especially in 2022–2023. High inflation increased operating costs for franchisees. Rent, wages, raw materials, energy, and logistics became more expensive. This was particularly serious in the food and retail sectors, where franchising is widely used. Profit margins decreased because many franchisees could not quickly increase prices, as consumers reduced their spending. As a result, some outlets were closed, the number of new openings declined, and royalty payments to franchisors became lower. The risk of franchisee default also increased.

Today, with low and stable inflation, operating costs are more predictable, consumers are spending more freely, and franchising is recovering and growing more easily. However, volatility remains a major risk: if prices surge again due to new crises, it could negatively impact the entire network, particularly in countries with differing economic conditions across the EU.

There's also the risk of regulatory enforcement and competition issues. EU competition law limits certain restrictions in franchise agreements (like price controls or territory protections), and breaking these can lead to fines up to millions of euros, void contracts, or lawsuits. This puts franchised businesses at a disadvantage compared to fully company-owned chains.

Compared to other entry modes, these risks are often lower in scale than full FDI (where the company bears all costs and exposure), but higher than simple exporting or licensing because of the ongoing relationship and brand dependency. Poor partner selection or weak contracts can turn small issues

into big financial problems (Baþik, 2024), (*Franchising explained: Unlocking growth opportunities and navigating risks* 2026).

Recommendations for minimizing risks and maximizing benefits

The main strategies include careful selection of franchisees. Franchisors should choose partners with relevant business experience, sufficient financial resources, and good knowledge of the local market and culture. Background checks, interviews, and trial periods can help ensure that franchisees follow the brand's standards and operate effectively.

Legal review of contracts is also essential. Franchise agreements must comply with EU and national regulations, including competition laws, data protection (GDPR), and fair business practices. Clear contracts define rights, obligations, payment terms, and conditions for termination, which helps avoid disputes and protect both parties.

Adaptation to local regulations is another important step. Franchisors may need to adjust their operations, products, or marketing to comply with labor, consumer, and environmental rules. Working with local experts can help prevent unexpected costs and legal problems.

Tools like SWOT and PEST analyses are useful for assessing potential risks and opportunities. SWOT identifies internal strengths and weaknesses and external opportunities and threats, while PEST examines political, economic, social, and technological factors that affect the market.

Finally, digitalization and sustainability are increasingly important in EU franchising. Digital tools, such as online training, operational apps, and data analytics, improve efficiency and control over franchisees. Sustainable practices, including reducing waste and using eco-friendly materials, help meet EU requirements and attract customers. Combining these strategies can improve business performance and reduce risks.

Conclusion

Franchising represents an effective strategy for international market entry in the European Union, balancing substantial economic advantages with inherent risks that require careful management.

The main economic advantage of franchising is lower capital requirements for the franchisor. The company can expand quickly in the EU single market because franchisees invest their own funds. This model also helps to reduce risks, since investments are shared between different partners. In addition, franchising provides stable income in the form of royalties. It allows faster market entry because local entrepreneurs understand their markets better. As a result, franchising supports economic growth by creating jobs and increasing cross-border business activity. However, franchising also involves significant risks. One of the main challenges is regulatory

compliance. Companies must follow EU competition law, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), as well as different national labour and consumer protection rules. Adapting to these requirements often requires high initial costs. There is also a risk of fines in case of non-compliance. Financial risks are mainly connected with the performance of franchisees. If a franchisee works poorly, does not pay royalties, or damages the brand's reputation, the franchisor may lose income and the overall value of the network can decrease. In addition, macroeconomic instability can negatively affect profitability. Factors such as inflation, currency fluctuations, and economic differences between regions may reduce revenues and increase costs. As a result, overall financial performance can become less predictable.

Overall, franchising constitutes a highly efficient and relatively low-risk mode of entry into the EU market when compared to capital-intensive alternatives such as wholly owned foreign direct investment. However, the success of franchising depends on careful preparation. It is important to select franchisees very carefully. The company must also conduct a detailed legal review of agreements. In addition, the business model should be adapted to regulatory requirements and local market conditions in each country.

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THE ROLE OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE IN SHAPING THE NEW ECONOMIC ARCHITECTURE OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

The structural transformation of the economic landscape in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) represents one of the most significant shifts in the global political economy of the twenty-first century. For decades, the region was defined by its peripheral status relative to the Western European core, a condition exacerbated by the historical legacy of the Cold War and the forced orientation of infrastructure toward the Soviet Union. The Three Seas Initiative (3SI), launched in 2015, emerged as a strategic response to these historical imbalances, aiming to foster a new economic architecture based on north-south connectivity, energy independence, and digital resilience. By integrating thirteen European Union (EU) member states situated between the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Seas, the 3SI seeks to bridge the developmental gap with Western Europe while creating a robust "shatterbelt" of stability against external pressures. This report provides an exhaustive analysis of the 3SI's role in reshaping the region's economic and security architecture, with particular focus on the Via Carpatia corridor, the intersection with the New European Security Architecture (EuSANU), implementation challenges, and the vital integration of Ukraine [1, 2].

Keywords: Central and Eastern Europe, Western European, Via Carpatia, New European Security Architecture, Three Seas Initiative.

Introduction

The conceptual origins of the Three Seas Initiative can be traced back to the interwar period and Józef Piłsudski's vision of the "Intermarium," a federation designed to preserve the independence of Central European states against the dual threats of Soviet Russia and Germany. While the Intermarium failed due to conflicting national interests and external aggression, its modern successor, the 3SI, was revived in 2015-2016 by the presidents of Poland and Croatia. Unlike its predecessor, the 3SI is explicitly economic and infrastructural in nature, operating within the institutional framework of the European Union and the security umbrella of NATO [3].

The initiative was formally inaugurated at the Dubrovnik Summit in 2016, with a declaration emphasizing the need to deepen European integration and harmonize development across the continent (Table 1). The primary objective was to overcome the "infrastructure deficit" left by the Soviet era,

where east-west corridors were well-funded to connect CEE markets to German supply chains, while north-south links were systematically neglected. This deficit restricted the movement of goods, services, and military assets, creating a strategic vulnerability that the 3SI aims to rectify through modernizing transport, energy, and digital grids [4].

Table 1

Summits*

Milestone	Year	Location	Key Outcome/Evolution
Founding Summit	2016	Dubrovnik, Croatia	Adoption of the joint declaration on North-South connectivity
Second Summit	2017	Warsaw, Poland	US President Donald Trump attends; 129 priority projects announced.
Third Summit	2018	Bucharest, Romania	EC and Germany granted observer status; prioritization of 3SIIF
Fourth Summit	2019	Ljubljana, Slovenia	Inauguration of the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund (3SIIF)
Eighth Summit	2023	Bucharest, Romania	Greece joins as 13th member; Ukraine and Moldova become associate partners
Ninth Summit	2024	Vilnius, Lithuania	Japan becomes strategic partner; focus on reconstruction of Ukraine
Tenth Anniversary	2025	Warsaw, Poland	Planned to set the direction for the next decade of integration

**Source: Made by the author from sources [4, 5].*

The inclusion of Greece in 2023 significantly expanded the geoeconomic weight of the initiative, effectively connecting the region to the Eastern Mediterranean and positioning the 3SI as a northern extension of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). This expansion reflects the initiative's growing role as a "democratic shield" at the intersection of energy security, economic growth, and military mobility.

The New Economic Architecture: Mechanisms and Pillars

The 3SI aims to create a more resilient economic architecture through three core pillars: transport, energy, and digital connectivity. These pillars are intended to foster economic convergence, reduce reliance on single energy suppliers, and enhance regional competitiveness in the global digital economy [1].

The Investment Framework and 3SIIF

A critical innovation of the 3SI is the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund (3SIIF), a commercial, market-oriented vehicle designed to leverage private capital for infrastructure development. This marks a shift away from traditional reliance on national budgets and EU cohesion funds. The 3SIIF operates as an equity fund, seeking high-quality infrastructure assets that offer attractive returns to investors [6, 7].

As of mid-2024, the 3SIIF has committed over €800 million across nine countries. Key investments include [7, 8]:

- Cargounit: The largest independent rolling stock company in Poland, crucial for rail freight market development.
- Greenergy Data Centers: The largest and most secure data facility in the region, based in Estonia, supporting the digital pillar.
- Enery: A renewable energy platform focused on solar power in the region, supporting energy diversification.

Despite these successes, the 3SIIF faces a substantial funding gap. While the target was set at €3–5 billion, it has struggled to attract large-scale private institutional capital, remaining heavily dependent on public contributions from member state development banks. The 2024 report estimates that to achieve full catch-up with Western Europe, the region requires between €600 billion and €2 trillion in infrastructure investment [4].

Transport Pillar: Via Carpatia as the Core Artery

The transport pillar is the most visible aspect of the 3SI's economic architecture, centered on the goal of creating a seamless north-south corridor. The flagship project, Via Carpatia, is designed to link the port of Klaipėda in Lithuania with the port of Thessaloniki in Greece [8, 9].

This corridor is not merely a highway; it is a catalyst for territorial cohesion. By passing through the historically less-developed eastern regions of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, Via Carpatia aims to stimulate small and medium business growth, the creation of technology parks, and research innovation. The project is part of the extended core TEN-T network, ensuring its integration into the wider European transport framework [8, 9].

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Energy Pillar: Diversification and Resilience

Energy security is perhaps the most urgent driver of the new economic architecture. The region's historical dependence on Russian gas has been identified as a strategic liability. Comparative analysis shows that in 2017, 75% of 3SI states were in the highest dependency bracket for Russian gas, compared to only 6% of Western EU states [3].

The 3SI has facilitated several "game-changer" projects to rectify this [1, 3, 6, 11]:

- The Baltic Pipe: Linking Norway, Denmark, and Poland to provide a new source of gas for Central Europe.

- The Krk LNG Terminal: A floating terminal in Croatia that allows for the import of LNG from global markets, including the United States.
- GIPL (Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania): Effectively ending the energy isolation of the Baltic states.
- BRUA Pipeline: A project to connect the gas systems of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria, facilitating regional gas trade.

Digital Pillar: Cybersecurity and Connectivity

The digital pillar focuses on enhancing the region's resilience against cyber threats and expanding broadband access. This includes projects like the Central European Drone Demonstrator (CEDD), which aims to integrate the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) environment of Poland, Moldova, and Ukraine into a new economic sector. However, analysts note that the digital pillar currently lacks the same level of investment credibility as the energy and transport sectors and requires more focus to attract sustained private interest.

Case Study: Via Carpatia – Routes, Budgets, and Strategic Length

Via Carpatia represents the backbone of the 3SI's transport architecture. Initiated in 2006 by Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Hungary, the project has since expanded to include seven countries along the main route, with others joining as partners.

Technical and Geographical breakdown

The corridor's total planned length, including branches, is approximately 8,800 kilometers, serving a population of over 125 million people. The main route follows a north-south axis through the eastern edge of the European Union (Table 2).

In Poland, the project is primarily implemented via the S19 expressway, running through the Podlaskie, Mazowieckie, Lubelskie, and Podkarpackie regions. The Polish government has earmarked over \$7 billion for its part of the route, which is seen as a vital economic engine for the country's eastern provinces. The S19 Lublin-Rzeszów section has already seen significant investment, with a total project value for certain sections exceeding PLN 1.4 billion, co-financed by the EU's Operational Program Infrastructure and Environment [13].

Financing Mechanisms for Via Carpatia

The financing of Via Carpatia is a multi-layered process involving national budgets, EU structural funds, and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). For example, the cross-border road connection between Poland and Slovakia received more than €326 million from the CEF, representing 85% of that specific project's budget. In Bulgaria, the government has provided a €6 billion guarantee to ensure the construction of the corridor connecting Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece. This massive public investment underscores

the corridor's strategic importance, although the integration of private capital through the 3SIIF remains a long-term goal for secondary infrastructure like logistics hubs and technology parks [14].

Table 2

Implementation budget of the 3SI*

Country	Segment Length (km)	Budget/Funding Details	Status (2024-2025)
Lithuania	341 km	EU funds; national budget	Kaunas-Klaipėda (245km) and Kaunas-Border (96km) sections
Poland	1,533 km (712km core S19)	€6.5 billion (Fully secured)	282.5km completed; 257.9km under construction; completion 2027
Slovakia	135 km	CEF (85% contribution for R4)	Feasibility studies for R4 expressway; some construction delays
Hungary	240 km	National and EU funds	All sections (Tornyosnémeti-Miskolc-Debrecen) completed
Romania	1,851 km	National Recovery Plan; EU funds	Largest segment; construction in progress across multiple branches
Bulgaria	662 km	€6 billion budget guarantee	Focus on Sofia-Kulata and Sofia-Svilengrad routes
Greece	452 km	National funding	Practically finished; connecting Thessaloniki to the Bulgarian border

**Source: Made by the author from sources [9, 12].*

The New European Security Architecture (EuSANU) and Military Mobility

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 fundamentally altered the 3SI's orientation, shifting the focus from purely economic development to the "New European Security Architecture". This architecture is characterized by the concept of "dual-use" infrastructure – assets that serve civilian economic needs while being optimized for military mobility [1, 4].

The EuSANU Project and Strategic Understanding

The project "Highlighting the New European Security Architecture in Teaching and Research" (EuSANU), supported by the Erasmus+ program, reflects this conceptual shift. Based at Alfred Nobel University in Ukraine, the project aims to foster strategic understanding among the political elite, academics, and public servants regarding the interdependence of economy, energy, and security in the 21st century. EuSANU emphasizes that a secure Europe requires not just military strength, but also energy diversification and resilient transport lattices that allow for the rapid movement of forces [15].

Military Mobility: Infrastructure as a Deterrent

Military mobility has become a cornerstone of the EU's and NATO's defense strategy on the Eastern Flank. The legacy of the Soviet era left the

region with a trillion-dollar infrastructure gap that restricts the Alliance's ability to move heavy equipment along a north-south axis. To address this, projects like Via Carpatia and Rail Baltica have acquired dual-use significance [6, 7, 16].

The European Commission's Military Mobility Package, presented in late 2025, aims to ensure the seamless movement of troops and equipment across the EU. This includes:

- Technical Standardization: Ensuring bridges and roads meet load capacities for modern main battle tanks (e.g., the 70-ton Abrams or Leopard).
- Bureaucratic Alignment: Reducing cross-border hurdles for military transport.
- Rail Gauge Integration: Transitioning from the Soviet 1520 mm gauge to the European 1435 mm gauge to facilitate logistics.

The 3SIIF has already invested in assets that support these goals, such as Cargounit's locomotive fleet, which is essential for transporting heavy freight and military assets. By modernizing the "cross-border lattice" of CEE, the 3SI effectively enhances NATO's deterrence posture by making the defense of the region more logistically feasible [6, 7].

Problems and Barriers to Implementation

Despite the high-level political support, the Three Seas Initiative faces several structural and political hurdles that threaten to marginalize it if not addressed.

Financial Constraints and the Funding Gap

The primary challenge remains the mobilization of long-term financing. While the 3SIIF has made progress, its current capital of approximately €1 billion is insufficient for the trillions needed for full regional convergence. Furthermore, the distribution of contributions is highly uneven. Poland has contributed roughly €750 million to the fund, while many other member states have shown "passive involvement," failing to meet the minimum €20 million entry requirement. This has led to a perception of "Polish dominance" within the format, which can create friction and reduce the buy-in from other states [4].

Institutional and Political Hurdles

The 3SI currently operates as a presidential-level discussion forum rather than a functional intergovernmental organization. It lacks a permanent secretariat, relying instead on a rotating presidency, which leads to disruptions in project management, inconsistent fundraising, and a lack of policy continuity. This structural weakness means the initiative has limited influence on the current legislation of its member states, as the prime ministers and cabinets – who lead policy execution – are not always fully integrated into the 3SI's presidential declarations [17].

Member states do not always share the same geopolitical outlook. While Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states view the 3SI as a critical tool against Russian aggression, countries like Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have shown more cautious skepticism or minimal interest. In 2025, Hungary issued statements distancing itself from the initiative’s condemnation of the war in Ukraine, highlighting deep divides in the region’s security perspective [4].

Additionally, conflicts with EU-wide policies like the European Green Deal present challenges. Financing and authorization for gas pipelines and conventional transport projects are often delayed because they do not align perfectly with new green mandates, creating a "policy trap" for CEE countries that still need traditional infrastructure to bridge the developmental gap [6].

Integration of Ukraine: Strategic Partnership and Reconstruction

The inclusion of Ukraine as an associate participating partner in 2023 was a transformative step for the 3SI. Ukraine no longer sees itself as a gateway to the East but as an "end country" for the eastern direction of European trade and connectivity. For the 3SI, Ukraine’s integration is the "flagship objective" of the coming decade [5].

Ukraine's Role in the Economic Architecture

Ukraine’s integration is focused on three main areas [11]:

1. Transport Connectivity: Extending the Via Carpatia and Rail-2-Sea corridors into Ukrainian territory. This includes the Lviv-Lublin and Kovel-Kyiv-Odesa branches, which will link Ukraine’s agricultural and industrial heartlands to the Baltic and Mediterranean ports (Table 3).
2. Energy Integration: Leveraging Ukraine’s vast underground gas storage facilities and integrating its electricity grid with the CEE network to enhance regional resilience.
3. Logistics Hubs: Positioning Poland and Romania as the primary logistics hubs for Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction.

Table 3

Integration of Ukraine in the 3SI*

Branch/Project	Route Connection	Significance
Lviv-Lublin	Ukraine-Poland border to S19	Direct link for western Ukraine to the Via Carpatia core
Kovel-Kyiv-Odesa	Northwest Ukraine to Black Sea	Strategic artery for grain exports and military logistics
Carpathian Initiative	Zakarpattia, Lviv (UA) to Slovakia & Poland	Cross-border regional development and sustainable tourism
Standard Rail Gauge	1435 mm connections	Addressing the 1520 mm bottleneck for faster EU integration

*Source: Made by the author from sources [6, 18].

Future Outlook: Three Seas 2.0 and Regional Resilience

As the Three Seas Initiative enters its tenth year in 2025, the Warsaw Summit is expected to mark the transition to "Three Seas 2.0". This evolution will likely involve the institutionalization of the initiative through a permanent secretariat and the launch of a second investment fund (3SIIF II) to address the persistent funding gaps [7].

Policy Recommendations for the Next Decade

To realize its full potential, the 3SI must address its internal contradictions and external challenges:

- **Establish a Permanent Secretariat:** To provide the administrative continuity needed for long-term projects like Via Carpatia and to better coordinate with Brussels.
- **Integrate a Governmental Pillar:** Moving beyond presidential declarations to include prime ministers and transport/energy ministers in a formal council, ensuring that 3SI goals are reflected in national budgets and laws.
- **Mobilize Regional Institutional Capital:** Engaging regional pension funds and local institutional investors to reduce dependence on external private equity.
- **Accelerate Ukraine's Membership:** Transitioning Ukraine from an associate to a full member as quickly as possible to anchor its reconstruction in the European framework.
- **Focus on Defence Innovation:** Adding a fourth pillar for defence technology, acknowledging that the region's economic prosperity is inextricably linked to its security architecture.

Conclusion

The Three Seas Initiative has successfully shifted the economic discourse in Central and Eastern Europe from one of peripherality to one of strategic connectivity. By focusing on the north-south axis, the 3SI has laid the groundwork for a new economic architecture that is more resilient, diverse, and integrated. The Via Carpatia project serves as a physical manifestation of this vision, while the integration of Ukraine offers a historical opportunity to redefine the region's eastern frontier. However, the transition from a political forum to a sustainable development engine requires overcoming significant financial and institutional barriers. If the member states can move past passive involvement and "sentimental geopolitical thinking", the Three Seas region can become a vital connector of the seas and a strategic link enhancing the stability and prosperity of the entire European continent.

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EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND INSTITUTIONS: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND THEIR ROLE IN THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Abstract

This paper examines the general characteristics of European countries and the role of institutions in the process of European integration. It argues that despite significant economic, political and historical diversity, European states are united by shared values and a well-developed institutional framework. The study highlights the evolution of integration from post-war economic cooperation to a complex system of supranational governance, focusing on key institutions such as the European Commission, European Parliament, Council of the European Union, European Council and the Court of Justice of the European Union. It concludes that these institutions are essential for ensuring coordination, legal consistency and democratic legitimacy, making them a fundamental driver of stability, cooperation and long-term development in Europe.

***Keywords:* European countries, European institutions, European Union, European Parliament, European integration.**

In the modern system of international relations, Europe represents one of the most developed examples of regional cooperation. European countries differ in size, level of economic development, historical experience and political traditions, but they are connected by common values, dense economic relations and a broad institutional framework. The current model of cooperation in Europe did not appear immediately. It was formed gradually after the Second World War, when political leaders began to search for mechanisms that could reduce the probability of new conflicts, support reconstruction and create a more stable basis for development. In this context, institutions became not only administrative structures, but also instruments that made long-term cooperation possible (European Union, 2026; European Parliament, 2026a).

The importance of the topic is explained by the fact that European integration has become one of the most influential political and economic processes in the contemporary world. For many decades, European countries have tried to combine national sovereignty with collective decision-making. This process has required the creation of institutions able to coordinate interests, adopt common rules, monitor their implementation and settle

disputes. Therefore, the study of European countries cannot be separated from the study of European institutions, because institutions give practical form to cooperation and transform general political intentions into concrete policies and legal norms (European Parliament, 2026b).

European countries form a highly diverse regional community. Western and Northern European states usually demonstrate high GDP per capita, developed welfare systems and stable democratic traditions. Many Central and Eastern European states have passed through difficult transitions from centrally planned systems to market economies and democratic governance. Southern European countries have their own specific social and economic features, including stronger dependence on services, tourism and maritime trade. Despite these differences, most European countries are united by commitment to democracy, the rule of law, protection of human rights and respect for international obligations. These values create the normative basis for cooperation and make institutional integration more realistic and sustainable (Council of Europe, 2026; European Union, 2026).

The historical development of integration in Europe confirms that economic cooperation often becomes the first step toward broader political coordination. The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 created a mechanism of joint control over strategic industries. Later, the creation of the European Economic Community expanded cooperation to trade and economic policy. Over time, integration deepened and covered many additional spheres, including monetary policy, regional development, environmental regulation, migration, justice and external relations. As integration expanded, the need for a more complex institutional structure also increased. European institutions emerged as a response to this need, because an integrated space cannot function effectively without bodies that prepare legislation, represent citizens, coordinate member states and guarantee uniform interpretation of law (European Parliament, 2026b).

Today, the European Union is the most advanced institutional model of integration in Europe. Its institutional design is unique because it combines supranational and intergovernmental elements. On the one hand, the Union has institutions that express the common European interest. On the other hand, it contains institutions in which national governments directly defend the positions of their states. This balance allows the Union to operate in a politically sensitive environment where integration must constantly be reconciled with national priorities. The institutional system of the EU is therefore not only an administrative mechanism but also a political compromise that has developed over decades of negotiation and reform (European Parliament, 2026b; European Parliament, 2026c).

A central role in this system belongs to the European Commission. The Commission is often described as the executive body of the European Union, but its role is wider than simple administration. It has a quasi-exclusive right of legislative initiative in many policy areas, which means that it prepares and submits proposals for European legislation. It also monitors the application of EU law, manages the budget and represents the Union in certain international negotiations. Because of these functions, the Commission serves as the main defender of the general interests of the Union rather than the interests of individual member states. In practice, this makes it one of the key engines of integration, since many European initiatives begin at the level of the Commission (European Parliament, 2026d).

The European Parliament performs another essential function within the institutional architecture of the Union. It represents the citizens of the member states and provides democratic legitimacy to European decision-making. Members of the European Parliament are elected directly, and the Parliament participates in the legislative process together with the Council of the European Union. In addition, it exercises control over the Commission and participates in the budgetary process. The growth of Parliament's powers over time reflects an important trend in European integration: the strengthening of democratic representation at supranational level. This development is significant because the legitimacy of European institutions depends not only on legal treaties, but also on the participation of citizens in the formation of common policy (European Parliament, 2023; European Parliament, 2026b).

The Council of the European Union represents the governments of the member states and remains one of the most influential institutions in the European decision-making process. Together with Parliament, the Council adopts legislation and the budget. It also coordinates policies of the member states in a number of fields and concludes international agreements on behalf of the Union in relevant areas. The Council illustrates the intergovernmental dimension of European integration, because its work is based on the participation of national ministers. Depending on the policy issue under discussion, different ministers meet in different configurations. This flexibility allows the Council to connect European rule-making with national executive structures and makes it a crucial arena for compromise between states (European Parliament, 2026c).

Another major institution is the European Council. It brings together the heads of state or government of the member states and defines the general political directions and priorities of the Union. Unlike the Council of the European Union, it does not normally exercise legislative functions. Its importance lies in strategic leadership. In periods of crisis, the European Council often becomes the central forum in which political solutions are

negotiated at the highest level. The development of this institution demonstrates that European integration requires not only everyday law-making, but also long-term strategic coordination. The European Council helps formulate broad directions for the Union's development and gives political impetus to further integration (European Parliament, 2026e).

The Court of Justice of the European Union guarantees the uniform interpretation and application of EU law. This role is extremely important because a legal order cannot remain coherent if common rules are interpreted differently in different member states. The Court contributes to legal certainty, protects the effectiveness of Union law and helps resolve conflicts involving institutions, member states and, in some cases, individuals and companies. In this sense, the Court is not only a judicial body but also an institution that supports integration by preserving the unity of the legal system. Without such a mechanism, the practical implementation of European rules would become fragmented and much less effective (European Parliament, 2026f).

The interaction between these institutions reflects the broader logic of European governance. The Commission initiates and supervises, Parliament represents citizens, the Council of the EU represents governments, the European Council sets strategic priorities, and the Court of Justice ensures legal consistency. None of these institutions can fully replace the others. Their distribution of powers creates a system of checks, balances and cooperation. This institutional balance is one of the defining characteristics of the European Union and explains why the EU differs from both a traditional international organization and a federal state. It is a hybrid structure in which policy-making is shared across several levels and actors (European Union, 2026; European Parliament, 2026b).

European institutions influence not only political coordination but also economic development. The creation of the single market has allowed the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, which has significantly increased economic interaction between member states. Common rules in competition policy, consumer protection, environmental standards and regional support have reduced barriers and created more predictable conditions for business activity. Institutional coordination also helps smaller states participate in a larger economic space on more stable terms. At the same time, integration has required adaptation, because common rules sometimes create pressure on national industries and social systems. This shows that institutions are not neutral structures: they shape incentives, distribute opportunities and influence the economic trajectory of the region (European Parliament, 2026; European Parliament, 2026c).

The role of institutions becomes especially visible when Europe faces major challenges. Economic crises, geopolitical instability, energy shocks,

migration pressures and climate policy demands all require coordination that goes beyond the capacity of a single state. European institutions create platforms for collective response. They organize discussion, formulate common measures and provide legal mechanisms for implementation. Although disagreements between states remain frequent, the institutional framework makes it possible to search for common positions and avoid complete fragmentation of policy. In this sense, institutions reduce transaction costs of cooperation and increase the capacity of European countries to act together in a complex international environment (European Parliament, 2026e; European Parliament, 2026d).

At the same time, the European model is not free from contradictions. Debates continue about the democratic deficit, the distribution of competences, the speed of integration and the balance between national sovereignty and supranational authority. Some political forces argue that European institutions are too strong, while others believe that they are still too weak to respond effectively to common problems. These debates show that integration is an open and evolving process rather than a finished project. Nevertheless, even criticism confirms the central importance of institutions, because most discussions concern not whether cooperation should exist at all, but how the institutional system should be improved (European Parliament, 2023; European Parliament, 2026a).

Table 1

Main institutions of the European Union and their functions*

Institution	Main function	Role in European integration
European Commission	Proposes legislation, supervises implementation of EU law and manages policies and the budget	Promotes the general interest of the Union and acts as one of the main engines of integration
European Parliament	Represents EU citizens and participates in legislation and budgetary control	Provides democratic legitimacy to supranational governance
Council of the European Union	Represents governments of member states and adopts legislation together with Parliament	Connects European rule-making with national executive interests
European Council	Defines general political directions and priorities of the Union	Provides strategic leadership and political impetus for integration
Court of Justice of the European Union	Ensures uniform interpretation and application of EU law	Maintains legal consistency within the Union

**Source: compiled by the author on the basis of official EU materials (European Parliament, 2026b; European Parliament, 2026c; European Parliament, 2026d; European Parliament, 2026e; European Parliament, 2026f).*

In general, the experience of European integration demonstrates that institutions are indispensable for transforming geographical proximity and shared values into stable cooperation. European countries have been able to build a dense network of rules, procedures and organizations that support peace, economic interaction and legal order. The institutional dimension of integration has become one of the most important reasons why Europe is often studied as a distinct model of regional development (Table 1). The success of this model does not mean the absence of problems, but it does confirm that long-term cooperation between sovereign states requires strong and adaptive institutions (European Union, 2026; European Parliament, 2026b).

Thus, European countries and institutions should be considered as interconnected elements of one broader system. Countries provide political legitimacy, social diversity and national interests, while institutions organize cooperation, create common rules and maintain continuity in policy implementation. The development of European integration has shown that institutions are not secondary to political life; they are one of its main foundations. Their continued evolution will remain a decisive factor for stability, economic development and the future direction of Europe as a regional and global actor (European Parliament, 2026c; European Parliament, 2026f).

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FINANCIALIZED SUSTAINABILITY AND GLOBAL IMBALANCE

The article is devoted to proving that sustainability is a trans-systemic cognitive concept and is integral to the universal architecture of financialization. It investigates ESG capital flows as meta-variables of macroeconomic resilience and fiscal neuro-governance and shows how the distribution of green liquidity is hurt by institutional asymmetry, therefore, destroying the coherence of the system. The use of econometric techniques across nations like Sweden, Singapore, and Vietnam shows that there is an inelastic relationship between the innovation density, the carbon-productivity and the fiscal modularity i.e. they constitute a neuroadaptive equilibration of sustenance progress. This paper promotes the concept of cognitive sustainability, in which financial, technological, and behavioral feedback loops meet and become a predictive intelligence system, thus making sustainability not just an item on the list, but a general function of the global capitalist system.

Keywords: cognitive sustainability; ESG financialization; institutional disparity; fiscal neuro-governance; entropy–stability quotient; green liquidity; innovation adaptability; macro-resilience; transnational economic data.

Sustainable development is an integrated economic mechanism operating through fiscal discipline, ESG analytics, and risk governance. The expanding climate–finance gap brings to light regulatory asymmetry, institutional design flaws, and poor distribution of eco-friendly capital. A macro-econometric model evaluates the relations of financial mechanisms, governance efficiency, and innovation density for Sweden, Singapore, and Vietnam by means of the ESG index, investment elasticity, and carbon productivity metrics. Cognitive sustainability becomes the next economic stage – data-driven governance, strategic foresight, and neuroeconomic feedback guaranteeing measurable global resilience.

The transition of sustainability into a financial science has gone hand in hand with the stabilization of the market, taxation, and the assessment of systemic risk. The struggle between nature and technology is marked by the former having fewer good areas while the latter is the one making them possible (Becker 2025). Environmental recovery worldwide is still economically insignificantly the same as before, but with increasing

ecological imbalance. Capital markets continue to experience eco-risk mispricing, and ESG integration operates in disunity through the absence of coordination among the various systems (Cesarone et al. 2023). Fiscal short termism and regulatory asymmetry are the root causes of the recurring inefficiencies that come with sustainability deficits. The evidence from the World Bank and IMF gives us a figure of just 2.8% for green assets in terms of global investment flows that are very far from the annual requirement of USD 4 trillion for transition (World Bank 2024d; IMF 2025). ESG performance remains uncorrelated with the resilience of GDP ($r = 0.21$), indicating that the operational frameworks are still very weak (UNDP 2024). Reinclination of SDG and ESG practices does not integrate real-time behavior calibration and create policy synchronization with industry innovation (WEF 2024). It is treated as compliance with formal rules, rather than being regarded as a measure of systemic stability. So, sustainability is transformed into a macroeconomic equilibrium variable by means of ESG benchmarking, econometric correlation, and cross-country clustering. The analysis employs data from the World Bank, UNDP, OECD, IMF, IPCC, and WEF to measure institutional efficiency, fiscal adaptability, and carbon productivity. It operates as a data-driven algorithm of economic intelligence, enhancing capital allocation and anticipatory governance.

The absence of structural connections among institutions, markets, and behavior keeps global unsustainability alive. The UN SDG framework establishes wide-ranging objectives, but it is still lacking in enforcement and coordination (UN 2023). Different ESG standards among OECD, IMF, and regional regulators result in inconsistent measurements and a 0.46 policy-implementation gap index (OECD 2025a; IMF 2024a). Distinct green finance taxonomies make capital flows difficult to trace, thus lowering fiscal accountability and transparency. Governance is still focused on compliance - keeping watch over formal disclosures instead of facilitating systemic transformation or measurable carbon reduction (WEF 2024). The sustainability dimension is more detailed, such that a clean showdown exists between market completion and firm competitiveness and its carbon neutrality commitments (OECD 2025b). After all, carbon tax rates and stringency will result in faster reduction of emissions but reduced market flexibility, especially in resource-rich economies, compared to a lower carbon price scenario (IMF 2024b; World Bank 2024a). Leakage cancels the effort of decarbonization, while ESG-washing privatizes sustainability as a mere image tool. Indeed, the financial liquidity available in global terms amounts to \$4 billion more per annum than investment in sustainable contexts (UNEP 2024; UNCTAD 2025). So, the imbalance persists due to institutional inertia and behavioral tendencies. In pursuit of short-term profits, businesses focus on

ESG factors with less gravity and stiff governance. Resilience measurement remains absent as a force for decision-makers, thus hampering adaptation within both business and government. Being fiscally and behaviorally unbalanced, though, the required global economy does not allow transformation but only a reaction to sustainability.

It is a far-reaching transformation towards sustainability as a path of long-term sustainability, based on an institutional structure, financial resources, and mechanisms. The SDG 2030 Agenda retains single accountability, while the Paris Agreement finances carbon commitments by correlative mechanisms (UNFCCC 2024). The EU Green Deal integrates sustainability with competitiveness. The ASEAN Circular Economy Strategy relicensed evaluation of waste reduction and ecosystem services as added worth in terms of growth (ASEAN 2024). This joint action decouples decarbonization from capital productivity and a new form of governance digitalization (OECD 2025c). Due to the level of development and innovation ability, the implementation differs. Sweden’s sustainability is driven by innovation by merging renewable infrastructure and AI-based carbon analytics (IEA 2025). Singapore’s circular economy is regulated by technology and finance aspects are accurately aligned with greenness. Vietnam adapts by utilizing the FDI spillovers and agricultural decarbonization to under resource constraints (World Bank 2024b). The integration of green capital liquidity and financial markets has redefined sustainability in the context of finance. The issuance of green bonds has surged to over USD 2.5 trillion, which are expected to act as both climate tools and reputation insurance. The introduction of carbon pricing through taxation or trading permits forces companies to recognize environmental expenses in their financial statements. AI-powered monitoring, blockchain carbon tracking, and digital ESG verification are all ramping up the accuracy of data, while clean-tech FDI is turning financial flows into institutional capacity. The data presented in Table 1 illustrate that worldwide carbon prices increased by 312 %, and the annual increase of green finance volumes was 38 %. This is empirical evidence of the financialization of sustainability as a single integrated market variable (IMF 2024; World Bank 2024c; Bloomberg 2025).

Table 1
Dynamics of Global Green Finance and Carbon Pricing, 2015-2024*

Indicator	2015	2024	CAGR (% p.a.)
Global Green Bond Volume (USD bn)	120	2.530	38.4
Average Carbon Price (USD/tCO ₂)	8	33	17.5
Renewable Energy FDI Share (%)	9	26	12.8

**Source: IMF Climate Finance Tracker (2024), World Bank Sustainable Investment Database (2024), and Bloomberg ESG Market Intelligence (2025).*

So, the economy of the nation fuses the three dimensions of technological intelligence, financial innovation, and regulatory harmonization into virtuous feedback of growth and resilience that makes compliance morph into competitive prestige.

Based on the dynamic paths of GDP, carbon emissions reductions, and ESG growth, this study examines how efficiently such national strategies could function from 2015 until 2024. That is, Sweden showed a good growth of 2.3% of GDP per year but with a significantly reduced GHG emissions by 32%; Singapore recorded 3.1% growth with around 21% reduction while Vietnam showed exactly 5.2% growth and 14% reduction (UNDP 2024a). ESG indices each improved by 11%, 8% and 6%, respectively, showing that policy coherence and renewables integration had direct strengthening effects on sustainable efficiency (IMF 2024c; World Bank 2024a).

Table 2

Macroeconomic and ESG Performance Indicators (2015-2024)*

Country	GDP CAGR %	ESG Index (2024)	GHG Reduction %	Renewables in Energy Mix %	FDI Share in Green Sector %	Policy Orientation
Sweden	2.3	82.6	-32	61	18	Innovation & technological integration
Singapore	3.1	76.4	-21	38	15	Regulatory precision & green finance
Vietnam	5.2	64.2	-14	29	11	Adaptive growth & industrial transition

**Source: World Bank (2024), OECD Green Growth Indicators (2023), UNDP SDG Database (2024), IMF Climate Finance Tracker (2024), and Bloomberg ESG Market Intelligence (2024).*

Econometric modeling established a regression relationship:

$$ESG = 0.42(GDP) - 0.37(CO_2) + 0.33(FDI) + 0.41(Renewables);$$

$$R^2 = 0.78.*$$

**Source: IMF Climate Finance Tracker (2024); Bloomberg ESG Database (2024)*

The coefficients confirm that renewable expansion and stable FDI inflows produce the highest ESG returns, while higher emission intensity weakens sustainability outcomes. Scenario modeling under $\pm 10\%$ carbon tax and $\pm 15\%$ investment shifts show that increasing carbon taxation improves ESG efficiency by 3-4 %, while reduced investment lowers it by 5-7 % (IMF

2024a). Such results underline the sensitivity of sustainable growth to fiscal consistency and capital allocation efficiency.

The governance of sustainability needs to transition from applying disconnected regulations to forming a whole system that embraces the government, the market, and the people. The coherence of policies with each other requires the coordination of fiscal frameworks, industrial strategies, and civic accountability with quantifiable metrics assigned to each of the levels involved vertically. Multi-level governance ought to interconnect the planning of the budget, investment in technology, and the participation of society asserting sustainability as a main economic variable (UNDP 2024b; WEF 2024). ESG transition is backed by behavioral economics through the use of incentives. These include, among others, tax breaks, rewards based on transparency, and feedback from algorithms that help in making decisions that are more resilient to risks. According to the empirical data from OECD (2024), the ESG frameworks that rely on incentives improve compliance efficiency by 27% and the speed of policy dissemination by 19%. The shift towards cognitive-resilient sustainability by the year 2030 requires the use of predictive analytics along with neuroeconomic modeling. Scenario-based systems that are powered by AI can predict volatility with 82% accuracy which in turn allows the capital to be allocated more efficiently (UNDP 2024b). Therefore, sustainability can be perceived as a self-regulating economic cognition model, where growth and stability are maintained through the combination of data integration and anticipatory intelligence.

To conclude, sustainability no longer exists only as a policy issue but now as a structural parameter of global economic stability. The success of sustainability relies on merging the aspects of fiscal precision, technological scalability, and behavioral adaptability into an overall governance matrix. The economies that will be able to align these three dimensions will not be growing, but rather, they will be in a state of controlled equilibrium—which is a situation where the three elements of risk, capital, and innovation are functioning together as one measurable resilient system.

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NAVIGATING DX AND AX POLICIES IN VIETNAM: EMPIRICAL LESSONS FROM INDIA

Abstract

This study examines the contrasting approaches to digital transformation (DX) and artificial intelligence transformation (AX) in Vietnam and India, offering insights into their respective strategies and outcomes. India has emerged as a global leader in digital governance through its open Digital Public Infrastructure (India Stack) and the IndiaAI Mission, which prioritize decentralized architecture, technology democratization, and international collaboration. Key initiatives such as Aadhaar, UPI, and Bhashini have driven financial inclusion, innovation, and linguistic accessibility, while fostering a robust AI ecosystem. In contrast, Vietnam has adopted a centralized governance model, focusing on modernizing public administrative services, building unified national databases, and implementing a pioneering risk-based AI legal framework – the 2026 Artificial Intelligence Law. This law emphasizes human rights and national security but imposes strict compliance requirements that may challenge domestic startups. Despite Vietnam's strengths in hardware manufacturing and export, its limited R&D investment, fragmented data infrastructure, and shortage of high-level AI talent constrain its technological advancement. By analyzing India's success, the study proposes strategic recommendations for Vietnam, including the adoption of open-source digital infrastructure, subsidization of cloud computing for AI research, flexible enforcement of the AI Law, development of a multilingual AI mission, and enhanced financial incentives for R&D. These measures aim to address structural bottlenecks, foster innovation, and enable Vietnam to achieve its ambitious goal of a 30% digital economy contribution to GDP by 2030. The findings highlight the critical role of balancing centralized governance with open innovation ecosystems to unlock the transformative potential of DX and AX, offering valuable lessons for emerging economies seeking to navigate the complexities of digital and AI-driven development.

Keywords: *Digital transformation; Artificial intelligence; Policy comparison; Open-source infrastructure; AI governance.*

1. Introduction

The global digital transformation process is entering an entirely new stage of maturity, where Artificial Intelligence is no longer an experimental technology confined to laboratories or a privilege of tech superpowers, but has become an essential infrastructure for socio-economic development and national governance. For emerging economies in Asia, digitalization and AI offer a historic opportunity to realize an economic “leapfrogging” strategy, allowing these nations to bypass the expensive developmental stages of traditional industrial infrastructure and advance directly to highly automated, data-driven economic models. Asia is currently expected to maintain its role as the primary engine of global economic growth, projected to contribute up to 49.7% of the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2026 based on purchasing power parity, with digital technology acting as the core catalyst for this breakthrough.

Within this comprehensive landscape, India and Vietnam are emerging as the two brightest spots regarding digital economic growth rates, despite significant differences in their starting points and market sizes. India, with the world's largest population and a rich history of providing global IT services, has been completely redefining the concept of global digital governance through its digital public infrastructure initiative, widely known as India Stack. Furthermore, this South Asian nation is heavily investing in the IndiaAI Mission to position itself as a leader in the global AI value chain, underpinned by a philosophy of creating open and accessible technology. Conversely, Vietnam is demonstrating unprecedented political determination through its National Digital Transformation Program up to 2025, oriented towards 2030, alongside the National Assembly's recent approval of the first Artificial Intelligence Law in Southeast Asia, officially effective from March 1, 2026. The contribution of the digital economy to Vietnam's GDP has made significant strides, reaching approximately 14.02% to 18% in the 2024-2025 period, aiming for an ambitious target of 30% by 2030.

Despite sharing the aspiration to ascend the global value chain, the policy approaches, system architecture designs, and technological risk management philosophies of the two nations reveal entirely different developmental trajectories. Consequently, structuring India's DX and AX policies from a systemic perspective, and conducting a multidimensional comparative analysis with the practical context and current barriers in Vietnam, has garnered significant interest from scholars recently.

2. Proposal Method

This study employs a qualitative research methodology based on secondary data analysis and a comparative approach between India and

Vietnam. Macroeconomic data, legal documents, and reports from international organizations (such as WIPO, UNESCO, Oxford Insights) for the 2024-2026 period were collected, analyzed, and contrasted to identify disparities in technology policies. All qualitative and quantitative analyses are grounded in three main theoretical streams within the fields of technological political economy and public administration. The integration of these theoretical lenses provides a powerful analytical tool to decode the success or failure of these strategies.

The Leapfrogging Theory in the context of digital transformation posits that developing nations or emerging economies can bypass intermediate stages of technological development to immediately adopt the most advanced technologies, thereby bridging the gap with developed countries in a short timeframe and at an optimal cost. In the current digital era, this concept is most clearly manifested through economies massively adopting mobile payments, cloud computing, and biometric identification systems on a population scale without needing to build physical bank branch networks or traditional copper-wire telecommunications. However, scholars also emphasize that the success of a leapfrogging strategy does not occur automatically but depends entirely on the complex interaction between national macroeconomic policies, synchronous infrastructure development, the technology absorption capacity of the corporate sector, and particularly the institutional context of each country. Adopting technology without adequate preparation in digital skills and legal frameworks can lead to increased digital inequality and structural unemployment (Mukhi, 2025).

The concept of Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) is an emerging theoretical framework that notably gained global attention during India's G20 Presidency in 2023. DPI is defined as a set of fundamental digital building blocks intentionally designed for the public good, operating on a societal scale, enabling high interoperability, and capable of being reused across various sectors. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), effectively adopting this infrastructure in the financial sector could boost the economic growth of Global South countries by 20% to 33% by 2030. A standard DPI architecture, termed by scholars as a “policy ecology approach”, typically comprises three essential foundational layers: remotely verifiable digital identity systems, multi-channel fast payment systems, and secure data exchange platforms based on user consent. This infrastructure functions similarly to highway systems or national power grids in the 20th century; however, instead of transporting goods or electricity, it serves to transmit “digital trust” among the economic actors of a nation (Bandura, 2024).

Regarding the AI governance framework, the global landscape is currently polarized into two main philosophical schools, reflecting the trade-off between innovation and social safety. The first model is innovation-driven governance, frequently pursued by countries like the United States and India. This model prioritizes ecosystem development, focusing state resources on supporting infrastructure (such as subsidizing computing power or opening public datasets), and only applies voluntary ethical guidelines rather than legislating rigid sanctions to avoid stifling startup creativity. The second model is risk-based governance, exemplified by the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act (EU AI Act) and, most recently, Vietnam's Artificial Intelligence Law. This approach requires categorizing algorithmic systems according to their potential societal risk levels (from low, medium, high, to unacceptable) and imposes strict legal and technical compliance obligations before a product is allowed on the market. The diffusion of this risk-control model from Europe to other nations is often referred to by researchers as the “Brussels Effect”, shaping global technology standards through normative power.

3. Data Analysis

3.1. Analysis of India's DX and AX Policies

India's digital vision over the past decade has undergone an astonishing evolution, shifting from being an IT outsourcing powerhouse to becoming an architect of the largest population-scale digital platforms on the planet (Goel et. al, 2024). The overarching philosophy of the Indian government is encapsulated in the message “Make AI in India and Make AI Work for India”, emphasizing the use of technology as a public good to narrow the development gap rather than creating monopolistic barriers. The most foundational and monumental achievement in India's digital transformation effort is the successful design and continental-scale deployment of the Digital Public Infrastructure model, widely known as India Stack. This process stems from the mindset of “goventrepreneurism”, where the state does not directly build proprietary applications for end-users but collaborates with the private sector to establish an open-source and decentralized system of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). This architecture allows any private organization to plug in and develop value-added services, thereby fostering an explosive innovation ecosystem around public services (Rahman, 2023).

The first and core foundational layer of India Stack is the identity layer, defined by the JAM trinity (Jan Dhan, Aadhaar, and Mobile). Aadhaar is the world's largest biometric identification system, providing a unique identification number to citizens based on fingerprints and iris scans. By March 2026, this system had issued over 1.44 billion identification numbers

and processed more than 27.07 billion authentication transactions in the 2024-2025 financial year alone. Aadhaar has revolutionized transaction costs in the economy, reducing electronic Know Your Customer (e-KYC) verification costs from \$10-\$20 to merely \$0.27 per transaction. When combined with the Jan Dhan Yojana financial inclusion initiative, this system brought hundreds of millions of unbanked citizens into the formal financial system, with accounts surging from 147.2 million in 2015 to 577.1 million by March 2026, mobilizing deposits up to 2.94 trillion Rupees. Telecommunications-wise, India achieved impressive coverage, with 85.5% of households owning smartphones and 5G networks reaching 99.9% of districts nationwide. The combination of these three elements created a tamper-proof identity infrastructure, saving the government's public financial management system over 4.31 trillion Rupees (2015-2024) by eliminating duplicate or non-existent welfare profiles.

The second layer in the India Stack architecture is the payment layer, led by the Unified Payments Interface (UPI). UPI is the world's largest real-time retail payment system, allowing instant money transfers between bank accounts via mobile devices. In January 2026 alone, UPI processed a massive volume of 21.7 billion transactions, totaling over 28.33 trillion Rupees. UPI's magnitude is reflected in its processing of approximately 49% of the world's total real-time payment volume. Unlike closed-loop e-wallets of private conglomerates like Alipay or PayPal, UPI is an open and decentralized network, allowing users from different applications (e.g., Google Pay, PhonePe, Paytm) to cross-transact seamlessly, thereby breaking payment monopolies.

The third layer comprises data exchange and e-commerce platforms aimed at fully digitizing economic aspects. Most notable is the Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC), launched in 2022 to democratize e-commerce. ONDC is not an app but a set of protocols allowing buyers and sellers to cross-transact across different platforms, preventing small businesses from becoming reliant on giant intermediary platforms. By December 2025, ONDC had attracted over 116,000 retailers from more than 630 cities across India. Furthermore, initiatives like the DigiLocker digital document wallet (serving 676.3 million users with over 9.5 billion documents issued) and the UMANG unified public service portal (supporting over 2,400 services with 102.5 million registered users) continue to reinforce the role of a citizen-centric digital government.

Notably, India has not kept these achievements to itself but has transformed its technological architecture model into a sharp diplomatic soft-power tool. By establishing global portals and funding the Modular Open Source Identity Platform (MOSIP), India provides developing nations with a

free, transparent, and sovereign digital identity solution. Currently, the MOSIP architecture is being tested by over 11 nations and deployed to issue digital IDs to over 90 million people in countries like the Philippines, Ethiopia, and Morocco, helping them avoid the trap of dependency on monopolistic Western tech vendors. Furthermore, India successfully linked the UPI system cross-border with 8 countries, including the UAE, Singapore, and France, facilitating remittance flows and global financial integration.

3.1.2. The IndiaAI Mission and Technology Democratization

Building upon the success of digitizing basic services, India entered the AI era by approving the IndiaAI Mission in March 2024. This mission was granted a massive budget of over 10,371.92 crore Rupees (over \$1.2 billion) for deployment over five years, aiming to build a comprehensive innovation ecosystem. The mission is methodically designed around seven strategic pillars, directly addressing bottlenecks in deep learning R&D (Maheshwari, 2023).

The most critical and highly interventionist pillar is Compute Capacity. Recognizing that startups and academia are often hindered by the expensive costs of Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) from international cloud providers, the Indian government decided to directly build a national computing infrastructure. Starting with a goal of 10,000 GPUs, the deployment exceeded expectations when India officially operationalized 38,000 GPUs by the end of 2025. The differentiator is the aggressive subsidy policy; research groups and startups can access this high-performance computing capacity for merely 65 Rupees (about \$0.78) per hour, creating an unprecedented global cost-competitive advantage.

Subsequent pillars focus on creating data platforms and developing indigenous algorithms. The Data Platform Initiative (AIKosh) was launched to collect and share high-quality datasets from both public and private sectors. By July 2025, this platform hosted over 3,000 datasets and 243 AI models across 20 fields, attracting hundreds of thousands of visits and downloads. Leveraging this data, the Foundation Models pillar provides funding for pioneering startups (such as Sarvam AI, Soket AI, Gnani AI, and Gan AI) to develop Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) infused with local cultural identity and local multilingual support, ensuring technological sovereignty.

Regarding human resource development (FutureSkills), the IndiaAI Mission grants scholarships to train 500 PhD candidates, 5,000 master's students, and 8,000 undergraduates in specialized data fields, while establishing a network of Data and AI Labs at vocational training facilities in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities to expand the technical workforce. Finally, to address algorithmic risks, the Safe & Trusted AI pillar is taking shape through the establishment of the IndiaAI Safety Institute, focusing on mitigating biases,

privacy-preserving machine learning, and algorithmic auditing, rather than imposing prohibitive legal barriers upfront.

The highest culmination of India's inclusive technology philosophy is demonstrated through the Bhashini AI project. In a nation with 22 official languages and thousands of dialects, linguistic division is the biggest barrier to digital transformation. The Bhashini platform uses Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms to provide real-time translation and voice recognition solutions. Built on crowdsourced data via the Bhasha Daan initiative, Bhashini allows citizens in remote areas to access public administrative services, healthcare policies, and online education entirely in their native tongues via smart devices. This model proves AI's immense potential in restoring information equality and preserving intangible cultural heritage, aligning with a welfare-for-all vision.

3.1.3. Evaluation of India's Macroeconomic Indicators and Internal Challenges

Intensive investment efforts have yielded highly positive macroeconomic growth indicators for India's tech economy. The country's tech sector and AI ecosystem currently employ over 6 million workers, with total industry revenue projected to surpass \$280 billion in 2025. According to research scenarios, the widespread application of AI could contribute an additional \$1.7 trillion to the Indian economy by 2035. Under the State of India's Digital Economy (SIDE) Index 2025, based on the CHIPS assessment framework, India is recognized as the 3rd largest digitized economy globally in terms of scale and breadth (behind only the US and China) thanks to its massive digital transaction volumes and world-leading ICT service exports.

However, the SIDE 2025 report also points out a paradox reflecting uneven development: despite its massive overall scale, India's ranking drops to 28th when considering the depth of penetration and usage intensity per individual (CHIPS User). The Digital Diffusion Tower analysis shows that although 99% of the population is covered by LTE networks, only 58% actually connect to the internet due to device cost and skill barriers, with smartphone ownership at 48%. Additionally, the Anthropic Economic Index analyzing global Claude.ai interactions in 2025 reveals that while India accounts for 5.8% of total global generative AI usage (ranking 2nd), it ranks 101st out of 116 when evaluated on a per capita workforce basis. This demonstrates that India's tech boom is currently concentrated primarily among urban intellectuals and tech professionals, not yet deeply permeating the entire demographic structure.

Furthermore, India's DPI model faces fierce criticism from scholars and civil society organizations regarding digital autonomy. Over-reliance on centralized biometric databases like Aadhaar raises profound concerns about

the risk of forming an “Orwellian surveillance state”. The mandatory collection of fingerprints and irises in exchange for access to social welfare services is scrutinized for its ability to protect personal data against leaks or abuse of power by regulatory agencies, turning citizens into quantifiable entities in an invisible data cage. This situation is further alarmed by India's very low maturity in cybersecurity readiness; only 7% of organizations achieved full maturity according to the latest assessments, and most businesses cope with a severe shortage of security experts. The void in cyber defense within a society wholly dependent on digital technology creates a strategic bottleneck, threatening the sustainable development of India's entire digital ecosystem.

3.2. Analysis of Vietnam's DX and AX Policies

In contrast to India's booming, decentralized scale, Vietnam is conducting its digital transformation with a heavily top-down directed approach. Vietnam's strategy places a strong emphasis on comprehensively modernizing public administrative services, building national databases as a core foundation, and establishing a preemptive legal corridor to ensure safety and national digital sovereignty amid a complex global geopolitical context (Vietnam Government, 2026).

3.2.1. National Digital Transformation Strategic Framework and Data Construction Efforts

The Vietnamese Government has identified science, technology, innovation, and digital transformation as pivotal, vital drivers to create breakthroughs in the economic growth model and avoid the middle-income trap. This strong political commitment is clearly reflected in the 2026 decision to allocate a record state budget package of up to 95 trillion VND (approximately \$3.6 billion) to directly promote spearhead technology sectors. These resources are directed to serve the National Digital Transformation Program up to 2025, oriented to 2030, with highly ambitious quantitative targets. Specifically, Vietnam aims for the digital economy to contribute at least 30% to GDP by 2030, far exceeding the 14.02% to 18% share achieved in 2024-2025. Regarding the digital society and digital government, the nation aims to provide 100% full-process online public services, ensuring at least 80% of citizens and businesses conduct administrative transactions online, and striving to enter the top 50 countries globally in e-Government.

The primary engine driving the digitalization of the government sector in Vietnam is Project 06 (Đề án 06), a landmark initiative chaired by the Ministry of Public Security to digitize and centrally manage demographic data. Project 06's architecture embodies a highly centralized governance mindset, where all citizen identification information is converged into a single

hub for easy synchronization and control. By the end of 2025, the National Population Database System successfully collected and managed over 107 million demographic records while establishing direct data transmission connections with 15 ministries and 34 localities nationwide. The project's most prominent milestone is the completion of issuing over 76 million chip-embedded citizen identification cards, alongside the deployment of the national electronic identification application VNeID, with over 67 million activated accounts. The VNeID ecosystem has become a centralized multi-utility identification platform, successfully integrating health insurance cards, driver's licenses, electronic household registration profiles, and biometric authentication solutions in the banking sector into a single digital identity, thereby significantly reducing intermediary costs and administrative processing time. The next crucial step is the launch and operation of the National Data Center in 2025. This infrastructure is expected to act as the “brain” of Vietnam's digital transformation, centrally integrating and managing 157 million records from 16 different national and specialized databases, laying a solid foundation for the future data economy.

3.2.2. The 2026 Artificial Intelligence Law

In a pioneering legislative move shaping the region, the Vietnamese National Assembly officially passed its first independent Artificial Intelligence Law, marking the nation as one of the earliest in Asia to possess a specialized legal framework for this advanced technology. Passed in December 2025 and officially effective from March 1, 2026, the AI Law replaces and consolidates previously fragmented tech-management provisions within the Digital Technology Industry Law (DTI Law), creating a synchronized, transparent, yet highly stringent legal corridor. The enactment of this law clearly reflects a technology governance philosophy echoing the EU AI Act, prioritizing human values, human rights, and national security over purely technical development.

The core of the management architecture in the 2026 AI Law is a Risk-based framework. According to Article 9, all algorithmic systems operating within Vietnamese territory will be evaluated and classified into one of three risk categories: Low, Medium, or High. Systems classified as high-risk—those capable of significantly impacting citizens' lives, health, legal rights, essential infrastructure, or national security (such as automated credit scoring systems, medical diagnostic software, or cyberspace surveillance systems) – will face exceptionally rigorous legal compliance obligations. Before commercial deployment is permitted, these systems must mandatorily register technical specifications with a national database managed by the Ministry of Science and Technology and undergo conformity assessments conducted by independent bodies. Furthermore, these systems must maintain continuous

human oversight mechanisms to ensure algorithms can be intervened with and disabled if necessary. For medium-risk systems, although pre-market assessments are not required, providers must still submit evaluation reports, undergo random inspections, and demonstrate technical safety measures upon request by authorities. Low-risk systems will not be subjected to these administrative barriers but are encouraged to adhere to voluntary ethical codes.

Another breakthrough aspect of the law is the Transparency Responsibilities regulations under Article 11, directly targeting the ramifications of the Generative AI boom. The law mandates that organizations and individuals deploying systems must implement clear notification measures so users know when they are interacting with machines rather than humans. More importantly, any audio, visual, or textual content generated or manipulated by AI, especially content simulating real human voices or faces (deepfakes) that poses a risk of factual confusion, must mandatorily be visibly tagged with digital watermarks recognizable by both humans and scanning devices. Acts of exploiting technology to falsify information, disseminate materials threatening security and order, or obstructing human oversight rights are strictly prohibited under Article 7.

The new legal system also clearly delineates legal liability along the technology supply chain. If a severe algorithmic incident causes damage to life or property, Articles 12 and 29 stipulate a clear compensation mechanism: the deployer is obligated to compensate the victim directly as soon as possible; subsequently, they have the right to claim reimbursement from the developer or provider based on the degree of fault allocated in the contract or according to investigative conclusions. Although it does not apply strict fines based on global revenue percentages like Europe, Vietnamese law maintains a strong deterrent through administrative sanctions, civil compensation, and even criminal prosecution for systemic violations.

The 2026 AI Law, combined with strong financial incentive policies from the DTI Law (such as funding 50% of new technology transfer costs for SMEs, or multi-year corporate income tax exemptions for data centers), demonstrates Vietnam's efforts in creating a healthy and safe competitive environment. However, the law's introduction also met with feedback from international trade associations. Organizations such as the Business Software Alliance (BSA) and the Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA) expressed profound concern about the feasibility of the overly rushed implementation timeline. The lack of detailed technical standards combined with too short a preparation period may cause many tech enterprises, especially foreign investors, to struggle in assessing compliance levels. Consequently, they petitioned the Vietnamese government to consider

applying an 18-month moratorium on administrative penalties, similar to the flexible deployment approach in the EU or South Korean markets.

3.2.3. Evaluation of Vietnam's Macroeconomic Indicators and Structural Bottlenecks

Despite achieving notable successes in policy planning and network infrastructure development, the endogenous capacity of Vietnam's tech ecosystem still reveals structural bottlenecks that must be overcome. Internationally, according to the 2025 Government AI Readiness Index (published by Oxford Insights), Vietnam made significant progress, rising to 5th place in the ASEAN region and firmly consolidating its governance capacity score. In WIPO's 2025 Global Innovation Index (GII), Vietnam ranked 44th out of 139 economies, while continuing to maintain its record as one of 17 countries outperforming expectations relative to their economic development level for 15 consecutive years. Vietnam's most outstanding aspect lies in its capability to manufacture and export high-tech creative goods, with export revenue from hardware and electronic equipment continuously breaking records, estimated at \$133 billion to \$178 billion in recent years, affirming its solid position as a leading global tech hardware manufacturing hub.

However, the brilliance of output indicators cannot mask severe limitations in input indicators, threatening the sustainable development of Vietnam's digital economy. The largest vulnerability lies in Research and Development (R&D) investment. According to recent aggregated data, Vietnam's total R&D spending only reached approximately 0.42% of GDP, a modest rate that not only lags behind the global average (1.25%) but is also significantly lower than India's ~0.6% or the 5.8% of leading innovative nations like Israel. Low R&D investment leads to the inevitable consequence that the majority of added value in Vietnam's current ICT industry remains dependent on software outsourcing and hardware assembly activities controlled by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) corporations, lacking core breakthroughs in mastering fundamental technologies.

Besides, the crisis of specialized human resources is a warning bell. Although the higher education system provides about 50,000 IT bachelors annually, adequately meeting the demand for basic outsourcing programming, a UNESCO assessment report indicates that elite research experts and engineers in the AI field currently account for a minuscule proportion, roughly 0.05% of the total workforce. The absence of high-intellect roles such as Large Language Model (LLM) fine-tuning engineers or deep learning algorithm optimization engineers severely stifles the new technology absorption capacity of domestic enterprises. Finally, the fragmentation of data infrastructure creates substantial technical barriers. Although the government

has strived to promote open public data with over 10 million records provided, data in most Vietnamese enterprises still exist as closed silos, lacking interoperability and standardization. The scarcity of high-quality datasets, especially specialized Vietnamese language data, makes it extremely difficult for enterprises to self-train and master distinct AI models.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1. Results

By cross-analyzing quantitative data and practical policy models, we can clearly identify the profound contrasts in both competitive advantages and the philosophy of creating digital spaces between India and Vietnam. Core macroeconomic indicators directly affecting digital transformation capacity are visually presented in the table below to illustrate the differences in endogenous capacity between the two economies.

To further specify the differences in resource scale and developmental focus, Table 1 summarizes the latest macroeconomic statistics on the digital economy, innovation capacity, and high-tech human resource structure of the two countries.

Table 1
Comparison of Macroeconomic Indicators on Digital Economy and Tech Resources between India and Vietnam

Quantitative Indicators (2025-2026 Period)	India	Vietnam
Global Innovation Index Ranking (GII 2025)	38/139	44/139
Research & Development Spending (R&D / GDP)	~0.6%	~0.42%
Annual STEM Engineering Graduates	~2,550,000 people	~50,000 people (IT sector)
Digital Transformation Investment Budget Scale	IndiaAI Mission: ~\$1.2 billion	General Budget Allocation (2026): ~\$3.6 billion
Hardware & ICT Services Export Market Share	Strong in global software services export	Achieved \$133 - \$178 billion (mainly hardware assembly)

Data from the table clearly reflect India's superior scale regarding the volume of scientific and technological human resources (over 2.5 million STEM students annually), providing an abundant supply for the global software development industry. Meanwhile, Vietnam, with a more limited population size and educational resources, excels in attracting FDI to operate tech equipment hardware manufacturing supply chains. Leaving economic scale differences aside, the three aspects below represent the starkest contrasts in the art of national policy administration.

4.1.1. System Architecture Design Philosophy

The data system architectures of the two countries reflect entirely different development and public administration philosophies. While India shaped its system according to a network model of open-source Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), allowing the private sector to freely innovate and provide applications on that platform, Vietnam leans toward building centralized interaction portals and databases under the direct and comprehensive management of state agencies.

India's India Stack model is the pinnacle of Decentralized design thinking. The Indian government absolutely refrained from undertaking the development of a single "Super App" to serve the entire population. Instead, the state apparatus is only responsible for building the underlying infrastructure and providing Open APIs. Commercial banks, investment funds, Fintech companies, and startups can build upon these open source codes to create countless different applications competing fiercely to attract users. The resounding success of the UPI system is attributed to this design, where citizens have the freedom to choose Google Pay, PhonePe, or local apps while ensuring perfect data interoperability of cash flows. Similarly, the MOSIP identity platform project proved India's technology export capability by providing the Global South with a free open-source framework, allowing these countries the freedom to customize rather than being dependent on expensive foreign licenses.

From a completely different angle, the process of building Vietnam's digital architecture, shaped through Project 06 and the VNeID super app, strictly adheres to the principle of Centralized architecture. The core objective of this system is to consolidate fragmented data from localities and sectors into a unified management hub at the National Data Center operated by the Ministry of Public Security, thereby enhancing surveillance capacity, strengthening security and order, and synchronizing public administrative governance. The most obvious advantage of this model is that the state maintains absolute quality control, avoiding data format fragmentation while directly protecting citizens' sensitive information from private enterprises illegally tracking data. However, this closed nature inadvertently creates an innovation bottleneck; the private tech ecosystem in Vietnam faces numerous technical and administrative barriers when seeking to connect to and exploit this massive public data repository to create financial services or derivative insurance, akin to how Indian enterprises leveraged the Aadhaar platform.

4.1.2. AI Governance Perspectives

The technological governance policy landscape highlights two distinct schools: India's massive resource investment to seize positional advantage,

and Vietnam's caution, placing safety first, reflecting the latency in core development capabilities between the two markets.

The IndiaAI Mission, with a massive investment of over \$1.2 billion, is a testament to India's political determination to dominate the global deep learning algorithmic supply chain. New Delhi's approach does not focus on immediately drafting prohibitive laws but channels full force into resolving the biggest bottleneck of the AI industry: cloud computing processing costs. The state's direct procurement and operation of 38,000 modern GPUs, subsequently allocated to startups and research institutes at an unimaginably subsidized price (under \$1/hour), is a classic market intervention move to stimulate research demand. Concurrently, projects like AIKosh or Bhashini are based on open principles, turning multilingual data treasures into common societal assets, helping programmers easily build algorithmic models without copyright hurdles.

Meanwhile, Vietnam's bold move to pass the AI Law earliest in the region, adopting a European-simulated risk management mechanism, indicates an extremely cautious policy orientation. The state aims to protect citizens' legal rights and privacy, and prevent the spread of deepfakes that undermine national security through strict auditing regulations and watermark requirements. This decision helps Vietnam score points on legal transparency before the international community, establishing a business environment with clear rules. However, the latent risk is that excessively high legal compliance cost barriers and complex certification processes may exceed the endurance of domestic startups that already suffer from weak cash flows, inadvertently paving the way for total dominance by multinational tech corporations – entities with surplus legal resources to meet these rigorous standards.

4.1.3. Global Competitive Position

The allocation of capacity in the digital ecosystem also creates a massive difference in the roles of the two nations on the global IT Outsourcing chessboard. Table 2 summarizes the prominent ecological characteristics affecting the FDI attraction strategies of both countries.

Market data analysis shows India continues to firmly hold the throne as the world's software factory thanks to a massive workforce equipped with fluent English skills, easily meeting the demands of maintaining massive legacy systems from the West. However, Vietnam is rapidly rising as an extremely formidable “challenger” due to its high agility, optimized Total Cost of Ownership – with an average developer salary of around \$15,800/year – and a low turnover rate (10-20% compared to India's 20-30%). Western startups and Fintech companies increasingly prefer establishing development centers in Vietnam to leverage high-quality software coding capabilities and the long-term commitment of young personnel. Nonetheless, weakness in

specialized algorithmic research capacity means Vietnam currently stops at the role of an implementer rather than a platform creator.

Table 2

Comparison of IT Outsourcing Ecosystem Characteristics

IT Outsourcing Ecosystem Characteristics (2025-2026)	India	Vietnam
Scale and Experience	Mature market, massive workforce, deep experience in Enterprise projects.	Emerging market, young, agile workforce, high growth rate, suitable for Agile teams.
Core Competitive Advantage	Scale of personnel ready to meet any large project; 24/7 continuous support capability; high English proficiency.	High employee retention rate, good technical programming quality, significantly lower developer costs, time zone advantage close to Asia and Europe.
Systemic Challenges	Unstable traffic and power grid infrastructure in many areas; shortage of cybersecurity engineers; quite high turnover rate (20-30%).	Limitations in the number of senior-level engineers; English communication skills improving but uneven; global-scale project management skills remain weak.

Additionally, while Vietnam possesses a solid fulcrum in stable telecommunications infrastructure with highly affordable internet rates and a top-25 global cybersecurity ranking, India is struggling to resolve blind spots in urban power infrastructure and severe security crisis risks. Having only 7% of organizations achieving advanced cyber defense readiness turns India into a lucrative target for cybercrime syndicates, directly threatening the safety of its massive national biometric data system.

4.2. Discussion

From practical realities – through dissecting India's policies and juxtaposing them with the economic context and existing technical barriers in Vietnam – this study proposes a system of highly actionable policy recommendations comprising five pillars to help Vietnam unlock resources and overcome developmental resistance to achieve its goal of a 30% digital economy GDP contribution.

First, create open spaces by integrating open-source philosophy into National Digital Infrastructure. The revolutionary success of the India Stack architecture and the MOSIP platform is the clearest proof that an innovation ecosystem cannot germinate on a closed platform. The Vietnamese Government, specifically the Ministry of Information and Communications and the Ministry of Public Security, needs to research, design, and provide secure Open APIs based on the National Population Database and the VNeID identification system. Instead of monopolizing authentication services, the state should allow startups, banks, and private financial institutions to connect

via encrypted portals, enabling them to develop micro-payment, credit scoring, and e-KYC services at costs approaching zero. Utilizing open-source architecture standards like MOSIP not only reduces technology licensing costs but also protects national digital data sovereignty from vendor lock-in by any monopolistic private contractor.

Second, deploy strong market intervention strategies to democratize cloud computing capacity for AI. The most fatal challenge to AI research in Vietnam is not a lack of ideas, but the massive cost barrier of GPU hardware. Inspired by India's aggressive subsidy of 38,000 GPUs for its domestic market, the Vietnamese Government needs to appropriate a portion of the 95 trillion VND national science and technology development fund (projected in 2026) to directly invest in building a "National AI Cloud" project. This supercomputer system should be managed by the Ministry of Science and Technology, acting as a public utility to provide algorithmic training capacity at deeply subsidized prices to key universities, research institutes, and quality-assessed startup projects. This is the most effective solution to pump "oxygen" directly into the tech ecosystem, lowering barriers to entry, thereby triggering a wave of developing Large Language Models (LLMs) infused with Vietnamese identity.

Third, apply the enforcement roadmap of the 2026 AI Law flexibly through a sandbox mechanism. The early enactment of the legal corridor is a standard-setting advantage, but immediately imposing strict risk-control measures could push small businesses into bankruptcy due to compliance costs. Therefore, agencies issuing decrees guiding the implementation of the law should consider establishing a moratorium lasting from 12 to 18 months from the law's effective date (March 2026). During this transitional period, heavy administrative sanctions related to watermark labeling errors or delays in conformity assessments should be relaxed or exempted, giving domestic enterprises time to self-restructure technical processes to meet standards. More importantly, the state must urgently expand Regulatory Sandboxes on a large scale, giving special priority to enterprises developing high-risk algorithmic applications in preventive healthcare and financial technology, allowing them to optimize algorithmic accuracy in real-world environments without fear of legal violations.

Fourth, initiate a Multilingual and Culturally Inclusive AI Mission. The resounding success of the Bhashini AI platform in India in eliminating language barriers for hundreds of millions of rural citizens is an invaluable lesson on how to apply technology to solve social inequality. The fragmented development and "incubator-bound" data situations in Vietnamese enterprises currently lead to a severe scarcity of high-quality datasets, especially standardized Vietnamese language data and dialects of 54 ethnic minorities.

Vietnam urgently needs to build an open national database platform, collected via paid crowdsourcing to label and digitize language systems, scripts, and traditional cultural heritage. These massive datasets will be an invaluable resource to train purely Vietnamese LLMs, not only helping authorities protect ideological security in cyberspace but also integrating into online public service platforms to provide regional voice-automated support features for highland communities, realizing the digital transformation vision of leaving no one behind.

Fifth, revamp financial incentive policies to stimulate capital flows into endogenous R&D. To escape the status of a hardware assembly outsourcing transit hub with thin profit margins, Vietnam must raise its R&D spending from the current 0.42% of GDP to approach the global average. The legal framework on tax incentives in the DTI Law needs to be concretized by progressive automatic tax credits for enterprises boldly reinvesting profits into specialized R&D centers for algorithms, semiconductor components, and cybersecurity. Furthermore, the Government needs to create pressure and incentive mechanisms for state-invested tech conglomerates like Viettel and VNPT to open co-working labs, sharing supercomputer access with academic experts and excellent IT students at universities. A prestigious national scholarship program dedicated to hundreds of AI PhD candidates, modeled after India's "500 PhD fellows", would help Vietnam urgently bridge the elite human resource gap, creating leadership nuclei for the digital industry in the coming decade.

5. Conclusion

In an era where the explosion of blockchain, big data, and particularly Artificial Intelligence is restructuring the global economic order, the ability to master these foundational technologies dictates the survival position of developing nations. Digital transformation is not merely about equipping computer tools or digitizing manual paper processes, but is fundamentally a profound revolution in social governance philosophy, resource reallocation, and the awakening of boundless human creative potential.

This comprehensive comparative study has sketched a multidimensional picture, indicating that while Vietnam has built extremely solid foundations regarding centralized administrative data governance via Project 06 and pioneered the establishment of a strict human rights protection legal framework via the 2026 AI Law, India's development model offers sharp practical philosophies to unlock the private sector's potential. The open-source protocol architecture of the India Stack ecosystem, the intensive market intervention strategy to democratize GPU server computing infrastructure for the academic community, and the finesse in applying technology to

thoroughly resolve the Bhashini project's multilingual barriers are classic paradigms of using technology as an inclusive public good.

To realize the aspiration of the digital economy contributing 30% to GDP by 2030, Vietnam must boldly step out of the comfort zone of the traditional tech outsourcing model and closed governance mindset. By weaving together existing strict legal disciplines with the open mindset of interoperable digital architectures, while simultaneously deploying decisive intervention policies to subsidize computing resources and promote endogenous R&D capital flows, Vietnam holds a historic opportunity to not only successfully complete its national digital transformation strategy but also confidently position itself as a leading independent, sovereign, and sustainably developed technological innovation hub in Asia.

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DZIEDZICTWO CYWILIZACJI ŻYDOWSKIEJ A TRANSFORMACJA SYSTEMÓW EKONOMICZNYCH

Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest analiza mechanizmów ekonomicznych wypracowanych w ramach cywilizacji żydowskiej, które – zdaniem Feliksa Konecznego – stanowiły jedno z kluczowych źródeł transformacji w kierunku nowożytnego kapitalizmu. W odróżnieniu od dominującej narracji, wiążącej narodziny kapitalizmu z etyką protestancką (Max Weber), artykuł przybliża koncepcję opartą na mobilności kapitału, własności ruchomej oraz innowacjach finansowych (kredyt, system bankowy) obecnych w społeczności żydowskiej od starożytności. Dodatkowo ukazano, w jaki sposób mesjanistyczny charakter cywilizacji żydowskiej znalazł swoje zsekularyzowane kontynuacje w ideologiach ekonomicznych XIX i XX wieku (socjalizm, marksizm), co stanowi oryginalne rozwinięcie myśli Konecznego. Wnioski wskazują na pluralistyczny charakter genezy kapitalizmu oraz na znaczenie długotrwałych mechanizmów cywilizacyjnych w procesach transformacji systemów ekonomicznych.

Słowa kluczowe: cywilizacja żydowska, Feliks Koneczny, transformacja systemów ekonomicznych, kapitalizm, własność ruchoma, kredyt, mesjanizm.

Abstract

The aim of this article is to analyze the economic mechanisms developed within Jewish civilization, which – according to Feliks Koneczny – constituted one of the key sources of transformation toward modern capitalism. In contrast to the dominant narrative linking the birth of capitalism to Protestant ethics (Max Weber), the article presents a concept based on capital mobility, movable property, and financial innovations (credit, banking system) present in Jewish communities since antiquity. Additionally, it demonstrates how the messianic character of Jewish civilization found its secularized continuations in the economic ideologies of the 19th and 20th centuries (socialism, Marxism), which represents an original development of Koneczny's thought. The conclusions indicate the pluralistic nature of the genesis of capitalism and the importance of long-term civilizational mechanisms in the processes of economic systems transformation.

Keywords: *Jewish civilization, Feliks Koneczny, transformation of economic systems, capitalism, movable property, credit, messianism.*

Współczesne debaty nad transformacją systemów ekonomicznych koncentrują się zazwyczaj na analizie instytucji, polityki gospodarczej lub przełomowych wydarzeń, takich jak rewolucja przemysłowa czy upadek gospodarki planowej. Rzadziej przedmiotem refleksji stają się długotrwałe mechanizmy cywilizacyjne, które przez stulecia kształtowały sposoby organizacji życia zbiorowego, a następnie – w zmienionych warunkach – przekształcały się w fundamenty nowożytnych systemów gospodarczych.

Jednym z badaczy, który podjął tę problematykę, był Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949). W swoich analizach cywilizacji żydowskiej nie tylko opisał jej strukturę społeczną, religijną czy prawną, lecz także zwrócił uwagę na specyficzny model ekonomiczny, który – jego zdaniem – wyprzedzał rozwiązania przyjęte w średniowiecznej i nowożytnej Europie. Model ten opierał się na przewadze własności ruchomej nad nieruchomą, na handlu jako podstawowej profesji oraz na zaawansowanych formach kredytu i bankowości [4, 5, 6].

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest rekonstrukcja ekonomicznych wątków teorii Konecznego dotyczących cywilizacji żydowskiej oraz ich interpretacja w kontekście szerszej dyskusji nad genezą kapitalizmu. Artykuł stawia tezę, że to nie tylko nowożytne procesy (jak reformacja czy rewolucja przemysłowa), ale także ukształtowany w diasporze, oparty na mobilności i kapitale pożyczkowym model ekonomiczny Żydów, stworzył alternatywny paradygmat, który stał się jednym z istotnych czynników transformacji w kierunku systemu kapitalistycznego. Dodatkowo – idąc za tropem Konecznego i innych myślicieli (Arnold Toynbee, Bertrand Russell) – artykuł wskazuje na związki między żydowskim mesjanizmem a zsekularyzowanymi ideologiami ekonomicznymi (socjalizm, marksizm), które w XIX i XX wieku stanowiły radykalną propozycję transformacji ustrojowej.

Feliks Koneczny, analizując czynniki konstytuujące cywilizację żydowską, nie ograniczał się do wymiaru religijnego czy społecznego. W jego ujęciu ekonomia stanowiła integralny element „metody ustroju życia zbiorowego”, który decydował o zdolności przetrwania tej cywilizacji przez tysiąclecia [3].

Koneczny podkreślał, że Żydzi od czasów starożytnych odeszli od modelu ekonomicznego opartego na własności ziemskiej. Zjawisko to miało dwie główne przyczyny. Po pierwsze, koczownicze pochodzenie plemion izraelskich nie sprzyjało przywiązaniu do ziemi jako trwałego dobra. Po drugie – i ważniejsze – przymusowe rozproszenie (*golus*) po upadku państwa żydowskiego spowodowało, że własność nieruchoma stała się nie tylko trudno

dostępna, ale wręcz niebezpieczna ze względu na zmienne położenie prawne Żydów w państwach chrześcijańskich i muzułmańskich [4, 5, 6].

W konsekwencji Żydzi skoncentrowali się na tym, co można było łatwo przenieść, wymienić i ulokować w różnych jurysdykcjach: na kapitale, towarach i wiedzy handlowej. Jak pisał Koneczny: „*Żydzi natomiast opierali się na własnościach ruchomych, a przemieszczali się z miejsca na miejsce, handlując*”. Ta mobilność kapitału i ludzi stanowiła istotną przewagę w świecie, w którym gospodarka feudalna była silnie osadzona w lokalnej własności ziemskiej [4, 6].

Koneczny zwracał uwagę na specyficzną strukturę zawodową społeczności żydowskiej. W starożytnym Izraelu wyodrębniły się trzy grupy: koczownicy (pasterze), rolnicy oraz lewici (kapłani). Rzemiosło było natomiast zaniedbane – Koneczny tłumaczył to ograniczeniami narzuconymi przez Filistynów, którzy uniemożliwili Izraelitom posiadanie broni, a tym samym zahamowali rozwój obróbki metali i pokrewnych profesji [4, 6].

W okresie diaspory struktura ta uległa dalszemu przekształceniu. Ponieważ dostęp do ziemi i do cechów rzemieślniczych był często ograniczony, Żydzi w naturalny sposób skierowali swoją aktywność w stronę handlu, pośrednictwa oraz usług finansowych. Koneczny podkreślał, że w państwach chrześcijańskich głównym fundamentem ekonomii była własność nieruchoma (szewc posiadający dom, w którym świadczył usługi), podczas gdy Żydzi rozwijali model oparty na wymianie i obrocie kapitałem [4, 5, 6].

Najbardziej znaczącym wkładem cywilizacji żydowskiej w transformację systemów ekonomicznych było – zdaniem Konecznego – wprowadzenie zinstytucjonalizowanego systemu kredytowego. Jak pisał: „Izraelici też jako pierwsi wprowadzili system bankowy, udzielając kredytów na procent (lichwa)” [4, 6].

Należy podkreślić, że w obrębie samej społeczności żydowskiej obowiązywały istotne ograniczenia. Tora zabraniała pobierania procentu od pożyczek udzielanych współwyznawcom. Oznaczało to, że kapitał pożyczkowy był kierowany przede wszystkim na zewnątrz – do gospodarki chrześcijańskiej, muzułmańskiej, a później nowożytnej. Powstał w ten sposób mechanizm, w którym jedna grupa społeczna pełniła funkcję dostarczyciela płynności finansowej dla otaczającej ją gospodarki, jednocześnie pozostając poza systemem feudalnych zależności [2, 7].

Koneczny nie wahał się przed postawieniem tezy, że „*system kapitalistyczny, istniejący w Europie już wiele lat, został wprowadzony przez Żydów*”. Teza ta – choć kontrowersyjna – znajdowała potwierdzenie w badaniach innych wybitnych uczonych, takich jak Max Weber, który w *Etyce protestanckiej a duchu kapitalizmu* również dostrzegał rolę żydowskiej tradycji gospodarczej.

Porównanie koncepcji Konecznego z tezą Maxa Webera jest kluczowe dla umiejscowienia analizy w głównym nurcie debaty nad transformacją systemów ekonomicznych. Weber dowodził, że duch kapitalizmu – racjonalne dążenie do zysku, ascetyzm, traktowanie pracy jako powołania – wywodzi się z etyki protestanckiej, a szczególnie z kalwinizmu.

Koneczny proponował inną ścieżkę interpretacyjną. W jego ujęciu to cywilizacja żydowska wypracowała mechanizmy ekonomiczne, które były nie tylko wcześniejsze, ale pod pewnymi względami bardziej nowoczesne niż średniowieczny etos chrześcijański. Należały do nich:

- Racjonalność prawna – prawo talmudyczne szczegółowo regulowało kwestie własności, umów, długu i dziedziczenia, tworząc stabilne ramy dla działalności gospodarczej;
- Mobilność kapitału – w przeciwieństwie do kapitału zamrożonego w ziemi, kapitał żydowski mógł być szybko przemieszczany, co odpowiadało potrzebom rozwijającej się wymiany międzynarodowej;
- Sieciowość – rozproszenie geograficzne stworzyło sieci kontaktów handlowych i finansowych obejmujące całą Europę, Bliski Wschód i Afrykę Północną.

Weber zdawał sobie sprawę z tej alternatywnej ścieżki. W swoich badaniach nad judaizmem starożytnym wskazywał na specyfikę żydowskiej racjonalności gospodarczej, choć ostatecznie to protestantyzm uznał za kluczowy czynnik kształtujący nowożytny kapitalizm. Koneczny – pisząc w tym samym czasie – odwrócił tę perspektywę, akcentując trwałość i zdolność adaptacji ekonomicznych wzorców żydowskich przez stulecia.

Istotne jest, że transformacja systemów ekonomicznych nie musi mieć jednego źródła. Koncepcja Konecznego sugeruje pluralizm dróg prowadzących do kapitalizmu, a cywilizacja żydowska jawi się w tym ujęciu jako laboratorium rozwiązań, które w pełni ujawniły swój potencjał dopiero w nowożytnej Europie.

Najbardziej oryginalnym – i często pomijanym – elementem analizy Konecznego jest próba powiązania ekonomicznych zachowań Żydów z ich mesjanistycznym światopoglądem. Autor *Cywilizacji żydowskiej* nie ograniczał się do opisu handlu czy kredytu; poszukiwał głębszych struktur świadomościowych, które decydowały o zdolności tej cywilizacji do kreowania nowych form organizacji życia zbiorowego, także w sferze ekonomii [3].

Koneczny pisał: „*Nie rozumiemy Żydów, póki nie zapoznamy się z ich marzeniami syjonistyczno-mesjanicznymi*”. Mesjanizm – wiara w wybranie, w ostateczne wypełnienie dziejów, w powinność przekształcania rzeczywistości doczesnej zgodnie z boskim planem – miał jego zdaniem

przekładać się na szczególne nastawienie do przyszłości, a tym samym do aktywności ekonomicznej [4, 6].

Wątek ten Koneczny rozwinął, wskazując na związki między żydowskim mesjanizmem a nowożytnymi ideologiami lewicowymi. Jak zauważał: „*socjalizm jest w ich oczach nowoczesną ewolucją Starego Testamentu*”. Powoływał się przy tym na Hansa Kohna, który w *Die politische Idee des Judentums* dowodził, że socjalizm stanowi środek do realizacji mesjanistycznych celów.

Jeszcze dalej poszli inni myśliciele XX wieku. Arnold Toynbee w swojej analizie marksizmu dostrzegał strukturę zapożyczoną z judaizmu:

- Jahwe → materializm dialektyczny,
- lud wybrany → proletariat,
- królestwo mesjańskie → dyktatura proletariatu,
- Kościół → partia komunistyczna.

Podobnie Bertrand Russell w interpretacji Marksa posługiwał się kluczem teologicznym: mesjasz to Marks, ponowne przyjście to rewolucja, piekło to kara dla kapitalistów, a tysiącletnie królestwo Boże to światowa wspólnota komunistyczna.

Koneczny, cytując tych autorów, nie utożsamiał się bezkrytycznie z ich stanowiskami, ale traktował je jako potwierdzenie własnej tezy: cywilizacja żydowska nie tylko wypracowała oryginalny model ekonomiczny, ale także dostarczyła strukturę pojęciowej dla najradzykalniejszych projektów transformacji ustrojowej XIX i XX wieku. Socjalizm i marksizm można w tej perspektywie rozumieć jako zsekularyzowane formy żydowskiego mesjanizmu – co stanowi istotne uzupełnienie analizy genezy kapitalizmu.

Przeprowadzona analiza ekonomicznych wątków cywilizacji żydowskiej w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego pozwala na sformułowanie kilku wniosków istotnych dla dyskusji nad transformacją systemów ekonomicznych.

1. Cywilizacja żydowska wypracowała alternatywny model ekonomiczny, oparty na własności ruchomej, handlu i kapitale pożyczkowym. Model ten, ukształtowany w warunkach diaspory i mobilności, okazał się wysoce adaptacyjny i – zdaniem Konecznego – stanowił jedno z historycznych źródeł nowożytnego kapitalizmu.

2. Geneza kapitalizmu ma charakter pluralistyczny. Obok dominującej narracji protestanckiej (Weber) należy uwzględnić wkład cywilizacji żydowskiej, która wprowadziła rozwiązania instytucjonalne (kredyt, sieci handlowe, racjonalność prawną) na długo przed reformacją.

3. Ekonomiczne zachowania nie dają się w pełni wyjaśnić bez uwzględnienia warstwy symboliczno-światopoglądowej. Koneczny, wskazując na związek żydowskiego mesjanizmu z socjalizmem i

marksizmem, otwiera pole do analizy, w której transformacja systemów ekonomicznych jest rozumiana nie tylko jako proces instytucjonalny, ale także jako kontynuacja głębokich struktur wyobraźni zbiorowej.

4. Współczesne systemy ekonomiczne, zdominowane przez kapitał mobilny, globalne sieci finansowe i gospodarkę opartą na wymianie, w większym stopniu niż często sądzimy kontynuują mechanizmy opisane przez Konecznego. Postawiona przez niego teza o cywilizacyjnych źródłach kapitalizmu zachowuje zatem aktualność i może stanowić punkt wyjścia do dalszych badań nad długim trwaniem (*longue durée*) w ekonomii.

Podsumowując, artykuł stanowi próbę recepcji i reinterpretacji koncepcji Feliksa Konecznego na użytek współczesnej debaty nad transformacją systemów ekonomicznych. Choć prace Konecznego pozostawały długo na marginesie głównego nurtu nauk społecznych, zawarte w nich intuicje dotyczące związku między cywilizacją, ekonomią i światopoglądem zasługują na ponowne odczytanie – także w kontekście wyzwań, przed którymi stoi współczesna gospodarka globalna.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED BUSINESSES EXPORTS IN UKRAINE'S ECONOMIC GROWTH

Abstract

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the fundamental role that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play in driving Ukraine's economic recovery and sustainable growth through active participation in international trade. Amidst the unprecedented challenges caused by the ongoing war, the disruption of traditional supply chains, and the shifting geopolitical landscape, SMEs have demonstrated remarkable adaptability. However, their export potential remains significantly underutilized compared to their European counterparts. This research focuses on analysing the current dynamics of SME exports in Ukraine, highlighting both the systemic barriers they face and their structural importance to the national economy. A central element of this study is the critical evaluation of trade policy instruments and state support mechanisms required to promote the interests of Ukrainian SMEs in global markets. Ultimately, the research argues that enhancing trade policy tools and integrating EU-aligned support mechanisms will not only stimulate SME export capacities but also ensure broader economic resilience, prevent deep economic crises, and foster Ukraine's deeper integration into global supply chains.

***Keywords:* small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), export dynamics, economic growth, trade policy instruments, European integration, economic recovery, Ukraine.**

Introduction

Historically, Ukraine's economy relied heavily on large industrial enterprises, which generated the majority of the country's export revenue. This focus often overshadowed the economic potential of smaller businesses. Today, however, amid severe economic shocks, geopolitical instability, and the goal of full integration into the European Union (EU), small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have become essential drivers of economic resilience, job creation, and structural reform. Their flexibility and capacity for innovation make them vital to a modern, balanced market economy [1].

Expanding into international markets through exports is a proven catalyst for national productivity and long-term economic growth. Exporting allows SMEs to achieve economies of scale, acquire new technologies, and protect their revenues against domestic economic downturns. For Ukraine,

building a strong SME export sector is not just a way to earn foreign currency; it is a strategic necessity for post-war reconstruction. Yet, while SMEs represent the vast majority of registered Ukrainian businesses and employ most of the active workforce, their share of total national exports is significantly lower than that of SMEs in advanced European economies.

This gap points to a major structural problem: Ukrainian SMEs face severe barriers to entering foreign markets. These obstacles include high logistical costs, limited access to trade financing, and a lack of knowledge regarding complex foreign regulations and quality standards. Traditional trade policies have largely failed to address these specific vulnerabilities, relying instead on macro-level frameworks that implicitly favour large corporate exporters equipped with the legal and financial resources to handle cross-border friction [1].

Therefore, Ukraine urgently needs to re-evaluate and optimize its trade policies to actively support SMEs. As the country aligns its legal and economic frameworks with the EU, adopting successful European export tools such as strong export credit agencies, comprehensive informational networks, and digitalized customs procedures is critical. Providing SMEs with this targeted state support will not only integrate Ukrainian businesses more deeply into global supply chains but also strengthen the very foundation of the nation's economic recovery.

The purpose of the research is to systematically analyse the strategic importance of small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) exports in driving Ukraine's economic growth, particularly under the current conditions of economic recovery. Furthermore, the study aims to evaluate the role of existing trade policy instruments in supporting SMEs and to identify highly effective export promotion strategies from the European Union that can be adapted and implemented to enhance the international competitiveness of Ukrainian businesses.

Results

The empirical analysis of the current macroeconomic environment reveals a critical paradox regarding the role of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) in Ukraine. On one hand, SMEs form the absolute foundation of the national economy, constituting 99.98% of all business entities, providing approximately 74% of all jobs, and generating 64% of the country's value added. Despite the unprecedented shock of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 which forced 64% of SMEs to temporarily suspend or scale down their operations the sector has demonstrated remarkable resilience. Data indicates that nearly 91% of enterprises have since resumed their activities, and by late 2023, only 9.6% of suspended companies remained

at a high risk of complete closure. Furthermore, the total number of registered individual entrepreneurs grew by 10% between October 2022 and October 2023, surpassing pre-war levels and highlighting a significant adaptive capacity driven by forced self-employment and simplified tax regimes [2].

However, when evaluating export dynamics, the statistics expose severe structural weaknesses that impede SME internationalization. Despite their domestic dominance, Ukrainian SMEs exhibit the lowest share of exports in total national export volumes compared to peer economies in Central and Eastern Europe. Currently, a staggering 57.2% of SMEs operate exclusively within the domestic market, and only 17.9% of small and medium-sized businesses are actively engaged in exporting. Moreover, the goods and services typically exported by these enterprises are often characterized by low profit margins. The disruption of global logistics and traditional trade routes has further exacerbated this isolation; currently, only 26.2% of Ukrainian companies participate in the supply chains of international corporations, representing a decline from the pre-invasion level of 28.9% [3].

A detailed examination of the barriers preventing SMEs from penetrating foreign markets highlights a combination of informational, financial, and logistical deficits. According to recent enterprise surveys, the primary obstacles hindering export expansion include a critical lack of access to European clients and partners (cited by 35.6% of businesses), severe limitations in financial resources (34.5%), and a shortage of qualified specialists capable of managing international trade operations (21.8%). Corroborating these findings, regular business sentiment surveys conducted by the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting (IER) reveal that alongside physical security risks, complex customs procedures and unpredictable regulatory environments remain top constraints for business recovery, pushing the necessity of export facilitation to the forefront of strategic survival [4].

The sheer financial toll of the ongoing war has severely depleted the working capital necessary for cross-border expansion. The average financial loss among affected companies is estimated at \$227,000, leaving limited capital for the substantial investments required to meet European quality standards and establish international marketing channels. Furthermore, Ukrainian SMEs currently invest three times less in research and development (R&D) compared to their European counterparts, heavily restricting their technological competitiveness abroad [3].

These statistical realities underscore the urgent need for structural intervention. While 43% of companies report either current involvement in international markets or a strategic intent to enter them, a significant segment remains hesitant due to high cross-border trade friction. Approximately 8% of

domestic-oriented SMEs expressed a direct interest in initiating foreign economic activity in 2024, yet they remain constrained by systemic barriers, including a lack of know-how regarding export administration and intercultural business differences [3]. Consequently, the data clearly illustrates that without targeted trade policy instruments and dedicated financial and institutional support, the immense export potential of Ukrainian SMEs will remain largely unrealized, depriving the national economy of a critical engine for post-war recovery and growth.

The macroeconomic impact of SME exports extends beyond financial gains, serving as a vital catalyst for national stability and societal resilience. By participating in international trade, these enterprises generate indispensable foreign exchange earnings that stabilize the national currency and mitigate trade deficits in a war-torn economy. The outward orientation of SMEs inherently stimulates domestic innovation; to compete in demanding markets like the EU, businesses must upgrade technological processes, enhance product quality, and adopt modern ESG practices, creating a positive spillover effect that raises standards across the national economy. Furthermore, export-oriented SMEs function as significant engines of job creation and foster a robust middle class, reducing the country's historical vulnerability to oligarchic monopolies and laying a democratic foundation for long-term recovery [5].

In the context of internationalization, trade policy instruments comprise government interventions and financial mechanisms designed to protect and stimulate export activities. Because SMEs operate with smaller financial buffers, they face disproportionately high barriers to entry, necessitating targeted tools to level the global playing field. These instruments are categorized into financial measures such as export credit guarantees, specialized war-risk insurance, and preferential lending and non-financial measures, including digital matchmaking platforms, economic diplomacy, and simplified customs administration. The strategic deployment of these tools aims to reduce the risk of entering foreign markets and empower SMEs to integrate into high-value global supply chains.

Currently, Ukraine's state-supported mechanisms, though present, remain insufficient to overcome high trade barriers. At the national level, the Export Credit Agency (ECA) provides vital insurance and factoring, supporting approximately UAH 3.1 billion in exports in 2023 [6]. Additionally, the "Nazovni" platform assists thousands of SMEs in finding foreign partners through diplomatic channels, while the "eRobota" program provides seed capital for processing modernization [7]. These efforts are supplemented by international donors, such as the USAID Competitive Economy Program and the EBRD, which finance national pavilions at trade

fairs like Anuga and Web Summit and provide vouchers for international certification [8].

Despite these initiatives, a critical evaluation reveals a fragmented landscape where support functions more as an emergency life-support system than a growth engine. The Ukrainian ECA's authorized capital remains small relative to demand, and comprehensive war-risk insurance for production and logistics remains largely inaccessible to average small businesses. Furthermore, platforms like "Nazovni" do not address the acute lack of affordable working capital; Ukrainian SMEs face domestic lending rates significantly higher than European competitors, placing them at a pricing disadvantage. Since international grant programs are intensely competitive and limited by donor budgets, they cannot serve as a systemic, nationwide solution.

To achieve a structural breakthrough, Ukraine must adapt the holistic trade policy instruments utilized by the European Union. A cornerstone of the EU's non-financial support is the Enterprise Europe Network (EEN), which provides localized advisory services and matchmaking through regional hubs. Ukraine should establish similar state-subsidized regional export hubs to guide SMEs through the entire internationalization cycle. Financially, Ukraine must mirror European Export Credit Agencies like Bpifrance or Germany's Euler Hermes, which offer subsidized insurance covering up to 95% of commercial and political risks. The Ukrainian ECA must be significantly capitalized to provide affordable war-risk insurance, as without such a mechanism, perceived risks will continue to deter buyers. Finally, Ukraine's grant programs should adopt the EU's "innovation voucher" model from programs like the Single Market Programme, specifically reimbursing the costs of CE marking, ISO certification, and green transitions [9]. Implementing these robust, heavily funded tools will allow Ukrainian SMEs to transition from low-margin goods to delivering competitive, value-added products to the global market.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the strategic expansion of small and medium-sized enterprise exports is fundamentally critical to Ukraine's macroeconomic stability, post-war reconstruction, and successful integration into the European Union. While historically overshadowed by the dominance of heavy industry, SMEs have demonstrated exceptional resilience and adaptability under unprecedented wartime conditions. However, their disproportionately low participation in international trade compared to European peers underscores the presence of severe structural, financial, and institutional barriers. The findings of this research indicate that traditional macroeconomic trade

frameworks and the current emergency-focused support mechanisms, while crucial for immediate survival, are insufficient to drive systemic, nationwide export growth. Presently, these tools function as fragmented, donor-dependent lifelines rather than a cohesive, sustainable economic engine.

To unlock the full potential of Ukrainian SMEs, a paradigm shift in state trade policy is imperative. Ukraine must aggressively adopt and adapt the highly effective, holistic support ecosystems proven within the European Union. This structural transition requires moving beyond localized informational platforms to the establishment of deeply integrated, state-subsidized regional export hubs directly modelled on the Enterprise Europe Network [9]. By providing tailored, end-to-end internationalization support, these hubs can effectively dismantle the informational asymmetries that currently isolate smaller businesses. Furthermore, the financial architecture of export promotion must be radically overhauled. The national Export Credit Agency requires significant capitalization to provide affordable, comprehensive war-risk insurance and working capital guarantees, mirroring the robust interventions of leading European institutions. Without such institutionalized risk mitigation, Ukrainian SMEs will remain at a severe pricing and competitive disadvantage in foreign markets.

Additionally, domestic grant programs must be systematically reoriented toward facilitating "export readiness." By adopting the European model of innovation vouchers, the state can directly subsidize the prohibitive costs of international certification, technological modernization, and compliance with stringent European environmental and quality standards. Ultimately, elevating the export capacity of SMEs is not merely a technical policy adjustment; it is a profound structural transformation. By decentralizing economic power, fostering a resilient, independent middle class, and integrating domestic producers into high-value global supply chains, the targeted promotion of SME exports will secure Ukraine's long-term economic independence and solidify its future within the European single market.

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EXPECTATIONS UNDER SCARCITY IN WARTIME ECONOMIES: REFLEXIVE ENERGY RATIONING AND WELFARE LOSSES

Abstract

Since 2022, repeated disruptions to energy infrastructure in Ukraine have turned energy scarcity from a temporary imbalance into a persistent institutional condition affecting households and firms alike. Under wartime uncertainty and systemic stress, scarcity governance functions not only as a technical balancing mechanism but also as an allocation regime that redistributes risks, access, and coping costs across the economy.

Energy scarcity regimes, including rationing schedules, consumption limits, emergency curtailment, and price volatility, often produce responses that differ from standard economic expectations. Even when constraints are anticipated, aggregate demand does not reliably smooth. Anticipation of restrictions may instead encourage front-loading of consumption, precautionary purchases, hoarding, and substitution into less efficient or more costly alternatives, especially when the duration or enforcement of scarcity measures remains uncertain.

Conventional approaches that assume well-calibrated expectations and stable compliance therefore risk misinterpreting both behavioral responses and welfare outcomes. The paper develops an economy-focused interpretation in which imperfect beliefs and expectation-driven feedback loops shape realized scarcity, institutional reactions, and the distribution of welfare losses. It outlines a socio-economic research agenda for measuring anticipation behavior, assessing institutional credibility and procedural fairness, and estimating welfare incidence under scarcity while accounting for circularity and cross-sector spillovers. These dynamics are evident in wartime economic conditions, where institutional design and credibility directly influence both system stability and the distribution of welfare losses.

Keywords: *Energy economy; wartime economy; reflexivity; welfare incidence; energy poverty; circular economy.*

Introduction

Energy scarcity is often viewed as an operational imbalance that can be addressed through scheduling, limits, curtailment, or tariff adjustments. Economically, however, scarcity governance is an allocation rule that redistributes access, risk, and coping costs across households and firms. Welfare losses are heterogeneous because coping capacity, which includes

liquidity, storage, technology, housing quality, and time flexibility, is unevenly distributed. This heterogeneity can make scarcity's incidence potentially regressive and deepen the deprivation dynamics associated with energy poverty [2].

Since 2022, Ukraine has experienced repeated large-scale energy infrastructure disruptions caused by Russian military aggression. These disruptions transformed energy scarcity from a temporary market imbalance into a persistent institutional condition affecting households, firms, and public services. Scarcity governance now operates under wartime uncertainty, infrastructure vulnerability, and shifting expectations regarding reliability and duration of supply constraints. Under such conditions, anticipation behavior, credibility of allocation rules, and procedural fairness become central determinants of welfare outcomes and system stability.

A key empirical complication is behavioral: scarcity signals do not consistently smooth demand as intended. Anticipation of restrictions can lead to pre-restriction front-loading, while uncertainty about duration, exemptions, or enforcement can promote hoarding and accelerated substitution into costly, risky, or inefficient alternatives. These responses can amplify system stress and raise the probability or severity of realized scarcity, creating feedback loops that standard rational-expectations-style reasoning is poorly equipped to capture.

Our goal is to advance a reflexive explanation that draws on fallibility and reflexivity: agents form imperfect beliefs under uncertainty, and these beliefs become causal inputs that shape their behavior; realized outcomes and institutional reactions then feed back into expectations and compliance. In addition, circularity strategies aimed at reducing leakage and increasing efficiency can lower aggregate scarcity costs. Still, they may yield unequal gains if access depends on private capital, thereby affecting the welfare incidence [3]. Finally, cross-sector linkages emphasized by the energy-water-food nexus imply that scarcity impacts propagate beyond energy budgets, shaping food costs, water service reliability, mobility, and time use [1, 5].

The contribution is to synthesize these strands into a testable economic framing of scarcity governance: (i) expectation-driven behavioral dynamics, (ii) endogenous credibility and procedural fairness as moderators of compliance, and (iii) welfare incidence as the central evaluative lens.

Methods

The proposed empirical strategy is socio-economic and avoids reliance on technical field experimentation. The objective is to identify reflexive dynamics - where expectations change behavior, behavior affects realized scarcity, and institutions respond - using quasi-experimental variation, distributional analysis, and institutional mapping.

Scarcity announcements and schedule updates are treated as economically meaningful events because they shift expectations and can induce anticipation behavior. The empirical focus is the “anticipation window” between the announcement and the realization of the constraint. Outcomes include household energy expenditures, purchases of substitutes and coping goods, arrears and disconnections, and deprivation indicators. The logic is reflexive: announcements can alter aggregate behavior, which may in turn affect realized scarcity and subsequent rule adjustments [8, 9].

Spatial and temporal variation in scarcity frequency and duration can be combined with proxies for institutional credibility (schedule accuracy, exemption transparency, compensation timeliness). In addition, institutional credibility can be operationalized through the transparency and verifiability of accounting records that underpin scarcity governance (metering, allocation rules, exemptions, and compensation). Distributed ledger technologies (DLT) provide tamper-evident audit trails for control and accounting-analytical support, potentially reducing information asymmetries and disputes over “what was allocated, to whom, and why” [11]. In empirical designs, DLT adoption (or partial deployment in accounting processes) can therefore be treated as a moderator of perceived credibility and procedural fairness when estimating behavioral responses and welfare incidence. Comparing trends pre- and post-regime changes across high- and low-exposure units allows estimation of how credibility and procedural fairness shift behavioral responses and welfare incidence, consistent with the view that compliance elasticity is endogenous. Household budget surveys and administrative records (arrears, disconnections where available) can be used to estimate distributional impacts: energy and substitute expenditure shares, coping costs, probability of energy poverty, and related deprivation measures. Classic fuel poverty work supports the use of deprivation-based incidence as a welfare-relevant metric beyond consumption averages [2]. Heterogeneity by income decile, household composition, dwelling quality, and location is central because scarcity effects are expected to be non-linear.

Reflexive dynamics depend on the interpretation of rules. Institutional mapping - how rules are communicated, how exemptions are granted, how grievances are processed - supports measurement of procedural fairness and legitimacy. Collective-action theory motivates this step: where users perceive capture, opacity, or free-riding, self-protective strategies can dominate, raising total welfare losses [7].

The nexus literature motivates measuring broader outcomes (food and water expenditures, transport/logistics costs, time-use burdens) because scarcity-induced substitution and supply-chain effects can shift welfare impacts across domains [1,5].

Results

The following hypotheses translate fallibility and reflexivity into testable economic statements.

H1: Anticipation and front-loading under imperfect beliefs. Announcements of impending scarcity constraints increase energy-related consumption and/or coping expenditures during the anticipation window relative to comparable non-announcement periods, controlling for seasonality and local conditions. Fallibility implies agents cannot precisely forecast realized scarcity or enforcement and therefore protect themselves by pulling forward high-value uses [8].

H2: Hoarding and regressive incidence via liquidity and storage gradients. Scarcity signals increase stockpiling and precautionary purchases disproportionately among higher-liquidity actors. At the same time, lower-liquidity households experience higher deprivation risk and higher effective prices (buying later), contributing to regressive welfare incidence consistent with energy poverty dynamics [2].

H3: Procedural fairness and credibility moderate compliance elasticity. For a given level of scarcity intensity, anticipation and hoarding effects are larger when perceived procedural fairness and institutional credibility are lower (opaque exemptions, inconsistent schedules, unreliable compensation). Where rules are predictable and contestable, cooperative adjustment is more potent and destabilizing behaviors are weaker, consistent with institutional accounts of collective action [7, 10] and with reflexivity mechanisms in which institutional performance reshapes expectations [9].

H4: Circularity reduces aggregate scarcity costs but may widen distributional gaps. Efficiency and loss-reduction measures associated with circularity reduce total scarcity costs. Still, if adoption depends on private capital (equipment, retrofits, storage), resilience gains may accrue disproportionately to better-off groups, potentially widening welfare gaps unless access is institutionally broadened [3, 4].

H5: Cross-sector spillovers expand welfare losses beyond the energy budget.

Scarcity shocks propagate through substitution and cross-sector linkages, affecting food prices, water services, and mobility/logistics costs. This implies that analyses limited to energy expenditure understate total welfare losses, particularly for vulnerable households [1, 5].

Discussion

The reflexive framing yields several implications for economic evaluation and scarcity governance.

The informational interventions may fail or backfire if they raise salience of scarcity while leaving ambiguity about duration, enforcement, exemptions,

or compensation. Under fallibility, agents treat uncertainty as risk to be hedged, making front-loading and hoarding privately rational even if socially destabilizing [8]. Reflexivity then converts these micro-responses into macro-instability by worsening realized scarcity, which can prompt stricter rules and further shifts in expectations [9].

Welfare incidence is the appropriate metric for policy performance. Average demand reduction or aggregate balance indicators do not capture the distribution of coping costs, deprivation risk, arrears accumulation, and time burdens. Fuel poverty research underscores that deprivation and affordability constraints are central welfare outcomes, not peripheral social considerations [2].

The institutional credibility and procedural fairness are economically causal, not merely ethically desirable. They shape compliance elasticity, willingness to coordinate, and the perceived legitimacy of burden-sharing. Institutional accounts of collective action imply that opaque or selectively enforced regimes can trigger self-protective behavior, eroding cooperation and increasing system-wide losses [7]. Energy justice research reinforces that procedural and recognition dimensions interact with distributional outcomes; in economic terms, they alter behavioral responses and thus the realized incidence of scarcity [4, 10].

Finally, circularity should be treated as a distribution-sensitive resilience strategy rather than an automatically benign efficiency upgrade. Loss reduction and efficiency can reduce aggregate scarcity costs, but without targeted access, such measures can increase inequality in resilience and shift welfare losses toward those least able to invest [3]. Similarly, nexus spillovers imply that compensatory policies and institutional reforms should be assessed across linked welfare channels, not only energy bills [1, 5].

Conclusion

Energy scarcity regimes are expectation-sensitive and institution-dependent. An economy-focused reflexive approach explains why anticipation, hoarding, and substitution can persist even under awareness of constraints, and why policy signals may amplify instability and welfare losses. The proposed research agenda uses quasi-experimental designs, welfare-incidence estimation, and institutional mapping to measure these mechanisms, identify credibility and procedural fairness as key moderators, and evaluate distributional outcomes while accounting for circularity and cross-sector spillovers. The central claim is pragmatic: scarcity governance that ignores reflexive dynamics risks systematic policy underperformance and regressive welfare impacts; governance that incorporates credibility, fairness, and distribution-sensitive resilience measures can reduce total costs while protecting vulnerable groups.

In wartime economies such as Ukraine, scarcity governance becomes a central mechanism of socio-economic stability. Understanding expectation-driven behavioral responses and institutional credibility is, therefore, essential not only for welfare protection but also for maintaining systemic resilience amid prolonged geopolitical conflict.

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HARRASING A DIGITAL SOCIETY TO SERVE VIETNAM'S DIGITAL ECONOMY IN THE NEW ERA

Abstract

The explosion of the global information technology era has completely reshaped the operational modalities of nations, posing an urgent demand for a comprehensive digital transformation process for every country. In Vietnam, the Resolution of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam has officially established the strategic orientation for national development in the 2026-2030 period, positioning science, technology, innovation, and digital transformation as the central growth engines. This study aims to investigate prominent digital society building models globally, analyze Vietnam's guidelines and policies in the effort to construct a digital social architecture that directly serves the breakthrough of the national digital economy, and discuss several implications for building Vietnam's digital society in the new context.

Keyword: digital society, digital economic, new era.

1. Introduction

The explosion of information and communication technology in the modern era has generated unprecedented transformations, completely reshaping the concepts of the digital society and the digital economy on a global scale. Through the theoretical lens of informational capitalism articulated by scholar Manuel Castells, information networks have become the organizational structure of modern society, wherein knowledge and digitized data act as the pivotal resources determining macroeconomic competitiveness. The transition from the traditional industrial operational model to a complex digital social network is not merely the process of adopting advanced technological tools; rather, it is essentially a comprehensive revolution in the modes of production, the structures of social relations, and cultural value systems. Amidst this dynamic context, the fundamental dialectical relationship between digital social architecture and the digital economy is becoming increasingly tight-knit and inseparable. A mature digital society, characterized by high-quality human capital, a

synchronized transmission infrastructure, and a robust cyberspace culture, serves as the indispensable infrastructural launchpad to propel any digital economy forward and sustain a long-term sustainable growth cycle.

In Vietnam, the national digital transformation process is entering a historic turning point with strategic orientations of future-shaping magnitude. The Resolution of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam adopted the national development orientations for the 2026-2030 period, emphasizing science, technology, innovation, and digital transformation as the nation's primary driving forces. Furthermore, the decision-making system of the Party's 14th National Congress aims to establish an entirely new growth paradigm, placing the focus of profit generation on the data economy, the digital economy, the green economy, and the circular economy, carrying the immense aspiration of achieving an average GDP growth rate of 10% per year or higher. In order to materialize this highly ambitious macroeconomic objective, the creation of an inclusive digital society – where all citizens are equipped with essential skill systems and guaranteed equal rights in enjoying technological achievements – is positioned by the Party and the State as one of the most vital survival tasks of the upcoming decade.

Previous studies in international academic forums have repeatedly affirmed the central role of digital social architecture in economic prosperity, while simultaneously exposing numerous underlying structural risks. During the 2023-2025 period, research scholars extensively dissected the impact of the digital era on optimizing labor productivity, while continuously issuing warnings regarding the risks of deepening the digital inequality divide and particularly severe environmental consequences in the absence of sustainable state governance policies. In Vietnam, in-depth empirical studies aiming to cross-examine the compatibility and practicality between the latest guidelines of the Party's 14th National Congress and global academic theoretical shifts regarding the digital society still exhibit significant gaps. Therefore, this study establishes the objective of multidimensionally analyzing the orientations of the Vietnamese Party and State regarding the creation of a digital society, cross-referencing prestigious academic works, thereby providing a highly empirical panorama to propose feasible solutions serving Vietnam's economic growth in the new era.

2. Methodology

This study is meticulously designed based on a multidimensional and complex approach, systematically intertwining the qualitative analysis of policy documents, the academic literature review method, and descriptive statistical techniques to ensure absolute comprehensiveness. The foundational

research object encompasses the entire system of strategic guidelines and policies of the Vietnamese Party and State, with the analytical focus placed squarely on the directive contents of the Resolution of the 14th National Congress of the Party in orienting the national development aspirations for the 2026-2030 period. The analysis of these political documents is executed through a deductive lens, aiming to deconstruct macroeconomic objectives into specific digital society development indicators, thereby establishing a framework of criteria to evaluate the policy execution capacity of the state administrative apparatus. This deconstruction process requires continuous juxtaposition between political discourse and the technical measurement requirements of the contemporary digital economic system.

To establish a theoretical framework and related issues for this study, the literature review method was implemented through a screening and appraisal process of international scientific works published within the 2023-2025 timeframe. These breakthrough academic evidences were extracted from the foundational Google Scholar database, with selection criteria centered around the theoretical systems of digital social networks, the reciprocal impacts of digital citizen identification on commercial growth, as well as information inequality barriers. Synthesizing international research works facilitates the establishment of a global frame of reference, allowing the study to evaluate whether Vietnam's strategies are converging or diverging from advanced academic intellectual currents.

Alongside policy and academic analysis procedures, the study deploys an in-depth descriptive statistical method to accurately quantify the current status of the digital society development process and the scale of the digital economy in Vietnam. Macro-empirical data were carefully gathered from public reports of the Ministry of Information and Communications (now the Ministry of Science and Technology), the General Statistics Office, the National Electronic Authentication Centre (NEAC), and the ranking data systems of United Nations agencies during the 2024-2025 period. The selected system of critical quantitative indicators includes the National Digital Transformation Index (DTI), the percentage contribution of the digital economy to the GDP structure, the broadband internet penetration rate, and the growth rate of adult citizens utilizing digital signatures. The organic integration between the global theoretical lens and the representative statistical data system assists the study in advancing toward accurately and transparently quantifying Vietnam's capacity to translate guidelines into economic power in the forthcoming period.

3. Results and Data analysis

3.1. Vietnam's strategic orientations in the new era

The Resolution of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam marks a profoundly important historical milestone as it officially establishes the pathway for radically innovating operational mindsets, positioning science and technology, innovation capacity, and the digital transformation process as the central engines of development. The decision-making framework for the 2026-2030 tenure once again affirms the roadmap for a comprehensive restructuring of the growth paradigm, mobilizing all resources to construct a high-quality economy revolving around three pillars: the data economy, the digital economy, and the circular economy. This strategic orientation targets not only the augmentation of the gross domestic product scale but also emphasizes the quality of growth, demanding that the contribution of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) exceed the 55% threshold. This represents a transition enabling Vietnam to ascend to a higher echelon within the global value chain via knowledge content and the power of digital algorithms.

To create an unobstructed corridor for the boom of the digital space, the Party's 14th National Congress exceptionally emphasizes and demands concentrated priority on executing three strategic breakthroughs: dismantling barriers from legal and institutional "bottlenecks", cultivating breakthroughs in high-quality digital human resources, and urgently perfecting smart technological infrastructure. On the dimension of developing the digital societal morphology, political orientations explicitly indicate the mandatory requirement to parallelize the development of the digital cultural space and the preservation of tangible indigenous culture. The exploitation of digital cultural resource mines and the establishment of codes of conduct within the cyberspace environment are viewed as sharpened tools to crystallize the global citizen value system, preventing moral degradation in the digital era. The analytical system of policy orientations and expected impact targets is transparently presented in Table 1 below.

Table 1
Analytical system of Vietnam's policy orientations and expected impact targets in the new era

Vietnam's Orientations (2026-2030 Period)	Focus of Digital Society and Digital Economy Application	Expected Impacts on Macroeconomic Growth
Taking innovation as the driving force	Building a digital startup ecosystem, developing the AI industry and semiconductor component manufacturing	Propelling the contribution of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) to exceed the 55% level

Table 1 (continued)

Vietnam's Orientations (2026-2030 Period)	Focus of Digital Society and Digital Economy Application	Expected Impacts on Macroeconomic Growth
Decisively establishing a new growth model	Deploying the power of the data economy, optimizing supply chains via e-commerce platforms	Pushing GDP growth rate > 10%/year, GDP per capita reaching the \$8,500 milestone (by 2030)
Strategic breakthroughs in human resource structure	Upgrading universal digital capacities, comprehensively transforming higher education models in STEM fields	Urgently compensating for the shortage of 200,000 IT engineers, creating a digital citizen class meeting international standards
Developing culture and human beings in the integration era	Creating and controlling the digital cultural space, shaping codes of conduct on social media platforms	Preventing ideological degradation risks, utilizing digital cultural resources as an engine for tourism and economic development
Synchronously perfecting the legal institutional system	Radically digitizing public administrative procedures, urgently promulgating a transparent legal framework for digital transactions	Improving the environment for attracting high-tech FDI capital, accelerating the progress of global e-Government rankings

3.2. Current status of digital society and digital economy development in Vietnam

The process of materializing guidelines for building a national digital state in Vietnam has initially yielded numerous achievements, proving the practical reformative power of macroeconomic policies. Statistics from central management ministries indicate that the financial scale of the digital economy is expanding with outstanding acceleration, pushing its proportionate contribution to the national GDP to continuously shatter old records. According to estimates, the proportion of the digital economy reached 16.5% in 2023 and is maintaining a stable growth rate of 20% per year, which is three times higher than the average GDP growth rate, aiming directly at the strategic target of 20% of GDP by the end of 2025. This explosion does not occur arbitrarily but is supported by an increasingly perfected transmission infrastructure system, with median mobile internet speeds reaching 28.66 Mbps and fixed broadband touching the 48.95 Mbps threshold, transforming the entire digital space into the most powerful distribution channel.

However, parallel to the highly optimistic picture regarding hardware infrastructure, the digital transformation process in Vietnam continues to reveal asymmetrical developmental lags. Most notably, although the proportion of citizens willing to familiarize themselves with and apply personal digital signatures has soared to 13.5% (more than four times higher

than in 2022), this actual outcome still exposes a massive dividing gulf compared to the ambition of 50% coverage, which is considered a prerequisite to forming a paperless financial transaction ecosystem. Additionally, the qualitative deficit in high-tech human resources, measured by a shortage of up to 200,000 computer and AI engineers as of 2025, is directly formulating a physical deterrent that restrains the takeoff aspirations of the domestic software industry, as demonstrated in Table 2 below.

Table 2

System of quantitative indicators measuring the digital economy and digital society in Vietnam for the 2024-2025 period

Empirical Measurement Indicators	Actual Quantitative Evidence 2024 - 2025	Strategic Targets
Proportionate contribution of the digital economy to GDP	Recorded at approximately 16.5% (in 2023) and continuing its upward growth momentum	Setting a firm ambition to achieve the 20% of GDP level by the end of 2025
Improvement in the National Digital Transformation Index (DTI) 2024	Ascended to reach a score of 0.7955 (a sharp surge of 8.6% compared to 2023)	Remarkable highlight: The Digital Society pillar leads the acceleration momentum, growing by 13.4%
E-Government Ranking (Evaluated by the United Nations)	Broke through to rank 71st/193 nations (leaping into the "Very High" group)	Bearing the heavy responsibility of entering the Top 50 leading global nations before the 2030 milestone
Penetration rate of civil social media platforms	Recorded 76.2 million accounts (covering 75.2% of the population in early 2025)	Accurately reflecting the public's readiness level to embrace digital culture
Universalization rate of personal digital signature services	Halting at a modest level of 13.5% of adults (despite quadrupling since 2022)	Currently struggling against enormous barriers to hit the 50% universalization finish line per strategic requirements
Shortfall gap in technological human resources (IT/AI)	The market demands 700,000; the supply is experiencing a disproportionate shortfall of 200,000	The most critical bottleneck directly threatening the speed of macroeconomic digital industrialization

4. Discussion

4.1. Compatibility and sustainable development

Comparing the orientations of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam with contemporary international academic currents, the research process observes a convergence of mindsets regarding the configuration of the new economic architecture. The analytical argumentation by Eltanbouly et al. (2025) regarding virtual space boundaries, alongside the systematic study by Lubacha (2023) on digital convergence in

the European market, both reach a mutual conclusion affirming that datafication power is dismantling and restructuring the entire governance models of nations. Excellent quantitative evidence from the research of An et al. (2024), combined with the hypothesis of Chen and Xu (2023), has explicitly proven that the digital economy platform does not merely inflate the scale of capitalist profits but also acts as the most critical macroeconomic catalyst to shape the trajectory of sustainable development. Furthermore, recent studies by Mishra et al. (2024) continue to reaffirm that the application of digitized ecological indicators possesses a potent governing capacity over the roadmap for fulfilling the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals.

Nevertheless, another crucial dimension that is inherently often overshadowed by the temptation of technological growth momentum is the massive ecological cost burden generated from the digitalization process. This vital existential issue has been excellently preemptively barricaded by the vision of the Party's 14th National Congress through the orientation of tightly intertwining digital transformation efforts with the concept of the "green economy". The Digital Economy Report by UNCTAD (2024) presents shocking statistics concerning carbon footprints, revealing that the operations of data centers and the short lifecycles of IoT devices devour approximately 6% to 12% of total global electrical energy consumption. This academic rationale is further reinforced by the studies of Mngumi et al. (2024), Mohsin et al. (2024), and Naseem et al. (2024), who have demonstrated the negative impacts of CO₂ emissions emanating from digital infrastructure within developing economic blocs. The fundamental lesson drawn is that the ambition to expand the digital GDP scale must not be traded at the cost of transforming the national ecosystem into a toxic e-waste dump.

4.2. Digital skills crisis and inequality

To successfully transform technological algorithmic potential into realistic material productive forces, the digital social structure demands a commensurate level of human capital reserves. The pioneering research of Künn-Nelen (2025) and the scholar group Mubarak et al. (2024) elucidated the "skills obsolescence" syndrome, issuing a stark warning about the socio-economic status stratification that will inevitably deepen if a nation relinquishes its governance over digital capability inequality. The modern concept of the "digital citizen" has far exceeded the limitations of purchasing and possessing devices for connectivity; it requires an evolution in terms of safety awareness, data analytical capacity, and the ability to adapt to labor automation, as pointed out by He et al. (2024). Therefore, Vietnam's vision to radically overhaul the higher education system to create a standard 4.0

knowledge workforce is the critical factor for enhancing the long-term competitiveness of the economy in the upcoming period.

Surveys from international markets have continuously affirmed that digitalization application capacity maintains a direct linear correlation with the income augmentation of vulnerable groups. Typically, a 2024 study on digital educational attainment in rural China confirmed that improving digital skill capacities assists rural residents in easily accessing credit and optimizing agricultural profits, transforming mobile devices into a spearhead weapon to eradicate new-generation poverty. Placed within the Vietnamese context, the fiber-optic transmission network between urban and rural areas still maintains certain fragmented boundaries in quality, carrying an immense risk of molding initial rudimentary technological gaps into a new form of class inequality. The capacity to universalize digital skills is not merely a welfare issue; rather, according to evaluations from reports related to the OECD bloc (2024), it serves as a protective shield for laborers against the displacement wave driven by artificial intelligence and automated systems.

4.3. Digital double bind and digital responsibility

Alongside macroeconomic prospective impulses, the comprehensive digitalization process in nations belonging to the Global South is taking the risk of confronting an extremely complex risk structure in terms of governance. The breakthrough research regarding the "Digital Double Bind" by Zayani and Khalil (2024) analytically dissected that, although market institutions constantly thirst for technological applications to accelerate profit trajectories, governments still endure the restraining tension caused by the necessity to maintain traditional social security control. This paradox, tightly combined with the warnings of Evenett and Fritz (2024) concerning the risks of fracturing and fragmenting the international digital legal system, has directly created countless legal bottlenecks. This conflict of interest partially explains the root causes hindering the boom of the electronic identity service market, whilst clearly reflecting the reasons why the European Union (EU) must continuously establish stringent regulatory barriers to combat the monopolistic manipulation of tech giants, as analyzed by Martini (2025).

The powerful, irreversible rise of the big data and AI industry has begun to pose extreme challenges regarding online civic human rights, precisely aligning with Fendt's (2025) cautionary theory regarding cognitive fragmentation in the "post-truth" era. The "Corporate Digital Responsibility" (CDR) model proposed by the scholar group Li et al. (2023), along with Faik et al. (2024), demands that the corporate governance elite discard the egoistic lens of short-term hyper-profitability. This model mandatorily requires the integration of algorithmic ethics foundations and personal privacy rights into the core of all digital business models to restore social equity, especially in a

context where issues of digital avatar privacy theft are turning into an imminent disaster (Eltanbouly et al., 2025). The equilibrium between encouraging a free space for technological innovation and imposing a sanctioning framework is precisely the most difficult legal corridor perfection requirement that government agencies must face in the near future.

To resolve this complex conundrum, establishing a smart city governance network based on social inclusivity orientations is the key. According to the study by Oughton et al. (2023), wireless network quality is the boundary-separating factor of an inclusive society, demanding robustly subsidized investment policies to prevent the risk of marginalizing vulnerable groups out of the digital welfare system. Similarly, standard evaluation structures such as the Bank Digital Transformation Index developed by Xie and Wang (2023) have indicated that the governance health of the digital financial system must be measured by its capability to serve and reach the customer groups at the bottom of the wealth pyramid. This perfectly resonates with the harmonious development guidelines of the Communist Party of Vietnam, wherein the scale augmentation of the digital economy is absolutely not permitted to become a tool for minority interest groups, but must act as a conveyance delivering prosperity to the entire citizen structure within society.

5. Conclusion

This scientific research has investigated a multi-dimensional analytical picture, intertwining the world's advanced academic theoretical foundations with Vietnam's orientation ecosystem for building a national digital state in accordance with the strategic spirit of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam. The construction of a digital social architecture does not merely shoulder the mission of a humanistic infrastructure framework providing direct vitality for the acceleration momentum of digital commerce; essentially, it also acts as a metric to gauge a nation's endurance against the impacts of the global artificial intelligence wave. Through analyses of global and Vietnamese cases, the empirical argumentation system of this paper has provided affirmation that Vietnam is maintaining a dynamic propelling force to construct a digital nation within the new developmental era.

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FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION: AUSTRIA'S MIGRATION PATTERNS AND LABOR DYNAMICS

This article presents Austrian migration trends from 1945 to 2025. It traces the country's transition from a country of emigration to a country of migration, where labor migrants and refugees continue to arrive to this day. It examines Austria's post-war period, the employment agreements of the 1960s, and the impact of geopolitical crises on the influx of migrants. The study reveals the contribution of immigrants to Austria's economy, labor market, and social security system. Combining historical and social data, the article shows the significant role of migration in shaping Austria's economic, demographic, and social landscape.

***Keywords:* Austria, migration, emigration, immigration, labor migration, refugees, EU mobility, post-war Europe, migrant workforce, demographic trends.**

Introduction

Austria's migration history over the last few centuries reflects the complex interactions of political, economic, and social forces. Due to political and economic instability in the post-war years, Austria was predominantly a country of emigration. However, following sustained economic growth in the mid-20th century and integration into the European Union, the country has become a destination for refugees, labor migrants, and skilled professionals alike. This article discusses the development of migration in Austria, the impact of geopolitical crises on the influx of refugees, and the growing role of migrants in the economy and society. It shows how migration has shaped Austria's population by analyzing historical trends, labor market integration, and socio-economic contributions.

In the years following the war, Austria was primarily a country people left rather than settled in. Around 1.4 million foreign forced laborers, former concentration camp prisoners, and prisoners of war were in Austria at the war's end. In addition, about one million displaced persons (DPs), refugees, and expellees from Eastern and Southeastern Europe arrived in the early post-war years. For many of them, Austria served only as a transit point before emigrating to the United States, Israel, or other countries overseas.

During the 1950s and 1960s, several thousand Austrians, primarily young women and men, left the country either temporarily or permanently to live in other European nations or overseas. Their main reasons for emigrating

were the search for economic security and political stability, which many felt Austria lacked until 1955 due to slow economic recovery, high unemployment, and continued political dependence. A significant economic divide existed between the severely war-damaged eastern regions under Soviet occupation and the largely intact western areas within the US occupation zone. Vienna, Lower Austria, and Burgenland faced particular disadvantages, including destroyed or dismantled industrial infrastructure, energy shortages, a collapsed transport system, and limited assistance from the Marshall Plan. As a result, many young workers, both men and women, chose to emigrate.

Key overseas destinations included the United States, Canada, and Australia, with Brazil and South Africa becoming more prominent in the 1960s. By 1961, around 20,000 Austrians had moved to Australia. Approximately 32,000 emigrated to Canada by the end of the 1960s, and about 16,000 settled in South Africa by 1975. Within Europe, most labor migrants relocated to Germany and Switzerland; in the 1950s alone, roughly 50,000 people moved to these two countries. Ongoing labor shortages there meant that by the early 1970s, around 45,000 Austrians were living in Switzerland and about 180,000 in Germany. Smaller numbers also migrated during the post-war years to the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, and Italy.

Compared with other Western European industrialized nations such as the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland, Austria only began to experience sustained economic growth in the mid-1950s. Prior to that, it had largely been a country of emigration. In addition, internal migration from economically disadvantaged regions, together with the integration of refugees, created a significant domestic labor pool. For instance, in 1952 the labor market was formally opened to the so-called Volksdeutsche, refugees regarded as ethnic compatriots. As economic expansion gathered pace, unemployment declined markedly, falling from 5.5 percent in 1955 to 2.9 percent in 1961. This improvement was driven by the expansion of the welfare state, increased public investment in housing and infrastructure, longer average periods of education, and shorter overall working hours and working life. Nevertheless, by the late 1950s Austria was already experiencing growing labor shortages in certain regions and sectors. Efforts to reduce the emigration of Austrian workers to neighboring countries, particularly Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany, were largely unsuccessful (Bischof & Rupnow, 2017).

Escaping from communist regimes was a common feature of the Cold War. When the Iron Curtain was firmly established at the end of the 1940s, opportunities for flight were drastically reduced. The fortified border system was intended to deter escape attempts by making them extremely dangerous

and, in many cases, potentially fatal. Despite these restrictions, thousands of people fled during the 1950s from neighboring communist states such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia to Austria. The precise number of refugees from communist countries has never been definitively determined and would in any case be difficult to verify. In comparison to the roughly 1.5 million Germans and Austrians expelled from Eastern Europe and the Displaced Persons who remained in Austria after the Second World War, their numbers were relatively modest, although there was considerable overlap between these groups. People fled communist regimes for political, economic, and personal reasons. In the immediate postwar years, many felt that the new political systems in East Central Europe threatened their civil liberties and economic security. Moreover, the newly established regimes implemented repressive measures, particularly against those who resisted or refused to conform. Once legal avenues for emigration were closed, escaping across tightly sealed borders involved significant personal danger.

In 1945, many people were expelled from Hungary, and additional waves crossed into Austria following the Communist takeover in 1947. Among those leaving were “German ethnics” (Volksdeutsche), Hungarian Jews, and Hungarian nationals, including army deserters. When the Iron Curtain was established along the Austro-Hungarian border beginning in 1948, escape routes were effectively blocked. Refugees attempting to cross the border were often shot by border guards. In the Soviet-occupied zone of Austria adjacent to Hungary, the Soviets frequently returned refugees to Hungary if Hungarian authorities demanded it.

In Czechoslovakia, it is difficult to distinguish the first refugees leaving after 1945 from the much larger number of ethnic Germans who were expelled following the war. After the communist takeover in February 1948, refugee flows from Czechoslovakia increased once again. The establishment of the Iron Curtain along the Austro-Czechoslovak border after 1948, however, effectively blocked escape routes and kept people confined within the country. Despite the heavily guarded Austrian borders with both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, although some temporary relaxations occurred, people continued to flee these countries intermittently until 1989.

During the early Cold War, Austria’s border with Yugoslavia was among the most violent. Reliable data on refugees and casualties from the 1940s are lacking. In the 1950s, thousands of people crossed from Slovenia into Styria. After Tito’s split with Stalin and the improvement of Yugoslavia’s relations with the West, Austria’s relationship with Yugoslavia also improved significantly. Postwar disputes over borders and reparations, which had strained relations, became less critical after 1948. From the 1950s onward, diplomatic relations between Austria and Yugoslavia normalized, and border

tensions decreased. With the relaxation of border controls, more Yugoslav citizens were able to enter Austria legally, often for work. This legal access reduced the need to flee, as emigration no longer required risking life as a refugee.

By the 1960s, following Western Europe's economic recovery, Austria had clearly become a country of immigration, with more people moving into the country than leaving it. Labor migrants, particularly from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, were officially recruited, while refugees (such as those from Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968) were admitted, although many eventually continued on to the US and Canada. Austria joined the European race for migrant labor relatively late. The first recruitment agreement was signed with Spain on May 2, 1962, followed by agreements with Turkey in 1964 and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1965. Labor migration from Turkey and Yugoslavia would ultimately become historically significant. Between 1962 and 1973, the peak period for foreign employment in Austria, the number of migrant workers rose from roughly 17,700 to around 250,000, with Yugoslav citizens comprising the majority at 78.5 percent and Turkish citizens accounting for 11.8 percent. The share of women among migrant workers also increased during this period, from 19 percent to 31 percent. Recruitment negotiations with Italy, Greece, and Tunisia were unsuccessful, though migrants from these countries were still employed in Austria in smaller numbers. In the case of Tunisia, a provisional protocol signed in 1970 allowed for a "test group" of Tunisian workers, which was increased from 100 to 400 in 1971 (Bischof & Rupnow, 2017).

Employers pushed for more flexible labor market regulations and simpler entry for foreign workers. Before the introduction of the *Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz* (Foreign Nationals Employment Law) in 1975, the legal framework governing the employment of migrants was still the *Deutsche Reichsverordnung über ausländische Arbeitnehmer* of 1933. This system relied on a complex admission process and required evidence that local Austrian workers were unavailable, as well as consideration of the prevailing economic conditions.

The initial framework for expanding the intake of foreign workers was established through the Raab-Olah Agreement (1961) between the Austrian Trade Union Federation and the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber. Annual quotas were set to limit the number of foreign laborers allowed in each region and industry. Until 1975, Austria managed immigration largely through administrative agreements rather than formal legislation.

Austrian migration policy was based on the principle of rotation, expecting that foreign workers would eventually return to their home countries. Consequently, the first recruitment agreement with Spain was

limited to a one-year period. At the same time, both the sending countries and the migrants themselves initially viewed this labor migration as a temporary arrangement.

In February 1962, the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte* began operating in Vienna. Following the signing of intergovernmental recruitment agreements, commissions were set up in Madrid in 1962, Istanbul in 1964, and Belgrade in 1966. The AGA coordinated recruitment between Austrian companies and the commissions abroad. The Austrian commissions in the workers' home countries managed on-site recruitment, conducted medical examinations, and arranged travel. In comparison with West Germany and France, Austria maintained a relatively modest recruitment infrastructure. All records maintained by the central Austrian recruitment office in Vienna were destroyed following its closure in 1993. Likewise, the documentation from the recruitment commissions in Madrid and Belgrade no longer exists. Only partial records from the commission in Istanbul are preserved in the archive of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (Bischof & Rupnow, 2017).

Austria experienced stable net immigration in the early 2000s, largely the result of labor mobility and integration into the European Union. Between 2001–2010, the total number of immigrants annually moving to the country was on average between 100,000 and 140,000, but the total number of outflows was much lower around 70,000–90,000 a year. These developments demonstrated that the country is a center of opportunity for workers across the EU region, particularly when the EU expanded in 2004 and 2007, by freeing its citizens from migration restrictions from many Central and Eastern European countries. Consequently, intra-EU migration was one of the primary components of migration phenomena within Austria in this period.

Workers from other EU countries, mainly from Germany, Hungary, Romania and Poland, often migrated to Austria seeking employment during this time. At the same time, Austria was drawn into both skilled and unskilled labor, primarily from Southeast Europe, with a lesser extent from Turkey. At this stage, outward migration was comparatively low and was primarily concerned Austrians moving outward, concentrating on neighboring EU countries with employment or educational prospects, including Germany and Switzerland, the most wanted destinations. Since around 2011, there has been a substantial surge in immigration to Austria, with international arrivals nearly two times the number of people entering Austria in the early 2000s. The reasons behind this increase were as follows:

- gradually looser transitional labor restrictions on new EU member countries and greater access to the Austrian labor market;

- global geopolitical crises, like conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan, which have caused asylum-seeking and humanitarian migration to Europe.

Austria experienced an extraordinary increase in immigration in 2015: more than 214,000 people flooded into the country within a year. The sharp surge was largely due to the European migration crisis, and large numbers of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq came seeking asylum and safety either in Austria or other European Union countries. Significantly, the volume of arrivals was a major demographic change. This was a humanitarian concern for people traveling abroad and emphasized Austria's status as a major destination for people fleeing war and instability in Europe. Emigration from Austria also increased at the same time. This trend was fueled in part by increased workforce mobility inside the EU and people returning to their home countries from abroad. Leaves also involved Austrian nationals moving to other EU member states for work or study as well as foreign-born residents either returning home or moving toward other EU member states. Nonetheless, despite this outflow, Austria reported a positive net migration balance, indicating that the arrival of migrants was higher than departures at all times – and therefore migration contributed towards the positive growth of state population.

In 2020, migration to Austria slowed down due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, in 2021, migration flows returned to their previous levels. Due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the resulting large number of refugees from Ukraine, immigration figures rose sharply. In 2022, the number of immigrants was 261,900, while the number of emigrants was 125,000.

In 2023 and 2024, immigration declined again to 195,000 and 178,600 people, respectively, but emigration continued to rise: 128,300 in 2023 and 128,500 in 2024. As a result, the balance with foreign countries declined: 66,600 in 2023 and 50,100 in 2024. This shows that the number of arrivals remains higher than the number of departures from Austria and that migration continues to support the country's population growth (Statistics Austria, 2025).

In 2024, an estimated 2.51 million people, roughly 27.8 per cent of Austria's total population, had some experience of migration, including first- and second-generation immigrants, based on statistics. This illustrates the role immigrants play in shaping the demographics of Austria. The largest concentrations of Austrian immigrants were from Germany, Romania, Turkey, Serbia and Hungary. Austria has uneven migration trends: in major cities like Vienna, Graz, Linz, and Salzburg there are a much higher number of residents with a migration background. Vienna, for instance, has a

population background of migrants that by early 2025 exceeds 40%. This highlights the city's long history as a hub of international labor, education and the arrival of refugees (Statistics Austria, 2025).

Recent research indicates both Austrian citizens and newcomers are leaving Austria due to many reasons: work, education, and due to the family situation. OECD data available for 2023 showed that some 15,000 Austrian residents relocated to the OECD. Of these, the largest percentage (about 38%) relocated to Germany, then large numbers of people to Switzerland and Turkey. The total number of people leaving Austria is still lower than that who come in, but this trend reflects an upward flow of emigration. It has a lot of workers who have skills that are in search of work abroad and also the students who are educated or undertaking vocational training in other countries. Family situation too is key: Many move to join relatives or move to countries of greater personal or social opportunity (OECD Data Explorer).

These changes illuminate that migration in Austria is becoming more and more intricate as Austria is still considered attractive for foreign nationals but that it is also facing a growing stream of emigration. The net migration is still positive, but these outflows represent the case that one needs to look at both the inflows and outflows of immigrants, for the purpose of analyzing demographic and labor market trends in Austria.

Due to this, the general public does not sufficiently appreciate the role migrants play in both Austrian society and their native countries, as a 2018 survey demonstrated. However, even in light of specific problems, migrants have diverse effects on the population: they work not as job seekers directly, as entrepreneurs, workers, in their own right, pay taxes and social security benefits, and are economically active as consumers. Besides their economic contribution, migrants play a dynamic role in social, cultural and community life: in the work and in volunteer activities. While many migrants maintain strong ties to families, friends and former employees in the countries where they have been migrating, they are also engaged in the political life and economic activities of their countries of origin.

Migrants are central to Austria's two largest income and workforce sectors and are commonly described as a leading cause of total employment increase. Foreign nationals comprised 16% of the workforce in the service sector and 16% of employees in industry and trade in 2017. The service sector (comprising both the public and private sectors), including public administration, hospitality, and transportation, represented 70.4% of total economic productivity and employed approximately 71% of people. For instance, the industrial and trade sectors, including manufacturing and mining, contributed 28.4% to GDP and a quarter of total employment. The other 1.2% of GDP was from agriculture and forestry.

As you can see in Figure 1 below, some industries within the Austrian economy are particularly dependent on migrant laborers. 35% of employees in administrative and support services, including equipment rental and leasing, travel agencies, facility management and call centers, are foreigners. A similar proportion, about 35 percent, is employed in accommodation and food services. Other sectors with significant proportions of migrant workers are domestic services (30.2%), arts, entertainment and recreation (21.6%), construction (20.6%), transport and warehousing (16%), information and communication (15.1%), manufacturing (14.8%), professional, scientific and technical services (12.7%), education (12.2%), and healthcare and social services (11.2%). Tourism is one of the pillars of Austria's economy. It makes a significant contribution to the country's productive economy and generates employment for approximately 20% of their workforce. The sector is intertwined with hospitality, leisure and cultural industries, transportation and travel services – all fields in which migrant workers are essential. Regarding employees of migrants, manufacturing is the leading sector, with 15% of all employed migrants. Accommodation and food services are next with 14%, followed by wholesale and retail trade, including motor vehicle repair, at 13.3% and construction, where 10.8% of migrant work (Kratzmann & Hartl, 2019).




Fig. 1. The proportion of migrants in various industries, 2019*

**Source: built by the author based on (Kratzmann & Hartl, 2019).*

Migrants are normally at both the lower and upper ends of the qualification scale, which suggests their hiring habits supplement, rather than directly compete, with those of the Austrian labor force. For instance, the EU citizens are employed more in highly skilled and academic vocations, mainly in engineering (i.e., the highest-skilled and advanced degrees), while the non-

EU citizens are concentrated more in lower-skilled areas, such as manufacturing, construction, transport and mining. It is suggested in the literature however, that the replacement of indigenous-born staff has been negligible; since migrants are predominantly active in some areas of the labor market that local employees are more and more leaving. In the past, migrant workers have historically contributed to labor shortages and this is in auxiliary and low skilled labor and to the local economy. These gaps were filled through increased participation of migrants and increased employment opportunities. Their position also needs to be seen among earlier economic policy to improve the competitiveness of export-oriented sectors. That was especially important for labor-intensive industrial and commercial segments such as textiles, leather, and apparel, and for high-value-to-business service sectors such as tourism. In all, immigration has been a great boost to Austria's economic development, as it has placed foreign workers on the jobs market in key sectors in which there have been labor shortages. These gaps are primarily due to demographic ageing as well as a shrinking native labor force and rising levels of education among Austrian-born men and women.

Alongside migrants who are now resident in the country, Austria still provides for a significant number of posted short-term workers in the country. As of 2015, 108,627 permits for this industry in total were granted, with Austria being one of the EU countries with the highest numbers with this type of work. This was an increase of 7.5 percent compared to the previous year, corresponding to 2.7 percent of total employment countrywide. The majority of posted workers were from Slovenia, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland. Over half (54%) worked in the construction industry, 25% in services and 20% in other industrial sectors (Kratzmann & Hartl, 2019).

Seasonal jobs in the agriculture, forestry and tourism businesses, particularly in winter and summer, which are critical for economic growth, cannot be adequately filled by local labor. Because the work is grueling and typically pays low minimums, hiring local workers is no small task. Therefore, temporary seasonal third-country nationals (non-residents) may work for the season. Seasonal work is also one of the few alternatives for asylum seekers. Third-country nationals are regulated under annual quotas and visa regulations to enter the country. In 2017, a total of 13,342 temporary employment permits were granted to third-country nationals, most being citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by Ukraine, Serbia, and Kosovo. Of these, 662 permits were awarded to asylum seekers. About 23% of seasonal workers were included in the core seasonal workers category, mostly from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. The numbers of seasonal workers are far higher than the number of permits: many workers from newer European Union member countries do not require job permits (Kratzmann & Hartl, 2019).

Austria had 465,000 of those self-employed in 2017, approximately 40% employed others. The backbone of the country is established businesses and their workforces to maintain their high living standards and economic performance. By comparison to Austria's long-standing tradition of labor migration, self-employment by migrants evolved comparatively late, emerging more prominently after the permanent settlement of former "guest workers" and their families, and became a phenomenon in the 1990s. That year, 52,000 foreign nationals, accounting for 8% of the foreign workforce, were self-employed, while 11.4 percent of Austrian citizens (not family members) were. About one-third of these migrant entrepreneurs had employees. More than 60% were EU citizens, and the remainder came from other third countries. Overall, 72,500 workers of self-employment had a migrant background, which refers to having both parents born abroad.

More and more immigrants are starting their own businesses, essentially as sole proprietors and the trend could arise from some of the struggles that migrants have with stable employment. As of 1 January 2017, approximately 31% of all sole proprietors had a migrant background (not all lived in Austria). More than 7% were Slovak citizens, a comparable share were Romanian citizens, and 2% were German citizens. As you can see in Figure 2, migrant entrepreneurs are particularly visible in commerce and crafts (41%), transportation (31%), tourism and leisure (20%), and trade (14%). There are a range of businesses owned by people from migrant backgrounds and the majority of the businesses are not the more usual ones like international restaurants, call shops, supermarkets and traditional crafts. These businesses also cater for the broader community and form an important part of local economy growth (Statistics Austria, 2025).




Fig. 2. Share of migrant-owned business by industry sector*

*Source: built by the author based on (Statistics Austria, Register-based Labour Market Careers 2025).

Around 63% of those aged 15-64 with a migrant background worked in Austria. The country provides social security to employees, as well as the self-employed and their dependants for life, and the support system is mainly

financed by income taxes and contributions to social security. Migrants mainly contribute to the system through social security payments, wage taxes, and value-added taxes. But an increasing level of migration in recent years, including people from new EU member states and people seeking international protection from nations including Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, has ignited debate about migrants' economic contributions to the economy and their effects on the welfare system. Other questions around the cost of providing refuge and integration options for asylum seekers and recognized refugees.

Debates about the impact of migration on the national budget and social system date back to the late 1980s, when demographic-driven increases in the workforce led to growing immigration via family reunification and asylum applications. Previously, it tended to be assumed that migrants gave more to the welfare system than they received in that the majority were working-age. The foreign population in Austria did much more to contribute to the social system than they derived cash benefits, a report from Austria's Federal Ministry of Social Affairs found. Foreign citizens paid €5.3 billion into social security, constituting 9.5% of all contributions in 2015, yet received €3.7 billion (6.1%) of social cash benefits. Conversely, Austrian citizens made contributions of €50.5 billion and were provided €57.6 billion. Austrians, on a per person basis, received €970 more benefits than they paid in, while foreigners contributed €1,490 more than they received. In total, the foreign citizens contributed €2,460 more to the society than the Austrian per capita (Kratzmann & Hartl, 2019).

Austria's social security operates on principles of solidarity and social balance. One reason migrants pay more in net contributions is that they are also under 50. Because social security payments and taxes are mostly taken up during working years, the younger average age of migrant persons means that they must fund benefits for everyone at large. In sum, migrants pay more than they receive into social budgets: a reflection of the contribution-based system and narrower redistributive parameters of the Austrian welfare state.

Austria's migration history since 1945 has seen the country embark on a dramatic shift from emigration to immigration. In the immediate post-war period, it was primarily a period of outward migration and refugee transit, but after economic progress from the 1960s, it saw the influx of new foreign workers: immigrants from both Turkey and the former Yugoslavia in fact became central. It was the intra-European mobility, humanitarian migration, global crises and other issues that had led to migration patterns since European Union accession and subsequent enlargements further reshaping migration. Although immigration and emigration have been variable for some years, Austria remains a net positive net migrant with population growth and

population ageing being counteracted. Migrants occupy a central position in crucial areas, including services, industry, construction, tourism, and care work, and are a major contributor to the tax and social security systems. For the most part, migrant labor has given shape to, and proved, the structural and enduring importance of Austria's economic performance, its demographic stability and its social development, for the future of the country.

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POLICY COMMUNICATION IN THE DIGITAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF VIETNAM

Abstract

This study examines the transformative evolution of policy communication in Vietnam, driven by the strategic orientation of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam. The Congress marked a paradigm shift from traditional one-way informational dissemination to a dynamic, interactive governance model that prioritizes social consensus, civic satisfaction, and operational transparency. Leveraging a mixed-methods approach, the research integrates qualitative analysis of political documents and legal frameworks with quantitative evaluation of statistical data from 2023-2024. Key findings highlight Vietnam's robust digital ecosystem, with 78.44 million active internet users (79.1% of the population) and 72.70 million social media accounts (73.3% penetration). The study underscores the critical role of digital transformation in enhancing the operational efficiency of press agencies, with 282 agencies undergoing digital maturity assessments and significant investments in technological modernization. Vietnam's policy communication strategy aligns with global trends, emphasizing multidimensional listening, stakeholder engagement, and the use of advanced technologies like AI for real-time feedback analysis. The research also identifies challenges, such as disparities in digitalization capabilities between central and local media agencies, and emphasizes the need for continued efforts to address these gaps. By adopting an "action-oriented" approach, Vietnam's policy communication system is evolving into a powerful tool for mobilizing societal resources, fostering economic development, and reinforcing state legitimacy in the digital era. This study contributes to the global discourse on strategic communication, offering insights into how Vietnam's innovative practices can serve as a model for other nations navigating the complexities of modern governance and digital transformation.

Keywords: Policy communication; Digital transformation; Strategic governance; Social media ecosystems; Civic engagement.

1. Introduction

The 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam has been comprehensively evaluated by the international media apparatus and geopolitical analysts as a tremendously significant milestone, fundamentally reshaping the developmental trajectory of the nation throughout the 2026-2030 period and projecting a long-term vision towards 2045 with the ultimate aspiration of building a prosperous and happy Vietnam. Empirical reality rigorously demonstrates that the aspiration to propel the nation into a new era necessitates a groundbreaking and disruptive economic growth model, positioning scientific and technological foundations, innovation ecosystems, and comprehensive digital transformation as the central driving forces to strive for a minimum annual GDP growth rate of 10%. In order to successfully actualize these exceptionally ambitious macroeconomic objectives, the entire political system of Vietnam inherently requires a smoothly functioning and highly synchronized operational mechanism designed to maximize the mobilization of all available resources within society. Within this highly dynamic context, policy communication no longer merely serves as a rudimentary tool for simple information dissemination; rather, it has robustly evolved into an indispensable strategic governance platform that ultimately dictates the success or failure of contemporary economic reforms.

The continuous and rapid evolution of media modalities in the digital era has been completely transforming the traditional methods of interaction between the governmental apparatus and the broader citizenry. The conceptual framework of policy communication is now profoundly understood by contemporary researchers and policy-making cohorts as a comprehensive, closed-loop interactive cycle, systematically extending from the initial stages of formulation, public consultation, and official promulgation, all the way to grassroots-level implementation monitoring. The unprecedented fact that the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, for the very first time, issued an “Action Program” directly embedded within the central Political Report indicates an exceedingly powerful paradigm shift from a purely policy-planning mindset toward a strictly concrete, execution-oriented mentality. Guided by the rigorous requirements set forth in the Resolutions of the 14th Party Congress, Vietnam’s policy communication endeavors are strategically positioned at a critical vantage point aimed at actively orienting public opinion, awakening endogenous national strength, and vigorously defending the cultural value systems and normative standards of the Vietnamese people to comprehensively serve the nation's modernization process.

On an international scale, national governments and a multitude of multilateral organizations are increasingly prioritizing the irreplaceable role of intelligent communication strategies in decisively shaping macroeconomic

policies and safeguarding state legitimacy. Massive and unprecedented scale investments directed into state communication agencies, intricately combined with the sophisticated application of artificial intelligence platforms and expansive social media ecosystems, are rapidly emerging as the dominant global trend designed to proactively counter the phenomenon of declining public trust on a worldwide scale. Stemming directly from this objective empirical reality, conducting an in-depth investigation into the theoretical foundations and practical applications of policy communication in Vietnam according to the core spirit of the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, while systematically juxtaposing these findings against prominent international academic trends from the 2023-2025 period, emerges as a profoundly urgent requirement. This research endeavor purposefully aims to elucidate precisely how Vietnam can optimally leverage digital platforms to accelerate comprehensive economic development in the new era.

2. Proposal Method

This research systematically operationalizes a sophisticated mixed-methods approach, rigorously integrating the qualitative analytical examination of political documents and legal frameworks with the quantitative empirical analysis of contemporary statistical data sets. Regarding the qualitative documentary aspect, the research team conducted an exhaustive, in-depth scholarly review of the strategic orientations articulated by the Communist Party of Vietnam at the 14th National Congress, Resolution No. 41/NQ-CP concerning the Government's action program, Directive 07/CT-TTg issued by the Prime Minister, and other pertinent legal corridors. The systematic analytical deconstruction of these normative legal documents substantially assists in extracting the underlying guiding spirit characterized by breakthrough thinking, alongside the practical requirements that the entire political apparatus explicitly imposes upon information and propaganda operations during an entirely new developmental phase. This rigorous methodological framework fundamentally ensures an accurate and precise comprehension of the Party's directing perspectives, thereby establishing a remarkably solid foundation for critically evaluating the practical implementation steps undertaken by administrative authorities at all levels, from the central government down to local municipalities.

In terms of the quantitative dimension, the current study strategically focuses on extracting and processing official statistical datasets formally published throughout the 2023-2024 period by the Ministry of Information and Communications (currently reorganized as the Ministry of Science and Technology). This invaluable secondary data source comprehensively encompasses the actual internet penetration rate among 78.44 million active users, the profound penetration depth of social networking platforms reaching

73.3% of the total population, and detailed evaluative metrics measuring the digital transformation maturity levels of 282 press and media agencies on a nationwide scale. These raw numerical figures were methodically systematized and processed utilizing rigorous descriptive statistical methodologies, subsequently being visually represented through standardized tables and charts to reflect the objective reality in the most unbiased manner possible. The highly transparent methodology for data collection and analysis, featuring meticulous cross-referencing among specialized sectoral reports, fundamentally guarantees the utmost integrity and high reproducibility of this entire scientific research procedure.

In order to successfully establish a remarkably robust theoretical reference framework and conduct meaningful international comparisons, the study methodically executed a systematic review protocol utilizing highly strategic keyword clusters such as public policy communication, political communication, and public sector economic development. The research carefully selected the most representative and preeminent scholarly works published within the timeframe spanning from 2023 to 2025, as meticulously indexed within the Google Scholar academic database. The stringent selection criteria particularly prioritized articles belonging to the rigorously peer-reviewed category, predominantly published in highly prestigious academic journals, with the explicit intention of providing an elite theoretical foundation concerning strategic communication frameworks, public crisis governance, and civic engagement mechanisms.

3. Results and Data Analysis

The strategic orientation delineated by the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam regarding policy communication strategy represents a profoundly historical paradigm shift, transitioning from a traditional, one-way informational propaganda model toward a highly interactive and responsive execution-based governance structure. The official Congress documents unequivocally identified the comprehensive perfection of institutional frameworks for rapid and sustainable development as a decisively critical strategic breakthrough, firmly demanding a substantial enhancement in the systemic capacity to formulate and actively organize the implementation of political guidelines. The most groundbreaking highlight of this Congress is the inextricable linkage established between “directional resolutions” and “action-oriented resolutions”, strictly mandating that officially promulgated policies must invariably possess corresponding communication mechanisms to ensure that citizens genuinely comprehend and deeply consent to them. Through the deployment of highly sophisticated multimedia Government Electronic Information Portals and advanced public opinion social listening software, the government is currently striving to

establish an exceptionally transparent informational environment, strategically positioning the practical satisfaction of both the general citizenry and the corporate business community as the ultimate metric for measuring operational efficiency.

To execute this macro-level innovative spirit in the most optimal and effective manner, the underlying digital infrastructure platform and the overarching internet coverage rate in Vietnam are fundamentally functioning as the vital circulatory blood vessels for seamless policy transmission. Comprehensive statistical data collected at the onset of 2024 powerfully illustrates a tremendously robust and flourishing digital ecosystem, providing the remarkably ideal foundational conditions required to deploy large-scale, nationwide strategic communication campaigns. Vietnam presently records an impressive 78.44 million active internet users, accounting for a substantial 79.1% of the total national population, alongside a phenomenally striking mobile phone subscriber rate utilizing smartphones that reached an extraordinary 81.8% as of February 2024.

Table 1
Quantitative statistical metrics of digital infrastructure and media access behavior in Vietnam
(2024 Data)

Quantitative Measurement Criteria	Recorded Empirical Data	Penetration Rate / Contextual Analysis
Internet user scale	78.44 million users	Equivalent to 79.1% of the total national population
Smartphone subscriber coverage	Reached 81.8% (February 2024)	Reflects the paradigm shift towards mobile news consumption
Social media user base	72.70 million active accounts	Accounts for 73.3% of the total population, establishing an open communication platform
YouTube platform reach	63.00 million periodic users	Covers 80.3% of the total internet user base in Vietnam
TikTok network advertising coverage	Achieved a penetration rate of 92.6%	Calculated specifically for the demographic cohort aged 18 and above
Fiber-optic internet household penetration	80.2% (February 2024 data)	Ensures the hardware infrastructure requisite for high-speed information accessibility

The profound and extensive penetration of tremendously powerful cross-border social media platforms, notably including YouTube and TikTok, has successfully architected entirely novel and dynamic spaces for information reception. This profoundly necessitates that the state's traditional communication apparatus must undergo a fundamental metamorphosis in order to adapt with maximum flexibility and completely master this modern informational battlefield.

In addition to the explosively exponential development of the digital connectivity infrastructure system, the endogenous strength and intrinsic capacity of the revolutionary press system are also currently being comprehensively fortified and consolidated through exceedingly decisive digital transformation strategies. In order to rigorously and efficaciously execute Directive No. 07/CT-TTg issued by the Prime Minister regarding the fortification of policy communication activities, the primary mainstream press agencies have significantly augmented their proportional investment into strategic technological modernization. A detailed analytical breakdown of the data officially published by the Authority of Press, under the Ministry of Information and Communications (now the Ministry of Science and Technology) in 2024, explicitly indicates that the level of financial and infrastructural investment dedicated to the journalistic digital transformation mission has surged substantially by 27.73% in comparison to the figures from 2023, rapidly ascending to account for a massive 50% proportion of the total developmental resources allocated within these agencies. Although, in empirical reality, only 282 out of the total 873 officially recognized press agencies have actively participated in the formal digital maturity assessment process, this elite nucleus group is currently monopolizing over 90% of the total readership and audience market share, distinctly demonstrating a powerful concentration of soft power into the hands of the pioneering entities that are currently leading the informational market.

The profoundly deep structural transition characterizing the operational models of these press agencies has simultaneously yielded highly positive economic outcomes and operational efficiencies, while drastically amplifying the dissemination performance of governmental policy information. The detailed assessment report conspicuously reveals that nearly 50% of the executive leaders heading these press agencies have directly and personally participated in steering the digitalization strategies, subsequently resulting in 40.78% of these institutional units heavily prioritizing the crucial mission of enhancing user experience interfaces within the modern cyberspace environment. These strategic and innovative developmental efforts have not only remarkably assisted 36.17% of the evaluated entities in recording highly stable and sustainable revenue growth, but have also vastly expanded their functional capacity to reach broader segments of the public on a massive scale. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the strategic establishment of bidirectional communication channels via the sophisticated integration of Social Listening software systems is continuously generating invaluable real-time empirical feedback, effectively empowering macroeconomic policy-makers to swiftly and accurately recalibrate socioeconomic developmental trajectories.

Table 2

**Evaluative matrix measuring the digital transformation maturity levels
of press agencies
(Data 2024)**

Maturity Level Category	Number of Qualified Agencies	Analysis of Characteristics and Trends	Growth Correlation Indicator
Excellent Level	28 media agencies	VTV leads the broadcasting sector, alongside 10 prestigious central newspapers and 8 pioneering local newspapers.	Indicates a growth of 6.27% compared to the 2023 benchmark
Good Level	65 media agencies	Comprises key national press agencies, serving as a critical force in shaping mainstream public opinion.	Formulates a multidimensional, dominant information network
Fair Level	55 media agencies	Investment efforts are increasingly intensifying to integrate automated digital content distribution technologies.	Serves as a robust stepping stone towards the “Good” category
Average Level	25 media agencies	This cohort is currently undergoing restructuring and experimenting with long-term content strategies.	Demonstrates operational stability
Weak Level	109 media agencies	The majority consists of specialized scientific journals (47.71%) enduring severe limitations in technological resources.	Exhibits a significant decline of 24.35% relative to the 2023 evaluation metric

In order to optimally satisfy the rigorous demands established by the Resolution of the 14th Party Congress concerning the comprehensive developmental strategy for the private economic sector and modern industrialization, policy communication is currently exerting a tremendously powerful role as a catalyst designed to thoroughly unlock and mobilize all available societal resources. The Government has expeditiously promulgated a comprehensive series of highly specific action programs, establishing a prominent strategic objective to successfully foster approximately 2 million actively operating production and business enterprises by the milestone year of 2030, a figure which specifically includes massive economic conglomerates possessing the formidable capacity to achieve global outreach. The deeply penetrating and pervasive communication regarding policies explicitly designed to systematically dismantle administrative bottlenecks, rapidly develop the high-speed railway infrastructural system, and comprehensively innovate land management protocols is systematically

architecting an exceptionally transparent and predictable business ecosystem. It is precisely this extraordinarily high degree of direct interaction and the verifiable capability to accurately measure actual public satisfaction that has effectively transformed policy communication into a fundamentally vital constituent element of the contemporary national public administration reform index.

4. Discussions

A rigorous and comprehensive scholarly investigation into the strategic and structural shift of the policy communication system in Vietnam, when meticulously viewed through the macro-level lens of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, inherently necessitates a highly rigorous academic juxtaposition against contemporary international systems of knowledge. The profoundly in-depth empirical research conducted by Macnamara (2025) and published in leading specialized journals has demonstrably indicated that, despite the allocation of colossal financial investments into governmental communication campaigns, this complex process within numerous Western nations is frequently entrapped within a rigid framework of one-way informational dissemination strictly intended to promote already finalized policies, rather than authentically listening to civic aspirations. Nevertheless, the fundamental and innovative orientation established by the Communist Party of Vietnam via Resolution 41/NQ-CP has definitively showcased a macroeconomic vision that closely approximates the absolute highest standard definitions articulated by the OECD (2025). This globally prominent organization consistently and emphatically asserts that public sector communication must fundamentally operate as a genuinely constructive dialogic function, wholly executing the critical mandate of multidimensional listening and delivering direct, actionable feedback to diligently serve the overarching common interests of the entire society.

The highly strategic role of mediated communication in structurally shaping macroeconomic policy frameworks and actively mobilizing massive streams of investment resources is currently emerging as one of the most fiercely debated and compelling academic subjects within recent international scholarly discourse. An exhaustive analytical survey conducted by a multitude of prominent scholars focusing on rapidly emerging economies such as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia during the 2025 period unequivocally corroborates the fact that the sophisticated application of framing theory and stakeholder theory constitutes an absolutely vital, life-or-death factor for successfully mobilizing financial resources to serve sustainable development objectives. Similarly, Vietnam's contemporary economic communication strategy, which is resolutely directed toward the immense aspiration of achieving a formidable 10% GDP growth rate, is currently employing these

exact cognitive framing analytical tools with exceptional flexibility and tactical precision. This advanced methodological approach successfully transforms traditionally dry and bureaucratic administrative resolutions into an incredibly profound source of inspiration regarding a “new era”, deeply resonating with and actively mobilizing both the international community of institutional investors and the tremendously promising domestic private economic sector.

The extraordinarily powerful resurgence and proliferation of sophisticated digital technologies alongside highly complex social network-based communication models have comprehensively and fundamentally reconfigured the foundational logic governing political interactions on the modern global stage. According to an exceptionally detailed academic analysis detailing the technological expectation life cycle (hype cycle) within contemporary political science published in 2025, the initial waves of utopian optimism regarding the absolute democratization of information sources via the internet have rapidly yielded to significantly more cautious and highly critical perceptions concerning the severe systemic risks associated with large-scale informational manipulation. Contemporary empirical studies focusing on the specialized domain of local government communication conducted by Smalec and colleagues (2025) also place an exceptional degree of emphasis on the paramount importance of social networking platforms functioning as open dialogue ecosystems, which directly and decisively dictate the measurable extent of democratic civic participation. The objective empirical fact that Vietnam officially records an astonishing 73.3% of its population actively utilizing social media constitutes the absolute most robust practical foundation for the state apparatus to proactively govern associated risks and maximally optimize the immense benefits derived from this globally decentralized communication trend.

In addition to these structural technological components, the structural quality of linguistic expression and the profound degree of syntactic complexity embedded within official policy documents have perpetually functioned as a formidable barrier impeding the optimal information reception process among the vast majority of the general public. Exhaustive specialized bibliometric analyses focusing on the intricate domain of policy communication executed by Nordin and colleagues (2025) within the Southeast Asian regional context definitively demonstrate that textual readability and the dense concentration of highly complex technical vocabulary exert a powerfully direct impact on the public's capacity to cognitively absorb and internalize legal regulations. Demonstrating a profoundly deep understanding of this practical reality, the integrated system of mainstream press agencies in Vietnam, operating under the highly strategic guidance of Vietnam Television (VTV), has proactively and comprehensively

innovated their editorial compilation and interpretive methodologies. The critically important documents emanating from the 14th Congress have been subject to a monumental effort to systematically translate them from heavily academic and bureaucratic language into modernized digital content formats and exceptionally intuitive question-and-answer documentary materials, thereby facilitating the seamless penetration of major national policies into every single stratum of the populace.

The rigorous execution of centralized information governance and the exhaustive mitigation of deliberately misleading informational flows within the context of today's highly volatile global economic environment represents a tremendously formidable challenge that is currently capturing the profound and specialized attention of the international research community. The prominent scholar Adiguzel (2025) has persuasively and conclusively demonstrated that throughout periods characterized by severe macroeconomic crises, the highly flexible recalibration of cognitive reference points within economic news broadcasts – heavily imbued with political orientation – functions as an indispensable mechanism explicitly aimed at maximally preserving overarching social stability. Within the sovereign context of Vietnam, the fiercely resolute policy directive advocating for the enhanced regulatory control of informational flows across the cyberspace domain does not merely play a strictly core role in robustly defending national political security; rather, it simultaneously and directly participates in architecting a genuinely stable macroeconomic environment explicitly designed to aggressively attract foreign direct investment (FDI). These tactically refined and highly selective control measures, remarkably analogous to the sophisticated political economy analyses of censorship meticulously articulated by Corduneanu-Huci (2025), are frequently and highly effectively deployed by the administrative governments of transitional economies as a potent mechanism to solidly reinforce and consolidate the centralized executive regulatory capacity of the modern state apparatus.

5. Conclusion

The multidimensional and comprehensive research findings generated within this scholarly work have powerfully and unequivocally affirmed that the exceptionally judicious strategic orientation set forth by the 14th National Congress has genuinely architected a completely comprehensive and systemic breakthrough within the realm of policy communication in Vietnam. Rather than persistently attempting to preserve the inherently antiquated, traditional one-way information dissemination model, the integrated system of the Party and the State is currently undergoing a fiercely decisive structural transition toward a remarkably modernized, highly sensitive, and interactively dynamic governance architecture. This entirely novel governance structure specifically

and unambiguously positions overarching social consensus, the objectively measurable degree of actual civic satisfaction, and an extraordinary level of operational transparency in executive administration as the absolute central metrics utilized for rigorously evaluating functional efficiency. The highly objective statistical data-driven evidence accumulated throughout the year 2024 distinctly and irrefutably indicates that Vietnam currently possesses a digital ecosystem characterized by an exceptionally high degree of technological maturity, which is organically and seamlessly integrated with a vastly expansive internet coverage network and a revolutionary journalistic system that is aggressively accelerating massive capital investments to achieve a comprehensive digital transformation across every conceivable operational dimension.

When executing a profoundly extensive and systematic comparative juxtaposition against the most advanced theoretical frameworks and global academic realities observed throughout the 2023-2025 timeframe, Vietnam's prevailing policy communication strategy demonstrates an extraordinarily rapid capability to synchronously align with the generalized progressive trends currently dominating the global landscape. However, despite having demonstrably achieved these phenomenally remarkable and paradigm-shifting developmental strides, the national communication apparatus must inherently sustain its vigorous efforts to systematically rectify the deeply ingrained and inherent disparities in digitalization capabilities that persist between centrally managed media agencies and the diverse operational units functioning at the localized grassroots levels. The highly strategic developmental trajectory spanning the immediate foreseeable future must place an exceptional degree of prioritized focus on the urgent institutionalization of sophisticated mechanisms designed to actively deploy AI technologies for the intricate analysis of massive user data repositories, thereby cultivating a significantly more profound understanding of the complex and evolving needs of the general public. The unwavering, steadfast, and fiercely decisive realization of the “action-oriented” spirit comprehensively championed by the 14th Party Congress will fundamentally ensure that the vital sector of policy communication effortlessly transcends its conventional role as merely the representative voice of the governing authorities, ultimately evolving to become a genuinely monumental source of endogenous power driving the entire national system forward.

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**MONETARY POLICY AND INFLATION CONTROL IN BRAZIL:
FROM HYPERINFLATION TO INFLATION TARGETING**

This article examines the evolution and effectiveness of Brazil's monetary policy in controlling inflation from the 1990s stabilization to the present. It analyses the transition from hyperinflation to an inflation-targeting regime, emphasizing the roles of institutional reform, central bank credibility, and fiscal-monetary interactions. Using historical evidence and recent data, the study evaluates interest rate policy, expectations formation, and external shocks. The findings indicate substantial gains in price stability but persistent constraints from fiscal pressures, inflation inertia, and exchange-rate volatility, implying that durable stability depends on policy coordination, credible institutions, and structural reforms. Overall, results highlight trade-offs between disinflation, growth, and financial stability in emerging economies contexts.

***Keywords:* Brazil; inflation targeting; monetary policy; central bank credibility; fiscal dominance; Selic rate; macroeconomic stability; emerging markets.**

Throughout its history Brazil was suffering from chronic inflation practically baked into its economic system, it's been so prominent that it defined the macroeconomic challenges in modern economic history. Few economies in the world can claim such experience with dramatic shifts – from chronic hyperinflation in the 1980s and the beginnings of 1990s to somewhat stable under formal inflation-targeting regime in the 21st century. The trajectory that the country has taken might offer a compelling interaction in monetary stabilization, institutional reform, and the complex interaction between fiscal policy, political dynamics and central bank credibility. Thus, it is not only historically significant but also analytically of value to review. (Baer, 2014; Arestis, Ferrari-Filho & Paula, 2011)

During the 1980s, Brazil faced persistent macroeconomic instability characterized by triple – and eventually quadruple – digit annual inflation. Price indexation, large fiscal deficit, weak policy credibility, and repeated failure of stabilization attempts have entrenched this situation for several years to come. (Bacha, 1994; Cardoso, 1992) inflation became so deeply embedded into the mechanisms like contracts, wages, and financial markets that it made stabilization practically non-obtainable goal. This changed by implementing Plano Real in 1994, which introduced new currency – the real – and combined

fiscal adjustments with exchange rates, which allowed to anchor it and create a breathing room for further improvements. (Modiano, 1998; Baer, 2014) this marked structural break in Brazil's inflation dynamic and laid the foundation for modern day monetary governance.

Following the exchange rate crisis of 1999, Brazil Formally adopted an inflation targeting regime Following the exchange rate crisis of 1999, Brazil formally adopted an inflation-targeting regime under the authority of the Central Bank of Brazil. Since then, monetary policy has been conducted primarily through adjustments in the Selic policy interest rate, with inflation expectations and credibility playing central roles in policy transmission (Minella et al., 2003). The adoption of inflation targeting aligned Brazil with a broader international shift toward rule-based monetary frameworks designed to anchor expectations and enhance transparency (Bernanke et al., 1999). Over the past two decades, Brazil has maintained a floating exchange rate system and progressively strengthened its institutional framework, culminating in the formal legal independence of the central bank in 2021. These reforms aimed to reduce political interference and enhance policy credibility (IMF, 2022).

Despite these institutional advancements, Brazil continues to face structural challenges that complicate the conduct of monetary policy. High public debt levels, recurrent fiscal pressures, exchange-rate volatility, and commodity price shocks expose the economy to inflationary risks that are often beyond the immediate control of the central bank (Blanchard, 2004; IMF, 2022). Moreover, the trade-off between controlling inflation and supporting economic growth remains politically contentious. Periods of aggressive monetary tightening, particularly during the 2014-2016 recession and the post-COVID inflation surge, have sparked debate about whether Brazil's interest rates are excessively high relative to its growth potential (Arestis et al., 2011). These tensions raise broader questions about fiscal dominance, policy coordination, and the limits of inflation targeting in emerging markets.

This paper will attempt to examine the evolution and effectiveness of Brazil's monetary policy in controlling inflation from the stabilization period of the 1990s to the present day. It seeks to answer the following central research question: to what extent has Brazil's inflation-targeting regime successfully ensured price stability while balancing the objectives of economic growth and financial stability? The study first reviews Brazil's historical inflation crisis and the structural reforms that followed. It then analyses the operational framework of monetary policy under inflation targeting, including interest rate dynamics, credibility formation and the role of expectations. Finally, it critically evaluates the fiscal, political and external constraints that shape the effectiveness of monetary policy in Brazil.

The study argues that while Brazil's monetary policy framework has been largely successful in preventing a return to hyperinflation, its effectiveness remains conditional upon fiscal discipline and institutional credibility. The Brazilian experience illustrates both the achievements and the inherent limitations of inflation targeting in an emerging economy subject to structural vulnerabilities and political pressures.

Evaluating the success of Brazil's monetary policy requires a nuanced view of its twin objectives: maintaining inflation near target levels and supporting sustainable economic growth. Since the adoption of the inflation-targeting regime and the formalization of a floating exchange rate, the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) has largely succeeded in fundamental price stabilization compared with earlier decades of hyperinflation. Nonetheless, recent experience highlights challenges in anchoring inflation expectations, managing inflation persistence, and balancing the costs of high interest rates with macroeconomic growth.

One clear indicator of policy success is the long-term reduction in inflation volatility and the anchoring of inflation expectations. After decades of chronic inflation, Brazil has since the late 1990s averaged significantly lower annual inflation rates, reducing macroeconomic uncertainty and building credibility for the monetary authority. Inflation targeting has contributed to this stability by providing a transparent and rule-based framework for setting monetary policy, and the Selic rate has become the primary instrument through which the BCB influences aggregate demand and inflation expectations (Minella et al. 2003; Corecon-SP 2025). From a longer historical perspective, this representational shift demonstrates a substantial departure from the policy instability of the pre-Real era.

However, recent inflation outcomes and market expectations illustrate shortcomings in fully achieving price stability within target bands. Throughout 2025, Brazil's official inflation rate (IPCA) repeatedly exceeded the upper bound of the target band, set at 4.5 per cent, underscoring persistent inflationary pressures that monetary policy struggled to neutralise swiftly (Agência Brasil 2025; Reuters 2025). These outcomes suggest that inflation dynamics have been more persistent and less responsive to monetary tightening than in simpler theoretical models. One contributing factor is inflation inertia, where past inflation feeds into future price setting through wages, contracts, and broader expectations, a pattern particularly relevant in emerging markets with extensive indexation traditions.

Part of this persistence can be attributed to structural and external forces beyond the direct control of the BCB. Commodity price fluctuations, exchange rate pass-through, and global supply chain disruptions have all complicated the inflation-targeting framework's ability to precisely calibrate

policy. When inflation unexpectedly exceeded target ceilings, even amid restrictive monetary stances, it highlighted the challenges central banks face in isolating domestic inflation drivers from global shocks. Moreover, inflation expectations appear to remain elevated at times, which constrains the BCB's ability to reduce real interest rates without risking a resurgence in price pressures.

Another dimension of the evaluation involves the costs associated with high interest rates. In an effort to curb inflation, the Selic rate in 2025 was maintained at historically high levels, around 15 per cent, to counter inflation above the target and reduce inflationary expectations (Reuters 2025; Agência Brasil 2025). While this restrictive stance contributed to moderating price growth, it simultaneously raised borrowing costs, dampened investment, and weighed on aggregate demand. Industrial and business associations have criticized this approach, arguing that high interest rates “suffocate the economy” and isolate Brazil in the global context by imposing higher real interest burdens than many peer economies (CNI 2025). These points reflect broader academic concerns that excessively tight monetary policy can suppress economic activity disproportionately, creating a trade-off between price stability and growth outcomes.

From a fiscal-monetary coordination perspective, Brazil's elevated public debt also complicates the evaluation of monetary success. High debt levels can exert upward pressure on interest rates and reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy, a phenomenon known as fiscal dominance. Analysts have cautioned that without credible fiscal adjustment, the central bank's efforts could be undermined as markets demand higher yields to compensate for sovereign risk, thereby elevating inflationary pressures irrespective of policy tightening (UOL 2025). This dynamic suggests that even a technically competent monetary regime may produce suboptimal outcomes if fiscal policy remains misaligned.

Beyond raw inflation figures and interest rates, there is also the question of distributional and broader welfare impacts. High interest rates disproportionately affect lower-income households and small businesses, which have less access to credit and savings buffers. While price stability benefits all economic agents in principle, the short-term costs of high interest rates, particularly in an environment of weak demand, may exacerbate inequality or slow labor market recovery. Critics argue that central banks should integrate consideration of real economic conditions, such as employment and growth, more explicitly into their frameworks to avoid undue harm to vulnerable segments of the population.

Despite these challenges, there are emerging signs that inflation may be gradually converging toward target bands more consistently. Projections

anchored in the market's Financial Focus surveys suggest that inflation expectations are forecast to approach the target range in coming years, remitting some pressure on the central bank to maintain extreme policy tightness (Agência Brasil 2025; Reuters 2025). If realized, this would represent a partial validation of the inflation-targeting regime's credibility and signaling capacity – that markets trust future inflation to align with objectives.

In sum, Brazil's monetary policy can be deemed partially successful in its historical achievement of price stabilization relative to its pre-1999 performance, and in establishing a transparent institutional framework. Yet, recent evidence suggests that challenges remain in fully anchoring inflation expectations, responding efficiently to external economic shocks, and striking an optimal balance between controlling prices and supporting growth. Furthermore, the interplay between monetary restrictions and fiscal dynamics implies that monetary policy alone cannot deliver sustained macroeconomic stability without complementary fiscal reforms. Ultimately, Brazil's experience illustrates that inflation targeting can provide a robust foundation for price stability, but its effectiveness is conditioned by broader structural, fiscal, and global economic factors.

Brazil's experience with inflation and monetary policy represents one of the most striking macroeconomic transformations among emerging economies. From the hyperinflationary crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s to the institutionalized inflation-targeting framework of the twenty-first century, the country has undergone a profound shift in both policy design and macroeconomic stability. The introduction of the Plano Real marked a decisive break with chronic inflation inertia, while the subsequent adoption of inflation targeting under the Central Bank of Brazil established a rule-based and increasingly transparent monetary regime. Over time, this institutional framework has significantly reduced inflation volatility and anchored expectations more effectively than in previous decades.

The analysis presented in this paper suggests that Brazil's monetary policy has been historically successful in achieving its most fundamental objective: preventing a return to hyperinflation and preserving macroeconomic credibility. Compared to the instability of the pre-1994 period, inflation levels since the introduction of inflation targeting have remained considerably lower and more predictable. The development of clear communication strategies, forward guidance mechanisms, and the formal legal independence of the central bank in 2021 further strengthened institutional credibility. These reforms have aligned Brazil with international best practices in central banking and enhanced its capacity to manage inflation expectations.

However, the evaluation also demonstrates that success has been conditional rather than absolute. Episodes of inflation overshooting, particularly during periods of external shocks such as commodity price fluctuations and post-pandemic global supply disruptions, reveal the limits of monetary control in an open emerging economy. Exchange rate volatility and inflation pass-through continue to complicate policy transmission, especially given Brazil's exposure to global capital flows and commodity markets. As such, the inflation-targeting regime, while structurally sound, operates within an environment of heightened vulnerability to external disturbances.

Moreover, the persistent tension between price stability and economic growth remains a central challenge. The use of high Selic interest rates to re-anchor inflation expectations has often generated substantial short-term costs in terms of reduced investment, slower output growth and higher borrowing burdens. Although restrictive monetary policy has generally succeeded in curbing inflationary pressures, it has also reinforced concerns regarding Brazil's chronically low growth trajectory and elevated real interest rates. This trade-off underscores the structural complexity of macroeconomic management in emerging markets, where financial stability, fiscal sustainability and development objectives intersect.

A further limitation arises from fiscal-monetary interactions. High public debt levels and recurrent fiscal pressures increase risk premiums and may weaken the effectiveness of monetary tightening, particularly if markets perceive insufficient fiscal discipline. The presence of fiscal dominance risks implies that monetary policy cannot operate in isolation. Without credible fiscal consolidation and institutional coordination, inflation expectations may remain partially unanchored, forcing the central bank to maintain higher interest rates for longer periods. Therefore, the sustainability of Brazil's price stability achievements depends not solely on monetary discipline but also on complementary fiscal reforms and policy coherence.

Despite these challenges, Brazil's monetary regime demonstrates resilience. The institutional architecture built since 1999, including inflation targeting, exchange rate flexibility and central bank independence, has provided a robust foundation for macroeconomic management. Importantly, the credibility accumulated over two decades has helped prevent destabilizing shifts in expectations, even during periods of political pressure and economic uncertainty. This suggests that while inflation may temporarily exceed target ranges, the broader framework retains sufficient institutional strength to prevent systemic breakdown.

Ultimately, Brazil's monetary policy can be characterized as a qualified success. It has decisively eliminated hyperinflation and embedded a modern central banking framework capable of managing complex macroeconomic

shocks. However, its effectiveness remains constrained by structural features of the Brazilian economy: fiscal fragility, inflation inertia, external vulnerability and historically high real interest rates. The Brazilian case thus illustrates a broader lesson for emerging markets: inflation targeting is a powerful stabilization tool, but its long-term success depends on institutional credibility, fiscal sustainability and structural reform.

Looking forward, sustained price stability in Brazil will require continued commitment to central bank independence, improved fiscal coordination and policies that enhance productivity and reduce structural rigidities. If these complementary reforms are implemented effectively, Brazil's monetary framework can not only preserve stability but also support stronger and more inclusive economic growth. In this sense, the country's experience offers both a model of stabilization achievement and a reminder that monetary policy, while essential, is only one component of a broader macroeconomic strategy.

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THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION AND THE LABOUR MARKET ON TURKEY'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC POTENTIAL

Abstract

In today's globalised world, international migration and labour market changes are important factors in determining countries' foreign economic potential. At this stage in the development of the global economy, Turkey is undergoing a dynamic transformation of its economic model, positioning itself as a leading regional hub. The state of the labour market and complex migration processes are the key factors determining the trajectory of this development. Between 2025 and 2026, Turkey is facing a dual challenge in which, on the one hand, it remains one of the world's largest centres for hosting refugees, with over 3 million people and, on the other, it faces an acute shortage of highly skilled workers in the high-tech, renewable energy and aerospace sectors. Understanding how these demographic and structural shifts affect Turkey's ability to attract foreign direct investment and build export capacity is critical to predicting the country's future role in global value chains.

Keywords: Turkey, investment climate, brain drain, FDI, migration processes, economic transformation, International Labour Migration.

Introduction

In the context of globalization, migration processes and labour market dynamics play a crucial role in shaping a country's foreign economic potential. The movement of labour across borders, along with changes in employment structure and workforce composition, directly affects economic growth, competitiveness, and international integration. Turkey represents a unique case, as it functions both as a source and a destination of migration. Large inflows of migrants, including refugees, alongside a dynamic and relatively young labour force, significantly influence the country's labour market and economic performance.

Methods

This study is based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods, ensuring a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between migration, the labour market, and Turkey's foreign economic potential. The research relies on secondary data analysis, drawing from reports of international organizations such as the OECD and the European Commission, as well as academic publications and policy papers (e.g.,

SAYARI, 1986; OECD, 2024; European Commission, 2023). These sources provide reliable statistical data on migration flows, employment indicators, and economic performance. A comparative analysis method is applied to examine changes in migration trends and labour market indicators over time, as well as their impact on foreign economic activity. In addition, a descriptive approach is used to outline key characteristics of Turkey's migration policies, labour market structure, and institutional framework (Migration Governance Overview, 2018; Employment and Skills Strategies in Turkey, 2017). The study also employs a systemic approach, allowing migration processes and labour market dynamics to be analyzed as interconnected elements influencing external economic outcomes, such as foreign direct investment, trade performance, and international cooperation (Bayram et al., 2021; Özdemir, 2024). Furthermore, elements of policy analysis are incorporated to assess migration governance, including the EU–Turkey cooperation framework and national regulatory mechanisms (European Commission, 2016; Zaun & Püttmann, 2025).

Main Material Presentation

Throughout the 1960s, unemployment increased. Unemployment was one of the main issues on the agenda. The solution to this problem was state-sponsored labour emigration and formal agreements between the Turkish state and industrialised countries that needed labour. The developed countries needed labour. It was at this time that the first mass immigration of Turkish and Muslim populations across the border, with labour migration mainly to Europe, was observed (SAYARI, 1986). In the 1980s the Turkish migration regime changed drastically as a result of a transition in migration patterns and the transformations in the social, cultural and economic environment. Kurds, and left-wing activists migrated to Europe, especially Germany, Sweden, and the UK. The early signs of a changing policy in the area of immigration are becoming increasingly apparent and the EU has been an important driving force since the early 2000s. Although Turkey began formal EU accession negotiations in 2005, this did not grant freedom of movement like it does for full EU members. Turks after these events mainly migrated through systems such as training programmes (Erasmus+) and family reunification. Mostly from 2004 to the present day, the migration pattern has been labelled as brain drain (Türkiye 2023 report - enlargement and eastern neighbourhood 2023) (International migration outlook 2024: Türkiye | OECD 2024). In this section, we will examine the general state of the labour market, in which we review graphs showing the causes and trends over 10-15 years. Let's look at Figure 1, which shows the total unemployment rate working-age population: 15-24 years old for Turkey in (January 2019-January 2025). This is significant

because youth unemployment directly affects economic growth, productivity, and the country's long-term development potential.




Figure 1. Unemployment rate of Working-Age Population Total: From 15-24 Years for Turkey (January 2019 – January 2025)*

**Source: TURKSTAT, Labour Force Statistics.*

The data represents the unemployment rate in percentage, of the working-age population (15-24 years) in Turkey. The period covers January 2019 to January 2025. Over this period, the unemployment rate dropped significantly, falling from 26.8% in January 2019 to 15.9% in January 2025, a decrease of almost 11 percentage. Let's analyse the potential reasons behind this trend. Initially, Turkey's GDP growth and increased industrial production contributed to the decline in the unemployment rate by creating new jobs, particularly in sectors such as manufacturing, services, and technology. Secondly, following the pandemic, there has been a significant improvement in the employment rate as economic activity has recovered. Thirdly, labour market regulations and employment support programmes may have contributed to job creation and labour force participation. Fourthly, demographic and structural changes have played a role. These include changes in the composition of the labour force, such as migration trends and informal employment. Lastly, growth in key industries such as technology, digital services, and exports has enabled a larger share of the working-age population to be absorbed (Labour Force Statistics, February 2025) (Güler et al., 2024). When examining youth employment figures, it is important to look at the bigger picture and also consider unemployment. The unemployment rate of the working-age population aged 15–24 in Turkey for the period from January 2019 to January 2025 is presented in Figure 2. This indicator was selected for analysis because it reflects the level of youth integration into the labor market and allows for the identification of key employment challenges.




Figure 2. Turkish employment of Working-Age Population Total: From 15-24 Years for Turkey (January 2019- January 2025)*

**Source: (Turkstat, 2025).*

Turkey's youth employment rate (ages 15-24) has shown a steady increase over the years. In January 2019, it was 31.1%, rising to 32.0% in 2020 youth employment was rising, indicating stable economic conditions. However, it declined to 30.3% in 2021, likely due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The rate rebounded to 32.8% in 2022 and saw strong growth, reaching 35.9% in 2023. The upward trend continued with 36.8% in 2024 and a projected 39.5% in 2025, marking the highest level in the dataset. This indicates economic recovery, better job opportunities, and possibly effective government policies, though sustained efforts in education, training, and economic stability remain crucial.

The available labour pool for is supported by Turkey's large working-age population of approximately 87.5 million. While the general labour force participation rate stands at 53.2%, the specific labour demand for park construction is supported by the high availability of migrant workers, who are heavily concentrated in the construction and agricultural sectors, ensuring a steady supply of manual labour for infrastructure development (Population structure by gender and age-group, annual, 1950-2050 2024). Turkish government in order to cope with problems on the labour market has launched a series of programmes that are designed to reduce disparities between regions, including a comprehensive incentive structure involving tax cuts, tax breaks and write-offs designed to promote investment and employment generation in relatively less developed regions. For example, the regional competitiveness operational programme, managed by the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology. The programme includes support for transition and institution building, regional and cross-border cooperation, and regional, rural and human resource development. For example, the strengthening vocational and technical education and training (SVET) project, which ran from 2002 to

2007, addressed the mismatch between education and training programmes and the needs of the labour market, which was later transformed into a (VET) programme for labour market policies (ALMP), with a strong focus on skills upgrading (training, entrepreneurship, on-the-job training and placement), which was adopted and made increasingly sensitive to the needs of specific groups" (Employment and Skills Strategies in Turkey 2017). Some programmes have been implemented to address youth and women's employment. Programs for digitalisation and the future of work were supported by the government to create better prospects for the country (Employment and Skills Strategies in Turkey 2017).

For decades, Turkey has served as a primary transit hub for migrants and refugees seeking to enter the European Union. Migrants from countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and various African nations often travel through Turkey in hopes of reaching Europe (Özdemir, 2024). Turkey is also an active player in global migration governance, participating in initiatives such as the Global Compact for Migration (2018) and collaborating with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on refugee protection and integration. In recent years, Turkey has also evolved into a destination country. It currently hosts the largest refugee population in the world (Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement – Questions and Answers 2016). To better understand the broader context of Turkey's emigration trends, the following Figure 3, which makes it advisable to move on to analysing the total number of international migrants in the period 1990–2024.




Figure 3. Total number of international migrants 1990-2024*

**Source: (Global Migration Data Portal 2025).*

The data presented on the total number of international migrants worldwide in 1990–2024 reflects a steady long-term global trend toward growth in international migration. Moderate growth was observed between 1990 and 2000 (from 153.9 to 174.6 million). This was due to the active phase of globalization, when international travel and relocation for work became more accessible (Savcı et al., 2024). From 2000 to 2010, we see an

acceleration in growth, with an increase of almost 46 million (to 221 million). The reasons for this were the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which caused the first major waves of refugees in the 21st century, as well as the reduction in the cost of air travel and the rise of the internet, which made it easier for people to find work abroad and stay in touch with their families. The trend gained momentum between 2010 and 2015, with a jump of 29 million in just five years (to 250 million). The Syrian crisis served as a catalyst, leading to the largest refugee crisis since World War II, which significantly affected statistics, especially in Turkey and Europe (Zaun & Püttmann, 2025). Already in 2015 to 2024, we are seeing an increase to 304 million. This contributes to the continuation of conflicts in neighboring countries. Turkey has developed a range of migration policies, visa programs, and bilateral agreements to manage labour mobility in response to both regional migration pressures and domestic labour market needs. One of the laws enacted to support migrants. It is the International Labour Force Law No. 6735. This law, adopted in 2016, regulates the employment of foreign nationals in Turkey by defining procedures for work permits and exemptions. It aims to attract skilled foreign labour and bring it in line with international standards. The foreign work permits under Turkish law are mainly classified in two categories: Permits for work under an employment contract and independent work permits. Turkey maintains formal bilateral labour agreements with countries including Germany, France, the Netherlands, Libya, Jordan, Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Belgium, and Qatar, facilitating labour mobility and cooperation. In terms of visa policy, Turkey operates a flexible e-visa system for short-term stays and has bilateral visa exemption agreements with several countries, especially in Central Asia and the Balkans, to facilitate easier labour migration. (Migration governance overview: The Republic of Turkey 2018) (General aspects of foreign work permits under Turkish law)

Migration has profoundly influenced Turkey's economy, social structures, and cultural landscape. On one hand, migrant labour especially from Syria and Afghanistan has been crucial in filling labour shortages in low-skilled, informal sectors such as agriculture, construction, and textile manufacturing. Migrants with capital funds to invest in Turkey has made relatively large contribution to investment in Turkey. Religious and ethnic pluralism has also increased, with the presence of Arab, Kurdish, Afghan, African, and Yazidi communities adding new layers to Turkey's demographic landscape. On the other hand, migration has posed significant challenges to social cohesion in Turkey. While early public reactions to Syrian refugees were marked by humanitarian solidarity, over time tensions have grown, especially in urban and economically disadvantaged areas (Bayram et al., 2021). Turkey's migration policy and labour market will evolve in response to

global economic changes, technological advances and changing migration trends. Turkey's labour market is likely to continue to benefit from the demand for low-cost labour in certain sectors, particularly agriculture, construction and textiles. However, as global supply chains shift, Turkey may face increasing competition from other emerging economies, such as those in Southeast Asia, for access to European and Middle Eastern markets. Turkey's reliance on migrant labour, particularly from countries such as Syria and Afghanistan, could pose long-term risks if demand for labour in traditional sectors declines due to automation, outsourcing or an economic slowdown in Europe (The evolving approach to refugee protection in Turkey: Assessing the practical and political needs - türkiye 2016).

Results

The analysis shows that Turkey's labour market and migration dynamics significantly impact its foreign economic potential. Youth employment has steadily improved in line with economic recovery and growth in key sectors such as manufacturing and digital services, as well as due to effective government employment policies. Migration plays a dual role: on the one hand, the country hosts a large refugee population, providing a low-cost labour force for sectors such as construction, agriculture and textiles and supporting export competitiveness. On the other hand, the outflow of highly skilled workers, such as brain drain, limits development in high-tech and innovation-driven industries. Government programmes, including vocational training, regional development incentives and youth and women's employment initiatives, have improved workforce participation and skill alignment. Overall, these factors demonstrate that Turkey has leveraged migration and labour market conditions to bolster its export capacity and attract foreign investment. However, retaining high-skilled talent remains essential for sustained foreign economic growth.

Discussion

The study shows that migration and labour market dynamics are key factors in shaping Turkey's foreign economic potential. Improvements in youth employment and workforce participation demonstrate the potential of government policies and structural reforms to support economic growth and enhance competitiveness. While migrant labour provides a low-cost workforce for export-oriented sectors, the emigration of skilled workers can limit innovation and development in high-tech industries, making migration both an asset and a challenge. Effective labour market and migration policies, including training programmes and regulatory frameworks, are essential to balancing these effects.

Conclusion

The research shows that Turkey's foreign economic potential is increasingly influenced by changes to its labour market and migration patterns rather than by geography alone. Between 2019 and 2025, the country achieved a significant reduction in youth unemployment (falling from 26.8% to 15.9%), reflecting structural improvements and a gradual shift towards higher-value sectors, such as technology and digital services. At the same time, migration has become an important economic asset. By hosting a large refugee population and implementing regulatory frameworks such as Law No. 6735, Turkey has maintained a competitive, low-cost labour force to support export-oriented industries, particularly in construction, textiles, and manufacturing. However, the ongoing 'brain drain' of highly skilled workers remains a key structural challenge, limiting innovation capacity and slowing the transition towards a knowledge-based economy. Overall, Turkey has managed to convert migration pressures into short-term economic advantages, but its long-term foreign economic potential depends on its ability to retain and develop high-skilled human capital. However, the sustainability of these gains and the realisation of the country's full foreign economic potential depend on its ability to develop, retain and utilise human capital effectively at all skill levels. This ensures that both low-cost and high-skilled labour contribute to long-term economic transformation and global competitiveness.

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THE DUTCH TRADE MODEL AND MARKET ENTRY DYNAMICS IN AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY SPARE PARTS

Abstract

This paper analyses the structural characteristics of the Dutch trade model and their implications for the agricultural machinery spare parts market. It highlights the Netherlands' role as a major re-export hub and examines how trade fragmentation, logistics efficiency, and macroeconomic trends influence market conditions. The study finds that despite increasing exposure to global trade disruptions, the agricultural aftermarket remains resilient due to counter-cyclical demand and rapid adoption of precision farming technologies. Successful market entry depends not on price competitiveness but on logistics speed, technical compatibility, and alignment with digital and sustainable agricultural practices.

Keywords: *Netherlands, trade model, re-exports, agricultural machinery, spare parts, precision agriculture, aftermarket, trade fragmentation.*

Introduction

The Netherlands is, by almost any measure, an outlier among European economies. A country of 17 million people ranks fourth globally in goods exports, holds the second-largest outward foreign direct investment stock in the world, and operates the logistics infrastructure, Rotterdam, Schiphol, and a dense multimodal network, through which a substantial share of Europe's commerce physically passes. This disproportionate position is not accidental. It reflects centuries of deliberate specialisation in intermediation, a model in which the Netherlands earns as much from moving and processing other countries' goods as from producing its own. Nearly half of Dutch goods exports in 2024 were re-exports, products that entered the country, underwent minimal transformation, and were shipped onward.

This trade architecture has profound implications that extend well beyond headline GDP figures. It means the Dutch economy is unusually sensitive to disruptions in global supply chains, unusually dependent on the regulatory coherence of the EU single market, and unusually exposed to the kind of trade fragmentation that has accelerated since 2022. When the United States imposes tariffs, when China retaliates against semiconductor export controls, or when post-Brexit friction slows cross-channel flows, the Netherlands feels the effects more acutely than economies with a more self-

contained production base. The April 2025 US tariff package alone could reduce Dutch GDP growth by a full percentage point in 2026, a figure that captures not just direct bilateral exposure but the systemic drag of reduced global trade volumes on a logistics-dependent economy.

Statement of Purpose

The paper pursues three connected objectives. First, it traces the macroeconomic trajectory of the Netherlands over 2010-2025, with particular attention to the structural features, the re-export model, the current account surplus, and the trade geography that distinguish the Dutch economy from its European peers. Second, it analyses how the current period of trade fragmentation, driven by US tariff escalation, semiconductor export controls, and post-Brexit friction, is reshaping the risk profile of this trade-dependent model. Third, it evaluates the Dutch agricultural machinery spare parts market as a specific case study, examining whether the combination of counter-cyclical demand, precision farming adoption, and the country's logistics advantages creates a viable entry opportunity for specialised manufacturers.

Presentation of Research Results

The Dutch economy averaged 1.6% annual real GDP growth over the 2010–2025 period (CBS, 2026), a figure that looks unremarkable until you examine the volatility underneath it. The economy contracted in only two years, 2012 and 2020, but the character of each downturn reveals something important about how the Netherlands absorbs shocks. The 2012 contraction was a product of the Eurozone crisis and domestic fiscal austerity, a slow-burn episode that pushed unemployment to 8.4% and took several years to fully reverse (IMF, 2014).

The 2020 contraction, by contrast, was sharp but shallow. GDP fell 3.9%, less than the EU average, because the Dutch government deployed a €13.2 billion wage subsidy programme that effectively paid businesses to keep workers on payroll rather than lay them off. This points to a broader pattern. The Netherlands has become better, over time, at cushioning demand-side shocks, but remains fundamentally exposed to supply-side and trade-route disruptions that its domestic policy tools cannot easily address (Fig. 1).

The post-pandemic period illustrates this vulnerability clearly. Growth surged to 6.3% in 2021 as pent-up demand collided with reopening, but the 2022 energy shock then hit the Netherlands harder than most of its neighbours. The country hosts the TTF natural gas hub, Europe's benchmark pricing point, which meant that the spike in wholesale gas prices fed into domestic costs with unusual speed and intensity. Consequently, inflation reached 10% in 2022, its highest level in four decades (CBS Statline, 2026), driven

predominantly by energy and food prices rather than by domestic wage pressures. The speed of the inflation spike and its subsequent decline illustrate a pattern characteristic of transit economies, because the Netherlands imports, processes, and re-exports vast quantities of goods, global commodity price movements are transmitted into domestic consumer prices with exceptional speed.



Fig. 1. Real GDP growth in the Netherlands, 2010-2025*

**Source: (CBS, 2026).*

The same mechanism works in reverse. Disinflation has been rapid, with CPI falling to 3.3% by 2024, but the asymmetry matters because the inflationary burst was concentrated in essential categories that disproportionately affected lower-income households (Fig. 2).



Fig. 2. CPI inflation in the Netherlands, 2010-2025*

**Source: (Statistics Netherlands, 2024b).*

The labour market tells a complementary story. Negotiated wages rose by 6.1% in 2024, the largest annual increase in over forty years (Statistics Netherlands, 2024b), a delayed response to the 2022-2023 cost-of-living squeeze. Yet this wage growth coincided with a further decline in labour productivity. GDP per hour worked has grown at just 0.2% annually since 2014, compared to 0.8% in the preceding decade (Statistics Netherlands, 2025). The 2016-2019 expansion was driven almost entirely by adding more workers and more hours rather than by producing more per hour. With unemployment now hovering near 3.7% and the participation rate close to its ceiling, this model of growth has essentially run its course. The Netherlands can no longer simply hire its way to higher output, which is why productivity stagnation has emerged as the central challenge facing the Dutch economy over the medium term (OECD, 2024). For the agricultural machinery sector, this labour squeeze has a direct consequence. Farmers face increasing difficulty finding seasonal and permanent workers, which accelerates the substitution toward mechanisation and precision technology and, by extension, increases demand for the spare parts that keep that technology running.

The trade numbers are where the Dutch model becomes most distinctive. Total goods exports reached €666.5 billion in 2024, but the composition matters far more than the total. Domestic exports accounted for just over half of that figure, while the remaining €331 billion consisted of re-exports, goods that pass through Dutch logistics infrastructure with minimal processing before being shipped to their final destination (CBS, 2025). This re-export intensity varies dramatically by trading partner. Roughly 60% of goods exported to Germany and 55% of those to Belgium are re-exports, while the share drops to 30% for the United States and just 16% for China. In other words, the Netherlands serves a fundamentally different function depending on who it is trading with. For its immediate neighbours it is primarily a distribution hub, whereas for more distant markets it functions as a producer-exporter in its own right (Fig. 3).

This distinction has real consequences for how trade disruptions ripple through the economy. The fastest export growth over 2015–2024 came from the United States, where Dutch shipments more than doubled from €17.5 billion to €38.2 billion, driven by pharmaceuticals, technology products, and ASML's lithography equipment. Meanwhile, exports to the United Kingdom, historically the Netherlands' fourth-largest market, grew more slowly than to any other top-five partner, a trajectory that aligns precisely with the introduction of post-Brexit customs friction (Statistics Netherlands, 2024a). The implication is that even modest increases in trade barriers can measurably redirect Dutch export flows, and the current environment of escalating tariffs

and export controls is likely to produce further geographic reshuffling in the years ahead.




Fig. 3. Exports partners of the Netherlands by trading partner, billion euros*

**Source: (CBS,2025).*

The current account provides perhaps the clearest lens through which to understand the structural health of the Dutch trade model. The Netherlands has maintained a persistent current account surplus throughout the entire 2010-2024 period, but the composition of that surplus has shifted in revealing ways. The goods balance has remained consistently large, averaging around €8 billion per year, reflecting both strong domestic production and the value-added margin on re-exports. Services trade, historically a modest contributor, turned significantly positive after 2019 as the Netherlands expanded its role in business services, intellectual property licensing, and digital platform hosting. Primary income flows, profits repatriated by Dutch multinationals and earnings on the country's large outward investment stock, have meanwhile become the largest single component of the surplus, peaking at €10.2 billion in 2021 (CBS, 2026). What this means is that the Dutch economy earns from the rest of the world through three distinct channels: goods, services, and capital returns (Fig. 4). This diversification provides a degree of resilience that the headline trade figures alone do not capture.

The investment dimension of the Dutch model further reinforces this picture. The Netherlands holds the second-largest outward FDI stock in the world, a position that reflects the country's historical role as a gateway for multinational corporate structures. Inward FDI is equally substantial, with the Netherlands consistently ranking among the top five global recipients (UNCTAD, 2024). Much of this investment is channelled through special

purpose entities, holding companies that use the Netherlands as a jurisdictional base for tax and treaty reasons. However, beneath the financial engineering lies a genuine productive economy that attracts investment in logistics, food processing, advanced manufacturing, and technology. The practical consequence for the agricultural machinery sector is that the Netherlands offers not just a consumer market but an investment platform. A supplier that establishes a distribution presence in the country gains access simultaneously to the Dutch treaty network, the EU single market, and the physical infrastructure of Europe's densest logistics corridor (Port of Rotterdam, 2021).




Fig. 4. Current account balance by component in the Netherlands, billion euros*

**Source: Bank, 2025.*

The agricultural component of Dutch trade deserves particular attention. Agricultural exports reached €128.9 billion in 2024, making the Netherlands the world's second-largest food exporter behind only the United States, a remarkable position for a country roughly the size of Maryland. It reflects a farming system that has been optimised for decades around intensive greenhouse production, precision inputs, and deep integration into European supply chains. The trade surplus in agricultural goods alone reached €42.8 billion, a figure that exceeds the total GDP of many smaller European nations. Furthermore, the Netherlands is increasingly exporting not just agricultural products but agricultural technology, with greenhouse equipment and machinery exports reaching €12.4 billion in 2024, adding an industrial dimension to what was already one of the world's most productive farming sectors (Wageningen Social & Economic Research, 2024).

The risks facing this trade model have intensified markedly since 2022, and three vectors of disruption stand out. The first is US tariff policy. The April 2025 tariff package could reduce Dutch GDP growth by approximately one percentage point in 2026, operating primarily through the indirect channel of reduced global trade volumes rather than through direct bilateral exposure alone (DNB, 2025). The second is the semiconductor export control regime, which has forced the Netherlands into an uncomfortable position between its largest technology company and its most important security ally. ASML's revenues from China fell from approximately 50% of total sales to around 25% following the expansion of Dutch export controls on DUV lithography equipment in January 2025, a contraction that illustrates how quickly geopolitical pressure can reshape the commercial position of even the most dominant technology firms (Sterling, 2025). A company that contributes roughly 0.5% of Dutch GDP and employs around 22,000 people domestically is thus directly in the crosshairs of great-power competition, with limited ability to insulate itself from decisions made in Washington and Beijing (OECD, 2024). The third is the structural legacy of Brexit, which has created a permanent drag on trade with the United Kingdom and serves as a reminder that even partial fragmentation of the single market carries measurable, lasting costs for an economy whose prosperity depends on frictionless cross-border flows.

These three pressures do not operate in isolation. They compound one another in ways that are specific to the Dutch model. Tariff escalation reduces global trade volumes, which depresses throughput at Rotterdam and Schiphol, the physical infrastructure on which the re-export economy depends. Export controls on semiconductors constrain the technology sector that has been the fastest-growing contributor to domestic exports. Post-Brexit friction, meanwhile, demonstrates that regulatory divergence, even within a broadly aligned set of economies, imposes permanent costs on a country whose competitive advantage rests on the seamless movement of goods across borders. It is therefore unsurprising that 85% of Dutch firms now rank geopolitical uncertainty among their top business risks, the highest proportion in the EU (EIB, 2025). For an economy that has spent decades building prosperity on the assumption of ever-freer trade, the current environment represents not merely a cyclical challenge but a potential structural inflection point, one that will test whether the Dutch model is adaptive enough to preserve its advantages in a world that is becoming demonstrably less open.

It is within this macroeconomic and trade context that the Dutch agricultural machinery spare parts market must be understood. The market was valued at \$948.3 million in 2024 and is projected to grow at a compound annual rate of 2.5% through 2033, a modest but steady trajectory that reflects

the sector's counter-cyclical character and its insulation from the trade volatility that affects other parts of the Dutch economy (Grand View Research, 2025). These are modest growth rates by any standard, but they mask a qualitative shift in what the market actually demands. The traditional aftermarket, replacement belts, filters, and hydraulic components, is being progressively overlaid with a precision agriculture layer that requires spare parts incorporating electronics, sensors, and connectivity modules. This shift is already well underway, with over 40% of Dutch farmers now using GPS-guided equipment and soil sensors, a penetration rate that is among the highest in Europe (Geetanshi, 2024). This creates a structurally different spare parts demand profile compared to markets where farming remains less technology-intensive, and it means that suppliers entering the Dutch market must be prepared to support not just mechanical components but increasingly complex integrated systems.

What makes the Dutch case distinctive within Europe is not merely the size of the agricultural machinery market but its technological maturity. Precision agriculture adoption in the Netherlands significantly outpaces the EU average. While only 20-25% of EU farms use any form of precision technology, the Dutch penetration rate exceeds 40% and is approaching 50% in the high-value greenhouse and dairy subsectors (Geetanshi, 2024). This gap is explained partly by farm economics, as Dutch farms are among the most capital-intensive in Europe with average output per hectare roughly five times the EU mean, and partly by the country's dense agricultural knowledge infrastructure. The practical implication for spare parts suppliers is that the Dutch market serves as an early indicator of where the rest of European agriculture is heading. The parts that Dutch farmers demand today will be demanded across the continent within a decade.

The market structure reinforces this dynamic. It is dominated by the usual global players, John Deere, AGCO, CNH Industrial, and the Kubota-owned Kverneland Group, which maintains production facilities in the Netherlands. These manufacturers keep tight control over their dealer networks, and brand loyalty among Dutch farmers is strong. Nevertheless, the aftermarket segment, spare parts and maintenance rather than new equipment sales, is the fastest-growing category in the sector, driven by farmers choosing to extend the life of existing machinery rather than commit to large capital investments during periods of uncertainty (IBISWorld, 2026). This counter-cyclical characteristic is significant. Spare parts demand remains relatively stable even when new equipment sales contract, providing a more predictable revenue base for suppliers who can establish themselves in the market before the next downturn arrives.

The connection between the macro-level trade disruptions discussed earlier and this specific market segment is not abstract. When tariff uncertainty discourages capital expenditure, farmers postpone purchases of new tractors, harvesters, and tillage equipment, which directly increases demand for replacement parts for existing machinery. When labour shortages push wages higher, farmers invest in automation and precision technology, which creates demand for a new category of technologically sophisticated spare parts. And when inflation squeezes farm margins, the economic logic of repair over replacement becomes even more compelling. In this sense, the very macroeconomic pressures that threaten the Dutch trade model as a whole actually strengthen the business case for the agricultural machinery aftermarket.

Barriers to entry, however, are real and should not be underestimated. Technical specifications are demanding, particularly for parts compatible with precision agriculture systems where tolerances are tight and electronic integration is essential. The regulatory environment adds further complexity, as EU emissions standards for non-road machinery impose progressively stricter limits that affect both new equipment and replacement components alike (European Commission, 2026), and the European agricultural machinery industry is under growing pressure to adopt circular economy principles in product design (CEMA, 2018). Perhaps most importantly, the Dutch farming community places exceptional value on equipment uptime and delivery speed. A combine harvester that breaks down during harvest cannot wait three weeks for a part to arrive from a distant supplier. Competitive entry therefore requires not just technical compatibility and competitive pricing but a logistics capability that can match the speed expectations of a market accustomed to next-day delivery through one of the most efficient distribution networks in Europe.

What ties all of this together is the broader Dutch trade infrastructure. The same logistics advantages that make the Netherlands a global re-export hub, Rotterdam, Schiphol, and the dense inland transport network, also make it an unusually efficient market for spare parts distribution (Port of Rotterdam, 2021). A manufacturer that can place inventory in the Netherlands gains access not just to Dutch farmers but to the wider Northwest European market via the same transit corridors that move €331 billion in re-exports annually. The agri-food sector is one of the Dutch government's nine designated strategic top sectors, and the national ambition to become a global leader in circular agriculture by 2030 creates a supportive policy environment for new entrants that align with this direction. Furthermore, 45% of Dutch agricultural firms plan to increase investment in green technologies over the next three years, a signal that the market is actively moving in exactly the direction that

a well-positioned supplier would want to follow (EIB, 2025), a signal that the sector is actively preparing for a more technology-intensive and sustainability-oriented future. This shift will require a correspondingly sophisticated supply chain for machinery components to support it.

Conclusions

The Dutch economy's trajectory over 2010-2025 reveals a trade model that is structurally powerful but increasingly exposed. The re-export architecture that generates outsized trade volumes also amplifies the impact of any disruption to cross-border flows, whether from tariffs, export controls, or regulatory divergence. The persistent current account surplus demonstrates genuine economic strength, as the Netherlands earns from goods, services, and capital returns simultaneously, but the productivity stagnation that has characterised the past decade constrains the economy's ability to grow through domestic means. This makes continued openness to trade not merely a preference but a necessity, at precisely the moment when the global trading environment is becoming less predictable.

For the agricultural machinery spare parts sector, these macro-level conditions create a paradox. The market is mature, modestly growing, and dominated by established global brands with strong dealer networks. Nevertheless, the qualitative shift toward precision agriculture, the counter-cyclical resilience of aftermarket demand, and the Netherlands' unmatched logistics infrastructure create genuine openings for specialised manufacturers. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that the current period of trade fragmentation, while threatening to the Dutch economy as a whole, actually reinforces the specific conditions that make the aftermarket attractive. Farmers defer capital expenditure, extend machinery lifespans, and invest in automation to offset labour shortages, all of which increase spare parts demand.

The key insight for potential market entrants is that competing in the Dutch aftermarket is less about offering lower prices and more about meeting a specific, interconnected set of demands: technical compatibility with increasingly digital equipment, delivery speeds that match Dutch expectations, compliance with tightening sustainability regulations, and strategic alignment with the country's long-term vision for circular, technology-driven agriculture. The broader analytical lesson is that the Netherlands is not simply a small open economy in the textbook sense. It is an economy that has built its prosperity on being indispensable to the movement of goods across Europe, and that indispensability simultaneously creates opportunity and vulnerability. Understanding this duality is essential

for any firm, in agricultural machinery or any other sector, that is considering the Dutch market as a point of entry into the European commercial landscape.

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INNOVATING PEDAGOGICAL PARADIGMS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEGAL DISSEMINATION AMONG GENERATION Z IN THE EPOCH OF GENERATIVE AI COPYRIGHT CONTROVERSIES: A CASE STUDY OF VIETNAM

Abstract

The rapid evolution of Generative Artificial Intelligence (Generative AI) has disrupted the global creative ecosystem, presenting significant challenges to the Intellectual Property (IP) legal framework. Generation Z, as digital natives, actively engages in content creation using AI tools but often lacks awareness of the legal boundaries between inspiration, open-source utilization, and copyright infringement. This research examines Vietnam's case, a country undergoing digital transformation and preparing to enforce a comprehensive Artificial Intelligence Law in 2026. By synthesizing theories on algorithmic governance, legal pedagogy, and empirical data, the study proposes a “Gamified Algorithmic Legal Dissemination Model” tailored to Gen Z's cognitive and behavioral traits. The model integrates algorithmic governance, gamification, and AI safety tools to create a dynamic legal education ecosystem. Key methods include embedding legal knowledge into social media platforms, designing AI-adaptive gamified legal scenarios, and promoting AI safety technologies like watermarking and digital fingerprinting. The study highlights Vietnam's strategic advancements, including the Artificial Intelligence Law 2026, which introduces groundbreaking regulations on human oversight, AI content labeling, risk management, and the establishment of a National AI Development Fund. Empirical data from Vietnam's grassroots digital transformation efforts further demonstrate the effectiveness of gamified legal dissemination in reshaping Gen Z's social norms and ethical behavior. This research underscores the importance of equipping the younger generation with critical thinking, ethical consciousness, and technological skills to navigate the complexities of IP law in the AI era. The proposed model offers a transformative approach to legal education, fostering sustainable compliance and empowering Gen Z to coexist and innovate within algorithmic systems.

Keywords: Generative AI; Intellectual Property Law; Algorithmic Governance; Gamification; Artificial Intelligence Law.

1. Introduction

The explosion of Generative Artificial Intelligence (Generative AI) has comprehensively reshaped the structure of the global creative ecosystem, bringing unprecedented legal and ethical challenges to the Intellectual Property (IP) legal system. At the epicenter of this tectonic shift is Generation Z (Gen Z) – true digital natives who not merely consume information but also directly participate in content co-creation processes through advanced AI tools and social media platforms. However, practical evidence indicates that this demographic's awareness regarding the fragile boundary between legitimate inspiration, open-source data utilization, and algorithmic copyright infringement remains largely limited and contradictory. Amidst a series of landmark AI copyright lawsuits unfolding globally, which threaten to redefine how large language models (LLMs) are trained, identifying and implementing innovative legal dissemination methods tailored to the psychological, cognitive, and digital behavioral characteristics of Generation Z has become a vital imperative for policymakers.

This research delves into a case study in Vietnam – a nation witnessing robust advancements in the digital transformation of its judicial system and currently in the urgent preparatory phase for enforcing a comprehensive Artificial Intelligence Law in 2026. By synthesizing the latest theories on algorithmic governance, legal pedagogy, and empirical data analysis from domestic press and judicial agencies, this study aims to propose a breakthrough algorithmic legal communication model. This model synergizes the coordination of algorithmic systems, AI security technologies, and gamification techniques to thoroughly resolve the legal cognitive dissonance among the younger generation.

Globally, the period from 2024 to early 2026 has witnessed an exponential surge in copyright infringement lawsuits involving AI-generated content. According to legal statistical data, the number of infringement lawsuits targeting AI development corporations in 2025 more than doubled compared to late 2024, leaping from approximately 30 cases to over 70 complex litigations. These legal battles, typified by *Thomson Reuters Enterprise Centre GmbH v. ROSS Intelligence Inc.*, *Bartz v. Anthropic*, *Kadrey v. Meta*, and numerous multidistrict class actions against OpenAI and ByteDance, have exposed a severe structural loophole in the traditional IP legal framework.

The focal point of debate in modern jurisprudence revolves around whether scraping and training AI models utilizing massive volumes of unlicensed copyrighted works constitute infringement or merely qualify as “Fair Use” under Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act. Courts must meticulously weigh the four factors of the fair use doctrine, wherein the core determinant is the “transformative nature” – whether AI serves a completely

distinct purpose and function from the original work or merely acts as a machine usurping the primary authors' market by reproducing protected expressions.

Research by You and Luo (2025) provides profound insight by demonstrating that the traditional judicial analytical framework based on the “access and substantial similarity” principle exposes systemic limitations when confronting the “fragmented recombination” nature of generative AI content. Furthermore, the infringement process occurs across three distinct technical stages: data acquisition, model training, and content generation. This structure creates an incredibly complex liability distribution chain, leading to extreme difficulties in traceability and legal accountability. Responding to these deadlocks, scholars such as Liang and Lu (2026) convincingly argue that while current global policy responses predominantly focus on the input stage (i.e., managing training data), legislators must redirect their attention to strictly managing outputs and establishing a consent and compensation mechanism, aiming to ensure a truly “copyright-safe” environment for AI. From a precedential judicial perspective, the summary decision in the Anthropic copyright infringement lawsuit emphasized a critical principle: although the training process may utilize copyrighted inputs for the machine to “learn”, it does not imply that the system's outputs are inherently infringing copies of those inputs. The clear demarcation between “concept learning” and “expression copying” is becoming the legal boundary shaping the entire future of the AI industry.

Facing the relative impotence of the traditional legal framework in directly regulating artificial neural network technology, the “Algorithmic Governance” theory has emerged as an alternative and complementary management paradigm. Algorithmic governance is defined by scholars as a new form of social order, based on strict coordination among subjects, adhering to rules, and integrating exceptionally complex computational cognitive procedures. According to the ideal classification proposed by Katzenbach and Ulbricht (2019), algorithmic governance systems can span a broad spectrum from “autonomy-friendly systems” (characterized by high transparency where humans remain the ultimate decision-makers) to “out-of-control systems” (characterized by low transparency, a “black box” nature, and fully automated execution).

In the realm of legal philosophy, Lessig's (2000) classic principle “Code is Law” has reaffirmed its practical value by indicating that technical regulations programmed deep within software source codes carry profound administrative-political and normative implications, transforming software developers into de facto “legislators” within the digital space. However, the application of algorithmic governance in public administration and asset management encounters two major barriers: the erosion of democratic control

capacity and a lack of transparency. The breakthrough research by Coglianese and Ben Dor (2020) emphasized the highly complex and sometimes “pernicious” relationship between intellectual property rights and AI regulations. Specifically, intellectual property rights (especially trade secrecy protection regimes) create massive legal barriers to the goals of transparency, fairness, and explainability of algorithmic models. Regulatory agencies coercing the disclosure of source codes and training dataset details to monitor algorithmic fairness can directly infringe upon the core intellectual property of global tech corporations, leading to a decline in innovation motivation and violations of international trade agreements.

Through the lens of communication and legal education, studies by Larsson (2020), indexed on the DBLP database, have profoundly analyzed the relationship between IP law compliance, social norms, and the necessity of consumer empowerment in data-driven markets. According to Larsson, modern legal communication cannot continue following the rut of merely relying on promulgating normative documents or one-way propaganda campaigns. Instead, legal knowledge must be “embedded” directly into the architecture of the very digital platforms with which the public interacts daily, transforming the platform itself into an automatic educational agent through algorithmic navigation.

Generation Z, as the most dynamic demographic of digital citizens, possesses an entirely distinct ecosystem for receiving information and shaping cognition compared to preceding generations. Metaverse platforms like Roblox and short-video platforms like TikTok are no longer merely entertainment tools but have truly become primary “hubs” for social communication and virtual interaction. In the Vietnamese market, research data indicates that Gen Z particularly favors social commerce formats, real-time interaction, and fast-paced content consumption. Surveys from tech recruitment platforms reveal a paradox: while Gen Z are the heaviest users of generative AI, 42.5% of young IT personnel in Vietnam express profound concern regarding legal risks associated with intellectual property infringement, cognizant that AI models are frequently trained on massive datasets illicitly extracted from the internet.

To shatter the “cognitive limit” and prevalent apathy of Gen Z toward dry legal texts, “Gamification” has risen to become a superior pedagogical solution in higher education. Gamification is defined as utilizing game design elements and mechanics in non-game contexts to enhance intrinsic motivation, engagement, and learning efficacy. A systematic literature review from leading databases Scopus and Web of Science (period 2023-2024) by Khairunnizam et al indicates that integrating gamification in legal studies significantly improves students' statistical motivation, comprehension levels, and skill retention capacities, with reported average engagement increases of

up to 20% across sample groups. Mechanisms such as reward points, leaderboards, and especially chance-based mechanics prove highly effective in stimulating continuous behavioral participation.

Nevertheless, applying Gamification to specialized legal education inherently entails undeniable ethical risks. Academic scholars warn that abusing or oversimplifying complex legal scenarios into entertaining game mechanics could distort the seriousness of core legal principles, or merely prompt students to attain superficial, shallow comprehension. Moreover, generational characteristic research demonstrates that Gen Z prioritizes independence in initial knowledge acquisition (often through personalized video lectures) prior to engaging in collaborative group work in class for practical skill refinement.

The forceful intervention of Generative AI in legal education, as highlighted in the breakthrough study by Ajevski et al. (2023) regarding ChatGPT's capability to pass the Bar Exam, and the empirical research by Hyde-Vaamonde and Keller (2025) at King's College London, compels legal pedagogues to alter their mindset. These studies affirm that “banning” students from using AI is unfeasible and counterproductive. Instead, legal education must pivot toward building a “culture of trust”, where students are encouraged to use AI as an assistive tool, yet concurrently undergo intensive training to rigorously evaluate and detect limitations in logical reasoning, incoherence, and plagiarism risks within AI-generated legal texts, thereby elevating human critical analytical competencies. Similarly, empirical research by Tafazoli et al. (2025) comparing performance between AI and law students in criminal law exams reinforces the perspective that current AI remains deficient in detailed legal analyses requiring multidimensional critical thinking, even though they excel in general open-ended essay questions.

2. Proposal Method

Based on the dialectical connection among the limitations of traditional intellectual property legal systems, the infinite potential of digital algorithmic governance, and the specialized psychological and behavioral traits of Generation Z, this research boldly proposes the “Gamified Algorithmic Legal Dissemination Model”. Research data describes this as a conceptually complex architectural model constructed on the core intersection of three essential methodological pillars: algorithmic governance (acting as content distributor), Gamification (acting as interactive motivator), and AI Safety (acting as practical copyright protection tool provider). The interlacing of these three pillars establishes a closed-loop legal education ecosystem with continuous interactive cycles, aiming to transform abstract concepts into digital survival skills for Generation Z. Specific methods include:

Firstly, the platform-embedded legal architecture method. Breaking away from the traditional mindset requiring users to proactively access state administrative legal information portals, this method proposes fully leveraging Optimizing Behavior Algorithms to automatically distribute micro-learning knowledge units regarding intellectual property directly onto Gen Z's newsfeeds. Algorithmic governance will be applied to transform popular social media platforms in Vietnam such as Zalo, TikTok, and the Facebook Fanpage system (like the former “Cot co Thu Ngu” page model in District 1, Ho Chi Minh City) into invisible learning spaces. User behavior analysis algorithms will trigger copyright warnings in the form of interactive pop-ups or engaging short-form videos the moment a user intends to download, share, or utilize AI image generation tools. This positions the law precisely in the time and space where potentially infringing behaviors are about to occur.

Secondly, AI-adaptive gamification techniques. This method focuses on designing simulated legal scenarios regarding AI copyright disputes. Through the power of Machine Learning technology, the system will automatically adjust and personalize the difficulty of hypothetical situations based on each individual user's competency and interaction history. For instance, the system might pose quick interactive problems: “You discover a newly launched generative AI model has used your entire graphic design portfolio for training without permission; which legal tool will you use to respond?”. By astutely applying sophisticated motivation-stimulating mechanisms like honorific reward point systems, competitive leaderboards, and chance-based mechanics, this method ensures maintaining Gen Z's intense attention without compromising the academic rigor and necessity of IP law institutions.

Thirdly, integrating AI safety as a practical pedagogical tool. Modern legal dissemination cannot merely stop at preaching theories on moral or property rights, but must imperatively provide the public with technical tools for identification and defense. The proposed method necessitates the vigorous popularization of knowledge regarding identification technologies and “AI Safety”, particularly visible/invisible Watermarking and Digital Fingerprinting. Legal educational communication campaigns will provide Gen Z with detailed instructions on how to apply labeling and embed protective codes into their own digital works to combat illicit data scraping by AI systems. Concurrently, educating them on the capacity to appraise source codes and recognize AI-generated content, thereby preventing inadvertent complicity in sharing and disseminating pirated products in cyberspace.

3. Data Collection

To demonstrate the feasibility and urgency of the proposed methods, the research design conducted empirical data collection and analysis using a

diverse Case Study method. The research scope centers on the market and public administrative system in Vietnam during the transition period from 2024 to early 2026. Secondary data was systematically extracted from reputable online repositories, including mainstream press agencies, government and National Assembly electronic portals, and local judicial bodies, wherein:

Data on the current state of infringement and copyright enforcement was extracted directly from operational reports of Vietnam Television (VTV) via the information distribution system of the Ministry of Public Security's Electronic Portal (ANTV). This data source meticulously records the scale and number of interception campaigns against AI-generated, spliced, and pirated content on social media platforms.

Data on digital transformation efforts in legal dissemination was collected from the reporting systems of the Ministry of Justice's Electronic Portal and the Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) Department of Justice. The collection focus comprises statistical figures on digital communication products and actual citizen engagement levels on social media platforms managed by local governments (such as the Fanpages of District 1, District 4, District 7, and the former District 6 in HCMC).

Legal data and macroeconomic policy orientations were synthesized from official discussion minutes of the 15th National Assembly of Vietnam (November 2025 session) revolving around the critique of the draft Artificial Intelligence Law. Particularly crucial are the published documents concerning the detailed contents of the official Artificial Intelligence Law (expected to take effect in March 2026).

Data on the awareness and psychology of Generation Z as a cross-referenced data from specialized surveys conducted by the tech recruitment platform ITviec and independent market analysis organizations between 2024 and 2025. This data source provides a quantitative picture of the awareness levels, IP concerns, and frequency of AI usage among young human resources in Vietnam.

4. Data Analysis

The multi-source data analysis process starkly highlights a profound contradiction between the exponential development speed of AI tools that infringe upon intellectual property and the readiness level of the current legal education system. However, it also points out Vietnam's highly promising strategic direction through establishing a completely novel macroeconomic legal framework and grassroots-level digitalization efforts.

4.1. The reality of AI copyright infringement and generation Z's dual cognitive loophole

Empirical data demonstrates that intellectual property infringement utilizing artificial intelligence in Vietnam is no longer an isolated phenomenon but is occurring on an alarming, industrialized scale. Typically, in 2024 alone, the operational department of the Digital Content Production and Development Center (Vietnam Television - VTV) had to activate technical measures to intercept and process over 43,000 cases of online copyright infringement. Notably, these violations are not the time-consuming manual copying acts of the past. Perpetrators employ fully automated AI algorithms to collect (scraping text content from electronic newspapers), splice images, tweak audio, and illegally broadcast mass volumes of copyrighted football matches aimed at attracting views and financial profiteering via advertisements.

Facing this rampant infringement, the awareness of the student and youth customer base (representing Gen Z) is exposing a highly polarized “dual loophole”. On one extreme, survey data regarding the young tech workforce reveals significant sensitivity, as 42.5% of respondents expressed deep concern over IP legal risks, clearly recognizing that the AI tools they use daily are trained on unlicensed resources. However, on the opposite extreme, practicing legal experts, typified by Lawyer Phan Vu Tuan, have sounded warnings about a more concerning reality: a considerable segment of students, despite not directly executing acts to create infringing products, is indirectly “aiding” criminals. Due to fast-content consumption habits and a lack of critical filtering, they casually share, comment on, and disseminate pirated spliced products across cyberspace. This behavioral contradiction is the clearest evidence proving that traditional IP law propaganda methods (via auditorium seminars, flyer distributions, or hanging banners) have completely failed to penetrate and shape the daily cognition of digital youth.

4.2. The new legal framework in the structural analysis of Vietnam's artificial intelligence law 2026

To counter the challenges posed by the generative AI wave, the Vietnamese National Assembly's passage of the Artificial Intelligence Law (officially expected to take effect in March 2026) is a milestone event, propelling Vietnam to become one of the pioneering nations globally to possess a complete and specialized code governing this core technological sector. This Act provides an exceptionally ideal normative database, forging a solid foundation to redefine the entirety of IP education content.

In-depth analysis of the Law's contents identifies 4 groundbreaking novelties directly impacting the philosophy of intellectual property rights protection, as illustrated in the table below:

Table 1

Core content of the Artificial Intelligence Law 2026

AI Governance Criteria (AI Law 2026)	Core Content	Implications for IP and Legal Education for Gen Z
1. Ensuring supreme human oversight	“Human-centric principle. Demanding absolute transparency, fairness, and accountability from AI developers and service providers”.	“Gen Z must be trained in critical thinking skills to demand transparency regarding 'training data', thereby ensuring the AI tools they apply do not violate original copyrights”.
2. Identification and AI Content Labeling	“Mandatory that all AI-generated products (audio, images, video) simulating real appearance or voice be clearly labeled to avoid confusion”.	“This is the core focus of legal dissemination. Gen Z, as the primary content creators, must master statutory labeling skills to avoid liability for fraud or moral rights infringement”.
3. Risk Management Classification (3 Levels)	Categorizes AI systems into 3 tiers: Level 1 (High risk - Source of extreme danger); Level 2 (Medium risk - Risk of confusion); Level 3 (Low risk).	“High-risk AI systems are subject to a 'strict liability' regime regardless of fault. Law and technology students must profoundly comprehend this financial risk”.
4. Establishment of National AI Development Fund	“Establish a non-profit financial fund outside the state budget, applying specific mechanisms that permit risk-taking in scientific research and innovation”.	Opens significant financial opportunities to fund Gen Z startup projects aimed at developing algorithmic plagiarism detection tools and AI Safety systems protecting copyrights.

Particularly, during the appraisal and discussion process at the National Assembly's plenary sessions, multiple Delegates (such as Lieutenant General Nguyen Minh Duc) frankly delved into the most complex “blind spot” of global IP law: Who is truly the legitimate owner of AI-generated products? The delegates' analysis pointed out that billions of personal data points (ranging from extracted security camera footage and speeches to everyday videos on social networks) are being stealthily harvested by AI systems to become learning resources without any permission or compensation mechanisms. Therefore, the stringent regulation demanding the transparentization of training data sources in upcoming implementation guidance decrees is Vietnam's most potent legal weapon to fundamentally resolve the conflict of interest between AI technological development goals and intellectual property asset protection.

4.3. Digital transformation and gamification in legal dissemination from grassroots units

Concurrently with perfecting macro-institutions, data analysis also indicates that a revolution in legal dissemination methods has begun to unfold

vigorously from grassroots administrative levels in major megacities. Statistical analysis from the Ho Chi Minh City Department of Justice proves that a modern digital legal communication ecosystem is gradually taking shape. By maximally leveraging the coverage of social media platforms (especially Facebook and Zalo), local governments have successfully initiated dismantling spatial and temporal limitations in propaganda efforts.

District-level social media pages in Ho Chi Minh City in the past (such as the “Cot co Thu Ngu” page managed by District 1, “Dat cang quan 4” of District 4, or “Nam Sai Gon” of District 7) adopted a new content design approach: converting dry legal documents into eye-catching infographics, interspersing characteristic cyber-cultural humor or warnings tied to current events (a prime example: the communication campaign “24 forms of cyber fraud in Vietnam”). Altering this information packaging method has generated completely organic virality within the student community, hitting the exact psychological “touchpoints” of Gen Z by satisfying both entertainment needs and academic information retrieval.

To substantiate the commitment level to this digital transformation process, the administrative data structure of Ho Chi Minh City's judicial system reflects a substantial content production scale, as shown in the table below:

Table 2

**Volume statistics of digitized and gamified legal dissemination data in
Ho Chi Minh City, 2019-2024**

Implementing Agency (HCMC)	Statistics on the volume of digitized and Gamified legal dissemination data	Primary access format
Department of Justice HCMC	Produced and published 3,623 data units.	“News, summary articles, short legal documents, interactive lectures, illustrative images, and specialized video clips”.
Ho Chi Minh City Police	“Published 3,285 articles, 781 investigative reports, 734 news bulletins, 760 images, and 20 crime warning videos”.	“Internal electronic information portal and immigration website, combined with social media propagation”.
City Women's Union	Produced and broadcasted 796 thematic video clips.	“Focused on family knowledge and related legal regulations, posted via Facebook page”.
District 6 People's Committee (formerly)	“Pioneered organizing 118 online legal knowledge competitions (applying Gamification), published 116 news items and 24 articles”.	Utilizing an online multiple-choice testing system (online contests) with reward mechanisms to create competitive motivation.

These quantitative indicators strongly affirm Müller-Birn's theory on "autonomy-friendly algorithmic governance"; when the state effectively utilizes digital distribution channels combined with targeted communication methods, the spillover capacity of legal knowledge achieves vastly superior, economical, and sustainable efficacy compared to maintaining traditional auditorium teaching methods. The continuous organization of online legal competitions by District 6 (formerly) serves as the most rudimentary yet vivid example of applying "Gamification" to draw the younger generation's participation into matters of legal compliance.

5. Discussion

The analyzed data volume opens space for profound discussion points of a judicial-philosophical nature regarding the future of intellectual property law education in the automated algorithmic era.

The first point is the need for a frank acknowledgment that traditional Intellectual Property Law itself is not a direct and effective regulatory tool for the complexity of artificial intelligence. As analyzed by scholar Crouch (2024), the foundational architecture of institutions like patents and copyrights was designed purely to provide time-limited economic rewards to incentivize individual creativity. They entirely lack the necessary mechanism "levers" to control profound ethical impacts, systemic safety, or the discriminatory biases of algorithms. Additionally, rigidly utilizing IP legal documents to regulate AI could generate destructive counter-effects. If jurisdictions abuse copyright laws to restrict or prohibit the collection of training data, that nation may inadvertently extinguish its own core technological competitiveness and creativity on the international stage. On an opposing perspective, if regulators permit the excessive abuse of trade secrets protection laws, AI tech corporations will legitimize the establishment of algorithmic "black boxes", entirely concealing opacity regarding data origins and manipulating users. In the context of this dilemma, the advent of Vietnam's Artificial Intelligence Law 2026 – with its stratified risk-based approach combined with mandatory transparent content labeling regulations – is evaluated as a harmonious legislative advancement, a refined supplement aimed at filling ethical voids that IP law cannot reach.

The second point revolves around the empirical value of the methodology: Innovating legal dissemination methods via Social Media and Gamification for Generation Z is not merely a pedagogical trick to optimize attention, but carries the significance of forging a new "digital social norm". Scholar Larsson and Moe (2012) once highlighted a criminal psychology reality that individual online IP infringement behaviors (such as illegal file sharing) are predominantly governed and tolerated by the norms of social networks and online groups, rather than the theoretical deterrent power of

statutes. For Generation Z – a community extremely tightly bonded via cyber culture and algorithmic trends – being continuously exposed to “gamified” copyright lessons and warnings, presented visually and humorously right on TikTok or Facebook, will gradually reshape their subconscious and ethical behavior. This pedagogical shift (from prohibition to building a culture of trust, as proposed by Hyde-Vaamonde and Keller) helps transform legal regulations from prohibitive barriers into civilized behavioral rules voluntarily adhered to in the digital space.

However, applying algorithmic governance to legal education also imposes a demand for state agencies to exercise extreme caution. The government must act as a “high-integrity algorithmic architect”, utilizing AI (e.g., automated legal advisory Chatbots) to analyze citizen petition needs, but must strictly control it to ensure the algorithm isn't biased, doesn't encode social inequalities into legal responses, and absolutely doesn't infringe upon citizens' personal data during feedback collection.

The third point, of a technical nature: The true success of future AI copyright infringement combat will depend entirely on the capacity to empower the young creator generation with technological self-defense. The fact that major media conglomerates like VTV are forced to apply advanced technologies like Watermark (invisible watermarking) and Digital Fingerprinting to automatically detect spliced copies is a valuable testament showing that, in the AI era, new digital solutions are the ultimate and most robust copyright defense barrier. Therefore, the focus of IP legal dissemination cannot just revolve around teaching Gen Z (future graphic designers, software engineers, musicians) to memorize clauses on moral or property rights by heart. Going further, legal education must teach them how to apply digital encryption to self-lock and protect their data assets against millions of illicit data scraping “bots” prowling the global internet network.

6. Conclusion

Transmitting and maintaining the rigor of complex Intellectual Property legal institutions in the generative artificial intelligence era can no longer rely on dogmatic, one-way, and static administrative educational paradigms. This research strongly affirms that, for Generation Z – citizens of the algorithmic era – legal knowledge can only be assimilated and transformed into sustainable compliance behaviors when it is profoundly and continuously “embedded” into the very digital ecological environment where they operate daily.

Through comprehensive evaluation and cross-referencing between Vietnam's groundbreaking macroeconomic legal framework (Artificial Intelligence Law 2026) and rich practicalities from local judicial agencies' digital transformation campaigns, the research has proven the feasibility,

efficacy, and urgency of the “Gamified Algorithmic Legal Dissemination Model”. By astutely leveraging the very automation power of social media algorithms to distribute micro-knowledge units, utilizing the cognitive-stimulating interactivity of Gamification techniques to enhance theoretical retention, and particularly providing practical “AI Safety” skill sets to protect creative assets, this model opens a new pathway for judicial work.

Fundamentally solving the AI copyright infringement conflict lies not merely in awaiting draconian punitive verdicts from Courts, but in a deeper foundational mission: educating a digital native generation equipped with sufficient critical thinking capacity, steadfast ethical consciousness, and sharp technological skills to peacefully coexist with, continuously create within, and master algorithmic systems. This ambitious constructive process demands continuous, strategic, and open companionship among the national education system, astute legislators, social media platform development corporations, and the very proactivity of the young creative community.

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STRATEGIES FOR THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF SERVICE BUSINESSES IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL FRAGMENTATION: AN INVESTMENT JUSTIFICATION FOR AN EDUTAINMENT HUB IN ITALY

The global economy is currently facing a period of unprecedented instability and "global fragmentation," which forces international businesses to fundamentally rethink their expansion strategies. This paper explores the transnationalization of the service sector using the "Experience Economy" approach as a primary driver. The study proposes and financially justifies a unique hybrid business model, specifically an Edutainment hub in Italy that combines non-formal English language education with the premium HoReCa sector, including a specialty coffee and wine bar. Italy was strategically chosen due to its reliable foreign capital protection laws and the unique opportunity to cut supply chain costs by utilizing local Mediterranean resources. The research highlights a significant market gap, as Italy's relatively low English proficiency compared to other EU countries creates a unique niche, and aligns the business model with the local socio-cultural tradition of academic networking over aperitivo. Moreover, the paper outlines a long-term scaling strategy, expanding from a localized B2C hub to a global B2B model by licensing proprietary pop-culture-based educational workshops. Consequently, this hybrid approach diversifies revenue streams and ensures FDI profitability even during periods of significant economic turbulence.

Keywords: *transnationalization, foreign direct investment, global fragmentation, experience economy, edutainment, B2B scaling, Italy.*

Introduction

In the current global economic landscape, the international business environment is heavily influenced by the phenomenon of "global fragmentation" (UNCTAD, 2024; Kearney, 2025). In this context, global fragmentation refers to the increasing shift from integrated global markets toward localized, regional economic blocs driven by geopolitical tensions and trade barriers. This era is characterized by near-shoring and friend-shoring strategies, where businesses prioritize geographical proximity and political alignment over the lowest production costs. Specifically, these strategies focus on relocating operations to neighbouring regions and politically stable ally nations to minimize supply chain disruptions. Geopolitical tensions and disrupted global supply chains are pushing modern investors away from risky emerging markets towards more stable European jurisdictions with

predictable legal frameworks and institutional security (IMF, 2025; World Bank, 2025). At the same time, consumer behaviour in developed countries has undergone a fundamental transformation. People are no longer satisfied with standard, uninteresting services because they actively seek emotions, community engagement, and personal growth. This shift is defined in modern economic theory as the "Experience Economy" (Pine and Gilmore, 1999; Rossi and Bianchi, 2024). To remain competitive in this environment, modern service businesses must adopt innovative formats like Edutainment, which represents a strategic and methodological blend of education and entertainment. For adult learners, traditional academic methods often fail due to high stress, cognitive overload, and a lack of free time. Edutainment effectively lowers the cognitive barrier by turning the learning process into a high-quality, socially engaging leisure activity.

The purpose of the study is to provide an economic and strategic justification for launching an Edutainment hub in Italy as a highly effective and resilient model for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

Market Justification

Why Italy? Entering a foreign market requires both macroeconomic stability and a deep, nuanced understanding of the local socio-cultural context. Italy offers a unique combination of these critical factors. First, from an investment security perspective, Italy has implemented strict FDI Screening regulations, providing a safe harbour for foreign capital amidst global uncertainty (Coccia, 2025). Furthermore, recent macroeconomic analyses confirm the resilience of the European service sector to external shocks, making it an attractive destination for capital (European Commission, 2025; Džogan et al., 2025). Second, a significant and measurable market gap exists. According to the official EF English Proficiency Index, Italy ranks 46th globally and 32nd out of 35 European countries, consistently placing in the "Moderate Proficiency" band and lagging significantly behind its EU peers (EF Education First, 2024). This statistical reality indicates untapped market potential for innovative language learning solutions that traditional academic institutions have historically failed to address. More importantly, the proposed business model perfectly adapts to local cultural habits and traditions. In major Italian academic hubs such as Bologna, Milan, and Rome, there is a strong and enduring tradition of academic networking. Students, researchers and professors rarely go straight home after a long day of lectures or intensive library research. Instead, they gather in local bars for an aperitivo, typically wine or Aperol, to socialize and discuss ideas. The Edutainment hub concept directly monetizes this cultural norm. By placing an English-speaking environment inside a premium wine and coffee bar, the educational service

integrates harmoniously into the daily routine of the target audience, making the service culturally relevant, organic and highly desirable.

Educational Methods. Multimedia and Pop Culture as Strategic Tools. Unlike traditional language schools that constantly struggle with low student retention rates, the proposed hub uses contemporary culture to build long-term customer loyalty. The educational core of the business relies on customized workshops built around modern cinema and music. The curriculum offers a rotating selection of original-language films tailored to different student interests, ranging from business and economics to psychology and visual arts. For instance, analysing modern cinematic masterpieces such as *The Great Gatsby* or *The Wolf of Wall Street* allows students to explore complex economic terminology and the evolution of the American Dream in a high-stakes business environment (Barker, 2024). For advanced language acquisition, the hub leverages the resonance of modern pop culture (UNESCO, 2025). Instead of standard, repetitive textbook exercises, students engage in the linguistic and semantic analysis of global musical trends. For example, the study involves analysing the complex metaphors, Americana references and advanced vocabulary, specifically at the B2-C1 levels, in the lyrics of globally recognized artists like Lana Del Rey or Halsey. These Americana references encompass iconic cultural symbols, vintage aesthetics and historical myths that define the traditional American way of life. By decoding such layers of meaning in lyrics, students transition from basic language comprehension to a deep understanding of complex socio-cultural contexts (Strong, 2024; Halsey, 2024). This approach creates a strong emotional connection and cultural resonance, which highly motivates adult learners to maintain their subscriptions and engage with the brand long-term (Komarac et al., 2024; Johnson, 2025).

Operational Resilience and Logistical Optimization. A critical vulnerability of international business during the era of global fragmentation is the risk of supply chain disruption (OECD, 2025). The proposed Edutainment hub mitigates this risk through a highly localized operational model. By integrating a HoReCa segment (representing Hotels, Restaurants, and Cafes), consisting of a specialty coffee bar and a premium wine selection, directly into the educational space, the business effectively achieves revenue diversification. This strategic synergy ensures financial stability. While long-term educational subscriptions provide predictable, recurring income, the daily bar operations generate immediate liquid cash flow. Such a model protects the enterprise from market fluctuations in the education sector, as the hospitality segment remains a constant draw for the local community. In addition to operational stability, locating the business in Italy allows for direct access to premium local Mediterranean resources. Instead of importing luxury goods across borders with associated customs duties, international shipping

tariffs and logistical delays, the hub partners with local Italian roasters and historic wineries. This 15-20% cost optimization is achieved through the elimination of intermediary margins, international shipping tariffs and cross-border Value Added Tax (VAT) complexities. Specifically, by establishing direct "farm-to-table" partnerships with local Italian producers, the hub minimizes "last-mile" logistics costs and avoids the carbon-border adjustment mechanisms (CBAM) that typically inflate the price of imported goods. Such a localization strategy makes the financial model highly crisis-resistant and sustainable by securing a stable, low-cost supply chain (Rossi and Bianchi, 2024; Hajduová, 2025).

Long-term Scaling Strategy: From B2C to B2B. The ultimate goal of this transnationalization project extends far beyond a single physical location in one city. Once the Business-to-Consumer (B2C) hub in Italy successfully validates the pop-culture methodology, the project will transition into a scalable Business-to-Business (B2B) model. The proprietary educational workshops, specifically the customized lesson plans, film analyses and lyrical breakdowns, will be packaged as valuable Intellectual Property. This transition involves a digital transformation of the curriculum into a cloud-based Licensing-as-a-Service (LaaS) platform. This innovative curriculum can then be licensed and sold to other language schools, corporate training centres, and boutique educational firms across Europe that struggle with student engagement and retention. By adopting this franchise-like model, the initial Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) project transforms into a high-margin digital export. Additionally, this B2B scaling effectively mitigates the risks associated with physical expansion, as it allows for rapid market entry into other EU jurisdictions, such as Spain or Greece (which share similar EF English Proficiency Index gaps and Mediterranean business cultures), without the capital-intensive costs of opening new physical venues.

Conclusion

In an era of global fragmentation, successful business transnationalization requires a departure from traditional, low-cost expansion paradigms toward high-value, culturally-integrated models. The Edutainment hub in Italy represents a strategically sound and innovative FDI model that effectively balances economic resilience with consumer-centric innovation. By capitalizing on Italy's institutional security and addressing a clear, statistically proven market gap in English proficiency, the project ensures high demand and lowers the barrier to entry in a competitive market. Moreover, the strategic integration of the Experience Economy through pop-culture-based learning and the local aperitivo culture creates a unique and defensible competitive advantage (economic moat) that is difficult for traditional competitors to replicate. The financial viability is further reinforced by the

synergy between non-formal education and localized HoReCa operations, which ensures cash flow diversification and logistical cost optimization. Consequently, the transition from a localized B2C presence to a global B2B IP-licensing strategy provides a highly profitable, resilient and scalable international business model capable of thriving even during periods of significant geopolitical and economic turbulence.

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PROTECTIONISM VS FREE TRADE: BENEFITS AND RISKS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This article examines the advantages and risks of protectionism and free trade for developing countries in the modern global economy. It argues that neither extreme approach is effective in isolation and proposes a balanced strategy of “strategic openness.” While free trade can enhance efficiency, lower costs, and promote technological transfer, premature liberalization may weaken domestic industries and increase inequality. Conversely, protectionism can support infant industries but risks inefficiency, fiscal pressure, and policy capture if prolonged. The study emphasizes the importance of sequencing reforms, institutional quality, and temporary, performance-based interventions. Ultimately, a mixed and disciplined trade policy is presented as the most sustainable path for inclusive development.

Keywords: protectionism, free trade, developing countries, industrial policy, trade liberalization, structural transformation, global value chains, economic resilience.

Introduction

First of all, for developing countries, trade policy is not a narrow technical area. It is one of the main instruments that determines what an economy produces, how quickly it learns, who gets jobs, and how vulnerable it remains to external shocks. The debate between protectionism and free trade is mostly a false choice. It’s not about picking one side. In reality, countries that actually succeeded used a mix of both strategies. Most economic failures didn’t happen because a country chose the “wrong” theory, but because their specific policies were just poorly designed.

Today, this debate is more important than ever. Things like the pandemic, changing energy prices, wars, and climate change have made trade very risky. Because of these problems, governments are rethinking their old ideas. They now realize that trade policy shouldn’t only focus on being cheap and efficient – it also needs to be safe. WTO and UN experts warn that the world is moving away from open trade and shifting into separate blocks. Honestly, this shift is dangerous: if countries stop cooperating, the poorest nations will pay the highest price, as they are already struggling with slow growth and massive debts (Gate, 2025).

In this article, we will look at the choice between protectionism and free trade. The main point isn’t just whether trade is important, but how

government policies work with local markets. For example, a tariff can either help a new industry learn and grow or it can just protect a lazy, inefficient company. In the same way, opening up markets can help exports, but it can also hurt local factories if they aren't ready. It all depends on the timing and the rules.

Purpose of the study

The goal of this study is to look at the pros and cons of protectionism and free trade for developing nations. We want to suggest a policy that balances global trade with local industrial support, as neither extreme seems to work perfectly in the modern economy. While free trade can bring in new technology and lower costs, protectionism is often needed to give local businesses a start. Our research focuses on finding a "middle ground" that allows a country to stay connected to the world while still building its own domestic strength through a smarter, more targeted approach.

A big part of this approach is making sure that any government support for local industries is tied to discipline and results. We argue that protection should not be a "blank check" for companies to stay inefficient. Instead, it must be temporary and based on clear performance targets, such as meeting export goals or improving product quality. This helps prevent "policy capture," where powerful groups lobby the government to keep trade barriers forever just to protect their own profits. By setting strict "sunset clauses" where support automatically ends, the government can force companies to become competitive on a global level rather than relying on the state indefinitely.

Furthermore, this study looks at the "sequencing" of these policies. We examine how countries can first build up their infrastructure, like ports, roads, and digital networks, before opening up to full competition. It ensures that when the "open door" policy begins, local firms actually have the tools to export their goods effectively. Without this preparation, liberalization often leads to a flood of imports that destroys local jobs before the country has a chance to develop its own strengths. We also analyze how the "quality" of a country's institutions, like its legal system and customs office, determines whether trade reforms will lead to long-term wealth or just short-term consumption.

Finally, the study emphasizes that government institutions must be accountable and the public must be protected during these economic changes. Moving between protection and free trade can be messy, and it often creates winners and losers. We look at how governments can build "safety nets," like retraining programs for workers or financial support for small businesses, to make sure that trade policy doesn't lead to higher inequality or social unrest.

Ultimately, the purpose of this research is to prove that a successful trade strategy is not just about changing tariff rates; it is about building a "social contract" where the benefits of trade are shared more broadly across the whole population. This means the government isn't just a referee, but an active partner in making sure the transition to a global economy actually helps regular people.

Research findings

A useful way to look at trade is by distinguishing between static and dynamic efficiency. Static efficiency is mostly about the short term, like having lower prices and more variety by focusing on what a country is already good at. On the other hand, dynamic efficiency is about long-term growth. It involves learning new technologies and moving into more advanced industries. While free trade usually helps with static efficiency, sometimes protecting certain sectors is necessary to help them grow and learn over time.

Developing countries often face a big problem with the timing of their reforms. If a country opens its markets before fixing domestic issues such as high transport costs, unreliable electricity or a lack of bank loans, it can lead to the sharp increase of imports that hurts local businesses. In these cases, the country might look more "open" on paper, but its own economy isn't actually creating much value. To avoid this, governments should combine trade opening with reforms that help local firms become more productive (The assessment of the manifestation of economic globalization, 2024).

The way trade affects different people is also very important. Even if trade makes a country richer overall, it can create a lot of inequality. Some regions or groups of workers might lose their jobs while others gain. In this report, we explore that labor markets don't always adjust easily and wages don't always follow the simple rules found in textbooks. Because of this, a good trade strategy shouldn't just be about cutting tariffs; it must also include tools to help workers transition to new jobs (Levell & Dorn, 2022).

Recently, there has been a lot of focus on economic resilience. Relying too much on one single country for important goods is risky because if a crisis happens, the whole system can fail. This doesn't mean a country should stop trading and try to make everything itself. Instead, it means diversifying where products come from. For developing nations, it is better to prioritize the safety of critical goods and logistics rather than trying to replace all imports with local versions.

The strongest argument for protecting a local market is the "infant industry" idea. New companies, especially in high-tech sectors often can't compete with massive international corporations that have more money and better networks. Temporary protection gives these local firms a "learning

window" to improve their quality. Historically, many successful countries used this method, but it only worked because the government forced those firms to meet high standards and compete globally (Jehn, 2025).

Finally, protection can be a tool for risk management. In sectors like food, medicine or energy, being completely dependent on other countries is dangerous. Having some domestic capacity can prevent a disaster if global supply chains break down. Also, if rich countries are subsidizing their own industries, poorer countries need to use selective policies to stay competitive. However, these interventions should be transparent and temporary.

While protectionism can sometimes help new industries, it carries several major risks for developing countries. The first and most serious danger is policy capture. This happens when businesses that benefit from trade barriers start lobbying the government to keep those barriers forever. Instead of using the help to become more productive, they focus on keeping their special privileges. This is very common in countries where the government doesn't have strong independent agencies to monitor performance. The result is usually higher prices for local people and very little innovation.

Another big problem is the lack of competition. When local firms are protected from foreign imports, they often lose the motivation to upgrade their technology or improve the quality of their products. This doesn't just hurt that one industry, it also hurts the whole economy. For example, if a country protects its steel industry, the local car manufacturers or construction companies have to pay more for steel. This makes them less competitive in the global market, creating a "bottleneck" that slows down national growth (Team, 2025).

Protectionism also creates fiscal stress on a country's budget. High tariffs and expensive subsidy packages can be a huge burden on the government's finances. This is especially dangerous when global interest rates are high. When a government spends too much money supporting inefficient industries, it often has to cut spending on essential things like schools, hospitals and roads. According to UNCTAD, many developing nations are already struggling with debt and undisciplined protectionism only makes this vulnerability worse.

Finally, there is the risk of international retaliation. If a country puts up broad barriers, other countries might respond by blocking that country's exports. Small developing economies really need access to foreign markets to grow, so losing that access can cause more harm than the domestic protection helps. Furthermore, these measures can scare away foreign investors. To avoid these issues, any government intervention needs to be very specific, follow international rules where possible and be explained clearly to trading partners.

Talking about free trade, it offers several big advantages for developing countries. First, it lowers the cost of imports for both families and businesses. When a local company can buy cheaper or better raw materials and machinery from abroad, it becomes more productive and can start exporting its own goods more easily. For regular people, especially those with lower incomes, cheaper prices for everyday goods mean their money goes further. According to research by economists like Edwards or Wacziarg and Welch, these are the main reasons why countries that look "outward" tend to grow more in the long run.

Another major benefit is that openness helps new technology spread faster. By importing modern equipment or working with foreign investors, local firms can learn new ways of managing a business much faster than if they tried to figure it out alone. It works best if the country also has good schools and efficient customs. Furthermore, trade can actually make governments work better. When a country tries to sell products to the rest of the world, the government is forced to improve its ports, fix its roads and make its legal system more reliable to meet global standards. Finally, trade allows companies to sell to a huge global market. Small domestic markets often aren't big enough for a factory to be efficient, but international demand lets them scale up and lower their costs (IMF, 2001).

However, free trade also has serious risks. The biggest one is "premature deindustrialization". If a country opens its borders too fast before its local firms are strong, those businesses might just become bankrupt. Workers then move from factory jobs into low-productivity "informal" jobs, for example, selling things on the street. Even if the country gets richer overall, the social and political pain during this transition can be very high.

A second risk is "specialization lock-in". A country might be good at exporting raw materials like oil or minerals, but that doesn't mean it will be good for their future. If they only focus on these, they stay vulnerable to price swings and never learn how to build more advanced technology. There is also the problem of unequal adoption, trade often helps some regions while leaving others behind. If workers can't move or learn new skills easily, they can face a permanent drop in their income. Lastly, trade agreements can sometimes limit a country's "policy autonomy," making it harder for them to use their own tools to help local industries grow (Globalization and deindustrialization in advanced countries, 2018). Looking at different countries, we can see that the most successful ones didn't just choose one extreme. Countries in East Asia combined openness with "disciplined intervention." They supported their companies but forced them to meet export targets and reach high quality standards. In contrast, many countries that tried to stay closed for too long ended up with low competition and poor growth.

The lesson here is that the sequence of reforms matters more than how fast you do them. Cutting tariffs works much better if you have already invested in good ports, reliable electricity and high standards. Without these foundations, opening up might bring in cheaper goods for consumers but won't help the country build its own strong industries. Trade policy must also be part of a bigger plan that includes stable exchange rates and low inflation.

In recent years, the discussion about trade policy has become increasingly polarized. On the one hand, some economists strongly support free trade and rapid liberalization. On the other hand, others argue that protectionism is necessary to protect domestic industries. However, in reality, the most important question is not which ideology is correct. Rather, the key issue is how governments can design trade policy in a practical, evidence-based and balanced way. In our opinion, successful development depends not on extreme positions, but on combining openness with strong domestic institutions and clear policy discipline (Terdik, 2022).

First of all, international evidence shows that global trade remains resilient. According to the WTO (2023), “international trade has exhibited remarkable resilience”. In other words, despite the pandemic, geopolitical tensions and supply chain disruptions, global trade has not collapsed. It demonstrates that integration into the global economy still brings stability and opportunities. Nevertheless, the same WTO report states that “trade costs in developing economies remain almost 30 per cent higher”. This is a very important point. It means that developing countries face structural disadvantages such as weak infrastructure, inefficient customs systems and high transport costs. Therefore, reducing tariffs alone cannot guarantee competitiveness. Before and during liberalization, governments must improve trade facilitation and reduce internal costs (WTO, 2023).

Moreover, UNCTAD highlights that many developing countries experience “weak growth, growing exposure to global shocks and the risk of trade fragmentation”. This suggests that global macroeconomic conditions create serious constraints. In addition, UNCTAD explains that recent inflation was “largely a supply issue, created by bottlenecks in global value chains”. As a result, countries should not focus only on price stability or tariff reduction. Instead, they should design trade systems that are more resilient, diversified and flexible (UNCTAD 2024).

Based on this evidence, a practical operational framework can be developed. First, governments should follow the principle of selectivity. That is to say, they should intervene only in sectors where there is clear potential for learning, technological upgrading and export demand. Broad protection across the whole economy usually reduces efficiency and increases costs for consumers.

Second, support must be conditional. In other words, firms should receive state assistance only if they meet specific productivity, export or innovation targets. If these targets are not achieved, support should be reduced or terminated. This creates incentives for improvement and reduces the risk of corruption or rent-seeking behavior.

Third, protection must be temporary. Every protective measure should include a clear sunset clause, regular review dates and predefined exit criteria. Without time limits, temporary policies can become permanent, which may harm competition and innovation (WTO 2025).

Furthermore, trade policy can not work in isolation. It must be combined with complementary institutions. For example, governments should improve customs procedures, strengthen competition policy, invest in logistics infrastructure, develop skills training programs and ensure access to finance for productive firms. Without these supporting reforms, trade liberalization may not lead to real industrial upgrading.

Another important issue is social adjustment. Trade reforms can create both winners and losers. Therefore, governments must provide retraining programs linked to real job opportunities, mobility support for workers and temporary income protection. Without social adjustment mechanisms, even economically efficient reforms may face political resistance and lose legitimacy.

In addition, monitoring and evaluation are essential. Governments should publish annual policy statements that measure productivity growth, export diversification, domestic value added, wage trends and fiscal costs. Independent review bodies should verify the results. Transparency increases accountability and helps distinguish effective capability-building from simple rent transfers (World Bank, 2018).

Looking at possible future scenarios between 2026 and 2035, we can identify three main pathways. The first scenario is unmanaged liberalization. In this case, tariffs are reduced quickly but domestic capability reforms lag behind. As a result, short-term consumption may increase but industrial upgrading remains weak and vulnerability to external shocks rises. The second scenario is broad protectionism. Here, tariffs and local-content rules increase across many sectors without strict discipline. It may provide temporary output support, but it often leads to higher consumer prices, fiscal pressure and limited productivity gains. The third scenario is strategic openness. This approach combines moderate liberalization with targeted, time-bound support and strong monitoring. Although progress may be slower at the beginning, diversification and resilience are likely to be more durable. Evidence suggests that this balanced strategy offers the highest probability of inclusive development (OECD 2021).

It is also important to consider political economy factors. In many developing countries, policies fail not because the objectives are wrong, but because implementation is weak or captured by interest groups. For this reason, governments need institutional safeguards, such as independent evaluation units, public disclosure of support recipients, and automatic review mechanisms. Governance quality is often more important than the exact tariff rate.

Finally, the climate transition and digital transformation add new dimensions to trade strategy. Trade fragmentation can increase the cost of green technologies, while full dependence on imports can create vulnerability. Therefore, countries should remain open to global sourcing while building domestic capabilities in selected niches. Similarly, digitally delivered services offer new export opportunities, especially for countries with limited industrial bases. Investments in digital infrastructure, skills and reliable cross-border payments can support faster integration into global markets (The development and use of a static segregation test, 2025).

In conclusion, the debate between protectionism and free trade should not be treated as a simple ideological conflict. Instead, policymakers should focus on sequencing, institutional quality and accountability. Trade policy is a tool for structural transformation, not an end in itself. When openness is combined with selective, conditional and temporary intervention, as well as strong social adjustment policies, countries are more likely to achieve sustainable growth, diversification and improved living standards. Therefore, a balanced and disciplined mixed strategy represents the most realistic and effective path for developing economies in the modern global system.

Conclusions

To conclude, we must realize that protectionism and free trade are simply instruments rather than final goals. Protection can help a country change its economic structure, but only if it is selective, temporary and based on real, measurable performance. If a government protects an industry forever without asking for results, that industry usually becomes inefficient and stops innovating because it has no reason to improve. In the same way, free trade can speed up productivity and help a country produce more diverse goods, but only if its institutions and firms are strong enough to compete and learn from global partners. Both of these strategies will fail if they are followed too strictly as a rigid ideology or without proper government safeguards to prevent a few powerful groups from taking all the benefits.

For developing countries, the most reliable strategy is a mix of strategic openness and disciplined industrial policy. This approach allows a country to stay connected to global markets and benefit from new technology while still

using specific tools, like targeted subsidies, technical training or infrastructure support, to help local industries grow in important sectors. However, the success of this plan depends on several factors: the right timing of reforms, the quality of government institutions, and a stable economy. It is also essential to have a good system to help workers adjust to changes, such as retraining programs for those who lose their jobs to international competition. Without these foundations, even a well-intentioned trade policy can lead to high debt, rising inequality, or social unrest.

Furthermore, the historical experience of successful nations shows that they did not just open their borders and wait for growth to happen. They actively managed the process by building "capabilities" in their people and their companies. This means that trade policy must be linked with education and investment in local technology. If a country only exports raw materials without developing its own manufacturing or services, it will always stay at the bottom of the global value chain. Therefore, the goal of any trade intervention should be to move the country into higher-value activities where wages are better and the economy is more stable.

The main lesson for policymakers and researchers is that we should stop the simple "yes or no" debates and focus on practical diagnostics. Instead of arguing whether trade is "good" or "bad" in an abstract way, we need to ask which specific problems, like poor electricity, lack of credit or slow customs, are holding the economy back. We must identify which sectors actually have a realistic chance to improve and eventually compete on a global level. It is also vital to know if the government has the capacity to properly monitor its support to prevent corruption and if the rules for ending that support are actually credible. In the end, economic success will be determined less by political ideology and more by the technical quality of how these policies are engineered and managed every day.

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DIGITAL GOVERNANCE AS A DRIVER OF URBAN RESILIENCE: INSIGHTS FROM UKRAINIAN CITIES¹

This study examines the transformation of Ukrainian cities under conditions of war, focusing on digitalization as a key driver of urban resilience. By analyzing the cases of Kryvyi Rih, Dnipro, Ternopil, Uzhhorod, Lviv, Kharkiv, and Vinnytsia, the paper identifies distinct models of smart governance that integrate legal, economic, and technological mechanisms. The findings demonstrate that digital tools ensure continuity of public services, enhance transparency, support labor market adaptation, and strengthen institutional trust. The research argues that digital infrastructure has evolved into a critical resilience asset, shaping competitive, adaptive, and investment-attractive urban systems in both wartime and post-war recovery contexts.

Keywords: urban resilience, digitalization, smart city, municipal governance, economic security, public services, Ukraine.

Introduction

In the context of full-scale war and profound socio-economic transformations, the issue of territorial community resilience in Ukraine has acquired fundamentally new significance. It is no longer limited to the ability of cities to recover after crises, but rather concerns their capacity to function continuously under conditions of persistent uncertainty, while ensuring

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Фінансується Європейським Союзом. Проте висловлені погляди та думки належать лише автору(ам) і не обов'язково відображають погляди Європейського Союзу чи Європейського виконавчого агентства з питань освіти та культури. Ні Європейський Союз, ні грантодавець не можуть нести за них відповідальність.

citizens' access to basic rights, services, and economic opportunities. In this framework, digitalization emerges not as an auxiliary tool of modernization, but as a key factor in shaping institutional, economic, and social resilience.

Ukrainian cities demonstrate diverse models of adaptation to emerging challenges, forming unique Smart City practices that combine technological solutions with effective municipal governance. From mobile administrative services and digital social platforms to video analytics systems, geoinformation technologies, and open budget frameworks, these tools not only improve the quality of governance but also create new mechanisms of trust between authorities, businesses, and citizens (*Muraev, 2020*).

The analysis of the cases of Kryvyi Rih, Dnipro, Ternopil, Uzhhorod, Lviv, Kharkiv, and Vinnytsia makes it possible to systematize approaches to urban resilience in Ukraine and to identify the key drivers of transformation that determine the competitiveness of territories in both wartime and post-war periods (*Visit Ukraine, 2026*).

Kryvyi Rih: A Model of Socio-Technological Mobility. Kryvyi Rih demonstrates a unique model of urban resilience, where the stability of a major industrial center is grounded in the uninterrupted access of every resident to essential rights and resources. This model is based on the concept of legal and economic resilience, implemented through the development of digital and mobile infrastructure.

A vivid example of legal resilience is the creation of the largest network of mobile Administrative Service Centers (ASCs) in Ukraine. In crisis situations, such as shelling or the destruction of stationary infrastructure, these mobile offices enable the rapid restoration of administrative services in any part of the community within hours. This ensures that the state, represented by the municipality, remains present and accessible to citizens even during periods of extreme disruption, effectively eliminating the risk of a legal vacuum.

The economic dimension of this resilience is embodied in the “Kryvyi Rih Citizen Card” ecosystem. This tool transforms social support into a transparent digital mechanism: the digitalization of benefits and subsidies allows the city to allocate budget funds efficiently, minimize misuse, and ensure targeted delivery. In addition to direct social assistance, such services – including specialized digital platforms for veterans – significantly reduce time costs for residents, which at the scale of a large city translates into support for local consumption and overall social stability. Thus, technological solutions evolve from mere convenience into a strategic safeguard of the community's socio-economic integrity.

Dnipro: A Model of Security and Legal Resilience. Dnipro became the first city in Ukraine to fully digitalize highly restricted sectors, ranging from advertising registration to cemetery plot management, exemplifying the

concept of “digital legal immunity” in practice. The city established one of the country’s most advanced video analytics systems. Its Situational Center, “Safe City,” collects data from over 2,600 surveillance cameras equipped with analytics capabilities such as license plate recognition, facial identification, and accident detection. For the economy, this reduces losses from vandalism and crime, while for businesses and investors, it ensures rapid response to emergencies and the physical security of assets.

The use of GIS technologies to monitor municipal networks and roads enables the city to maintain infrastructure resilience even under resource constraints. In 2025, Dnipro integrated all social and administrative services into a single digital entry point, allowing effective management of a large internally displaced population (IDPs) and their integration into the labor market via a municipal employment platform.

Dnipro’s experience demonstrates how digitalization of niche services can become a powerful tool for anti-corruption and labor market adaptation. Initiatives such as the free platform work.dniprorada.gov.ua, the “eDnipro” app, and the Diia.Business hub connect local businesses with job seekers and global opportunities, creating a comprehensive infrastructure that strengthens economic-legal resilience and enhances regional investment attractiveness. Digitalization has become a key factor in ensuring the continuous operation of a frontline megacity under heightened security risks."

Ternopil: A Model of Service Integration. Ternopil exemplifies the integration of municipal services into a unified digital management system through its “Smart City Ternopil” initiative. The city leverages technology to optimize budget expenditures and enhance investment attractiveness. Central to this model is an integrated platform for utilities and e-ticketing. While similar in functionality to citizen cards in Dnipro and Kryvyi Rih, Ternopil’s system primarily focuses on efficient resource allocation for housing, utilities, and transport infrastructure, reducing waste and improving forecasting accuracy. A hallmark of the city’s approach is one of Ukraine’s most advanced open budget reporting systems, providing real-time transparency that builds trust with external investors and strengthens the city’s economic resilience.

Uzhhorod: A Model of Cross-Border Digital Resilience. Uzhhorod has become a strategic hub for relocated businesses during wartime, demonstrating a model of rapid capital absorption supported by a robust Geographic Information System (GIS) with an emphasis on logistics and infrastructure. Full digital transparency of available production facilities, land plots, and utility networks simplifies investor entry, integrating relocated capital into the local economy. Collaboration with state agencies allows the city to develop digital solutions for managing transport flows, including e-queues at border crossings. These innovations not only alleviate urban infrastructure pressures but also establish Uzhhorod as a key logistical node.

Digital support for relocated businesses functions as a cornerstone of the city's new economic resilience, where speed of access to data becomes a decisive competitive advantage.

Lviv Community: A Model of Integration Hub and Digital Ecosystem. Lviv exemplifies a municipal resilience model by transforming the "city as a service" concept into a tangible support platform for technology-driven and relocated businesses. Emphasizing human capital and minimizing "information friction," the city creates a seamless interaction between government and entrepreneurs. During the full-scale invasion, advanced digital services, from e-queues to commercial real estate platforms, enabled rapid integration of hundreds of businesses into the local economy. Collaboration between the city council and the IT cluster produced high-tech monitoring and logistics tools. The City-as-a-Platform approach, including chatbots and e-consultations, efficiently absorbed displaced populations and businesses, signaling a transparent, predictable, and investor-friendly digital ecosystem

Kharkiv Community: A Model of Extreme Digital Resilience. Kharkiv represents a municipal resilience paradigm where digitalization evolves from convenience to a fundamental "right to the city." In a high-risk security environment, digital infrastructure ensures community connectivity and prevents economic collapse despite physical destruction. The "My Kharkiv" app replicates key national e-government functions, providing uninterrupted access to services and legal support during crises. Advanced algorithms for energy grid monitoring and automatic switching enhance infrastructure resilience, while e-prescriptions and digital queues preserve human capital. Kharkiv's approach demonstrates that digital transformation acts as a strategic safeguard, maintaining social and economic integrity when physical assets face constant threats.

7. Vinnytsia: Model of Institutional Excellence. A foundational element in the panorama of Ukrainian Smart Governance is the experience of Vinnytsia, where the municipal digital ecosystem has become a benchmark of efficiency. Unlike other cities that often focus on individual services, Vinnytsia implements a holistic concept centered on an integrated GIS portal and a comprehensive electronic document management system.

The economic efficiency of Vinnytsia's model is evidenced by concrete results: full digitalization of land auctions and municipal property lease processes has significantly increased city budget revenues even during acute crises. Data transparency has been a decisive factor in attracting major industrial players, particularly within the Vinnytsia Industrial Park. For such investors, detailed digital maps and clearly regulated e-procedures are essential prerequisites for capital placement.

The socio-economic and legal impact of this system is reflected in a 40% reduction in time required to access municipal services. This improvement supports the development of medium-sized businesses by minimizing administrative barriers. High levels of trust among residents and entrepreneurs, documented in annual municipal surveys (including IRI), directly result from the city's focus on procedural clarity and efficiency. Tools such as the Municipal Innovation Map and the Open Data Portal transform city management into a transparent service, positioning Vinnytsia as an ideal platform for sustainable economic development.

Conclusions

The analysis demonstrates that Ukrainian cities are developing a multidimensional model of resilience, with digitalization serving as a system-forming element. Despite differences in scale, resources, and geographic location, all examined communities leverage technology to ensure continuity of governance, minimize risks, and sustain economic activity. Kryvyi Rih emphasizes mobile services and socially targeted support; Dnipro focuses on security solutions and a digital labor market; Ternopil prioritizes cost optimization and budget transparency; Uzhhorod enables rapid integration of relocated businesses; Lviv builds an integrated innovation ecosystem; Kharkiv relies on survival through digital infrastructure; and Vinnytsia exemplifies institutional excellence. Collectively, these models form a comprehensive architecture of Ukrainian Smart Governance.

The key insight is that digital solutions are transforming from efficiency tools into critical resilience infrastructure. They provide not only operational speed and transparency but also a new form of interaction between the state and citizens, rapid, direct, and trust-based. In the post-war recovery phase, such models will underpin the development of competitive, inclusive, and investment-attractive territories in Ukraine.

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EVOLUTION OF THE POLISH PENSION SYSTEM UNDER DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURE

Abstract

This article analyzes the Polish pension system in the context of challenges imposed by contemporary demographic trends. The financial security of citizens after the conclusion of their professional activity is one of the pillars of state policy, serving the function of macroeconomic income distribution between generations. The primary objective of this mechanism is capital accumulation and the protection of seniors against longevity risk. The study demonstrates that the progressive aging of the population constitutes a critical burden on public finances. The deepening decline in the value of benefits relative to average wages, along with growing capital deficits, represents the most severe problems of the current model, which urgently requires remedial actions in the long-term perspective.

Keywords: *social policy, pensions, public finances, economy, demography.*

EWOLUCJA POLSKIEGO SYSTEMU EMERYTALNEGO W WARUNKACH PRESJI DEMOGRAFICZNEJ

Streszczenie

Artykuł przedstawia analizę polskiego systemu emerytalnego w kontekście wyzwań narzucanych przez współczesne trendy demograficzne. Zabezpieczenie finansowe obywateli po zakończeniu aktywności zawodowej to jeden z filarów polityki państwa, pełniący funkcję makroekonomicznego podziału dochodów pomiędzy pokoleniami. Głównym zadaniem tego mechanizmu jest akumulacja kapitału i ochrona seniorów przed ryzykiem długowieczności. W opracowaniu wykazano, że postępujące starzenie się społeczeństwa stanowi krytyczne obciążenie dla wydolności finansów publicznych. Pogłębiający się spadek wartości świadczeń w stosunku do średnich wynagrodzeń oraz narastające niedobory kapitałowe to najpoważniejsze problemy obecnego modelu, które wymagają działań zaradczych w perspektywie długoterminowej.

Słowa kluczowe: *polityka społeczna, emerytury, finanse państwa, gospodarka, demografia.*

1. Wprowadzenie i problem badawczy

Mechanizm zabezpieczenia emerytalnego stanowi filar stabilności finansów państwa, będąc jednocześnie głównym instrumentem chroniącym byt materialny obywateli po ustaniu ich aktywności na rynku pracy. Konstrukcja ta opiera się na spójnym systemie norm i narzędzi instytucjonalnych, których zasadniczym zadaniem jest efektywna akumulacja oszczędności oraz ich ochrona przed procesami inflacyjnymi, co ma gwarantować wypłatę adekwatnych świadczeń. Sprawne działanie tego mechanizmu stoi pod znakiem zapytania, ze względu na postępujące starzenie się populacji, które w perspektywie nadchodzących dekad wygeneruje bezprecedensową presję na wydolność całego aparatu. Wynika to bezpośrednio z faktu wydłużania się przeciętnego trwania życia i postępu w medycynie, czemu równolegle towarzyszy drastyczny spadek dzietności. Ten splot zjawisk, charakterystyczny dla rozwiniętych gospodarek, wymusza krytyczną rewizję dotychczasowej architektury świadczeń oraz pilną implementację rozwiązań gwarantujących odpowiednią stopę zastąpienia.

Celem niniejszego opracowania jest charakterystyka systemu emerytalnego w Polsce na gruncie teoretycznym oraz ukazanie jego kluczowych elementów, funkcji i wyzwań związanych z pogarszającą się kondycją systemu i problemami demograficznymi.

2. Wyniki badań i dyskusja

Wbrew potocznym wyobrażeniom, system emerytalny nie odnosi się wyłącznie do okresu starości, rozumianego jako faza pobierania świadczeń emerytalnych. Obejmuje on również etap aktywności zawodowej, w którym ubezpieczony odprowadza składki z zamiarem zabezpieczenia swojego bytu ekonomicznego po zakończeniu pracy zarobkowej. System ubezpieczeń emerytalnych może być analizowany zarówno w ujęciu makroekonomicznym, jak i mikroekonomicznym.


Analiza makroekonomiczna wskazuje, iż gospodarstwa domowe dokonują intertemporalnej alokacji dochodu, przeznaczając jego część na przyszłą, często odległą w czasie konsumpcję, przy wykorzystaniu mechanizmu solidarności międzypokoleniowej oraz instrumentów inwestycyjnych dostępnych na rynkach finansowych. W pierwszym przypadku ubezpieczeni opłacają składki emerytalne, nabywając w ten sposób prawo do przyszłych świadczeń. W drugim przypadku mamy do czynienia z gromadzeniem oszczędności, które następnie są inwestowane za pośrednictwem instytucji finansowych, takich jak banki oraz fundusze emerytalne i inwestycyjne.

Oba te sposoby oszczędzania na okres starości w istocie polegają na dokonywaniu zapisów księgowych na odpowiednich rachunkach, gdyż bieżące składki osób aktywnych zawodowo finansują aktualne świadczenia emerytalne i rentowe. M. Mikołajek w „Studium ekonomicznym polskiego systemu emerytalnego” podkreśla, iż: „System emerytalny w perspektywie makroekonomicznej jest narzędziem podziału bieżącego dochodu (PKB) między pokolenie pracujące oraz pokolenie emerytalne” [1].

Priorytetem polityki publicznej musi być zapewnienie godnego poziomu życia generacji emerytów zarówno w okresie obecnym, jak i w długim horyzoncie czasowym. Stanowi to jedną z kluczowych funkcji systemu emerytalnego. Kolejną funkcją jest ochrona przed ryzykiem długowieczności (tzw. *longevity risk* [2]), wynikającym z niepewności co do długości życia jednostki w fazie pobierania emerytury. Ryzyko długowieczności jest zjawiskiem zasadniczo pozytywnym z perspektywy jednostki i społeczeństwa, jednak w warunkach braku odpowiednich mechanizmów ubezpieczeniowych osoby żyjące relatywnie długo byłyby szczególnie narażone na ubóstwo w późnej starości.

System emerytalny pełni zatem funkcję ochrony przed nadmiernie szybką konsumpcją zgromadzonego kapitału emerytalnego. Dzięki obowiązkowi uczestnictwa i przymusowi odprowadzania składek ubezpieczenie emerytalne może być oferowane po relatywnie niższym koszcie i w szerszym zakresie dostępności dla obywateli.


Konstrukcja systemu emerytalnego stanowi jeden z fundamentalnych elementów ładu instytucjonalnego i stabilności społeczno-ekonomicznej kraju. Polski system emerytalny składa się z trzech filarów, przedstawionych na rysunku 1.



Rysunek 1. System emerytalny w Polsce*

*Źródło: Opracowanie własne na podstawie Mikołajek M. Studium ekonomiczne polskiego systemu emerytalnego, DOI: 10.23734/23.18.039, https://repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/Content/94281/PDF/05_M_Mikołajek_Studium_ekonomiczne_polskiego_systemu_emerytalnego.pdf s.81 [14.03.2026].

Każdy z trzech filarów polskiego systemu emerytalnego charakteryzuje się odmiennymi, specyficznymi cechami konstrukcyjnymi. Pierwszy filar obejmuje emeryturę wypłacaną przez Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych (ZUS). Każdy ubezpieczony posiada indywidualne konto w ZUS, na którym ewidencjonowane są opłacane składki emerytalne. Zgromadzone środki podlegają corocznej waloryzacji, uwzględniającej przede wszystkim realny wzrost cen, określany przez Główny Urząd Statystyczny. Pierwszy filar ma charakter repartycyjny, co oznacza, że środki wpływające z bieżących składek nie są inwestowane, lecz przeznaczone bezpośrednio na wypłatę świadczeń osobom aktualnie pobierającym emeryturę. Wysokość emerytury wypłacanej w ramach tego segmentu systemu emerytalnego zależy zasadniczo od łącznej kwoty składek zaksięgowanych na indywidualnym koncie ubezpieczonego oraz od wieku, w którym dana osoba przechodzi na emeryturę. Od 1 października 2017 r. w Polsce obowiązujący ustawowy wiek emerytalny wynosi 60 lat dla kobiet oraz 65 lat dla mężczyzn. Średnia oczekiwana długość trwania życia na emeryturze wynosi obecnie około 16 lat dla osób przechodzących na emeryturę w wieku 65 lat oraz około 23 lata dla osób przechodzących na emeryturę w wieku 60 lat. Prognozowane zmiany oczekiwanej długości życia na emeryturze w horyzoncie kolejnych lat przedstawiono na rysunku 2.



Rysunek 2. Prognozowana długość życia w momencie przejścia na emeryturę (w miesiącach) w Polsce w latach 2016 – 2025*

*Źródło: Opracowanie własne na podstawie danych Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego, <https://stat.gov.pl/sygnalne/komunikaty-i-obwieszczenia/lista-komunikatow-i-obwieszczen/komunikat-w-sprawie-tablicy-sredniego-dalszego-trwania-zycia-kobiet-i-mezczyzn,285,10.html>, lata 2016-2025 [14.03.2026].

Jak można zaobserwować, od 2016 roku oczekiwana długość życia na emeryturze wykazywała tendencję wzrostową. Jednak w wyniku wybuchu pandemii COVID-19, która w szczególności zagrażała osobom w starszym wieku i doprowadziła do wzrostu śmiertelności wśród emerytów,

prognozowana długość życia na emeryturze w następnych dwóch latach uległa gwałtownemu obniżeniu. Skutkowało to podwyższeniem wysokości świadczeń emerytalnych dla osób, które w tym okresie rozpoczęły ich pobieranie, ze względu na krótszy statystyczny okres wypłaty świadczeń. Istotnym elementem przy ustalaniu wysokości przyszłej emerytury ubezpieczonego jest również wartość kapitału początkowego. Stanowi on odzwierciedlenie zwaloryzowanej sumy składek na ubezpieczenie emerytalne, opłaconych przez ubezpieczonego przed 1 stycznia 1999 roku, czyli przed wprowadzeniem indywidualnych kont ubezpieczonych w Zakładzie Ubezpieczeń Społecznych (ZUS). [3].

II filar, obejmujący Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych (ZUS) oraz Otwarte Fundusze Emerytalne (OFE), został w założeniu skonstruowany jako filar kapitałowy. Obecnie jednak taki charakter ma w dużej mierze wymiar jedynie formalny, co wynika z relatywnie niewielkiego znaczenia OFE w całym systemie emerytalnym. Jest to konsekwencją zarówno niskiej części składki emerytalnej kierowanej do OFE, jak i obowiązywania tzw. „suwaka bezpieczeństwa”. Jak wskazuje literatura przedmiotu, działania rządu z 2014 r. istotnie podważyły zaufanie społeczeństwa do form zabezpieczenia emerytalnego innych niż obowiązkowe ubezpieczenie wyłącznie w ZUS.

Kapitałowy charakter OFE jest ściśle uzależniony od wyników inwestycyjnych funduszy, które podlegają wahaniom w zależności od koniunktury na rynkach finansowych. Pomimo występującego ryzyka inwestycyjnego istnieje jednak możliwość zwiększenia wartości zgromadzonych składek. Brak skutecznych działań kolejnych rządów skutkuje stałym spadkiem liczby nowych członków OFE oraz niekorzystną strukturą wiekową uczestników, w której aż 62% (9,3 mln) stanowią osoby powyżej 41. roku życia [4]. Prowadzi to do stopniowego, długotrwałego rozkładu systemu OFE. Z uwagi na postępującą dekulację kapitału, utrzymywanie OFE w obecnym kształcie wydaje się całkowicie nieuzasadnione, przy jednoczesnym braku konkretnych inicjatyw legislacyjnych zmierzających do zmiany obowiązujących regulacji.

II filar emerytalny ma charakter obowiązkowy, jednak w jego ramach ubezpieczony dysponuje prawem wyboru. Składki mogą być kierowane albo wyłącznie do ZUS, albo dzielone pomiędzy ZUS i OFE. OFE zostały powołane w celu efektywnego pomnażania środków na rynku kapitałowym i tym samym zapewnienia relatywnie wyższego poziomu świadczeń emerytalnych w przyszłości. Dodatkową, istotną z punktu widzenia ubezpieczonych cechą OFE była możliwość dziedziczenia zgromadzonych środków, co nie występuje w przypadku środków ewidencjonowanych w ZUS. W praktyce okazało się jednak, że OFE nie realizują w pełni zakładanych funkcji. Do głównych problemów należy zaliczyć wysokie

opłaty pobierane przez Powszechne Towarzystwa Emerytalne (m.in. opłata za zarządzanie oraz opłata od składki – w latach 1999–2003 sięgająca nawet 10% odprowadzanej składki, następnie do 2009 r. wynosząca 7%, do 2013 r. – 3,5%, a obecnie 1,75%) [5], a także negatywny wpływ globalnego kryzysu finansowego z lat 2007–2009 na wyceny aktywów funduszy. W reakcji na narastające problemy fiskalne państwa rząd zdecydował się na reformę OFE, której istotnym celem było obniżenie relacji długu publicznego do PKB oraz uniknięcie przekroczenia drugiego progu ostrożnościowego. W wyniku przeprowadzonych zmian członkostwo w OFE uzyskało charakter dobrowolny. Obecnie każdy ubezpieczony ma do wyboru dwie alternatywne formy rozdysponowania części składki emerytalnej:

- przekazywać część składki emerytalnej w wysokości 7,3% w całości na subkonto w ZUS. Środki te mogą być dziedziczone przez bliską osobę po śmierci osoby opłacającej składki.

- podzielić część składki emerytalnej 7,3% na dwie części:
 - wpłata na subkonto w ZUS w wysokości 4,38%;
 - wpłata do OFE w wysokości 2,92%.

Obecnie przeważa przekonanie, że świadczenia emerytalne wypłacane w ramach I i II filara systemu emerytalnego nie będą wystarczająco wysokie, aby zapewnić godziwy poziom życia w okresie poprodukcyjnym. W konsekwencji obserwuje się rosnące zainteresowanie osób aktywnych zawodowo gromadzeniem dodatkowych środków na emeryturę w ramach III filara systemu emerytalnego. W obszarze dobrowolnego oszczędzania emerytalnego można wyróżnić w szczególności Indywidualne Konto Emerytalne (IKE) oraz Indywidualne Konto Zabezpieczenia Emerytalnego (IKZE), gdzie:

- IKE – Indywidualne Konto Emerytalne (IKE) stanowi instrument długoterminowego oszczędzania o charakterze emerytalnym, pełniący funkcję swoistego zabezpieczenia finansowego na okres po zakończeniu aktywności zawodowej. Rozwiązanie to zostało wprowadzone do polskiego systemu prawnego z dniem 1 września 2004 r. na podstawie Ustawy z dnia 20 kwietnia 2004 r. o indywidualnych kontach emerytalnych [6]. Założenie IKE ma charakter całkowicie dobrowolny.

Indywidualne Konto Emerytalne może być prowadzone przez różne instytucje finansowe, w szczególności banki, domy maklerskie, zakłady ubezpieczeń, powszechne towarzystwa emerytalne oraz towarzystwa funduszy inwestycyjnych. Konstrukcja produktu w ramach IKE jest zróżnicowana – środki mogą być lokowane m.in. w fundusze inwestycyjne, jak również na lokatach bankowych. Kluczową cechą IKE jest zwolnienie z podatku od dochodów kapitałowych (tzw. podatku “Belki”) pod warunkiem, że wypłata środków nastąpi po ukończeniu przez oszczędzającego 60. roku

życia [7]. Ustawodawca dopuścił również możliwość dokonywania wpłat na IKE przez osoby małoletnie, które ukończyły 16 lat, przy czym jest to możliwe wyłącznie w latach, w których uzyskują one dochody z tytułu umowy o pracę oraz jedynie do wysokości uzyskanego wynagrodzenia [8]. Środki zgromadzone na IKE podlegają dziedziczeniu, przy czym ich nabycie jest zwolnione z podatku od spadków i darowizn. Jednocześnie obowiązuje ustawowy limit rocznych wpłat na IKE, wynoszący 300% prognozowanego przeciętnego wynagrodzenia w gospodarce narodowej. W 2023 r. limit ten wynosił 20 85 zł, natomiast w 2026 r. został ustalony na poziomie 28 260 zł [9].

➤ IKZE – Indywidualne Konto Zabezpieczenia Emerytalnego (IKZE) zostało wprowadzone na mocy Ustawy z dnia 25 marca 2011 r. o zmianie niektórych ustaw związanych z funkcjonowaniem systemu ubezpieczeń społecznych, która weszła w życie z dniem 1 stycznia 2012 r. Konstrukcja IKZE została oparta na rozwiązaniach przewidzianych dla Indywidualnych Kont Emerytalnych (IKE), jednak pomiędzy tymi instrumentami występuje różnica w zakresie regulacji dotyczących opodatkowania. Wpłaty na IKZE mogą zostać odliczone od podstawy opodatkowania podatkiem dochodowym od osób fizycznych w danym roku podatkowym, natomiast wypłata zgromadzonych środków podlega zryczałtowanemu podatkowi dochodowemu w wysokości 10% wypłacanej kwoty. Środki zgromadzone na IKZE mogą zostać wypłacone po ukończeniu 65. roku życia przez oszczędzającego, zgodnie z warunkami określonymi w przepisach ustawowych.

W ramach dobrowolnego oszczędzania emerytalnego można wyróżnić kolejne dwa instrumenty:


➤ Pracownicze Programy Emerytalne (PPE) – instrument ten powstał w 1999 roku wraz z budową nowego systemu emerytalnego w Polsce. Jest to więc najstarszy element systemu. PPE są oferowane wyłącznie przez pracodawcę. W odróżnieniu od PPK, państwo nie wpłaca dodatkowych składek, ale pracodawca może wpłacać składkę w wysokości aż 7% wynagrodzenia. Środków zgromadzonych w PPE nie można wypłacić przed przejściem na emeryturę. Po ukończeniu 60. roku życia środki wypłacane są w ratach lub jednorazowo;

➤ Pracownicze Plany Kapitałowe (PPK) – Pracownicze Plany Kapitałowe (PPK) stanowią najmłodszy instrument funkcjonujący w ramach III filara systemu emerytalnego. Ustawa z dnia 4 października 2018 r. o pracowniczych planach kapitałowych [10] weszła w życie 1 stycznia 2019 r., natomiast pierwsze programy PPK rozpoczęły działalność 1 lipca 2019 r. Mechanizm finansowania PPK polega na comiesięcznym odprowadzaniu składek na indywidualny rachunek uczestnika. Co do zasady, pracownik

finansuje składkę podstawową w wysokości 2% wynagrodzenia brutto, z możliwością jej dobrowolnego podwyższenia do maksymalnie 4%. W przypadku osób osiągających dochody poniżej 120% minimalnego wynagrodzenia, minimalna składka pracownika może zostać obniżona do 0,5% wynagrodzenia brutto. Pracodawca dokonuje natomiast wpłaty podstawowej w wysokości 1,5% wynagrodzenia brutto, z możliwością jej podwyższenia do 4%. Dodatkowym źródłem zasilania rachunku PPK są środki pochodzące z budżetu państwa, obejmujące wpłatę powitalną w wysokości 250 zł oraz coroczną wpłatę w wysokości 240 zł, dokonywaną po spełnieniu ustawowych warunków. Środki zgromadzone w ramach PPK podlegają dziedziczeniu bez obowiązku uiszczania podatku od spadków i darowizn. Po zakończeniu aktywności zawodowej i osiągnięciu co najmniej 60. roku życia uczestnik może dokonać wypłaty środków w preferencyjnym trybie: 25% zgromadzonego kapitału może zostać wypłacone jednorazowo, natomiast pozostałe 75% w formie 120 miesięcznych rat. W przypadku innego sposobu lub wcześniejszego terminu wypłaty, środki podlegają opodatkowaniu podatkiem od dochodów kapitałowych. Strategia inwestycyjna w ramach PPK opiera się na funduszach zdefiniowanej daty i jest dostosowana do cyklu życia uczestnika, co oznacza stopniowe obniżanie poziomu ryzyka inwestycyjnego wraz ze zbliżaniem się do wieku emerytalnego.

Obecnie system emerytalny w Polsce mierzy się z wieloma trudnościami, które niestety według badaczy w kolejnych dekadach będą się pogłębiać. Jednym z czynników będzie wzrost liczby osób pobierających świadczenia z systemu emerytalnego. Na rysunku 3 można zauważyć zwiększającą się liczbę osób pobierających świadczenia emerytalno-rentowe w latach 2005-2025. Pewnym zaburzeniem charakteryzują się lata 2013-2017, kiedy to obserwuje się spadek tej liczby. Ma to bezpośredni związek z reformą zmieniającą wiek emerytalny. W 2017 roku przywrócono powszechny wiek emerytalny na poziomie 60 lat dla kobiet i 65 dla mężczyzn. W związku z tym od roku 2017 emeryturę zaczęły pobierać nie tylko te osoby, które osiągnęły wiek 60 i 65 lat, ale również te, które w latach 2013-2017 pracowały dłużej.


Procesy demograficzne, poprzez silny i bezpośredni wpływ na liczebność populacji emerytów oraz osób objętych ubezpieczeniem społecznym, w istotny sposób determinują sytuację finansową systemu emerytalnego. Z tego względu najnowsze wyniki prognoz demograficznych są przedmiotem szczegółowych i pełnych obaw analiz. Zgodnie z tymi prognozami liczba ludności Polski zmniejszy się z 38,9 mln w 2022 r. do 32,5 mln w 2060 r., a następnie do 28,2 mln w 2080 r. Oznacza to, że w 2080 r. populacja Polski będzie niższa od obecnej o 9,7 mln osób, co odpowiada spadkowi o 25,5%.



Rysunek 3. Liczba osób pobierających świadczenia emerytalno-rentowe z pozarolniczego systemu ubezpieczeń społecznych w Polsce w latach 2005-2025*

*Źródło: Opracowanie własne na podstawie danych Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego (<https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/bdl/dane/podgrup/tablica>; kategoria K40: wynagrodzenia i świadczenia społeczne, grupa G404: świadczenia społeczne, podgrupa P2861: Emeryci i renciści).

Niekorzystne zmiany w strukturze wieku ludności są ilustrowane przez relację liczby osób w wieku poprodukcyjnym do liczby osób w wieku produkcyjnym.



Rysunek 4. Struktura ludności Polski według ekonomicznych grup wieku – dane do roku 2022 i prognoza do roku 2080*


*Źródło: Opracowanie własne na podstawie: „Prognoza wpływów i wydatków Funduszu Emerytalnego do 2080 roku” Departament Statystyki i Prognoz Aktuarnych, Warszawa, październik 2022.

Zgodnie z prognozą demograficzną wskaźnik ten rośnie do 2061 r., następnie nieznacznie obniża się do 2067 r., po czym ponownie wzrasta do 2080 r. W 2022 r. na 1000 osób w wieku produkcyjnym przypadało 421 osób

w wieku poprodukcyjnym, w 2061 r. wartość ta wzrasta do 806 osób, a w 2080 r. do 839 osób. Powyższe dane zostały zobrazowane na rysunku 4, na którym przedstawiono podział ludności na trzy grupy ekonomiczne: ludność w wieku przedprodukcyjnym (0–17 lat), ludność w wieku produkcyjnym (mężczyźni: 18–64 lata; kobiety: 18–59 lat) oraz ludność w wieku poprodukcyjnym (powyżej ustawowego wieku emerytalnego).

Prognozowane, systematyczne starzenie się struktury demograficznej społeczeństwa polskiego oznacza, że do roku 2080 liczebność populacji w wieku przedprodukcyjnym zmniejszy się o ok. 36% w stosunku do roku 2025, liczba osób w wieku produkcyjnym obniży się o ponad 40%, natomiast populacja w wieku poprodukcyjnym zwiększy się o 26%.

Wzrastająca liczba świadczeniobiorców emerytalnych wywiera negatywny wpływ na wysokość przeciętnej emerytury oraz jej relację do przeciętnego wynagrodzenia w gospodarce. Jak przedstawiono na rysunku 5, w szczególności w ostatnich czterech latach dynamika wzrostu przeciętnych świadczeń emerytalnych pozostaje wyraźnie niższa niż dynamika wzrostu wynagrodzeń, co uniemożliwia nie tylko zmniejszanie dystansu między tymi wielkościami, lecz nawet utrzymanie dotychczasowego poziomu relacji emerytury do płacy. Choć zarówno przeciętne emerytury nierolnicze, jak i rolnicze wykazują tendencję wzrostową w ujęciu rocznym, skala tych wzrostów jest niewystarczająca z punktu widzenia zachowania ich relatywnej wartości względem wynagrodzeń.



Rysunek 5. Porównanie przeciętnej emerytury rolniczej i nierolniczej z przeciętnym wynagrodzeniem w latach 2008-2025 w Polsce*

*Źródło: Opracowanie własne na podstawie danych Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego (<https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/bdl/dane/podgrup/tablica>; kategoria K40: wynagrodzenia i świadczenia społeczne; grupa G404: świadczenia społeczne; podgrupa P2860: przeciętna miesięczna emerytura i renta brutto).

W związku z postępującymi i gwałtownymi zmianami w strukturze demograficzno-wiekowej ludności Polski, w nadchodzących latach należy oczekiwać dalszego zwiększania się rozbieżności pomiędzy przeciętnym wynagrodzeniem a przeciętną emeryturą, co będzie prowadzić do realnego obniżenia wartości świadczeń emerytalnych.

3. Wnioski

Przeprowadzona analiza polskiego systemu emerytalnego wskazuje, że obecny model znajduje się pod silną i bezprecedensową presją wynikającą z niekorzystnych trendów demograficznych. Proces starzenia się populacji, w połączeniu z trwałym obniżeniem współczynnika dzietności, prowadzi do istotnego pogorszenia wskaźnika obciążenia demograficznego. Jak wykazano w opracowaniu, bezpośrednim skutkiem tych procesów jest narastająca erozja realnej wartości świadczeń w systemie zdefiniowanej składki. Prognozowany spadek stopy zastąpienia do poziomu około 25% w 2060 roku stanowi jedno z kluczowych wyzwań dla stabilności makroekonomicznej państwa oraz dla bezpieczeństwa socjalnego przyszłych kohort emerytów.

Zreformowany w 1999 roku trójfilarowy system emerytalny był w założeniu projektowany jako instrument ograniczania ryzyka demograficznego poprzez dywersyfikację źródeł finansowania świadczeń. Niemniej jednak marginalizacja otwartych funduszy emerytalnych (OFE) oraz utrzymujący się niski poziom uczestnictwa w dobrowolnych filarach kapitałowych uwidoczniły strukturalne ograniczenia i niedoskonałości tego rozwiązania instytucjonalnego. Utrzymanie długookresowej stabilności dochodowej gospodarstw domowych w wieku poprodukcyjnym nie jest obecnie możliwe przy oparciu się wyłącznie na I filarze repartycyjnym, finansowanym z bieżących wpływów do Funduszu Ubezpieczeń Społecznych.

W świetle powyższych ustaleń konieczne staje się wdrożenie niezwłocznych, wielowymiarowych interwencji o charakterze zarządczym i regulacyjnym. Nadrzędnym celem polityki publicznej powinno być zwiększenie aktywności zawodowej w starszych kohortach wieku, w szczególności poprzez konstruowanie silnych, systemowych bodźców do opóźniania momentu przejścia w stan bierności zawodowej z tytułu emerytury. Równolegle, absolutny priorytet należy przypisać intensyfikacji działań edukacyjnych i legislacyjnych ukierunkowanych na upowszechnienie wykorzystania instrumentów III filaru (takich jak PPK, IKE, IKZE czy PPE). Wyłącznie synergia mechanizmów kompensacyjnych opartych na kapitale prywatnym z publicznym systemem zabezpieczenia emerytalnego i gwarancji

dochodu pozwoli ograniczyć ryzyko głębokiej degradacji materialnej populacji w wieku poprodukcyjnym w nadchodzących dekadach.

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AUSTRALIA'S ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL UNCERTAINTY: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

The article examines the structural features of the Australian economy, its dependence on commodity exports, and the growing role of the services sector. The study analyses the impact of China-Australia trade tensions, post-COVID recovery dynamics, inflationary pressures, and the challenges posed by climate change and the energy transition. Particular attention is paid to Australia's strategy of trade diversification through new bilateral and multilateral agreements, including the Australia-India ECTA and engagement in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. The article assesses the prospects for developing the critical minerals sector as a cornerstone of Australia's future competitive advantage. The role of immigration and demographic policy in addressing structural labour shortages is examined alongside innovation deficits and productivity challenges that constrain long-run growth. Statistical evidence is presented in tabular form to contextualise macroeconomic performance, export structure, and resource endowments.

Keywords: *Australian economy, commodity exports, trade diversification, energy transition, Indo-Pacific, critical minerals, economic resilience, innovation policy, immigration, productivity.*

Introduction

Australia is one of the world's most prosperous and stable economies, consistently ranking among the top twenty largest economies by nominal GDP. Its development model, built on abundant natural resources, a highly educated workforce, and strong institutional frameworks, allowed the country to weather multiple global crises without experiencing a technical recession for nearly three decades – a streak interrupted only by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. However, this resilience should not obscure the structural vulnerabilities that have gradually accumulated: excessive reliance on mineral and agricultural exports, geographic and economic dependence on a single dominant trading partner, underdeveloped domestic manufacturing, and escalating fiscal pressures from an ageing population.

The current period represents a pivotal juncture for Australian economic policy. Global commodity markets are being reshaped by the energy transition, geopolitical tensions are redrawing trade routes, and the digital economy is creating new competitive pressures. The experience of the COVID-19 pandemic exposed supply chain fragilities and the limits of open-

economy dependence, prompting a broader rethink of industrial strategy across the developed world, including in Canberra.

Understanding how Australia navigates these challenges is relevant not only from the perspective of a single national economy, but also as a case study in how resource-rich developed nations can pursue structural transformation while maintaining social cohesion and macroeconomic stability. Few countries combine Australia's characteristics, a small open economy, a dominant commodity sector, proximity to the world's fastest-growing region, and high living standards, making it a particularly instructive subject for comparative economic analysis.

Research Objective

The purpose of this article is to analyse the key structural characteristics of the Australian economy, to identify the primary internal and external challenges it faces in the current decade, and to assess the strategic directions through which Australia is seeking to enhance its long-term economic resilience and competitiveness. A secondary objective is to present relevant quantitative evidence to contextualise Australia's position within the global economy and to support the analytical claims advanced in the study.

Results

1. Macroeconomic Performance and Structural Overview

Australia's economic structure is characterised by a pronounced dual nature. The services sector accounts for approximately 70% of GDP and employs the vast majority of the workforce, with financial services, education, healthcare, and retail trade being the dominant contributors. At the same time, the country's export profile remains heavily skewed towards commodities: iron ore, coal, natural gas, gold, and agricultural products collectively account for over 60% of total merchandise export value. This structural duality creates a persistent tension between domestic consumption-driven growth and export income volatility tied to global commodity price cycles and the economic conditions of major trading partners.

The Australian economy benefits from several structural advantages that have supported long-run stability. These include a flexible exchange rate that acts as an automatic stabiliser, depreciating when commodity prices fall, thereby cushioning export revenues in domestic currency terms, a well-capitalised banking system operating under prudential oversight by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), and an independent central bank with an established inflation-targeting framework. Fiscal policy has been managed conservatively over the long run, leaving Australia with lower government debt ratios than most comparable advanced economies.

Table 1 presents key macroeconomic indicators for Australia over the period 2019-2023, capturing both the disruption caused by the pandemic and the subsequent recovery trajectory.

Table 1

Key Macroeconomic Indicators of Australia, 2019-2023*

Indicator	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
GDP (USD billion)	1,396	1,330	1,543	1,724	1,693
Real GDP Growth (%)	1.9	-2.2	5.2	3.7	2.0
Unemployment Rate (%)	5.2	6.5	5.1	3.5	3.7
Inflation (CPI, %)	1.6	0.9	2.8	6.6	4.1
Current Account (% GDP)	0.6	2.5	3.0	1.7	1.2
Government Debt (% GDP)	41.8	57.5	57.8	52.5	49.6
RBA Cash Rate (% year-end)	0.75	0.10	0.10	3.10	4.35

*Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2024); IMF World Economic Outlook Database (2024); Reserve Bank of Australia (2024).

The data illustrate several important trends. The 2020 contraction of 2.2% was relatively moderate by OECD standards, reflecting both effective early pandemic containment and the largest peacetime fiscal stimulus in Australian history. The 2021 rebound of 5.2% was among the strongest in the developed world. The post-pandemic period, however, brought elevated inflation, peaking at 6.6% in 2022, which prompted the Reserve Bank of Australia to raise the cash rate from a historic low of 0.10% to 4.35% by November 2023, the fastest tightening cycle in three decades. Despite this aggressive monetary policy response, unemployment remained remarkably low, reaching 3.5% in 2022 and reflecting both strong labour demand and the structural tightness introduced by pandemic-era immigration restrictions. Government debt rose sharply in 2020 but has since declined as a share of GDP, underpinned by strong nominal GDP growth and commodity-driven tax revenues.

2. Export Structure and the China Dependence Challenge

Australia's export profile is dominated by a relatively small number of high-value commodities, making export revenues highly sensitive to global price fluctuations and the economic conditions of key trading partners. Table 2 presents the structure of Australia's major exports in 2023.

Iron ore alone accounts for more than one quarter of all Australian exports, with approximately 85% of output destined for Chinese steel mills. The three primary fossil fuel and mining categories – iron ore, coal, and LNG – together comprise approximately 65% of merchandise export value. This

concentration is extraordinary by the standards of any advanced economy and creates systemic macroeconomic risk. A sustained slowdown in Chinese construction activity, for instance, could reduce iron ore revenues by tens of billions of dollars annually, with knock-on effects on government royalty revenues, the Australian dollar exchange rate, and business investment in the resource sector.

Table 2

Australia's Major Export Commodities, 2023*

Commodity	Export Value 2023 (USD bn)	Share of Total Exports (%)	Primary Destination
Iron Ore	92.4	27.1	China (85%)
Coal (thermal & metallurgical)	67.8	19.9	Japan, India, S. Korea
Liquefied Natural Gas	61.5	18.1	Japan, China, S. Korea
Gold	21.3	6.3	United Kingdom, China
Education Services	17.4	5.1	China, India, Nepal
Tourism & Travel	12.8	3.8	China, USA, UK
Beef & Veal	9.6	2.8	Japan, USA, S. Korea
Wheat	7.2	2.1	Indonesia, Philippines
Copper	5.8	1.7	China, Japan, India

*Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2024); Australian Bureau of Statistics (2024).

The geopolitical dimension of this dependence became starkly apparent following the deterioration in Australia-China relations from 2020. China imposed informal trade restrictions on Australian barley, wine, beef, seafood, timber, cotton, and coal in response to political disputes. The economic damage was concentrated in specific sectors – the wine industry lost approximately AUD 1.2 billion in annual exports to China – but the overall macroeconomic impact was cushioned by two factors: the inability of China to substitute iron ore imports from elsewhere, and the ability of Australian exporters of affected goods to partially redirect to alternative markets. By late 2023, diplomatic re-engagement had led to the lifting of most restrictions, but the episode fundamentally altered the policy calculus around trade diversification.

3. Trade Diversification and Regional Integration

In response to the vulnerability exposed by the China trade dispute, the Australian government has actively pursued new and deeper trade agreements. The Australia–India Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (AIECTA), which entered into force in December 2022, was the most significant bilateral trade deal Australia had signed in over a decade. It eliminated tariffs on 85% of Australian goods entering India immediately upon entry into force, with coverage expanding to 90% over ten years. India, with its growing

middle class, expanding manufacturing base, and projection to become the world's third-largest economy by the early 2030s, represents a natural long-term counterpart to Australian exports of critical minerals, education services, coal (which India continues to import for power generation), and agricultural products.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which entered into force for Australia in January 2022, creates a rules-based framework for trade across fifteen Asia-Pacific economies. While RCEP's tariff reduction commitments are modest for Australia, most bilateral preferential access already existed, its value lies in harmonising rules of origin across the region, which simplifies supply chain management for Australian exporters operating across multiple ASEAN countries. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), launched in 2022 with fourteen member economies including Australia and the United States, focuses on supply chain resilience, clean economy, fair economy, and connected economy pillars. Although it lacks traditional market access provisions, IPEF positions Australia within a US-anchored regional economic architecture that provides strategic depth to its trade diversification agenda.

4. The Energy Transition and Critical Minerals Strategy

The global energy transition poses both a structural threat and a significant opportunity for Australia. As the world's largest exporter of coal and one of the largest exporters of LNG, Australia faces the prospect of long-term structural decline in demand for its two most important fossil fuel categories as major economies accelerate decarbonisation. However, Australia also possesses extraordinary endowments of the critical minerals that underpin the technologies of the energy transition. Table 3 summarises Australia's position in the global critical minerals landscape.

Table 3

Australia's Position in the Global Critical Minerals Market*

Mineral	Global Rank (Production)	Known Reserves (global share)	Strategic Importance
Lithium	1st	~24%	EV batteries, grid-scale storage
Cobalt	3rd	~18%	Battery cathodes, aerospace alloys
Nickel	4th	~23%	Battery anodes, stainless steel
Rare Earth Elements	4th	~3%	Magnets, wind turbines, electronics
Vanadium	3rd	~9%	Grid-scale energy storage
Manganese	2nd	~20%	Steel alloys, EV batteries

**Source: Geoscience Australia (2024); United States Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries (2024).*

Australia is the world's largest producer of lithium, accounting for approximately 47% of global mine production in 2023. The Pilbara region of Western Australia hosts the world's largest hard-rock lithium deposits, processed primarily as spodumene concentrate for export to China, where it is refined into lithium chemicals for battery manufacturing. Australia also ranks among the top global producers of cobalt, nickel, vanadium, and manganese – all of which are critical inputs for battery technology and clean energy infrastructure.

The strategic question for Australia is whether it can move up the value chain from raw mineral extraction to processed materials, precursor chemicals, and potentially battery cell manufacturing, thereby capturing a greater share of the value created by the global energy transition. The Future Made in Australia Act (2024) provides approximately AUD 22.7 billion over a decade in production tax incentives and grants targeting solar panel manufacturing, green hydrogen production, battery precursor chemicals, and critical mineral processing. The government has specifically targeted the downstream processing gap: while Australia mines most of the world's lithium, it currently processes only a small fraction domestically, with the vast majority exported as concentrate to China for refining.

Green hydrogen represents another significant long-term opportunity. Australia's combination of abundant solar and wind energy resources, large land area, existing port infrastructure, and established LNG supply relationships with Japan and South Korea positions it as a potential major exporter of green hydrogen and ammonia. Multiple pilot projects and feasibility studies are underway, and Australia has concluded strategic hydrogen partnership agreements with Germany, Japan, and South Korea. Commercial scale, however, remains contingent on further reductions in electrolyser costs and improvements in hydrogen transport logistics.

5. Labour Market, Immigration, and Demographic Policy

Australia's post-pandemic labour market has been shaped by the interaction of strong aggregate demand, supply disruptions caused by border closures, and the structural characteristics of an economy that has historically relied on net overseas migration to supplement domestic labour supply. The closure of international borders from March 2020 to late 2021 eliminated a structural source of labour supply growth, producing acute shortages in healthcare, aged care, construction, agriculture, and hospitality. These shortages contributed to wage growth of 3-4% per annum from 2022, historically high by Australian standards, and added to inflationary pressures.

The resumption of immigration from mid-2022 produced a surge in net overseas migration reaching a record 518,000 persons in the 2022-23 financial year, according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics. This rapid population

growth has provided relief to tight labour markets but has intensified pressure on housing supply and urban infrastructure. Australia's housing affordability crisis worsened significantly as population growth outpaced new dwelling construction, with capital city dwelling prices rising sharply despite elevated mortgage rates. The government has set a target of 1.2 million new dwellings over five years under the National Housing Accord, but construction industry capacity constraints, materials costs, and planning approval delays make this target challenging.

Australia's longer-term demographic outlook is shaped by an ageing population structure. The old-age dependency ratio is projected to increase from approximately 25% today to over 40% by 2060, according to the Intergenerational Report 2023. This trajectory implies rising fiscal pressures from aged care, healthcare, and pensions expenditure, while simultaneously reducing labour force participation rates. Immigration remains the primary policy lever available to moderate this demographic transition, but cannot fully offset the structural fiscal implications of an older age structure. The government's aged care reform agenda, which aims to improve quality and expand home care provision, also represents a significant fiscal commitment with long-run budgetary implications.

6. Innovation, Productivity, and the Digital Economy

Innovation and productivity growth represent persistent structural weaknesses in the Australian economic model. Business expenditure on research and development (BERD) as a share of GDP has declined from approximately 1.0% in the early 2000s to around 0.7% in recent years, well below the OECD average of approximately 1.6% (OECD, 2023). Australia ranks 23rd among OECD economies on business R&D intensity, reflecting the dominance of resource extraction industries which are less R&D-intensive than manufacturing or technology sectors.

Multi-factor productivity (MFP) growth has also been disappointing. The Productivity Commission's 2023 inquiry identified a broad-based deceleration across virtually all sectors, attributing it to declining competitive pressure in sheltered industries, regulatory complexity, underinvestment in digital infrastructure, and below-average management capability in Australian firms (Productivity Commission, 2023). The Commission noted that Australia had essentially 'borrowed' productivity gains during the mining boom by allocating resources to high-productivity resource extraction, but that this dynamic had run its course and been replaced by slower-growth service sector expansion.

The technology sector, while producing globally recognised firms including Atlassian, Canva, WiseTech Global, and Afterpay (now part of Block Inc.), remains small relative to the economy. Australia's venture capital

ecosystem has grown significantly, from approximately AUD 1 billion in annual investment in 2018 to over AUD 4 billion in 2022, but remains modest by international comparison. The National Reconstruction Fund (AUD 15 billion), the expanded R&D Tax Incentive, and the Digital Economy Strategy represent the government's primary policy instruments for addressing the innovation deficit. The effectiveness of these instruments will ultimately depend on the quality of implementation and the sustained political will to maintain long-horizon investment commitments across electoral cycles.

Conclusions

The Australian economy stands at a crossroads between the continuation of a resource-based growth model and the pursuit of a more diversified, knowledge-intensive economic structure. The macroeconomic data presented in this article confirm that Australia has maintained a broadly favourable performance trajectory – robust employment, moderate debt levels, and a swift post-COVID recovery – but also reveal structural vulnerabilities associated with commodity concentration, bilateral trade exposure, and a persistent productivity deficit.

The China trade dispute of 2020-2023 served as a catalytic stress test that exposed both the risks of bilateral over-dependence and Australia's capacity to adapt when strategic imperatives demanded it. The partial normalisation of China relations from late 2023 has reduced immediate urgency but not the underlying strategic rationale for diversification. New agreements with India, continued engagement through RCEP and IPEF, and the development of the Indo-Pacific supply chain architecture represent meaningful progress, though the weight of China in Australian trade flows will remain dominant for the foreseeable future given structural complementarities.

The energy transition represents the most consequential long-term structural force shaping Australia's economic future. The country's extraordinary critical minerals endowments position it uniquely well to benefit from the global green technology supply chain revolution, but only if policy frameworks can successfully support value-added downstream processing rather than perpetuating commodity dependency in a new form. The government's industrial policy initiatives reflect a genuine understanding of this imperative, though their ultimate effectiveness will depend on sustained commitment and the ability to compete internationally for mobile capital investment in a global subsidy environment.

Labour market policy must balance the immediate economic benefits of high immigration against the social and infrastructure costs of rapid population growth, while immigration remains essential to managing the demographic transition of an ageing society. The innovation and productivity

deficit demands a more ambitious and sustained policy response than Australia has historically committed to – without meaningful improvement in these areas, the country risks a gradual erosion of its per capita income advantage relative to comparator economies over the long run.

In sum, Australia's economic trajectory over the coming decade will be determined by its ability to manage the tension between stability and transformation, leveraging existing institutional strengths, resource endowments, and geographic positioning, while systematically building the new productive capabilities, trade relationships, and innovation capacity that a rapidly evolving global economy will require.

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PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION IN THE CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY

This study examines the development of international transportation in the context of globalization, emphasizing its strategic role in ensuring the continuity of global supply chains and economic integration. The paper analyzes the impact of globalization on transport flows, identifies key trends such as digitalization, multimodal logistics, and decarbonization, and highlights major challenges, including geopolitical disruptions, infrastructure disparities, regulatory inconsistencies, and cybersecurity risks. Particular attention is paid to Ukraine, whose transport system faces both opportunities and constraints under current conditions. The study substantiates priority directions for enhancing efficiency, resilience, and competitiveness of international transport systems through infrastructure modernization, legal harmonization, and technological innovation.

Keywords: *international transportation; globalization; logistics systems; transport infrastructure; multimodal transportation; digitalization; Ukraine.*

Introduction

The current stage of the world economy is characterized by a certain acceleration of globalization processes, accompanied by an increase in international trade volumes, the integration of national economies and the formation of global value chains. In these conditions, international transportation acquires strategic importance, since it is they who ensure the spatial unity of the world market, the continuity of production processes and the timely movement of goods, capital and labor resources. At the same time, the transformation of logistics chains under the influence of digitalization, geopolitical changes, regionalization of trade and increased environmental requirements leads to the emergence of new challenges for the transport industry. The uneven development of infrastructure, the increase in the risks of supply disruptions, increased competition between international transport corridors and the need to harmonize regulatory and legal regulation determine the relevance of studying the problems of the development of international transportation in the context of globalization of the world economy.

Research objective

The goal is a systematic analysis of modern problems of international transport development in the context of globalization processes and justification of possible directions for overcoming them. To achieve this goal, the following tasks are envisaged: to investigate the impact of globalization on the formation of international transport flows; to analyze the current state and trends in the development of international transport; to identify key infrastructure, organizational, regulatory and geopolitical problems; to outline promising directions for increasing the efficiency of the international transport system.

Research results

The essence of globalization is the formation of close interdependence of national economies, which is accompanied by the intensification of international trade, the movement of capital, technology and labor resources. In these conditions, there is a deepening of economic integration of states, which involves the coordination of policies, the removal of barriers and the creation of a common economic space. Such processes directly affect the global transport system, since it is transport that provides the material basis for the functioning of global production and logistics chains. The growth of international exchange leads to the development of intercontinental transport corridors, intermodal transportation and digital cargo flow management systems. At the same time, globalization intensifies competition between transport hubs and countries for transit flows, which stimulates the modernization of infrastructure and the introduction of innovative technologies. Thus, the global transport system is transformed under the influence of integration processes, becoming more interconnected, large-scale and technologically advanced.

The economy of Ukraine, as a developing country, experiences ambiguous consequences that are manifestations of these processes. In some cases, they lead to certain benefits and advantages, and in others, to loss of opportunities and increased dependence [1].

As stated in [2], freight transportation and international trade have always been closely interconnected, exerting a significant influence on each other.

In modern conditions of globalization, the development of transport infrastructure is gaining strategic importance for the functioning of the world economic system. Transport, as one of the basic infrastructure sectors, creates the prerequisites for the stable life of society and ensures the implementation of social, economic and geostrategic priorities of states in the process of their inclusion in the world economic space. The activation of international trade

and economic cooperation between countries and integration associations determines the need for highly efficient transport support, capable of servicing growing volumes of transportation in the conditions of internationalization of economic relations. National transport systems are an important factor in the integration of economies into the global market and the formation of their competitive advantages. The key condition for such integration is the full inclusion of the national transport system into the world transport network and its active participation in international transport corridors [3].

The current state of international transport is characterized by the growth of world trade volumes and the expansion of global supply chains, which directly affects the dynamics of transport flows. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, maritime transport provides about 80% of world trade by volume, remaining a basic element of international logistics [4]. At the same time, analytical materials of the World Trade Organization indicate structural changes in world trade, which are accompanied by the reorientation of part of the flows and the growth of the role of regional markets [5]. According to research [6], the transport sector of Ukraine, with the help of partners and donors, is gradually restoring the volume of cargo transportation in international traffic.

Among the key trends in the development of international transportation, the active digitalization of transport and logistics processes, the introduction of electronic document management, real-time cargo tracking systems and supply chain management platforms are highlighted [4]. Along with this, the importance of multimodal and intermodal transportation is increasing, which optimize costs and reduce delivery times. Geopolitical factors and trade restrictions lead to the transformation of international transport corridors and the formation of alternative routes. An additional vector of development is the greening of transport, in particular the introduction of energy-efficient technologies and measures to decarbonize transportation in accordance with international climate goals [4]. Thus, international transportation is developing in the context of structural restructuring of the world economy, technological changes and increasing requirements for the sustainability and safety of logistics systems.

The current state of international logistics is characterized by a high level of uncertainty. The processes of globalization, which previously stimulated the openness of borders, are now faced with barriers caused by security, economic and environmental factors [7].

Let us consider the main problems that are characteristic of the transport industry when performing international transportation. First of all, it is worth highlighting the political component. For example, the war against Ukraine caused the blocking of traditional transport corridors. This led to: reorientation

of cargo flows to less efficient, but safer routes; increase in insurance risks and freight costs; physical destruction of critical infrastructure (ports, railway junctions) [8].

A separate issue is that the implementation of the concept of sustainable development requires significant investments in decarbonization from carriers [9]. The main challenges are the need to update the fleet in accordance with Euro-6 standards and the introduction of alternative energy sources, which currently have a limited network of gas stations.

Globalization requires full transparency of supply chains. This can be achieved through the use of information technologies. The paper [10] analyzes the impact of digitalization on the transformation of logistics systems in the context of globalization and the development of e-commerce. It examines key digital technologies, such as the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence, Big Data, blockchain, cloud services and supply chain management systems, which contribute to increasing the efficiency and transparency of logistics processes. The advantages and disadvantages of implementing these technologies are studied, as well as barriers, in particular high financial costs, the need for qualified personnel and cybersecurity threats. However, their implementation requires significant investments and ensuring data security. It is indicated that digital transformation is crucial for increasing the competitiveness of logistics companies in the current environment, but requires a systemic approach to overcome the challenges associated with cybersecurity, financial investments and personnel training.

It is also worth noting the regulatory and legal barriers in organizing cargo transportation in international traffic. Thus, in [11] it is noted that the efficiency of global supply chains largely depends on the development of multimodal transportation, which ensures the delivery of cargo on the principle of “door to door” and combines the advantages of different modes of transport. Multimodal schemes using sea transport are especially important for Ukraine, which combine the high carrying capacity of sea transportation with the flexibility of land logistics. At the same time, the implementation of such transportation requires coordinated interaction of all participants in the transport process and a clear regulatory and legal framework. In practice, the efficiency of multimodal transportation is reduced due to legal conflicts, inconsistency of international and national norms, as well as differences in customs and documentary procedures. This causes cargo delays, additional costs and disruption of the technological integrity of logistics chains. For Ukraine, which is integrating into the European economic space, the harmonization of legislation is a key condition for increasing the competitiveness of the national transport system.

Conclusions

Globalization is causing a profound transformation of the world transport system, increasing the interdependence of national economies and increasing the role of international transportation in ensuring the continuity of global supply chains. Current trends in the development of the industry are associated with digital transformation, greening of transport, the development of multimodal technologies and the reorientation of transport flows under the influence of geopolitical factors. At the same time, significant barriers remain that reduce the efficiency of logistics processes and require systemic regulation. For Ukraine, the restoration and modernization of transport infrastructure, integration into the European transport network and harmonization of the legal environment are of key importance. The comprehensive implementation of these measures will create the prerequisites for increasing the sustainability, competitiveness and adaptability of the national transport system in the face of global challenges.

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EMPLOYEE EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAMESE ENTERPRISES ENTERING THE EUROPEAN MARKET: CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

Abstract

This study examines the cultural and institutional challenges influencing employee experience in Vietnamese enterprises expanding into the European market. Leveraging a mixed-methods approach, the research integrates national culture theory and institutional theory to analyze the dynamic interaction between cultural divergences and institutional pressures. Quantitative analysis, based on Hofstede's cultural dimensions and labor institutional data, reveals significant differences in individualism and power distance between Vietnam and European countries, which impact leadership styles, communication practices, and employee expectations. Qualitative document analysis of case studies highlights challenges in cross-cultural management and compliance with stringent European labor standards, including worker protection, transparency, and participatory practices. Findings underscore the mediating role of human resource governance in addressing cultural misalignments and institutional demands, which are critical for enhancing employee satisfaction, organizational commitment, and performance. The study contributes to international management literature by proposing an integrated framework that combines cultural and institutional perspectives to explain employee experience in multinational enterprises. Policy recommendations are provided to support Vietnamese firms, policymakers, and internationalization support organizations in fostering effective HR governance and facilitating successful integration into European markets. Future research should focus on empirical surveys, regional comparisons within the EU, and longitudinal studies to further validate and refine the proposed framework.

Keywords: Employee experience; Vietnamese enterprises; European market; cultural differences; institutional pressures

1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) represents one of the world's largest and most advanced markets, increasingly attracting Vietnamese enterprises through free trade agreements, most notably the EU–Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA). While this agreement has facilitated greater access to European markets, entry into such a highly regulated and competitive environment requires more than product adaptation and compliance with legal frameworks. It also raises complex challenges in organizational management, particularly in the domain of human resource governance.

In recent years, the concept of *Employee Experience (EX)* has emerged as a strategic determinant of organizational performance and competitiveness. For multinational enterprises, EX is profoundly shaped by cross-cultural and institutional differences between the home country and host country contexts. Vietnamese firms expanding into Europe thus face a dual imperative: not only to align their business strategies with European regulatory and market expectations, but also to manage employee experiences in ways that reconcile divergent cultural norms, labor practices, and institutional structures.

This study seeks to critically examine the cultural and institutional challenges that influence employee experience within Vietnamese enterprises operating in Europe. By analyzing the implications of these challenges for both employees and organizations, the research aims to provide theoretically grounded insights and propose context-sensitive human resource management strategies. Such an approach underscores the importance of integrating cultural awareness and institutional adaptability into HR governance, thereby enhancing organizational resilience and sustaining competitiveness in the European market.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Employee Experience in the Context of International Enterprises

The concept of *Employee Experience* has increasingly become a focal point in contemporary human resource management, reflecting employees' holistic perceptions of their work environment, organizational culture, governance systems, and interpersonal interactions throughout their tenure within a firm. Prior studies emphasize that EX extends beyond employee engagement, encompassing the interplay of organizational culture, workplace conditions, and managerial systems designed to support employees (Bersin, 2016; Morgan, 2017).

Within multinational enterprises, EX assumes particular significance as organizations operate across diverse cultural and institutional contexts. Research published in the *International Journal of Human Resource*

Management (2022) underscores that EX is a decisive factor in organizational adaptability and performance in multicultural environments. Empirical evidence from Vietnamese enterprises in Germany further illustrates that employees' perceptions of transparency, fairness, and leadership style directly shape their satisfaction and capacity to adapt to European workplaces (Nguyen & Tran, 2023).

Moreover, labor systems in European countries often emphasize employee participation, voice, and autonomy in the workplace. Eurofound (2023) reports that EX in European enterprises is strongly influenced by institutionalized mechanisms of social dialogue and robust labor standards. For firms originating from emerging economies, these institutional expectations present substantial challenges when expanding into the European market. Addressing such challenges requires not only compliance with regulatory frameworks but also a deliberate integration of participatory practices and culturally sensitive leadership approaches into human resource governance.

2.2. National Cultural Differences and Challenges of Cross-Cultural Management

National cultural differences are widely recognized as one of the most significant barriers to corporate internationalization. According to Hofstede's (2020) model of national culture, employee behavior and expectations are shaped by dimensions such as power distance, individualism versus collectivism, and uncertainty avoidance. Comparative data from Hofstede Insights (2024) indicate that Vietnam tends to exhibit high power distance and collectivist orientations, whereas many European countries emphasize egalitarianism and individual autonomy. These divergences directly affect leadership styles, decision-making mechanisms, and organizational communication practices.

Empirical studies have demonstrated that cultural distance between Asian and European enterprises can undermine employee engagement and diminish positive workplace experiences. Research on Vietnamese managers in France highlights common difficulties in adapting to cultures that value critical debate, decentralized authority, and transparency in organizational processes (Le & Pham, 2022). Similarly, cross-national comparative analyses reveal that mismatches in leadership expectations and communication norms constitute critical determinants of employee satisfaction in international work environments (Lee & Ande, 2024).

At the organizational level, theories of corporate culture advanced by Schein (1985) and Denison (1990) emphasize that organizational effectiveness depends on the alignment between foundational cultural assumptions and employee expectations. When firms expand into

multinational contexts, misalignment between home-country governance practices and host-country cultural norms can erode employee experience and, ultimately, organizational performance. Addressing these challenges requires deliberate strategies that integrate cultural sensitivity into leadership, communication, and human resource governance.

2.3. Institutional Theory and Adaptation Requirements in the European Market

Beyond cultural factors, recent scholarship in international management has emphasized the critical role of institutional environments in shaping organizational behavior. Drawing on Scott's (2025) institutional theory, firms are subject to the simultaneous influence of three institutional pillars: the regulative (legal frameworks), the normative (social expectations), and the cognitive (shared understandings).

The European labor market is distinguished by stringent legal systems, high standards of worker protection, and strong mechanisms of employee representation. Reports from the OECD (2021) and the European Commission (2024) highlight that non-EU enterprises entering the European Union must substantially adjust their human resource policies to meet labor compliance requirements and governance transparency standards.

Empirical evidence published in the *Journal of International Business Studies* (2023) demonstrates that institutional pressures constitute a decisive driver of change in multinational firms' human resource management practices. Case studies of small and medium-sized Vietnamese enterprises in Eastern Europe reveal that institutional adaptation often entails organizational restructuring and modifications in labor relations (Tran & Vo, 2021). Furthermore, trade agreements such as the EVFTA have intensified demands for labor standards and HR governance among Vietnamese firms seeking access to European markets (Nguyen, 2022).

Taken together, these findings underscore that institutional environments are not merely external constraints but active forces shaping organizational adaptation. For Vietnamese enterprises, success in European markets requires not only compliance with legal and normative frameworks but also proactive alignment with cognitive expectations embedded in European labor institutions. This highlights the necessity of integrating institutional sensitivity into HR governance as a strategic imperative for international expansion.

2.4. The Relationship between Culture, Institutions, and Employee Experience

Recent research suggests that employee experience in international enterprises is shaped by the simultaneous interaction of cultural differences and institutional pressures. The Job Demands–Resources (JD–R) model

developed by Bakker and Demerouti (2007) illustrates how internationalization increases job demands, particularly through pressures to adapt to diverse cultural contexts and comply with institutional requirements. When organizations fail to provide adequate resources to support employees, the result can be diminished engagement, reduced compliance, and ultimately lower performance – outcomes that may even undermine the firm's competitive position in global markets.

In addition, employee voice theory highlights the importance of two-way communication and participatory decision-making, which are strongly encouraged within European institutional environments (Morrison, 2011). This emphasis often conflicts with hierarchical governance structures prevalent in many Asian enterprises, including those in Vietnam. Recent studies of Vietnamese firms operating in Europe reveal that the challenges of managing multicultural workforces significantly affect organizational commitment and employee experience (Nguyen & Le, 2025).

These insights underscore that employee experience in international contexts cannot be understood in isolation from the dual pressures of cultural divergence and institutional expectations. Effective human resource governance therefore requires not only the provision of sufficient resources to balance job demands but also the integration of participatory practices that align with host-country institutional norms.

2.5. Literature gap

Although research on international human resource management and cross-cultural governance has advanced considerably, several critical gaps remain. First, much of the existing scholarship on employee experience has been developed within Western enterprises, while the concept remains relatively novel in firms from emerging and developing economies such as Vietnam. Second, many studies tend to analyze cultural and institutional factors in isolation, without integrating these perspectives into a unified analytical framework. Third, in-depth investigations of employee experience within Vietnamese enterprises operating in European markets remain scarce, leaving important empirical and theoretical questions unanswered.

Against this backdrop, the present study proposes an integrative approach that combines national culture theory with institutional theory to explain the challenges shaping employee experience during the internationalization of Vietnamese firms in Europe. By bridging these two perspectives, the research aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how cultural divergences and institutional pressures jointly influence employee perceptions, organizational commitment, and workplace adaptation. This integrated framework not only advances theoretical discourse but also offers practical insights for Vietnamese enterprises seeking to

strengthen their human resource governance in complex international environments.

3. Research Methodology

This study employs a mixed-methods research design to provide a comprehensive analysis of the cultural and institutional challenges affecting employee experience in Vietnamese enterprises entering the European market. The integration of quantitative and qualitative approaches enables both systematic assessment of cross-national differences and deeper interpretation of organizational and institutional mechanisms shaping employee perceptions.

Such an approach is consistent with international management research, where phenomena are simultaneously influenced by national cultural factors and institutional environments, as framed by Hofstede's cultural dimensions and Scott's institutional theory. Accordingly, the study draws upon two primary sources of data. First, secondary quantitative data are utilized to identify cultural divergences and labor institutional characteristics across countries. Second, qualitative document analysis is conducted to interpret managerial challenges and employee experiences within organizational practice.

By combining these methods, the research aims to capture both the structural patterns and contextual nuances of employee experience, thereby offering a more holistic understanding of how Vietnamese firms adapt their human resource governance in the European context.

3.1. Quantitative data collection

Secondary quantitative data are employed to measure and compare national cultural differences and labor market characteristics between Vietnam and European countries. Two principal sources of data are utilized.

- National cultural indices: The study draws on Hofstede Insights (2024), which provides measures across key cultural dimensions – Power Distance, Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Long-Term Orientation. These indices enable the identification of cultural distance between Vietnam and EU member states, a factor widely regarded as foundational in shaping employee expectations and managerial practices within multinational enterprises.

- Labor institutional data: In addition, the research incorporates aggregated data from reports published by the European Commission (2024), the OECD (2021), the International Labour Organization (2020), and Eurofound (2023). These sources reflect the defining features of European labor institutions, including stringent legal protections, high standards of worker welfare, and strong mechanisms for employee participation.

By combining cultural indices with institutional datasets, the study establishes a robust empirical basis for analyzing how Vietnamese enterprises must adapt their human resource governance when entering the European market. This dual-source approach ensures that both cultural divergence and institutional pressures are systematically captured, thereby strengthening the explanatory power of the research framework.

3.2. Qualitative data collection

In addition to quantitative data, this study conducts a systematic qualitative document analysis to explore the mechanisms shaping employee experience in practice. The selection of materials encompasses four principal categories:

- International scholarly research: This includes studies on cross-cultural management, international human resource governance, and employee experience in multinational enterprises. These works provide theoretical and empirical foundations for understanding how employee perceptions are shaped in diverse organizational contexts.

- Reports from international organizations: Publications by the OECD, Eurofound, and the European Commission offer empirical evidence on labor conditions, compliance requirements, and institutional frameworks in Europe. These reports serve as critical sources for identifying institutional pressures that influence HR practices.

- Legal and regulatory frameworks: Documents related to European labor standards and the implications of trade agreements such as the EVFTA are analyzed to assess institutional demands placed on Vietnamese enterprises entering the EU market.

- Case studies of Vietnamese enterprises in Europe: Empirical research on Vietnamese firms operating in Germany, France, and Eastern Europe (Le & Pham, 2022; Tran & Vo, 2021; Nguyen & Tran, 2023) is examined to identify practical challenges and employee experience outcomes in multicultural organizational settings.

By triangulating insights from these diverse sources, the qualitative analysis complements the quantitative findings, enabling a more nuanced understanding of how cultural and institutional factors jointly shape employee experience in Vietnamese enterprises expanding into European markets.

3.3. Data analysis

The study employs three complementary analytical strategies to ensure a comprehensive examination of employee experience in Vietnamese enterprises operating in Europe.

- Quantitative comparative analysis: National cultural data are utilized to compare cultural distance between Vietnam and European countries. This analysis identifies latent differences that may influence

leadership styles, communication practices, and work expectations. By quantifying cultural divergence, the study highlights potential challenges that shape employee experience in multinational contexts.

- Qualitative content analysis: Systematic document analysis is conducted to identify themes related to culture, institutions, and employee experience. This approach enables the classification of factors into cultural barriers, institutional barriers, and organizational responses designed to mitigate these challenges.

- Theoretical synthesis: Building on established frameworks, the study integrates insights from national culture theory and institutional theory to establish causal relationships between institutional environments, cultural differences, and employee experience. This approach is particularly relevant in international management research, where direct empirical data may be limited but the phenomena under investigation are highly context-dependent.

Together, these methods provide a multi-layered understanding of how Vietnamese enterprises adapt their human resource governance in European markets, capturing both structural divergences and organizational responses within a coherent analytical framework.

3.4. Reliability

To ensure scientific reliability, the study applies data triangulation by combining quantitative and qualitative evidence, drawing upon multiple academic and institutional sources, and systematically cross-checking theoretical propositions with empirical findings. Linking national cultural indices with practical document analysis enhances both content validity and the generalizability of insights in the field of multinational corporate governance.

The mixed-methods approach enables the identification of structural differences between cultural and institutional environments, the interpretation of organizational mechanisms that shape employee experience, and the formulation of managerial recommendations for Vietnamese enterprises entering European markets.

Accordingly, this methodological design is considered appropriate for the study's objective of constructing an integrated analytical framework that explains employee experience within the internationalization process of Vietnamese firms. By embedding triangulation into the research design, the study strengthens its explanatory rigor and provides a balanced perspective that bridges theory and practice.

4. Research findings

4.1. Quantitative findings

National cultural data derived from Hofstede’s model provide a basis for measuring the extent to which cultural differences influence employee experience in cross-national work environments.




Figure 1. Individualism and Power Distance between EU countries and Vietnam according to Country comparison graphs of Hofstede Insights

Figure 1 illustrates notable divergences in two key dimensions: individualism and power distance. Individualism scores in most European countries exceed 50, whereas Vietnam registers a score of 20—representing a gap of approximately 30 points. In terms of power distance, most European countries fall within the range of 20 to 60, with the exception of France, Poland, and Belgium, which record values around 70, comparable to Vietnam. These differences have direct implications for leadership styles, organizational communication, and employee expectations in multinational enterprises.

By contrast, differences in Uncertainty Avoidance are less pronounced. Vietnam demonstrates similarities in work process orientation with Nordic countries, while greater discrepancies are observed when compared to Western and Eastern European nations. Regarding Long-Term Orientation, Vietnam’s score aligns closely with those of several European countries,

suggesting a degree of convergence in strategic outlook and organizational planning.

These comparative findings highlight that while certain cultural dimensions (e.g., long-term orientation) may facilitate smoother integration, others – particularly individualism and power distance—pose significant challenges for Vietnamese enterprises seeking to adapt their human resource governance to European contexts.




Figure 2. Long-term Orientation and Uncertainty Avoidance between EU countries and Vietnam according to country comparison graphs of Hofstede Insights

Individualism emerges as the most pronounced cultural divergence. Employees in European countries generally expect higher levels of autonomy and dialogue, with performance evaluation and decision-making processes requiring transparency. In contrast, governance models in Vietnamese enterprises remain predominantly hierarchical, creating potential misalignments in managerial practices and employee expectations.

Institutional data standardized from OECD (2021), Eurofound (2023), and the European Commission (2024) further reveal that European labor environments operate at significantly higher levels of regulatory intensity. Key institutional components – including worker protection, employee feedback mechanisms, compliance requirements, and organizational

transparency – are consistently more demanding than those observed in Vietnam.

According to Scott's institutional theory, these discrepancies generate multiple forms of pressure: regulative pressures through legal compliance requirements, normative pressures through social expectations of fairness and participation, and cognitive pressures through organizational demands for transparency and accountability. Together, these institutional forces compound the cultural challenges faced by Vietnamese enterprises, underscoring the need for adaptive human resource governance strategies when integrating into European markets.

4.2. Qualitative findings

Content analysis of case studies on Vietnamese enterprises operating in Germany, France, and Eastern Europe (Le & Pham, 2022; Nguyen & Tran, 2023; Tran & Vo, 2021) reveals two major categories of challenges:

- Cultural challenges in human resource management: The most salient issue arises from differences in leadership and communication styles. Hierarchical and directive management approaches, common in some Vietnamese firms, often conflict with European employees' expectations of autonomy and transparency. This misalignment reduces employee satisfaction and weakens organizational engagement.

- Institutional and compliance challenges: Strict labor regulations in Europe require firms to invest substantially in HR governance and compliance systems. Limited knowledge or slow adaptation to these requirements can expose enterprises to legal risks and simultaneously generate insecurity among employees, undermining trust in the organization.

These limitations in cultural and institutional adaptation are closely linked to employee experience. When firms fail to reconcile cultural expectations or meet institutional standards, employees are more likely to report negative experiences and reactions. Such outcomes not only diminish individual performance and increase turnover rates but also damage the employer's reputation in the European labor market.

5. Findings Discussion

5.1. The Role of Cultural Distance in Shaping Employee Experience

The findings indicate that cultural distance between Vietnam and European countries exerts a significant influence on employee experience within Vietnamese enterprises engaged in internationalization. Quantitative analysis highlights that the most substantial divergences occur in the dimensions of individualism and power distance.

This result is consistent with Hofstede's argument that societies with high levels of individualism tend to expect autonomy, participatory decision-

making, and horizontal communication within organizations. By contrast, governance models in Vietnamese firms remain strongly shaped by hierarchical structures and collectivist orientations.

Consequently, the core challenge lies not merely in employees' professional competencies but in the incompatibility between managerial cultural expectations and host-country workplace norms. This misalignment helps explain why many Vietnamese enterprises struggle to retain experienced employees in Europe, even when business performance indicators appear favorable.

5.2. Institutional Pressures as Drivers of Human Resource Governance Restructuring

The findings demonstrate that the European labor environment imposes significantly higher institutional pressures compared to Vietnam, particularly in relation to worker protection, organizational transparency, and mechanisms of employee voice. According to Scott's institutional theory, firms operating in international contexts must achieve institutional legitimacy by complying with host-country legal frameworks and adhering to prevailing social norms. Within the EU, however, these pressures extend beyond legal compliance to encompass normative expectations and cognitive demands embedded in societal perceptions of fairness and accountability.

The evidence further suggests that Vietnamese enterprises often encounter an "institutional shock" when their domestic HR governance systems prove misaligned with European requirements for labor dialogue, union representation, and corporate social responsibility. This misfit not only challenges organizational adaptation but also directly shapes employee experience, as workers perceive gaps in transparency, participation, and protection. Addressing such institutional pressures therefore requires deliberate restructuring of HR practices and proactive engagement with European labor institutions to sustain competitiveness and legitimacy in the host market.

5.3. Convergences, divergences, and research implications

A key contribution of this study is the identification of the mediating role of human resource management, whereby employee experience becomes central to organizational adaptation in the context of international economic integration. This finding extends traditional internationalization research, which has largely focused on market strategies, by demonstrating that successful international expansion depends heavily on the adaptation of employee experience rather than solely on economic competitiveness.

Another salient finding is that culture and institutions do not exert independent effects but interact dynamically in shaping employee experience. Cultural distance amplifies the difficulty of meeting institutional

requirements, while institutional pressures compel firms to modify HR practices that are deeply rooted in domestic cultural norms. This interplay highlights that employee experience in multinational enterprises is simultaneously influenced by the cultural heritage of the home country and the institutional environment of the host country.

By establishing this interaction, the study contributes to the integration of two theoretical streams that are often examined separately: national culture theory and institutional theory in international human resource management. The results underscore the importance of a holistic framework that accounts for both cultural and institutional dynamics in explaining employee experience during the internationalization of Vietnamese enterprises.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

6.1. Conclusion

This study analyzes the cultural and institutional challenges affecting employee experience in Vietnamese enterprises entering the European market. The findings reveal that cultural differences – particularly in the dimensions of individualism and power distance – create significant divergences in employee expectations regarding leadership style, decision-making mechanisms, and organizational transparency. At the same time, the European labor environment, characterized by high standards of worker protection, social dialogue, and organizational accountability, imposes substantial institutional pressures on Vietnamese firms.

The results demonstrate that employee experience is not shaped by cultural or institutional factors in isolation but emerges from the dynamic interaction between the two. When firms fail to adapt adequately to the host cultural–institutional environment, phenomena such as reduced engagement, increased labor conflict, and declining employee satisfaction may occur, directly undermining organizational performance and sustainability in the internationalization process.

A major contribution of this study is the clarification of the mediating role of human resource management, which functions as a mechanism enabling firms to achieve institutional fit and enhance employee experience. In doing so, the research extends traditional approaches to internationalization, which have primarily emphasized market competitiveness, by highlighting that success in the European context depends equally on the capacity to adapt human resource governance to complex multicultural and institutional environments.

6.2. Policy recommendations

Based on the research findings, several policy recommendations are proposed at three levels: enterprise, policymaking agencies, and internationalization support ecosystems.

- For Vietnamese enterprises: Firms should strengthen cross-cultural management capabilities among leaders and managers when operating in Europe. Training in intercultural communication, empowering leadership, and transparent governance is essential to reduce cultural conflict and improve employee experience. Human resource policies must be localized to align with European labor standards, particularly in relation to employee feedback mechanisms, transparent performance evaluation, and ensuring workers' participation rights.

- For Vietnamese policymaking agencies: Regulatory bodies should enhance support for enterprises in the internationalization process by providing updated guidance on EU labor standards, developing training programs on international management and institutional compliance, and disseminating information on labor requirements embedded in trade agreements such as the EVFTA. Preparing firms with adequate HR governance capacity prior to expansion will help mitigate institutional risks and strengthen long-term competitiveness.

- For internationalization support organizations: Business associations, chambers of commerce, and international consultancy agencies should act as intermediaries by facilitating access to local legal and labor expertise and by sharing best-practice models of successful enterprises. Such initiatives create opportunities for Vietnamese firms to learn, exchange experiences, and adopt effective strategies for managing employee relations in European markets.

6.3. Limitations and future research directions

This study employs national cultural data from Hofstede's model and international institutional reports to conduct a comparative analysis between Vietnam and Europe. However, the reliance on secondary data at the national level presents certain limitations, as the findings may not be fully generalizable to all Vietnamese enterprises expanding into European markets. Industry-specific characteristics, firm size, and internationalization strategies may generate distinct employee experiences that are not captured by aggregated national indicators.

Moreover, the European labor environment is not homogeneous; differences across Western, Northern, and Eastern Europe may lead to varying employee experiences. In addition, the dynamic policy context of the European Union—particularly in relation to labor regulations, migration

policies, and ESG standards – suggests that the findings may be influenced by future institutional changes.

The qualitative document analysis, based on academic studies, international reports, and case studies, provides valuable insights into institutional and managerial contexts. Nevertheless, this approach is constrained by the scope of available literature and the limited number of empirical studies directly examining Vietnamese enterprises in Europe. As a result, some conclusions remain more theoretically inferred than empirically validated. While this limitation restricts immediate generalizability, it also opens avenues for future research to provide more precise and practical recommendations.

Future studies should therefore conduct direct empirical surveys of employees and managers in Vietnamese enterprises operating in Europe to quantitatively test the proposed research model. Comparative analyses across different EU regions would also be beneficial, as institutional variations between Northern, Western, and Eastern Europe may produce distinct employee experiences and offer firms a richer knowledge base for effective adaptation. Finally, longitudinal studies would allow for the assessment of institutional adaptation processes and the evolution of employee experience across different stages of internationalization.

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GREEN TRANSITION IN THE VIETNAMESE ECONOMY: POLICY CHALLENGES, STRUCTURAL BARRIERS, AND STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS TOWARD NET-ZERO EMISSIONS

Abstract

The green transition in national economies has become an objective trend and a priority in development strategies across many countries, aimed at addressing climate change and environmental degradation. Vietnam – one of the nations most severely affected by climate change and belonging to the group of developing countries – has committed to achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. This commitment marks a profound shift in its economic development strategy, placing the green transition at the center. The paper analyzes the policy challenges and structural barriers inherent in this process, including overlaps in the legal framework, the absence of long-term green finance mechanisms, inadequacies in renewable energy infrastructure, and constraints in high-quality human resources. The core content of the study focuses on an in-depth examination of structural challenges in legal, financial, and technical domains, thereby proposing policy orientations to support Vietnam in successfully realizing its net-zero target by 2050. The analysis situates Vietnam's transition within the broader context of sustainable development and deepening international economic integration, underscoring both the urgency and strategic significance of this pathway.

Keywords: *Vietnam; Green transition; Net-zero emissions; Sustainable development; Climate change; International integration.*

1. Introduction

Climate change has become, and continues to be, an existential threat directly impacting economic growth, social welfare, and the sustainable development of nations worldwide, including Vietnam. With its commitment at COP26, Vietnam announced the target of achieving net-zero emissions by 2050, thereby necessitating a restructuring of the growth model toward lower emissions and greater efficiency – marking a pivotal turning point in the country's national development strategy. However, in the course of this transition, Vietnam faces multifaceted challenges in terms of policy frameworks, economic structures, and resource mobilization.

Globally, Germany and South Korea are regarded as exemplary models of the green transition, distinguished by coherent policies and long-term vision. Germany launched its *Energiewende* strategy early, focusing on three pillars: expanding renewable energy (currently accounting for more than 46% of electricity generation), enhancing energy efficiency, and developing a decentralized energy system that enables households and small enterprises to produce and consume clean electricity. Germany has also set the target of phasing out coal-fired power entirely by 2038, while pioneering green transportation (electric vehicles, hydrogen buses) and waste management, with the highest recycling rate worldwide (67%). The issuance of green bonds has provided stable financing for renewable energy projects and sustainable infrastructure.

South Korea has pursued a systematic approach through the Green New Deal (2020), integrating green growth with digital transformation and social equity. The country aims to raise the share of renewable energy to 30–35% by 2040, with strong investments in offshore wind and the hydrogen economy. South Korea has also advanced energy-efficient building retrofits, developed smart cities, and applied artificial intelligence to resource management, alongside one of the world's most sophisticated waste treatment systems.

This study seeks to analyze the current state of the green economic transition in Vietnam, with a particular focus on identifying core policy challenges, structural barriers, and the capacity for national coordination. Methodologically, the research employs document analysis and secondary data from the General Statistics Office (GSO). The paper also draws comparative insights from international experiences in South Korea and Germany to assess Vietnam's adaptive capacity.

The principal contribution of this research lies not only in descriptive analysis but also in uncovering underlying causal factors, thereby proposing systemic strategic orientations to support Vietnam in achieving its net-zero emissions target by 2050. Furthermore, the comparative perspective enhances the reference value and practical applicability of the study within the broader context of global integration.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Concepts and Approaches to the Green Transition

Over the past two decades, the green transition has emerged as a central concept in development strategies aimed at reconciling economic growth with environmental protection and climate change mitigation. According to UNEP (2011), a green economy is defined as 'an economy that is low in carbon emissions, resource-efficient, and socially inclusive.' Vietnam has adopted this concept through its Green Growth Strategy for the period 2021–2030,

which emphasizes the transformation of the growth model toward sustainability, innovation, and enhanced adaptive capacity to climate change.

In contrast to traditional growth models that prioritize resource exploitation and production expansion, the green transition underscores the decoupling of GDP growth from environmental degradation. This is a systemic process requiring coherence across institutions, technology, finance, and social behavior. For developing countries, the green transition simultaneously represents an opportunity to narrow technological gaps and strengthen competitiveness, while also posing the challenge of balancing climate objectives with social welfare considerations.

2.2 Research Framework

This study synthesizes three principal theoretical frameworks – Green Growth, Circular Economy, and Sustainable Development – to analyze challenges and strategic orientations for Vietnam.

The Green Growth theory, developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2011) and the World Bank (2012), emphasizes the capacity to sustain economic growth while minimizing environmental impacts. Its core focus lies in the absolute decoupling of GDP from emissions, achieved through technological innovation, improved energy efficiency, and the internalization of environmental costs. In the Vietnamese context, this framework explains why emission intensity indicators may improve while total emissions continue to rise due to the expanding scale of the economy, thereby underscoring the need for deeper structural reforms.

The Circular Economy theory, popularized by the Ellen MacArthur Foundation (2015) and the European Commission (2020), shifts away from the linear model of ‘extract–use–dispose’ toward redesigning products and processes so that waste is recycled, reused, and reintegrated into the value chain. This framework provides analytical tools for identifying bottlenecks in waste management, supporting industries, and recycling infrastructure—areas where Vietnam currently lacks coherent mechanisms.

The Sustainable Development theory calls for balancing the three pillars of economy, society, and environment. Within the context of the green transition, this framework is particularly significant for assessing the distributive impacts of policy, highlighting stakeholder participation—from enterprises and communities to civil society organizations—as a prerequisite for sustainability.

3. Research Methodology

This study employs a qualitative research design, combining document analysis and secondary data to examine the trajectory of Vietnam’s green transition. The analysis is grounded in three theoretical frameworks – Green Growth, Circular Economy, and Sustainable Development – which together

provide a multidimensional lens for conceptualizing the green economy as an integrated development model that reconciles economic expansion with environmental protection.

- Document Analysis: The research systematically reviews policy documents, reports, and legal frameworks relevant to Vietnam’s green economy, including the National Green Growth Strategy for 2021–2030 with a vision to 2050 (Decision No. 1658/QĐ-TTg), as well as regulatory guidelines on renewable energy development and green finance. Reports from international organizations such as the World Bank, OECD, and Vietnam’s General Statistics Office (GSO) are also examined to identify trends, gaps, and challenges in policy implementation. This method enables a comprehensive understanding of institutional structures, policy objectives, and enforcement mechanisms.

- Secondary Data: Statistical data from the GSO, the World Bank, and other international institutions are utilized to assess the current state and dynamics of key green economy indicators, including CO₂ emissions, energy structure (share of renewable energy), and the volume of green credit and green bonds within the banking system.

- Comparative Analysis: To situate Vietnam’s experience within a global context, the study draws insights from international models of green economic development and energy transition, notably Germany’s Energiewende and South Korea’s Green Growth Strategy. These case studies serve as benchmarks for evaluating Vietnam’s adaptive capacity in the face of globalization, digital transformation, and international climate commitments such as COP26.

- Application of Theoretical Frameworks: The Green Growth framework is applied to conceptualize economic development as a process of decoupling GDP growth from environmental degradation and resource depletion, emphasizing the role of technological innovation and energy efficiency. The Circular Economy framework highlights the importance of redesigning production and consumption systems, shifting from a linear model (‘extract–use–dispose’) to a closed-loop system of recycling and reuse. The Sustainable Development framework underscores the necessity of harmonizing the three pillars—economic, social, and environmental—within policy design and implementation, while stressing stakeholder participation across government, private sector, and civil society as a prerequisite for long-term sustainability.

By integrating qualitative analysis, secondary data, and theoretical insights, this methodological approach provides a robust foundation for understanding both the challenges and opportunities of Vietnam’s green economic transition. The study aims to contribute to the formulation of

sustainable, transparent, and participatory strategies aligned with national development goals and international climate commitments.

4. Research Findings

4.1 Policy Challenges

First, Vietnam's legal framework remains fragmented and incomplete, with limited mechanisms for cross-sectoral coordination. Although numerous strategies and action plans have been introduced, provisions on the green transition are only partially embedded within existing legislation, and Vietnam has yet to enact a dedicated Green Economy Law. Moreover, regulatory frameworks remain inconsistent across ministries and agencies. A notable example is offshore wind power, identified as a strategic priority in Resolution No. 55-NQ/TW (February 11, 2020) of the Politburo on the orientation of national energy development strategy to 2030, with a vision to 2045. The resolution emphasizes the need for breakthrough mechanisms and policies to promote renewable energy in connection with the maritime economy. In practice, however, the legal framework governing offshore wind remains underdeveloped and lacks coherence. Relevant provisions are dispersed across multiple laws, such as the Law on Electricity and the Law on Marine and Island Resources and Environment, without a unified regulatory corridor. This fragmentation complicates licensing procedures, the determination of marine spatial rights, and the practical implementation of projects. From a sustainable development perspective, these shortcomings reveal an imbalance among the three pillars: policy continues to prioritize short-term economic growth objectives, while insufficiently integrating environmental protection and social equity. The dispersion across laws (Electricity Law, Marine and Island Resources and Environment Law, Environmental Protection Law) undermines policy coherence and limits the participation of private sector actors and communities – both of which are essential for sustainable governance models.

Second, green finance policies remain underdeveloped relative to demand. Green credit is a critical financial instrument for channeling capital into environmentally friendly projects, renewable energy, and sustainable development. In Vietnam, despite notable progress, the scale of green credit remains modest compared to actual needs and to regional peers. The green bond market is still small, with cumulative issuance of only about USD 2.3 billion—significantly lower than other ASEAN countries. High credit risks, substantial investment costs, and an incomplete environmental–social assessment framework constrain capital flows. Human resources and ESG evaluation tools remain limited, while reporting standards lack harmonization, creating difficulties for monitoring and investment decision-making.

Table 1

Comparison of green finance in several ASEAN countries in 2023*

Nation	Green credit (% of total outstanding loans)	Cumulative green bonds (USD)	Notes
Vietnam	~4.2% (21.6 billion USD)	~2.3 billion USD	Green credit outstanding is concentrated in renewable energy; the bond market is still very small.
Thailand	~9%	~6.2 billion USD	The central bank issues guidelines for green credit. There is a fund to support green bonds.
Malaysia	~12%	~8.5 billion USD	The green Islamic bond market (Sukuk) is developing strongly and enjoys tax incentives.
Indonesia	~7%	~7.4 billion USD (Govt. >50%)	The government is leading the issuance of green bonds and encourages private sector participation.
Philippines	~6%	~4.1 billion USD	There are tax incentives for sustainable bonds and support financing for green infrastructure.

**Source: Compiled from ADB, State Bank of Vietnam, Ministry of Finance (2026).*

Moreover, from the perspective of implementation, management and monitoring capacities remain limited. This is evidenced by the fact that many environmental targets have not been achieved as anticipated, revealing a persistent gap between policy formulation and practical outcomes.

4.2 Structural Barriers of the Economy

By combining qualitative analysis of economic structures with quantitative data on emissions, this study demonstrates that structural barriers constitute the core impediments slowing Vietnam's green transition.

First, dependence on fossil fuels remains a prominent issue. The energy mix reveals that coal and other conventional sources continue to dominate electricity generation. According to reports from the Vietnam Electricity

Group (EVN) and the Ministry of Industry and Trade, by Q3 2025 the total installed capacity of the national power system reached approximately 90 GW, of which coal-fired power accounted for about 33%, hydropower 28%, and renewable energy (solar and wind) around 27–28%, while gas-fired power contributed roughly 10%. The electricity sector’s share of total CO₂ emissions remains high, fluctuating between 50–55%. Compared with other sectors, emissions from energy are approximately four times higher than those from agriculture and seven times higher than those from waste management.

To situate Vietnam’s position within the regional emissions landscape, the study further compares per capita CO₂ emissions and emission intensity relative to GDP, drawing on data compiled from World Bank reports (2024).

Table 2
Per capita CO₂ emissions data for 2024 in some Southeast Asian countries*

Nation	Vietnam	Thailand	Malaysia	Indonesia
CO ₂ per capita (tons/person)	4.3	4.0	8.3	2.9

**Source: Compiled from World Bank (2026).*

With per capita emissions reaching 4.3 tons of CO₂ in 2024, Vietnam ranks second within the comparison group – higher than Thailand (4.0 tons) and Indonesia (2.9 tons), but only about half of Malaysia (8.3 tons). Malaysia records the highest emissions in the region due to its heavy industrial base and oil and gas exports. By contrast, Thailand, despite having a larger economy, maintains lower emissions thanks to greater energy efficiency and a service-oriented economic structure. Indonesia’s per capita emissions remain low, yet its aggregate emissions are substantial given its large population. Notably, Vietnam’s per capita emissions currently stand at the regional average but are rising rapidly under the pressures of industrialization and electrification. Without timely and coordinated mitigation measures, Vietnam risks surpassing Thailand and approaching Malaysia’s emission levels within the next decade – a major challenge to its net-zero target by 2050.

Second, financial resources for implementing green economy policies remain limited. The investment demand for the green transition is substantial, yet the national financial system has not met requirements in terms of scale or sustainability. According to estimates by the Ministry of Planning and Investment (now, the Ministry of Finance), Vietnam will require approximately USD 30 billion for green programs and projects during 2021–2030. However, the state budget can only cover 25–30% of this demand, leaving the remainder dependent on private and international capital.

Advanced financial instruments such as green bonds and sustainable finance funds have not yet been widely deployed, resulting in capital shortages for potential projects.

Third, technological capacity remains constrained. Many industrial sectors in Vietnam continue to rely on outdated technologies, leading to high energy consumption, reduced production efficiency, and increased emissions. The national economy remains heavily dependent on foreign technology transfers, with limited regional innovation hubs and insufficient mechanisms to support green entrepreneurship.

Finally, human capital quality is not commensurate with the requirements of a green economy. A sustainable transition demands a workforce with specialized expertise and adaptive skills in emerging technologies, particularly in renewable energy, organic agriculture, environmental management, and circular economy practices. However, according to the General Statistics Office (2026), Vietnam's employed labor force in 2025 reached 52.7 million, yet only 29.5% had formal training with degrees or certificates. The shortage of skilled labor in green technology and environmental management reduces the effectiveness of project implementation and slows the pace of the transition.

5. Discussions

The green transition represents not only a formidable challenge but also a significant opportunity for Vietnam to restructure its economy. The expansion of renewable energy, the advancement of the circular economy, and the promotion of innovation can serve as new drivers of growth. International experience highlights the crucial role of the state in shaping policy direction and supporting market development. For Vietnam, the strategic orientation toward net-zero emissions must be pursued through a systemic, cross-sectoral, and long-term approach that harmonizes economic growth, social welfare, and climate commitments.

Germany's *Energiewende* demonstrates the feasibility of decoupling economic growth from emissions through a stable legal framework, a clear coal phase-out roadmap, and a flexible energy market. South Korea's Green Growth Strategy integrates macro-level policy with concrete instruments such as green public procurement and eco-labeling, showing how the combination of green technology investment and long-term financial policy can foster new industries, generate employment, and safeguard social welfare. Within the region, Thailand and Malaysia have advanced further in establishing renewable energy certificate markets and green taxonomies, thereby attracting sustainable private capital. For Vietnam, the key lesson is the need to construct a forward-looking legal framework, introduce competitive bidding mechanisms for renewables, and establish a green taxonomy to mobilize

private investment – requirements emphasized across the theoretical perspectives of Green Growth, Circular Economy, and Sustainable Development.

Building on the current analysis and international lessons, five strategic orientations emerge as essential for Vietnam’s pursuit of net-zero emissions by 2050. First, institutional reform and enhanced policy coordination capacity are foundational. Vietnam must strengthen its institutional framework to ensure coherence, transparency, and enforceability, while establishing robust inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms and integrating net-zero objectives into socio-economic strategies, sectoral planning, and public investment programs.

Second, the transformation of the energy structure is decisive, given that energy remains the largest source of emissions. Strategic priorities should include reducing coal dependence, rapidly expanding renewable energy, and modernizing grid infrastructure, with particular emphasis on wind, solar, biomass, and emerging energy sources supported by upgraded transmission, storage, and flexible dispatch systems.

Third, the development of green finance and the mobilization of investment resources are indispensable. Vietnam must cultivate a robust green financial market, diversify funding sources, and reduce financing costs for enterprises, while refining project classification criteria, promoting green bonds and credit, and leveraging international resources such as climate finance and the Just Energy Transition Partnership. Fourth, technological capacity, innovation, and human capital must be strengthened. Vietnam should promote research, technology transfer, and localization of green technologies, while simultaneously investing in workforce development through training, retraining, and upskilling to ensure a just transition and enhance adaptability.

Finally, international integration and the enhancement of green competitiveness must be embedded within the framework of sustainable development. As global trade increasingly hinges on environmental standards, Vietnam’s net-zero strategy is essential for maintaining export competitiveness. Carbon border adjustment mechanisms, ESG standards, and emission traceability requirements will impose growing pressures on enterprises, making the green transition not only a matter of international commitment but also a prerequisite for deeper participation in global value chains. Proactive efforts to build a national brand associated with green production, expand technological cooperation, leverage next-generation trade agreements, and engage actively in global climate initiatives will be critical to Vietnam’s long-term positioning.

6. Conclusion

The transition to a green economy aimed at achieving net-zero emissions is not merely a normative aspiration but an objective necessity. For Vietnam, it represents both a formidable challenge and a transformative opportunity to restructure its economic foundations. Moving toward a green economic model will not only mitigate the adverse impacts of climate change but also open new avenues for investment, enhance competitiveness, and meet the demands of international integration. Yet the process is fraught with obstacles in policy design, economic structure, and resource mobilization. The success of this strategy will depend on adopting a systemic and cross-sectoral mindset, ensuring consistent coordination among policy frameworks, market mechanisms, and stakeholder participation. In this sense, the green transition is not simply a global trend but an inevitable pathway for Vietnam to achieve its sustainable development goals.

From a strategic perspective, the imperative lies in recognizing that the green transition is simultaneously a restructuring agenda and a competitiveness agenda. It requires Vietnam to move beyond incremental adjustments and embrace structural reforms that align economic growth with environmental stewardship and social equity. The experience of leading economies demonstrates that state leadership, coherent legal frameworks, and innovative financial instruments are indispensable in bridging the gap between policy ambition and practical outcomes. For Vietnam, this means embedding net-zero objectives into the core of socio-economic planning, while fostering a governance model that integrates ministries, local authorities, private enterprises, and civil society into a unified system of action.

Equally important is the strategic positioning of Vietnam within global value chains. As international trade becomes increasingly conditioned by environmental standards, carbon border adjustments, and ESG requirements, the green transition must be understood as a prerequisite for sustaining export competitiveness and securing long-term economic resilience. In this regard, Vietnam's pathway to net-zero is not only about fulfilling climate commitments but also about redefining its role in global production networks. By proactively building a national brand associated with green production, investing in technological innovation, and cultivating a skilled workforce capable of adapting to new industries, Vietnam can transform the green transition into a lever for sustainable growth and international leadership.

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STRATEGIC POLICY COMMUNICATION IN FOSTERING VIETNAM'S NATIONAL SOFT POWER IN THE NEW ERA

Abstract

The proliferation of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, coupled with profound geopolitical volatilities, is reconfiguring state governance modalities worldwide. Within this context, Vietnam is embarking upon an epoch of national resurgence, anchored in strategic autonomy and the holistic digital transformation of its political apparatus. This research endeavors to systematize the policy directives of the Communist Party and the State of Vietnam. Through a comparative analysis of global trends and an examination of empirical data, the study assesses the nation's efficacy in forging soft power within the digital epoch.

Keyword: *Strategic policy, communication, soft power.*

1. Introduction

On the international theoretical front, the foundational concepts of digital diplomacy and soft power are currently undergoing a fundamental paradigm shift, largely driven by the pervasive impact of artificial intelligence and advanced algorithmic technologies. Recent scholarly investigations conducted by both global and Vietnamese researchers have increasingly warned about the inherent duality of the digital era. While this technological landscape provides a robust platform for nations to amplify their voices on the global stage, it simultaneously engenders profound risks of narrative manipulation and potential infringements upon national sovereignty. Within a global political context fundamentally reshaped by technological advancements, international studies spanning the 2023–2025 period have elucidated new dimensions of digital diplomatic practices. Notably, research by Garba (2025) and Ababakr (2025) indicates that digital diplomacy empowers states to bypass traditional institutional gatekeepers, enabling direct engagement with foreign publics to reshape geopolitical discourses and actively consolidate soft power. Nevertheless, the exercise of this power harbors significant latent risks. Scholars such as Manor (2023) and Tegeback

(2024) have proposed theoretical concepts like the “humanization paradox” and “narrative saturation”, explicitly warning that digital diplomacy campaigns may ultimately erode political legitimacy if they are devoid of substantive, real-world practical actions.

The formidable rise of digital diplomacy cannot be decoupled from the foundational infrastructure of a highly developed digital society. Statistical evidence and analyses drawn from prominent global studies demonstrate that strategic policy communication, coupled with the robust construction of digital infrastructure, constitutes a critical focal point for successful international integration. For instance, empirical studies by Pamment (2020) and Huang (2025) robustly affirm the absolute necessity of public emotion management within cyberspace as a defensive mechanism to prevent external information manipulation and cognitive warfare. Meanwhile, regional perspectives from Asia, as evidenced by studies such as those by Rafitrandi (2025), demonstrate that transforming modern entertainment industries into mechanisms of digital soft power yields immense competitive advantages for emerging economies seeking to elevate their global standing.

In the specific context of Vietnam, although the state has promulgated numerous comprehensive strategies regarding e-government and the digital economy, the academic investigation into the multifaceted intersection of policy communication, soft power, and cyberspace still presents numerous uncharted areas requiring rigorous examination. The landmark event of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam marks a fundamental paradigm shift in national strategic thinking, wherein science, technology, and culture are definitively positioned at the very epicenter of the nation's upward trajectory. The subsequent issuance of Resolution No. 80-NQ/TW on January 7, 2026, by the Politburo concerning the development of Vietnamese culture has officially institutionalized the concept of “soft power” within the state apparatus. Departing from previous approaches, Vietnam's current strategic orientation firmly asserts that culture functions as a critical “regulatory system”—acting as both the fundamental bedrock and the breakthrough driving force for sustainable national development. This progressive perspective necessitates that the entire political system fundamentally reconceptualize the developmental space, actively transforming traditional values and national identity into tangible assets endowed with international competitiveness. Furthermore, the Politburo's designation of November 24th annually as “Vietnam Cultural Day” serves to broadcast a potent policy message aimed at coalescing and amplifying Vietnamese national pride amidst the complexities of the digital era.

To materialize this ambitious vision, Resolution 80-NQ/TW of the Communist Party of Vietnam has explicitly quantified developmental targets,

laying a solid foundation for a highly professionalized cultural industry ecosystem. The specific objective stipulates that by the year 2030, cultural industries must contribute approximately 7% of the national GDP, accompanied by the establishment of 5 to 10 national brands possessing international stature; subsequently, by 2045, this economic proportion is projected to increase to 9% of GDP. More importantly, Vietnam has articulated a profound aspiration to secure a position among the world's top 30 leading nations in the Global Soft Power Index by 2045. Alongside these metrics, the Government's comprehensive action program emphatically highlights the critical imperative of safeguarding “digital cultural sovereignty”. The deliberate construction of a robust content creation ecosystem and the implementation of digitized heritage product models are envisioned as the essential prerequisites for ensuring that strategic policy communication genuinely generates value in the ongoing cultivation of Vietnam's national soft power.

In order to effectively execute the policy communication directives aligned with the spirit of the 14th National Congress, Vietnam has relentlessly fortified its digital economic foundation, achieving highly impressive growth outcomes. According to the socio-economic performance reports released by the General Statistics Office, throughout 2024 and early 2025, the digital economy has continuously reaffirmed its pivotal role as the primary growth engine for the Vietnamese economy. This dynamic sector is estimated to have contributed over 14% to the national GDP (equivalent to approximately 72 billion USD). Within this sphere, the e-commerce sector has maintained a robust developmental trajectory, expanding at an annual rate of 22% to 25% and achieving an impressive total revenue milestone of 36 billion USD. Notably, the digital technology industry is exhibiting tremendous vitality, characterized by the active operation of over 80,052 enterprises. This sector generated an approximate total revenue of 198 billion USD, exceeding the initially projected annual targets by an impressive 16%. This remarkable economic breakthrough provides the indispensable material and technological infrastructure required to flawlessly execute and sustain sophisticated national communication campaigns across the global cyber environment.

2. Methodology

To achieve its core objectives, this research rigorously employs a comprehensive mixed-methods approach, strategically integrating policy discourse analysis, a systematic literature review, and descriptive statistics. The subjects of this investigation encompass three distinct and meticulously categorized data cohorts, specifically designed to ensure profound analytical comprehensiveness and high methodological reproducibility. Firstly, the

primary dataset consists of official authoritative documents and strategic resolutions promulgated by the Communist Party and the State of Vietnam. The principal focus is anchored on Resolution No. 80-NQ/TW and the overarching directives pertaining to national cultural development set forth for the forthcoming 14th National Congress. Secondly, the investigation evaluates the contemporary international theoretical framework concerning digital diplomacy and soft power. This involves synthesizing the most prominent and representative scholarly works globally, which critically encapsulate the ongoing paradigm shifts in transnational soft power dynamics.

Regarding the quantitative empirical data, this study systematically aggregates and rigorously analyzes official statistical reports published predominantly within the 2024–2025 timeframe. These critical secondary data sources are meticulously extracted from authoritative national institutions, including the General Statistics Office and the Ministry of Science and Technology, alongside highly reputable international organizations such as the GSMA and DataReportal. The principal measurement indicators utilized for this analysis encompass the proportionate contribution of the digital economy to the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the national Digital Transformation Index (DTI), the aggregate volume of active internet users, and the comprehensive social media penetration rate. The sophisticated data processing procedure centrally focuses on systematically deconstructing complex layers of information, thereby translating raw statistical metrics into concrete, actionable evidence that accurately reflects the overarching digital readiness of contemporary Vietnamese society. Ultimately, this strategic amalgamation of a rigorous international theoretical lens with grounded domestic empirical data substantially bolsters the structural integrity of the research, ensuring the maximum validity, reliability, and academic objectivity of its final conclusions.

3. Results

The 14th National Congress marks a fundamental paradigm shift in national strategic thinking, wherein science, technology, and culture are centrally positioned within the trajectory of national ascent. The subsequent promulgation of Resolution No. 80-NQ/TW on January 7, 2026, by the Politburo regarding the development of Vietnamese culture has formally institutionalized the concept of “soft power”. Departing from previous approaches, Resolution 80 explicitly affirms that culture functions as a critical “regulatory system”, serving as both the foundational bedrock and the breakthrough driving force for sustainable development. This progressive perspective compels the political system to fundamentally reconceptualize the developmental space, actively transforming traditional values and national

identity into tangible assets endowed with international competitiveness. Furthermore, the Politburo's designation of November 24th annually as "Vietnam Cultural Day" broadcasts a potent policy message explicitly designed to coalesce national pride.

To materialize this ambitious vision, Resolution 80-NQ/TW has quantified its developmental targets, thereby laying a robust foundation for a professionalized cultural industry ecosystem. The specific objective stipulates that by the year 2030, cultural industries must contribute approximately 7% of the national GDP, accompanied by the establishment of 5 to 10 national brands possessing international stature; subsequently, by 2045, this economic proportion is projected to increase to 9% of GDP. More importantly, Vietnam has articulated a profound aspiration to secure a position among the world's top 30 leading nations in the Global Soft Power Index by 2045. Concurrently, the Government's comprehensive action program emphatically highlights the imperative of safeguarding "digital cultural sovereignty", constructing a vibrant content creation ecosystem, and implementing sophisticated digitized heritage product models. Following the 14th Congress, strategic policy communication is being executed with an emphasis on transparency, strategically aimed at forging domestic consensus while concurrently attracting international support.

To effectively execute the policy communication directives aligned with the spirit of the 14th Congress, Vietnam has relentlessly fortified its digital economic foundation, achieving highly impressive growth outcomes. According to the socio-economic performance reports released by the General Statistics Office, throughout 2024 and early 2025, the digital economy has continuously reaffirmed its pivotal role as the core engine of growth. This dynamic sector is estimated to have contributed over 14% to the national GDP (equivalent to approximately 72 billion USD). Within this sphere, the e-commerce sector has maintained a robust developmental trajectory of 22-25% annually, achieving an impressive total revenue milestone of 36 billion USD. Notably, the digital technology industry is exhibiting tremendous vitality, characterized by the active operation of over 80,052 enterprises, generating an approximate total revenue of 198 billion USD, thereby exceeding the initially projected plans by 16%. This remarkable economic breakthrough provides the indispensable material and technological infrastructure required to flawlessly execute and sustain national communication campaigns across the cyber environment.

Regarding the digital social infrastructure, the Digital 2025 report published by DataReportal provides a comprehensive overview of the penetration depth and connectivity capabilities of the Vietnamese populace. As of early 2025, Vietnam recorded 79.8 million active internet users,

representing 78.8% of the total population, alongside 76.2 million active accounts across various social media platforms. The average mobile internet connection speed has surged to 75.72 Mbps, while the proportion of households utilizing fiber optic cables has exceeded 82.4%, surpassing the national planning targets. Concurrently, Project 06 (Đề án 06), which focuses on developing population data applications, has created a significant turning point in public data governance, evidenced by the successful issuance and synchronization of over 20 million electronic identity cards (VNeID).

In order to systematically monitor and catalyze the quality of the digital society, the Ministry of Science and Technology (a function formerly under the purview of the Ministry of Information and Communications) has continuously refined the Digital Transformation Index (DTI) evaluation framework. The DTI measurement results for 2024, promulgated in 2025, indicate that Hanoi is playing a comprehensive leading role across all four core pillars: digital awareness, digital institutions, the digital economy, and the digital society. On the international front, according to assessments by the Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA), Vietnam has ascended to the 7th position within the Asia-Pacific region regarding the advancement of digital societal development. These infrastructural achievements, coupled with the Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) ranking rising to 17th globally, forge a robust security shield that safeguards the flow of information and ensures the preservation of cultural heritage within cyberspace.

4. Discussion

A rigorous comparative analysis of Vietnam's contemporary policy frameworks and legal instruments against the backdrop of prevailing digital diplomacy theories reveals that the nation is currently orchestrating strategic advancements closely aligned with overarching global trends. Most notably, concerning the cultivation of national soft power and the strategic opportunities presented to emerging economies, Vietnam's deliberate utilization of advanced digital platforms to globally broadcast its rich heritage values constitutes an astute and calculated strategy designed to substantially augment its geopolitical influence. The state-endorsed conceptualization of “culture as a regulatory system” vividly manifests a constructive cognitive paradigm, aligning intimately with the core tenets of constructivism within the realm of public diplomacy. National identity and soft power are not static; rather, they are continuously constructed and iteratively refined through sustained communicative interactions across the global cyberspace. Consequently, persistent efforts to systematically integrate traditional cultural values into the burgeoning digital industry do not merely stimulate tangible

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth; they concurrently operate to transmute intangible cultural assets into quantifiable, measurable dimensions of soft power.

Nevertheless, the profound ambition to secure a position among the top 30 leading nations in the Global Soft Power Index introduces formidable challenges during the practical implementation phase. Recent empirical studies have unequivocally demonstrated that the contemporary media environment is overwhelmingly dominated and intricately regulated by the proprietary distribution algorithms of transnational technology conglomerates. Consequently, if official policy communication remains confined to the rudimentary, unidirectional digitization of administrative documents, strategic state messages will inevitably be submerged and rendered ineffective due to the pervasive phenomenon of “narrative saturation”. The crucial imperative of safeguarding “digital cultural sovereignty” demands not merely advanced technical proficiencies, but also a profound sophistication in the nuanced art of digital storytelling, which must rigorously satisfy the evolving aesthetic standards of a diverse global audience. Furthermore, cultural communication initiatives must authentically and transparently reflect progressive societal values, consciously forging a seamless unity between curated online messaging and concrete, real-world practical actions in order to successfully circumvent the detrimental “humanization paradox”.

In addition to these proactive measures, the systematic application of analytical tools designed to measure the potential erosion of national reputation within cyberspace must be formally integrated into the overarching governance frameworks at the ministerial level. Given that social media penetration in Vietnam has reached an exceptionally high threshold, encompassing over 76 million active users, the latent risk emanating from toxic, fabricated, and malicious information flows – specifically engineered to fracture the great bloc of national unity – constitutes a perpetual and critical security threat. Although comprehensive policies driving digital infrastructure development and the widespread implementation of the VNeID electronic identification system are currently constructing a highly secure digital shield, the insidious risks associated with psychological manipulation and persistent digital inequality necessitate rigorous and continuous monitoring. Moving forward, the optimal and equitable allocation of strategic communication resources, the sophisticated application of artificial intelligence to conduct deep analysis of social media data, and the aggressive promotion of synergistic public-private partnerships will serve as the decisive strategic orientations required to sustain a healthy, resilient, and thriving digital ecosystem.

5. Conclusion

The comprehensive system of guidelines, strategic policies, and legal frameworks promulgated by Vietnam has definitively marked a transformative new chapter in the paradigm of national governance. This strategic pivot decisively positions cultural heritage and national soft power at the very epicenter of the country's developmental trajectory within the contemporary digital era. The rigorous analytical findings derived from this study empirically substantiate that Vietnam's strategic policy orientations are highly congruent and fundamentally compatible with advanced contemporary theoretical frameworks concerning digital diplomacy and the global social construction of the digital sphere. The nation's unprecedented breakthrough achievements – characterized by exponential growth rates in the digital economy, ubiquitous internet penetration, and enhanced institutional capacities for digital transformation – have collectively established a remarkably robust and resilient physical infrastructure. This solid foundation is absolutely critical for the highly effective global dissemination and targeted transmission of strategic policy narratives. Ultimately, the synergistic integration of profoundly astute political directives with state-of-the-art technological infrastructure is currently generating a tremendous momentum that propels the nation's overarching developmental aspirations forward.

Admittedly, the nation continues to confront formidable, multifaceted challenges arising from the monopolistic algorithmic dominance of global technology platforms, the latent risks of cultural identity erosion, and persistent geopolitical technological asymmetries. Nevertheless, an unwavering and resolute commitment to the strategic imperative of safeguarding “digital cultural sovereignty” will undoubtedly serve as a formidable launching pad for Vietnam's future advancements. In order to successfully actualize the profound national aspiration of ascending into the top 30 leading countries in the Global Soft Power Index, it is imperative that the state governance apparatus continuously refines and modernizes the comprehensive legal framework governing digital data. Furthermore, there must be a radical innovation in official communication modalities, pivoting decisively toward dynamic, two-way interactive paradigms. Concurrently, the strategic exploitation and maximization of public diplomacy through sprawling social media networks are of paramount importance. The deliberate empowerment and transformation of every individual citizen into an authentic, proactive digital cultural ambassador will unequivocally play a decisive, catalytic role in successfully elevating and firmly repositioning the national brand identity across the highly competitive international arena during this era of comprehensive innovation.

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EASTERN VALUES IN THE PERCEPTION AND REALIZATION OF THE GOALS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE REALISTIC SOCIALISM

Abstract

This study explores the integration of Eastern values into the perception and realization of the goals and characteristics of Chinese Realistic Socialism, a distinctive development model shaped by the fusion of Marxism–Leninism and Eastern cultural foundations. Employing an interdisciplinary approach that combines philosophy, political science, and development studies, the research highlights the profound influence of values such as the doctrine of the mean, harmony, the unity of heaven and humanity, and people-centeredness. These values are not only theoretical constructs but are institutionalized into China's development policies, shaping its modernization model. The study identifies key features of Chinese Realistic Socialism, including modernization of a massive population, common prosperity, harmonious material and spiritual development, ecological balance, and peaceful development. These characteristics reflect the holistic, balanced, and sustainable approach rooted in Eastern philosophy, emphasizing stability, social order, and harmony. The research also examines the practical implementation of these values through policies addressing education, healthcare, social equity, ecological conservation, and international cooperation. The findings underscore the role of culture as an endogenous driving force in development, offering insights into the potential for non-Western development paths that integrate tradition and modernity. This study contributes to the theoretical understanding of Chinese Realistic Socialism and provides valuable lessons for other nations seeking sustainable and culturally grounded development models in the context of globalization.

Keywords: *Eastern values; Chinese Realistic Socialism; modernization; harmony; sustainable development.*

I. Introduction

In the context of globalization and increasingly fierce competition among development models, the issue of identity and value foundations in the process of modernization has become a central theme in contemporary social science research. The crisis of certain traditional development models, along with global challenges such as social inequality, climate change, and moral

degradation, has raised the need to seek new development approaches that are more sustainable and humane. In this context, the examination of the role of indigenous cultural-philosophical value systems in shaping national development paths has received increasing attention. China, as a country with a long-standing civilization and a rich system of philosophical thought, has chosen a development path of socialism with its own distinctive characteristics, in which the combination of Marxism–Leninism and Eastern values plays a foundational role, both establishing theoretical legitimacy and ensuring compatibility with specific historical and cultural conditions.

China's development practice over the past decades shows that its model of Realistic Socialism is not merely a political-economic system, but also an integrated whole of values with profound cultural and philosophical dimensions. Traditional values such as the doctrine of the mean, harmony, "the unity of heaven and humanity," and "people-centeredness" do not exist as separate or merely symbolic elements; rather, they have deeply permeated the ways of thinking, goal orientation, and organization of development practice. This is clearly reflected in the fact that China does not pursue an extreme development model based solely on economic growth, but instead aims for a comprehensive development model that balances the economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological spheres, while emphasizing the central role of the people and harmony with nature.

However, although there have been many studies on socialism with Chinese characteristics, most current research remains focused on economic aspects, political institutions, or development strategies, without deeply analyzing the specific role of Eastern values in both dimensions: theoretical perception and the process of realization in practice. In particular, the relationship between the Eastern philosophical foundation and the formation of development goals and characteristics of the Chinese model of modernization has not yet been systematically clarified. Therefore, this article aims to deeply analyze this relationship, focusing on clarifying how Eastern values are internalized in the perception of the goals and characteristics of Chinese Realistic Socialism, while being institutionalized and implemented in specific development policies. Through this, the article contributes to elucidating the nature, characteristics, and operational logic of this model in the current context of globalization.

II. Literature review

Recent studies on socialism with Chinese characteristics have focused on three main directions, reflecting the multidimensional development of this field of research.

First, studies on the theory of Chinese socialism emphasize the creativity in applying Marxism–Leninism to China’s specific conditions. Socialism with Chinese characteristics, particularly through the Chinese model of modernization, has successfully resolved the “major problem” in the history of scientific socialism – that is, how economically underdeveloped countries can achieve socialist modernization after “crossing the Caudine Forks.” This represents an original contribution, opening up new approaches to interpreting the nature of China’s development model (Tang, A., 2025).

Second, studies on China’s development model focus on analyzing characteristics such as rapid economic growth, the role of the state, and the strategy of controlled international integration. Margaret Pearson and her colleagues, in a book chapter published in 2025 in the *Handbook of Comparative Political Economy*, outlined the trajectory of China’s economic development since the post-Mao era, emphasizing the unique combination of market mechanisms and Party-state control, particularly in the fields of high technology, real estate, and finance (Xiang, G., Liu, J., & Yang, Y., 2024). In addition, a study published in *Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions* pointed out that China’s low-carbon energy transition cannot be simply understood as a unified “state-led” model. Instead, the study highlights the existence of diverse governance structures at the local level, with varying models across provinces, such as the distributed governance model in Jiangsu (Yang, K., & Feng, K., 2026).

Third, some recent works have begun to pay attention to the role of culture and traditional values, arguing that Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist thought have an important influence on development thinking. A study by Hong Xiuping in *Chinese Social Sciences Today* affirmed that all three ideological systems – Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism – together constitute the identity of China’s traditional cultural and intellectual heritage, aiming toward the goals of social stability, harmony, and happiness (Hong, X., 2015). However, most studies have only stopped at affirming the general role of Eastern culture, without clarifying how these values are concretized in development goals, model characteristics, and practical policies. This gap serves as the basis for this article to conduct a deeper analysis, contributing to clarifying the specific operational mechanisms of traditional cultural values in shaping China’s contemporary development model.

III. Theoretical framework

1. Eastern Values in Social Philosophy

Eastern values were formed on the foundation of Eastern traditional philosophy and culture. It is precisely the diversity and richness of culture and the distinctive features of philosophy that have created unique Eastern values.

The East is a vast region with a long history marked by the formation of civilizations from very early times, notably Egypt, Mesopotamia, China, India, etc. This is an area with a rich combination of diverse and profound cultures; therefore, this region has also produced many values of positive significance not only for Asia but for all humanity. At the same time, it shaped civilization and distinctive Eastern values different from Western culture, civilization, and values. Eastern civilization was formed on the basis of living habits associated with rivers, natural conditions, and production methods oriented toward agricultural activities, wet rice cultivation, and the need for flood control... leading to the early emergence of self-governing rural commune models and communal solidarity within the commune. This foundation created a need for Eastern people to unite and bond together to withstand the harshness of nature, to overcome and master nature. Therefore, people often live harmoniously with one another, showing solidarity and mutual assistance in production and daily life. The early formation of rural village communities also strengthened people's sense of responsibility toward the community: neighbors, villages, kinsfolk, homeland, and nation. Community spirit and a sense of community responsibility gradually developed into national spirit and Eastern patriotism. This distinctive Eastern cultural trait gave rise to a very important Eastern value: emphasizing community spirit, responsibility, and harmony in interpersonal relationships.

With the specific Asian mode of production linked to rural communes and agricultural production, which depended primarily on nature, as well as the need to overcome natural influences, an important reason why people developed the habit of being closely connected to and following nature, living in harmony with nature, and regarding nature as deities (gods of rain, thunder, Mother Nature, Mother Earth, mountain gods, river gods, tree gods, etc.). Following nature and selecting seasonal crops as the main farming method were ways for Eastern people to take advantage of favorable weather conditions while mitigating the negative impacts of natural disasters... in agricultural production. Acting against nature, against "heaven's will," would come at a cost; nature would "get angry" and "punish" with natural disasters, epidemics, crop failures... Additionally, due to the organizational characteristic of traditional Eastern society as an agricultural society with rural communes where each family was self-sufficient, the family and village became isolated and detached, people were bound by strict rules, even superstitions... people were also prone to compromise and be content with what they had, granted by "heaven" or "God," thus limiting people to submission and acquiescence to nature and external circumstances, without the will to strive to master circumstances, conquer nature, or "transform nature" as in the West. This cultural trait has also been refined and become

one of the quite distinctive Eastern values: emphasizing harmonious development between humans and nature, between humans and humans, and between individuals and the community and society.

One of the traditional cultural traits that influenced Eastern philosophy and contributed to Eastern values is the influence of ideological systems such as Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism... Among them, Confucianism, with its moral and political doctrines, had a great and lasting influence on many Eastern countries. Confucian thought emphasized morality, ethics, building a peaceful, stable, disciplined, harmonious society with principles and order, stressing civilization, rites and music, moral education, and learning. With their positive values, these thoughts took root deeply and gradually formed Eastern values, emphasizing morality, valuing peace, stability, and social order; valuing culture and moral education for people... In the East, the state emerged early in slave-owning societies. Because agriculture emerged and developed quite early, it led to the formation of social organizations, class differentiation, and the emergence of the state. The earliest ancient Eastern states (slave-owning states) appeared around the 4th century BCE in Egypt and Mesopotamia, followed by states in the Indus River, Ganges River, Yellow River, and Yangtze River regions (3rd century BCE)... Subsequently, the strong development of centralized absolute monarchies, with a series of conquests, territorial expansions, and sovereignty struggles... had a strong impact even on Western countries... The role of the state apparatus, headed by the king, was especially emphasized. The strong development of slave-owning states, absolute monarchies, and great civilizations also brought many cultural and spiritual values to this region. These include the value of emphasizing order and social stability associated with the role of the state in Eastern countries...

Thus, over many centuries, with the depth and distinctive features of traditional thought, culture, philosophy, as well as the characteristics of the Asian mode of production... traditional cultural values, moral and ideological values, and values of philosophical doctrines were formed... Synthesizing these, it can be seen that Eastern values are a combination of the meaningful, positive, and noble common values, both material and spiritual, of the Eastern region. In summary, Eastern values can be seen to include several fundamental values: emphasizing stability, social order, and the role of the state; valuing solidarity, collective interests, and responsibility toward the community; valuing the role of culture and education; emphasizing the role of morality and moral education for people; valuing harmonious development between humans and nature, between humans and humans, and between individuals and the community and society.

Eastern values are considered a collection of thoughts, philosophies, cultures, and ethics formed and developed over thousands of years of history in East Asian civilizations, in which China played a central role with the profound influence of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and other traditional thoughts. These values not only reflect how Eastern people perceive the world but also shape behavior, social organization, and state governance: The bifurcation of the dynamic historical current originating from antiquity (Greece) and the sluggish historical progression with the Asian mode of production serves as a historical basis for explaining the opposition between East and West and to some extent demystifies the mystery of the East. Unlike the West, where the power to manage feudal society often lay with the nobility and clergy, in ancient China, a high-ranking official class emerged very early. While Western philosophy tends toward rationality, analysis, and detailed dissection of issues, ancient Chinese philosophy leans toward intuition and holistic perception. Western thought is individualistic, while ancient Chinese thought emphasizes totality, harmony, and the interconnections among elements.

One of the prominent characteristics of Eastern values is communitarianism. Unlike the individualistic thinking of the West, Eastern culture emphasizes solidarity, collective spirit, and harmony in social relationships. Confucianism, with its philosophy of “cultivating oneself, regulating the family, governing the state, bringing peace to the world,” stresses the individual’s responsibility toward family, society, and the nation. Taoism, with its principle of yin-yang, emphasizes balance and harmony between humans and nature, and between opposing elements in life. Meanwhile, Buddhism brings a spirit of compassion and tolerance, encouraging people to live for the common good, transcend the ego, and strive for shared peace. Throughout history, Eastern values have not only been an ideological foundation but also a guiding principle for action. Chinese dynasties applied these thoughts to build a stable, orderly, and developing society; therefore: *“through so many upheavals, so many dynastic changes, Chinese society still stood steadfast, only until the Opium War did its foundations begin to shake”* (Dao, D. A., 1942).

2. Socialism with Chinese characteristics

Socialism with Chinese characteristics is a distinctive development model built and developed by the Communist Party of China in the process of leading the country. This model is not a mechanical copy of classical theory, but rather the result of a combination of Marxism–Leninism, Chinese practice, and the Eastern cultural foundation. First, in terms of theoretical basis, socialism with Chinese characteristics takes Marxism–Leninism as its guiding ideology. This is considered the compass for action, providing general

principles on the laws of social development and the path toward socialism (Quyet, N.V., 2018). According to this doctrine, socialism is an inevitable stage in the history of humanity, aiming to liberate people from oppression and injustice. However, China does not apply it dogmatically but instead carries out the “Sinicization” of Marxism–Leninism. Second, this model is closely tied to Chinese practice. The historical, economic, and social realities of China have set the requirement to flexibly apply theory to suit the specific conditions of a populous country with uneven development. Therefore, socialism with Chinese characteristics is defined as “a product of the combination of the basic principles of Marxism with the concrete realities of China” (NSSFC, 2021). The reform and opening-up process since the late 20th century is clear evidence of adjusting the development model to promote economic growth and international integration. Third, this model is also deeply influenced by the Eastern cultural foundation, especially traditional values such as emphasizing stability, social order, and community spirit. In the process of building socialism, China focuses on combining modernization with preserving and promoting national cultural identity, while absorbing the essence of human culture (People.cn, 2026). In summary, socialism with Chinese characteristics is a synthesis of theory and practice, of universality and national specificity. It is precisely this combination that has created a unique development model, reflecting a path toward socialism suitable for China’s historical, economic, and cultural conditions.

3. Analytical Framework

This article employs a two-tier analytical framework to clarify Eastern values in the perception and realization of the goals and characteristics of Chinese Realistic Socialism. This approach allows for the connection between the ideological foundation and the process of application in practice, thereby highlighting the role of cultural factors in the development model. At the first tier – perception – the article focuses on analyzing the goals and characteristics of Chinese Realistic Socialism under the influence of Eastern values. Values such as emphasizing social order, community spirit, harmony, and stability are considered an important foundation in shaping development goals. Not only aiming for economic growth, this model also emphasizes the balance between development and stability, and between the individual and the collective. The characteristics of the model therefore bear clear imprints of Eastern thought, differing from purely Western approaches. At the second tier – practice – the article analyzes how these values are concretized through policies and implementation processes. Orientations regarding social management, controlled economic development, and prioritizing political stability all reflect the application of Eastern values in practice. Through this, it can be seen that the goals and characteristics not only exist at the theoretical

level but have also been flexibly realized in accordance with China's specific conditions. The combination of the two tiers helps clarify the pervasive role of Eastern values, from perception to action, in the process of building Realistic Socialism in China.

IV. Annalysis and discussion

1. Eastern Values in the Perception of the Goals and Characteristics of Chinese Realistic Socialism

First, Eastern values are reflected in the perception of the goals of Chinese Realistic Socialism

In the process of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, the perception of development goals is not only based on the principles of Marxism–Leninism but also deeply influenced by Eastern ideological values. Values such as the doctrine of the mean, harmony, the unity of heaven and humanity, and people-centeredness have become an important methodological foundation in defining the goals of Chinese Realistic Socialism.

Since its founding, the Communist Party of China has defined its mission as seeking happiness for the people and rejuvenating the Chinese nation, with national modernization being the long-term path and goal. Through each stage, this goal has been concretized in accordance with historical conditions. During the period of revolution and socialist construction, the central tasks were to complete the transition to the socialist system, develop productive forces, promote industrialization, and gradually meet the material and cultural needs of the people, aiming to build a modern socialist country. During the reform and opening-up period, the focus shifted to liberating and developing productive forces, eliminating poverty, enriching the people, while creating the material and institutional foundation for national rejuvenation. Entering the new era, the Communist Party of China has clearly defined the goal of achieving socialist modernization and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, thereby orienting the entire process of national development.

Regarding the roadmap, in the spirit of the Party's 20th National Congress documents, China's national development goals are concretized in a two-stage roadmap: from 2020 to 2035, basically achieving modernization; from 2035 to the middle of the century, successfully building a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful (Communist Party of China, 2022). This is the overall blueprint for long-term development, clearly demonstrating the continuity and evolution in the strategic goals of socialism. The connotation of this goal is comprehensive and systematic, including building a country that

is economically prosperous, politically democratic, culturally advanced, socially harmonious, and ecologically beautiful.

The notable feature in the way goals are defined is the emphasis on comprehensiveness and balance in development. Modernization in China's conception is not merely industrialization or economic growth, but a process of coordinated development across the economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological spheres. This clearly reflects the holistic thinking of Eastern philosophy, in which elements of social life exist in organic relationships and need to be harmoniously balanced.

First, the doctrine of the mean is clearly reflected in the way development goals are defined in a balanced and stable direction. China does not pursue an extreme development model but chooses a path of modernization that is controlled, gradual, and suited to practical conditions. The development goal is therefore not only about speed but also about long-term stability, reflecting the spirit of "no bias, no extremism" in Eastern philosophy.

Second, the value of harmony plays a central role in the perception of goals. The construction of a society that is "prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful" demonstrates a development orientation toward balance between various aspects: economic growth with social equity, urban development with rural development, and among different regions. This is an inheritance and modernization of the thought of "harmony without uniformity" in Eastern tradition.

Third, the thought of "the unity of heaven and humanity" is reflected in the goal of building an ecological civilization. Development cannot be separated from nature but must aim for harmony between humans and nature. This shows that the perception of goals in Chinese socialism has transcended the purely economic development model to move toward sustainable development.

Fourth, the thought of "people-centeredness" holds a core position in the goal system. The Communist Party of China emphasizes the principle of "putting the people at the center," considering the improvement of people's lives and the promotion of common prosperity as the essence of socialism. The people are both the goal and the driving force of development, reflecting the combination of socialist theory and Eastern humanistic tradition.

Thus, in theoretical perception, the goals of Chinese Realistic Socialism bear strong imprints of Eastern values, manifested in balanced, harmonious, sustainable, and people-centered thinking.

Second, Eastern values are reflected in the perception of the characteristics of Chinese Realistic Socialism

In the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the basic characteristics of this model are defined not only on the basis of the

universal principles of Marxism–Leninism but also closely linked to China’s historical conditions, development practice, and cultural foundation. In the spirit of the 20th National Congress, the prominent characteristics of “Chinese modernization” can be summarized into a system including: modernization of a huge population; modernization of common prosperity for all; modernization of material and spiritual civilization harmony; modernization of harmonious coexistence between humans and nature; and modernization following the path of peaceful development (Communist Party of China, 2022). These are not merely descriptive features of the development path but also essential criteria reflecting the Chinese-characteristic model of Realistic Socialism.

First, modernization of a huge population is a characteristic reflecting China’s specific conditions while also demonstrating a holistic development approach. Modernizing a country with over one billion people requires coordinated efforts across economic, social, and governance sectors. This is connected to the holistic thinking in Eastern philosophy, in which society is viewed as a unified system where all elements have organic relationships with one another.

Second, modernization of common prosperity for all is a core characteristic reflecting the socialist nature of the Chinese model. The goal is not only economic growth but also the reasonable distribution of development outcomes, narrowing the wealth gap, and ensuring social justice. From the perspective of Eastern values, this characteristic deeply reflects the thought of “people-centeredness” and community spirit, in which the interests of the people and social stability are placed at the center.

Third, modernization of material and spiritual civilization harmony is an important characteristic of Chinese modernization, clearly defined in the documents of the 20th National Congress. Accordingly, China not only focuses on developing productive forces and improving material standards but also emphasizes building culture, ideology, and the socialist value system to ensure the correct development direction. From the perspective of Eastern values, this characteristic reflects a comprehensive and balanced development mindset, in which material and spiritual elements are placed in a coordinated relationship. In the modern context, this view is institutionalized as a requirement for synchronous development between economy and culture, between growth and social progress. Therefore, the combination of material and spiritual civilization is not only a requirement for balanced development but also a mechanism ensuring the sustainability and socialist orientation of the modernization process.

Fourth, modernization of harmonious coexistence between humans and nature is a characteristic with contemporary significance but also has deep

roots in Eastern philosophy, particularly the thought of “the unity of heaven and humanity.” Accordingly, development cannot be based on unlimited resource exploitation but must respect the laws of nature and aim for ecological balance. This demonstrates the combination of modern sustainable development requirements with traditional ideological foundations.

Fifth, modernization following the path of peaceful development clearly reflects the concept of “harmony” in Chinese culture. China affirms that it will not follow a development path based on conflict or hegemony but aims for mutually beneficial cooperation. Eastern values here are expressed in the mindset of valuing peace, stability, and order—factors considered fundamental conditions for long-term development.

Overall, the characteristics of socialism with Chinese characteristics are not only the concretization of the development path under specific historical conditions but also the crystallization of Eastern values such as harmony, the doctrine of the mean, communitarianism, and holism. These values do not exist abstractly but have been internalized into each specific characteristic of the development model, thereby shaping the distinctive identity of Chinese Realistic Socialism in the new era.

2. Eastern Values Embodied in the Realization of the Goals and Characteristics of Realistic Socialism with Chinese Characteristics

Based on the theoretical understanding of the goals and basic characteristics defined at the 20th National Congress, China has implemented their realization through a comprehensive policy system linked to a two-step strategic roadmap leading to the mid-21st century.

Firstly, regarding the characteristic of modernization on a massive scale, China faces not only the typical challenges of development but must also simultaneously address issues of scale and quality. Therefore, the policies for realization are not limited to expanding production but focus on achieving the modernization of the people and promoting well-rounded human development, primarily reflected in efforts to enhance both the quality and scale of the population. In 1949, when the People's Republic of China was founded, the population was 540 million, with 80% illiteracy and an average life expectancy of 35 years (Xinhuanet, 2019). Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, especially since the Reform and Opening-up, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government have placed great emphasis on education and implemented a strategy of prioritizing its development. China's adult literacy rate remains around 96–97%, meaning the illiteracy rate is only about 2–3% ([Tradingeconomics.com](https://www.tradingeconomics.com), 2024). This demonstrates a significant improvement in population quality, laying a solid human resource foundation for modernization efforts. Additionally, the Chinese Communist Party has continuously improved the public health

system, medical service system, and social security system, effectively addressing the challenging issue of imbalance between population size and people's livelihoods during modernization. Since the 18th National Congress, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party has recognized talent as a strategic resource for national rejuvenation and for gaining the initiative in international competition, while simultaneously formulating a major strategy for the comprehensive cultivation, introduction, and utilization of talent. The 20th National Congress emphasized building a modern education system, developing science and technology, and improving the healthcare and social security systems. Notably, this approach does not view a large population as a burden but transforms it into an advantage by enhancing "human quality." This clearly reflects the Eastern mindset of governing society as an organic whole, where harmonizing internal elements is more important than mere expansion.

Secondly, regarding the characteristic of modernization for common prosperity for all the people, the process of realization shows a shift from a singular focus on growth to an emphasis on equity in distribution. China has set the goal that by 2035, substantial progress will be made in achieving common prosperity, and by 2049, common prosperity for all will be basically achieved. The Central Economic Work Conference held in December 2021 pointed out: "It is necessary to accurately understand and grasp the strategic goals and practical methods for achieving common prosperity. Under China's socialist system, we must continuously unleash and develop productive forces, continuously create and accumulate social wealth, and also prevent polarization. To achieve common prosperity, first, through the joint efforts of people across the nation, we must make the 'pie' bigger and better, and through reasonable institutional arrangements, we must cut and divide the pie well" (People's Daily, 2021). To achieve this goal, the key lies in how to utilize and regulate capital. The Conference emphasized the need to correctly understand and grasp the characteristics and operational laws of capital: "The socialist market economy is a great creation. Under the socialist market economy, various forms of capital will inevitably exist. We must give full play to the positive role of capital as a production factor while effectively controlling its negative impacts. It is necessary to set up 'traffic lights' for capital, strengthen effective legal oversight of capital, and prevent the unregulated expansion of capital" (People's Daily, 2021).

Beyond utilizing economic tools such as taxation and welfare, China also adjusts its development structure through strategies like rural revitalization, regional development, and income distribution control. This demonstrates the recognition that inequality is not merely an economic consequence but also a social and political issue. From the perspective of Eastern values, this

approach reflects the holistic and harmonious thinking found in Confucianism, emphasizing the principle of "harmony without uniformity" and the concept of society as a unified whole requiring long-term balance and stability, rather than pursuing the maximization of narrow, partial interests.

Thirdly, regarding the characteristic of modernization that harmonizes material civilization and spiritual civilization, a prominent feature in practice is that China does not treat culture as merely a supplementary domain, but places it on an equal footing with economic development in its national development strategy. In a speech at the headquarters of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris, France, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "The realization of the Chinese Dream is the result of the balanced development and mutual promotion of material civilization and spiritual civilization. Without the continued inheritance and development of civilization, and without the flourishing and prosperity of culture, the Chinese Dream cannot be achieved" (Xi Jinping, 2014). The 20th National Congress emphasized that "we must maintain firm cultural confidence and strengthen spiritual power to realize the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" (Communist Party of China, 2022).

This understanding of harmony is further extended to the relationship between the economy and ecology through Xi Jinping's well-known statement: "Lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets." This viewpoint is not merely environmental guidance, but also a revolution in developmental thinking: it shifts the perception from exploiting nature to valuing and preserving it as a form of sustainable cultural and economic asset. It reflects China's clear recognition that economic development cannot be separated from a foundation of values and spiritual order; without such a foundation, the development process is prone to long-term social instability. Therefore, alongside promoting economic growth, China has simultaneously implemented policies in education, media, and the construction of a socialist value system, with the aim of strengthening the spiritual foundation and creating endogenous momentum for sustainable development. This approach reflects an Eastern mode of thinking that emphasizes harmony and holism, viewing economic development and the building of a spiritual foundation as two organically interconnected dimensions that together contribute to maintaining social stability and ensuring the sustainability of development.

Fourthly, the construction of a form of modernization characterized by harmonious coexistence between humans and nature represents the conscious ecological awareness of the Communist Party of China over a long historical trajectory, especially since the advent of the new era. Since the 18th National Congress, through comprehensive and in-depth reforms, China has accelerated top-level design and the establishment of an institutional system

for ecological civilization, continuously issuing guiding opinions on promoting ecological civilization and an overall plan for reforming the ecological civilization system, and formulating more than 40 reform measures related to its development. China has carried out comprehensive and systematic arrangements for ecological civilization in terms of overall goals, fundamental concepts, guiding principles, key tasks, and institutional guarantees.

At the same time, laws such as the Law on the Prevention and Control of Soil Pollution, the Yangtze River Protection Law, the Environmental Protection Law, the Law on the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution, and the Forestry Law have been promulgated, revised, and improved, providing a legal framework for the construction of ecological civilization. Here, we can observe a remarkable transformation of Eastern values: the philosophical idea of the “unity of heaven and humanity,” once abstract in nature, has now been concretized into rigorous institutional principles. It no longer remains merely moral teachings in books, but has truly become a general operational norm that governs and guides the behavior of both the state apparatus and economic actors in the market.

Fifthly, China pursues modernization through peaceful development, on the basis of peaceful development. Following the path of peaceful development requires China to resolutely combat all forms of colonialism, hegemonism, and bullying. China actively participates in the reform and development of the global governance system, upholds the international system with the United Nations at its core, upholds the international order based on international law, upholds the fundamental principles of international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, upholds and practices true multilateralism, and actively promotes the development of economic globalization in a direction that is open, inclusive, mutually beneficial, balanced, and beneficial for all parties. China always adheres to peaceful development, cooperation, and mutual benefit, maintains friendly relations with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, actively engages in exchanges and cooperation with other countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, and resolutely safeguards world peace and promotes common development.

According to a report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 2021, China's GDP accounted for 16.9% of the world's total, and this share has been steadily increasing ([Visualcapitalist.com](https://www.visualcapitalist.com), 2024). By 2035, it is expected to exceed 25%. This has made the international balance of power more balanced. More importantly, China's economic development is closely linked with the rest of the world. Thus, with the characteristic of modernization through peaceful development, China has chosen a strategy of

integrated yet controlled engagement – deeply participating in the global economy while maintaining strategic autonomy. The concept of a "community with a shared future for mankind" reflects a development approach based not on adversarial competition but on long-term cooperation. This clearly reflects the value of "harmony" in Eastern culture, while also serving as an adaptation to the context of globalization.

The five core features of Chinese-style modernization do not exist as discrete elements; rather, they are tightly interwoven into an integrated structure, operating throughout a two-step strategic roadmap toward the future. The realization of this roadmap serves as a vivid demonstration of the dialectical unity between epistemology and practical action. Within this framework, Eastern values are not merely abstract ideas or cultural nostalgia, but have truly been institutionalized into concrete governance policies, laws, and national operating mechanisms. It is precisely this infusion of Eastern philosophy into the modern system that has enabled China to shape a distinctive development model – one that not only pursues material prosperity but also preserves cultural essence and ecological harmony within the continuous flow of the contemporary world.

V. Findings and implications

1. Main Findings

The study shows that Eastern values play a profound and consistent role in the formation and development of realistic socialism in China. First, these values are not limited to traditional ideological foundations such as emphasizing order, stability, community spirit, and harmony, but have also been integrated into the modern political theoretical system. This helps clearly shape long-term development goals and social orientation.

More importantly, Eastern values have been institutionalized into concrete policies, reflected in the ways social governance, economic management, and political stability are organized. Development policies are designed not only to promote growth but also to focus on balancing factors such as the economy, society, and the environment, as well as between modernization and the preservation of tradition. As a result, China's development model is holistic, balanced, and relatively sustainable, with no separation between objectives and means of implementation. The combination of theoretical thinking and practical execution has created a distinctive development model that reflects flexible adaptation to specific historical and cultural conditions.

2. Implications

From the research findings, several important implications – both theoretical and practical – can be drawn. First, this model suggests the

possibility of forming a non-Western development path, in which countries do not necessarily have to follow existing templates but can build their own trajectory based on their historical, political, and cultural conditions. This contributes to enriching development approaches in the context of globalization. Second, the study emphasizes the central role of culture in development. Culture is not only a spiritual foundation but can also be transformed into practical resources, guiding policy and creating social consensus. Effectively harnessing traditional cultural values helps enhance the stability and sustainability of the development model. Third, the experiences from China offer valuable references for developing countries, particularly Vietnam. However, application should be selective and creative, suited to specific contexts, and avoid mechanical copying. At the same time, attention should be paid to balancing economic growth with social stability, and international integration with the preservation of national identity, thereby building a development model that is both effective and sustainable.

VI. Conclusion

The article affirms that realistic socialism in China is a distinctly characteristic development model, formed on the basis of a close combination between the theoretical foundation of Marxism–Leninism and the rich traditional value system of Eastern culture. This is not a simple replication of theoretical principles, but rather a process of selection, adaptation, and "localization" to suit China's specific historical, social, and cultural conditions. It is this combination that has created a development mindset that is both universal and uniquely distinctive. Within this framework, Eastern values such as the doctrine of the mean, harmony, people-centeredness, and the unity of heaven and humanity play a particularly important role. These values are not confined to the realm of ideology or ethics; they also directly shape the perception of development goals. At the same time, they influence the process of realizing the model's goals and characteristics, as reflected in policy formulation, social governance, and economic management. As a result, this development model consistently strives for balance among various factors rather than focusing on a single dimension. Moreover, the integration of tradition and modernity has created a distinctive development path, reflecting a flexible adaptability to the changes of the times. This model not only emphasizes economic growth but also prioritizes ensuring social stability, improving people's livelihoods, and preserving the ecological environment. It is precisely this harmonious combination of economic, social, and environmental goals that contributes to long-term sustainability.

From this study, it can be seen that realistic socialism in China is not merely a specific development model of one country, but also an important

contribution to development theory in the current global context. It offers new insights into the combination of traditional and modern elements, as well as between theory and practice, while affirming the role of culture as an endogenous driving force in the development process.

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THE DOMINANCE OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS AND THE SUSTAINABILITY PARADOX IN VIETNAM'S JOURNALISM ECONOMY

Abstract

This article analyzes the reshaping of Vietnam's journalism economy in the digital era under the simultaneous influence of two macro-level dimensions: market restructuring driven by digital platforms and the current regulatory framework governing journalism. The overlap of these forces not only erodes traditional revenue streams but also generates a “sustainable paradox,” in which news organizations must fulfill political–social missions while ensuring economic viability under conditions of limited resources and increasingly adverse market structures. Drawing on media economics and the Resource-Based View, the study demonstrates that current revenue diversification efforts are, in essence, a compulsory process of organizational resource restructuring. Newsrooms are gradually transitioning toward media-tech models, leveraging first-party user data, developing event-based and business-to-business ecosystems, and maintaining new forms of cross-subsidization to support core journalistic functions. The study concludes that, despite initial legal adjustments introduced through the amended laws of 2025, the sustainable development of Vietnamese journalism requires a coordinated approach that integrates macro-level policy reform with organizational innovation.

Keywords: *journalism economy; sustainable paradox; digital platforms; regulatory framework; revenue diversification; cross-subsidization.*

I. Introduction and Brief Literature Review

The process of digital transformation is fundamentally reshaping the economic foundations of journalism on a global scale. The proliferation of digital technologies has enabled journalistic content to be copied, shared, and circulated at minimal cost, while simultaneously making the control of access rights and content distribution more difficult than before (Cunningham, Flew, and Swift, 2015). This development not only undermines traditional revenue

streams but also reflects a structural transformation in which the modes of value creation, content distribution, and competition in journalism are being reorganized under the influence of digital technologies and new communication networks (Daidj, 2018, p. 124). At the core of this process lies a shift from a journalism-centered ecosystem to a platform-dominated structure, where technology platforms increasingly hold significant advantages in terms of data, technological capacity, and the ability to orchestrate information flows.

In Vietnam, this shift is most evident in the digital advertising market. Although available data and estimates are not entirely consistent, they uniformly indicate a clear trend: the majority of online advertising value is migrating toward cross-border platforms and social networks. According to figures released in 2024, approximately 80% of the online advertising market share is concentrated in platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, and TikTok (Phuong Anh, 2024). Research analyses further demonstrate that these platforms have captured an increasingly large proportion of advertising revenues that previously belonged to mainstream news organizations (Tran Bao Chau and Tran Quang Dieu, 2025, pp. 296–315). This trend highlights the declining intermediary role of journalism in the advertising market, while simultaneously increasing the dependence of newsrooms on the digital platform ecosystem.

Confronted with the erosion of traditional revenue sources, many news organizations have sought to diversify income streams by implementing paywall models, expanding communication services, organizing events, or developing value-added digital products (Do Anh Duc and Pham Thi Van Anh, 2024; Le Tran Nguyen Huy, 2024; Le Xuan Manh, 2024). However, when applied in the Vietnamese context, these models reveal significant limitations. On the one hand, the digital content market remains shaped by consumer habits favoring free content and by the widespread persistence of copyright infringement (Bui Chi Trung, 2025; Tran Bao Chau and Tran Quang Dieu, 2025, pp. 296–315). On the other hand, news organizations operate within a distinctive institutional framework. Despite being subject to financial autonomy mechanisms, most newsrooms continue to function as public service units rather than independent business entities, thereby reducing their flexibility in expanding economic activities and restructuring revenue streams (Bui Chi Trung, 2025). Within this context, Vietnamese journalism faces a structural contradiction: newsrooms must simultaneously adapt to market competition pressures while fulfilling specific political and social missions (Bui Chi Trung, 2025; Tran Bao Chau and Tran Quang Dieu, 2025, pp. 296–315). At a more general level, some scholars conceptualize this contradiction as a form of “sustainable paradox” (Tran Bao Chau and Tran Quang Dieu, 2025, pp. 296–315), reflecting the incomplete compatibility between

journalism's financial objectives and its social functions, thereby posing long-term challenges to the development of the journalistic system.

Although these issues have been addressed in certain studies, the academic field still lacks integrated analyses that simultaneously consider two dimensions: (i) the restructuring of the market driven by digital platforms and (ii) the current regulatory framework governing Vietnamese journalism. Existing works largely approach these dimensions separately rather than connecting them within a unified explanatory framework. Consequently, there remains a need for an approach capable of accounting for both the market pressures generated by digital platforms and the institutional constraints under which Vietnamese journalism operates in the context of digital transformation.

From this standpoint, the article raises a core research question: How are the dominance of digital platforms and the current regulatory framework jointly reshaping the economics of Vietnamese journalism in the digital era? Building on this, the study aims to clarify the overlap between these two macro-level dimensions in order to analyze the nature of the sustainable paradox, while also providing reference points for newsroom-level revenue diversification strategies—particularly from the perspective of resource restructuring and organizational adaptation in the present period. Within this approach, the article interprets the “sustainable paradox” not merely as a tension between journalism's financial objectives and social functions, but as the outcome of the interaction between market pressures generated by digital platforms and the regulatory framework governing Vietnamese journalism. This interaction, in turn, stimulates adaptive responses through resource restructuring and revenue diversification.

II. Research Methodology

This study employs a qualitative document-based analytical approach to examine the reshaping of Vietnam's journalism economy under the impact of digital transformation. The data sources are synthesized from four principal groups: (1) international theoretical works on media economics and digital platforms; (2) domestic academic studies on the practice of Vietnamese journalism; (3) the system of legal and regulatory policy documents; and (4) industry data and reports on revenue, market share, and content distribution trends. The integration of these sources provides both a solid theoretical foundation and close alignment with the realities of operational practice.

The logical structure of the article is developed through a multi-level analytical framework (Figure 1). At the macro level, the study focuses on two dimensions that simultaneously shape the Vietnamese journalism economy: the market restructuring driven by digital platforms and the current regulatory framework governing journalism. The interaction between these two

dimensions constitutes the basis for identifying the “sustainable paradox” of Vietnamese journalism in the digital era. Building on this foundation, the analysis extends to the organizational level, examining newsroom adaptation strategies through resource restructuring and revenue diversification.




Figure 1. Analytical framework of the reshaping of Vietnam’s journalism economy in the digital age*
*Source: Authors’ proposal (2026).

Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical lenses applied at each level of analysis. Platform economics is employed to explain the process of market

restructuring driven by digital platforms; media economics provides the basis for identifying the “sustainable paradox” arising from the interaction between the two macro-level dimensions (market restructuring and regulatory framework); and the Resource-Based View (RBV) is applied to analyze newsroom adaptation strategies at the organizational level.

III. Research Findings and Discussion

3.1. Market Disruption of the Dual Product Model and Pressures from Digital Platforms

From the perspective of media economics, the “dual product market” model has long constituted the operational foundation of modern journalism. Since news possesses the characteristics of a public good – particularly its non-rivalrous nature in consumption – news organizations find it difficult to sustain financial viability solely through the sale of content (Heinrich, 2024, p. 155). Consequently, newsrooms must use content to attract audiences and then commercialize audience attention through the advertising market, thereby generating cross-subsidization revenues to offset production costs (Hagen and Schäfer-Hock, 2024, p. 667). According to Cunningham, Flew, and Swift, this economic logic historically underpinned the functioning of modern journalism (Cunningham, Flew, and Swift, 2015).

However, this cross-subsidization mechanism has been severely weakened under the influence of cross-border digital platforms. In the digital environment, network effects intensify market concentration around a small number of dominant actors (Dewenter and Rösch, 2024, pp. 103-117), while advantages in data and traffic orchestration enable platforms to enhance advertising distribution efficiency and capture the majority of communication budgets. Within this context, journalism not only loses advertising market share but also becomes increasingly dependent on platforms for content distribution and audience access (Le Quoc Minh, 2023). This phenomenon exemplifies platform dependency, whereby news organizations continue to produce content yet progressively lose control over distribution, user data, and advertising revenue streams (Tran Bao Chau and Tran Quang Dieu, 2025, pp. 296–315).

The erosion of the cross-subsidization mechanism is clearly reflected in the prolonged decline of Vietnam’s journalism economy in recent years. According to data released in 2024, platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, and TikTok accounted for approximately 80% of the online advertising market share (Phuong Anh, 2024). In this context, domestic journalism revenues from advertising have continued to fall sharply. This industry-wide downturn shows no signs of abating, with total revenues declining by 6.1% in 2024 and a further 3.7% in 2025 (Phuong Anh, 2024; Giang Giang, 2026).

Platform pressures extend beyond competition for advertising revenues, fundamentally altering the mechanisms of content distribution in journalism. In the digital environment, many news organizations are compelled to publish content on intermediary platforms to expand reach and attract traffic. However, as audience traffic increasingly depends on automated display and ranking mechanisms of social media and search engines, newsrooms gradually lose direct control over their relationship with the public (Le Quoc Minh, 2023). In this sense, digital platforms function not merely as distribution intermediaries but as forms of algorithmic intermediation, where visibility, circulation, or suppression of content is determined by automated criteria beyond newsroom control. Changes in distribution algorithms can reduce traffic and directly affect digital advertising revenues (Le Quoc Minh, 2023). Within this environment, newsrooms are easily drawn into a competition for clicks and virality, thereby increasing the risk of adjusting content according to traffic-driven logic in order to adapt to platform distribution mechanisms (Le Quoc Minh, 2023; Do Anh Duc and Pham Thi Van Anh, 2024).

Platform pressures are also evident in the widespread problem of copyright infringement in the digital environment. According to Nguyen Minh Hai, Vietnam Television alone detected and addressed 141,712 cases of online copyright violations by November 2023. Data further indicate that of every 100 units of revenue generated from copyright fraud on YouTube, 55 originated from Vietnamese users (Nguyen Minh Hai, 2024). At the level of journalistic content, unauthorized copying, reposting, and exploitation occur in diverse forms, underscoring copyright as a critical bottleneck in preserving the economic value of journalistic products (Tran Quang Dieu, 2024, pp. 238–246). In this context, the implementation of paywall models faces significant obstacles, as audiences lack incentives to pay when similar content remains freely accessible online (Nguyen Thi Quynh Nga, 2024, pp. 196–223).

Taken together, these manifestations demonstrate that the dominance of digital platforms not only undermines traditional revenue streams but also profoundly transforms the ways in which journalism creates value, distributes content, and engages audiences. In this sense, revenue flows, distribution mechanisms, and data control are simultaneously shifting away from news organizations and converging within the platform ecosystem – an emblematic expression of the market restructuring process driven by digital platforms in Vietnam’s journalism economy today.

3.2. The Current Regulatory Framework and Pressures of Financial Autonomy

From the perspective of media economics, state regulation in the communication sector is not only intended to shape market structures but also to pursue non-economic objectives such as opinion diversity, public interest,

and social responsibility. However, when regulatory frameworks fail to keep pace with the dynamics of the digital market, existing policy constraints and legal provisions may narrow the adaptive space of journalistic organizations, thereby affecting both innovation incentives and the economic performance of newsrooms.

In Vietnam, a critical bottleneck lies in the dual legal status of news organizations. Specifically, newsrooms are required to gradually achieve financial autonomy to sustain operations amid declining advertising revenues, yet they continue to function primarily as public service units with revenue-generating activities, without being fully recognized as independent business entities (Bui Chi Trung, 2025). This ambiguity between the mandate to “engage in journalism economics” and the mechanism of “financial autonomy” forces newsrooms to simultaneously seek revenue streams to maintain operations while fulfilling political and social missions under conditions of limited investment resources (Nguyen Van Dung, 2024; Bui Chi Trung, 2025). Meanwhile, budgetary support and state contracting mechanisms for journalism remain insufficiently aligned with the requirements of digital transformation and market adaptation. Some studies indicate that investment expenditures for journalism development are currently very low, while contracting and support mechanisms for public-interest communication activities have not been implemented in a systematic manner (Dong Manh Hung and Tran Xuan Than, 2024, pp. 316–331). As a result, many news organizations are compelled to manage finances independently but lack the organizational conditions and resources necessary to restructure more effectively. In addition, policy instruments – such as taxation – often exhibit significant delays, further intensifying pressures on the internal resources of newsrooms (Dong Manh Hung and Tran Xuan Than, 2024, pp. 316–331; Nguyen Van Dung, 2024). Within this context, reinvestment capacity for technology, infrastructure, and innovation in operational models continues to shrink, leaving newsrooms struggling to diversify revenue streams with flexibility.

Nevertheless, these structural bottlenecks have begun to be recognized and addressed by the state through the gradual refinement of the legal framework. A significant development is the National Assembly’s adoption of the amended Press Law No. 126/2025/QH15, effective from July 1, 2026, which supplements and clarifies mechanisms for task assignment, contracting, tendering, and cost support for journalistic activities serving political missions and policy communication (NA., 2025a). At the same time, the law expands and specifies legitimate revenue categories for news organizations, including revenues from reading, listening to, and viewing journalistic works; from exploiting and using journalistic works; from partnerships; from public service activities contracted by the state; and from other lawful activities (NA.,

2025a). In parallel, the amended Corporate Income Tax Law No. 67/2025/QH15 introduces a preferential tax rate of 10% on the income of news organizations (NA., 2025). These initial adjustments indicate that the current regulatory framework is gradually adapting to new realities, thereby providing a stronger legal basis for news organizations to alleviate short-term survival pressures and pursue strategies of revenue diversification in the coming period.

3.3. Dual Impacts and the Sustainable Paradox

From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that the market restructuring driven by digital platforms and the current regulatory framework do not operate in isolation but overlap in the process of reshaping the Vietnamese journalism economy. While digital platforms erode traditional revenue streams and diminish newsroom control over content distribution and user data, the regulatory framework simultaneously constrains the adaptive capacity of journalistic organizations in transforming operational models and expanding revenue sources. The overlap of these two forces contributes to what Tran Bao Chau and Tran Quang Dieu conceptualize as a form of the “sustainable paradox” of Vietnamese journalism (Tran Bao Chau and Tran Quang Dieu, 2025, pp. 296–315).

This paradox is most clearly manifested in the gap between managerial expectations and actual resource conditions. On the one hand, journalism faces mounting pressure from declining revenues as advertising flows migrate toward digital platforms (Le Quoc Minh, 2023; Phuong Anh, 2024; Giang Giang, 2026). On the other hand, news organizations remain subject to the “dual objective” of fulfilling political–social missions while progressing toward financial autonomy. Yet, as some scholars observe, in practice fewer than 3% of news organizations are able to simultaneously meet the dual requirements of effective political communication and financial independence (Nguyen Van Dung, 2024). Another indicator highlights the severe limitations of external support: investment expenditures for journalism development currently account for less than 0.3% of total state budget investment (Dong Manh Hung and Tran Xuan Than, 2024, pp. 316–331). Under such conditions, news organizations struggle to establish a balanced and stable revenue structure capable of sustaining core operations while supporting long-term transformation.

Ultimately, the “sustainable paradox” of Vietnamese journalism lies in the requirement that news organizations ensure economic sustainability, while prevailing market, organizational, and regulatory conditions do not yet allow them to operate as fully fledged market actors (Nguyen Van Dung, 2024; Bui Chi Trung, 2025; Tran Bao Chau and Tran Quang Dieu, 2025, pp. 296–315). This paradox therefore reflects not merely a short-term financial difficulty but a structural contradiction within the current market and regulatory

mechanisms of journalism. Within this context, newsrooms are compelled to seek adaptive responses at the organizational level through resource restructuring and revenue diversification.

3.4. Organizational Adaptation: Resource Restructuring and Revenue Diversification

From the perspective of the Resource-Based View (RBV), organizational adaptability largely depends on the ability to identify and restructure distinctive assets, particularly intangible ones such as brand reputation and user data (Daidj, 2018, pp. 119–124; Eble and Hoch, 2024, p. 350). In the context where digital platforms and the current regulatory framework jointly transform the revenue structure of Vietnamese journalism, the central issue is not only the pressures faced by newsrooms but also how they respond at the organizational level. From this vantage point, revenue diversification in Vietnamese newsrooms today does not unfold as a discretionary expansion but rather as a compulsory maneuver aimed at revaluing and maximizing the remaining intangible resources.

First, the implementation of paywall models in Vietnam must be understood beyond the narrow function of content monetization. From the standpoint of media economics, since news strongly exhibits the characteristics of a public good and is subject to pronounced non-excludability in the digital environment, direct pricing and retail sales of individual news items inevitably encounter market limitations (Cunningham, Flew, and Swift, 2015, chaps. 1 and 4; Heinrich, 2024, pp. 142, 146). Moreover, in a context of weak consumer willingness to pay and widespread copyright infringement, paywalls clearly offer limited short-term financial relief (Le Xuan Manh, 2024; Nguyen Thi Quynh Nga, 2024, pp. 196–223). However, deeper analysis of digital revenue strategies suggests that paywalls should not be interpreted as mechanisms for selling individual articles but rather situated within the logic of a “membership economy,” oriented toward value exchange with a subscribed and highly engaged audience segment (Do Anh Duc and Pham Thi Van Anh, 2024; Le Xuan Manh, 2024).

Viewed through this lens and aligned with RBV, paywalls transcend their role as mere revenue tools to function as strategic filters for newsrooms. To a certain extent, news organizations are deliberately narrowing superficial traffic – often volatile and heavily dependent on platform algorithms – in order to identify and define a core audience segment. This process facilitates the accumulation of higher-quality user data. In this sense, under RBV, paywalls can be understood as a form of asset restructuring: transforming transient audiences into strategically valuable first-party data (Vu Duy Hung, 2024, pp. 332–354), thereby laying the foundation for the development of more stable value-added services in the long term.

Second, the shift toward the event economy and business-to-business (B2B) services reflects a significant restructuring of journalism's value chain and funding mechanisms. The decline of traditional advertising has prompted newsrooms to expand into off-page services such as event organization, forums, marathons, and communication partnerships (Le Xuan Manh, 2024; Tran Bao Chau and Tran Quang Dieu, 2025, pp. 296–315). From the perspective of organizational strategy, however, this is not merely a patchwork of supplementary revenues. In terms of media economics, journalism leverages its brand reputation and the attention generated by content to develop extended services, thereby creating a new form of cross-subsidization (Hagen and Schäfer-Hock, 2024, p. 667). Within this logic, journalistic and commercial activities are not separated but mutually reinforcing: the legitimacy and credibility of journalism nurture commercial services, while revenues from these services provide the conditions for sustaining core newsroom operations. At a certain level, this can be interpreted as an effort to build a symbiotic ecosystem that reduces the pressure to monetize journalistic content at all costs.

Third, the transition toward the “journalism–technology organization” model indicates a deeper organizational adjustment. In a context where control over distribution and data increasingly shifts toward digital platforms, investment in media-tech solutions and the direct collection and management of first-party data has become essential for newsrooms to better understand audience behavior, personalize products, and develop value-added services. In this sense, data is no longer merely a technical support tool but has become a strategic asset to be accumulated and exploited as a core organizational resource.

Taken together, these adaptive strategies demonstrate that news organizations are not passively reacting to structural pressures but are actively restructuring their operational models and resources. These efforts represent attempts to resolve the “sustainable paradox” outlined above, while simultaneously opening new possibilities for the development of Vietnam's journalism economy in the digital era.

IV. Conclusion: Dual Impacts and Policy Recommendations

The reshaping of Vietnam's journalism economy in the digital era is driven simultaneously by two macro-level forces: market restructuring led by digital platforms and the current regulatory framework governing journalism. Their overlap not only erodes traditional revenue streams but also produces a “sustainable paradox,” whereby news organizations must fulfill political–social missions while ensuring economic viability under conditions of limited resources and increasingly unfavorable market structures. In this context, organizational adaptation – particularly through resource restructuring and

revenue diversification – reflects the practical efforts of newsrooms to explore new operational models. Yet such efforts alone are unlikely to yield sustainable outcomes if confined to the internal maneuvering of individual organizations. The challenge is not merely to generate additional revenue but to re-establish a more balanced development structure that reconciles public-interest obligations, organizational capacity, and market conditions. On this basis, several policy recommendations are proposed:

First, at the level of state regulation, the legal framework should be further refined to facilitate the economic activities of journalism in the digital environment. This requires not only expanding legitimate revenue sources but also designing support mechanisms that recognize journalism’s dual nature as both a public-interest sector and a market actor. In particular, the development of digital journalism’s economic–technical standards should be accelerated to provide appropriate criteria for resource allocation, while contracting and support mechanisms for political–social communication should be strengthened, alongside enhanced copyright protection in the digital sphere.

Second, measures are needed to rebalance the relationship between journalism and technology platforms. As platforms increasingly dominate revenue flows, distribution mechanisms, and audience data, the issue extends beyond advertising competition to journalism’s position within the entire digital communication value chain. Policy priorities should therefore include fairer value-sharing mechanisms, stronger platform accountability for journalistic content, and guaranteed access to data and audiences for newsrooms.

Third, at the organizational level, newsrooms must continue restructuring resources around data, technology, and direct audience relationships. This entails not only diversifying revenue through extended services but also actively building new strategic assets – particularly user data, technological capabilities, and high value-added products. In the long term, journalism’s sustainability will depend on cultivating a loyal audience base, reducing reliance on platform-driven traffic, and developing complementary service ecosystems aligned with journalistic content strengths and brand credibility.

Overall, the sustainable development of Vietnam’s journalism economy in the digital era cannot rest solely on newsroom efforts but requires a coordinated approach across market dynamics, regulatory frameworks, and organizational capacities. Properly recognizing the nature of the “sustainable paradox” is therefore not only of academic significance but also a critical foundation for designing more feasible solutions for the future of Vietnamese journalism.

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OVERCOMING THE HALAL LOGISTICS BOTTLENECK: INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS TO ATTRACT ISLAMIC FDI IN VIETNAM

Abstract

Global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) faces volatility, yet Islamic efficiency-seeking capital is expanding rapidly. However, Vietnam's general-cargo infrastructure lacks strict non-cross-contamination Halal facilities, critically bottlenecking this investment influx. Grounded in New Economic Geography (NEG) and the Eclectic Paradigm (OLI), this paper conceptualizes physical Halal-certified logistics as a primary location advantage. The study evaluates Vietnam's current Halal supply chain deficit, arguing that this physical infrastructure gap exponentially inflates compliance costs and deters investment. Furthermore, institutional factors, specifically local administrative governance, are examined as essential supporting conditions. Consequently, the paper proposes macro-policy interventions focusing primarily on designating dedicated Halal Hubs at deep-water ports, supplemented by targeted institutional reforms. These combined efforts are imperative to transform passive geographic proximity into an active competitive catalyst, successfully integrating Vietnam into the global Halal supply chain.

Keywords: *Halal Logistics, Efficiency-seeking FDI, Location Advantage, Physical Infrastructure, Institutional Reforms.*

1. Introduction

FDI contracted by 2% in 2023 amid supply chain restructuring (UNCTAD, 2024). Conversely, the global Islamic economy demonstrates robust resilience, with Muslim consumer spending reaching US\$2.29 trillion in 2022 (DinarStandard, 2023). Anticipating the efficiency-seeking capital shift from Islamic Multinational Enterprises (Iqbal et al., 2025), Vietnam approved the national Halal industry development scheme until 2030 (Vietnam Government, 2023).

Despite robust agricultural capabilities, Vietnam faces a severe paradox: FDI inflows from Islamic nations remain disproportionately marginal

(Ministry of Planning and Investment [MPI], 2024). This bottleneck stems fundamentally from existing logistics infrastructure, which is predominantly designed for general cargo (Vietnam Logistics Business Association [VLA], 2024). The Halal industry dictates strict product integrity from farm to port (Zulfakar et al., 2014). Thus, the critical absence of non-cross-contamination facilities, such as segregated warehouses and dedicated cold chains, elevates compliance risks (Dinh, 2025).

Consequently, this paper approaches the Halal logistics shortage primarily as a severe physical infrastructure deficit, compounded by institutional friction. Grounded in NEG (Krugman, 1991) and the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1988), this study highlights physical infrastructure as the core determinant of location advantage. Furthermore, it incorporates Institutional Theory (North, 1990) to examine local governance as a supporting condition. Ultimately, the paper proposes macro-policy interventions to transform passive physical infrastructure into a proactive, niche location advantage to attract efficiency-seeking Islamic FDI.

2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1. The Halal Logistics Debate and Sustainable Development

Traditionally, academic discourse regarding Halal logistics has been polarized. One prevailing school of thought views strict non-cross-contamination protocols primarily through the lens of operational constraints. From this perspective, Halal compliance is often framed as an institutional friction that inflates supply chain overheads, thereby increasing transaction costs for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) (Ab Talib et al., 2015; Tieman & Ghazali, 2014).

However, an emerging and more contemporary perspective explicitly links Halal supply chain management with the broader agenda of sustainable development. Scholars argue that Halal principles transcend mere religious compliance; they act as a rigorous framework for supply chain integrity, ethical consumption, food safety, and traceability (Ali et al., 2017; Zulfakar et al., 2014). In the modern global economy, these elements correspond directly with Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) standards. Thus, upgrading infrastructure to meet Halal protocols is no longer viewed merely as a cost burden, but as a strategic catalyst for sustainable economic growth and supply chain resilience.

Despite this paradigm shift, a significant research gap persists. While extensive literature examines Halal ecosystems within mature Islamic markets (e.g., Malaysia, Indonesia) (Ngah et al., 2014), there is a profound lack of empirical research addressing how transitional economies like Vietnam can

systematically overcome physical infrastructure deficits to attract Islamic efficiency-seeking FDI. This paper addresses this specific void.

2.2. Theoretical Foundations: New Economic Geography and the Eclectic Paradigm

The Eclectic Paradigm identifies Ownership, Location and Internalization advantages as the core determinants of MNE expansion (Dunning, 1988). For Islamic MNEs, recent capital shifts are predominantly efficiency-seeking, prioritizing destinations that optimize global supply chains and minimize operational overheads (Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Iqbal et al., 2025). Within this paradigm, location advantage acts as the primary pull factor for host countries.

Crucially, NEG emphasizes that physical infrastructure directly dictates this locational competitiveness by reducing transport costs and fostering industrial agglomeration (Krugman, 1991). In the Halal industry context, conventional general-cargo infrastructure is fundamentally insufficient. Dedicated, physically segregated Halal-certified infrastructure is what generates a definitive comparative advantage in trade and investment.

Furthermore, drawing on Institutional Theory (North, 1990) as a moderating perspective, establishing such a specialized physical ecosystem requires robust local governance and policy frameworks (institutions) to mitigate administrative failures and support the infrastructure's effectiveness.

3. Methodology

3.1. Research Design

This study adopts a sequential mixed-methods approach, integrating quantitative descriptive analysis with qualitative institutional evaluation (Saunders et al., 2019). This dual approach is essential to comprehensively unpack the transmission mechanism between physical infrastructure deficits and the resulting investment barriers, aligning with the theoretical underpinnings of NEG and Institutional Theory.

3.2. Data Collection and Variables

The research relies on secondary time-series data covering the 2018–2023 period to capture post-pandemic supply chain shifts.

- **Dependent Variable:** FDI inflows. Data specifically targeting registered capital from Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) member states, with a strategic focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, into Vietnam were extracted from the MPI and UNCTAD databases.

- **Independent and Contextual Variables:** To assess locational advantage, data regarding the physical capacity of maritime logistics infrastructure (specifically at Cai Mep - Thi Vai and Lach Huyen deep-water ports) and the availability of specialized cold-chain facilities were sourced

from the VLA. Additionally, proxy indicators for local administrative efficiency were referenced using the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) framework.

3.3. Analytical Procedure

The analysis is executed in two fundamental phases. First, descriptive statistics are utilized to synthesize and tabulate the empirical data, visualizing the severe disparity between Vietnam's total registered inward FDI and the marginal proportion originating from Islamic economies. Second, a qualitative institutional analysis evaluates the specific transaction costs, third-party auditing expenses, and administrative frictions associated with the absence of localized Halal-certified hubs. This establishes a causal link between institutional bottlenecks and the deterrence of efficiency-seeking Islamic MNEs.

4. Current Status of Halal Logistics Infrastructure and Islamic FDI in Vietnam

4.1. Disparity in FDI Inflows: General Capacity vs. OIC Sourced Capital

The 57 member states of the OIC possess immense outbound investment capabilities. Between 2018 and 2023, capital outflows from the Middle East and North Africa aggressively diversified into the ASEAN region, capitalizing on regional supply chain integration (ASEAN Secretariat & UNCTAD, 2023).

Table 1
Registered FDI Inflows to Vietnam: Total vs. MENA/OIC Proxies (2018-2023) (Unit: Billion USD)*

Year	Total Registered FDI	Estimated FDI from MENA/OIC	% Share of Total FDI
2018	35.46	0.28	0.79
2019	38.02	0.31	0.81
2020	28.53	0.15	0.52
2021	31.15	0.18	0.57
2022	27.72	0.21	0.75
2023	36.61	0.25	0.68

**Source: Compiled and calculated by author based on MPI databases, 2024*
This estimation aggregates direct registered capital from major OIC/MENA economies based on MPI datasets. It serves as a proxy indicator and may not fully capture indirect Islamic FDI routed through third-party financial hubs (e.g., Singapore or Hong Kong).

However, as visualized in Table 1, Vietnam’s absorption of this capital remains critically low. MENA countries consistently account for less than 1% of Vietnam's total registered inward FDI (MPI, 2024). This disparity highlights a severe localized bottleneck. While neighboring nations like Malaysia and Indonesia successfully institutionalize Halal investment

corridors, Vietnam’s inability to capture this efficiency-seeking capital indicates fundamental flaws in its investment environment regarding religious compliance.

4.2. Capacity Evaluation of Halal-certified Maritime Infrastructure

This FDI deficit fundamentally stems from the structural incompatibility of Vietnam's logistics infrastructure. Table 2 outlines the current physical constraints at the country's main trade hubs.

Table 2
Logistics Infrastructure Capacity Matrix at Primary Deep-Water Ports (2023)*

Port Gateway	General Cargo Capacity	Dedicated Halal Terminals	Segregated Halal Cold Chain
Cai Mep - Thi Vai	~ 8.3 million TEUs	None (0)	Non-existent
Lach Huyen	~ 2.5 million TEUs	None (0)	Non-existent

**Source: Synthesized from Vietnam Logistics Report, VLA, 2024 and Port Authority Data*

Currently, maritime gateways operate exclusively on a general-cargo model (VLA, 2024). As Table 2 indicates, they lack physically segregated terminals, dedicated Halal container yards, and specialized cold chain storage. According to Halal supply chain protocols, absolute physical separation is mandatory to prevent cross-contamination (Haram) from non-compliant goods, particularly pork and alcohol derivatives (Tieman et al., 2012). The absence of a dedicated Halal port ecosystem breaches these religious integrity requirements, rendering the existing infrastructure incapable of accommodating Islamic MNEs (Ngah et al., 2014).

4.3. Qualitative Assessment of Transaction Cost Escalation

To further understand the real-world impact of the infrastructure deficit shown in Table 2, it is necessary to map the operational friction experienced by Islamic investors. Table 3 illustrates the comparative operational procedures between conventional logistics and attempted Halal logistics within Vietnam's current unsegregated environment.

Table 3
Comparative Matrix of Operational Friction: Conventional vs. Halal Logistics in General-Cargo Ports*

Logistics Stage	Conventional Logistics Procedure	Halal Logistics in Unsegregated Ports	Economic Impact on MNEs
Warehousing	Shared storage, standard inventory management	Requirement for temporary, off-site specialized storage or physical barrier installations	High direct operational cost; increased transit time

Table 3 (continued)

Logistics Stage	Conventional Logistics Procedure	Halal Logistics in Unsegregated Ports	Economic Impact on MNEs
Handling & Transfer	Standard equipment usage	Mandatory equipment cleansing if previously used for non-Halal goods.	Ritual cleansing costs; severe operational delays
Auditing & Inspection	Standard customs clearance	Rigorous third-party Halal integrity verification at multiple touchpoints	Escalated transaction costs; administrative bottlenecks

**Source: Author's compilation based on Halal standard protocols (Tiemann & Ghazali, 2014))*

Table 3 explicitly demonstrates that the lack of dedicated physical infrastructure forces MNEs to adopt compensatory, highly inefficient operational procedures. These extra steps translate directly into quantifiable financial burdens.

5. Discussion and Policy Implications

5.1. Institutional Friction and the Escalation of Compliance Costs

The empirical evidence presented in Section 4 elucidates a stark reality: Vietnam's general-cargo maritime infrastructure is fundamentally incompatible with the stringent non-cross-contamination requirements of the Halal supply chain. However, the transmission mechanism from this physical infrastructure void to the deterrence of efficiency-seeking Islamic FDI is strictly cost-driven. Grounded in Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1981) and the Eclectic Paradigm (Dunning, 1988), this section argues that the physical deficit triggers severe institutional friction (North, 1990), which exponentially inflates operational overheads for MNEs.

5.2. Spatial Agglomeration Constraints in Logistics Hubs

Beyond the direct financial burden of compliance, the structural deficit in Vietnam's maritime gateways violates the fundamental principles of New Economic Geography (Krugman, 1991). Within the NEG framework, a host country's locational advantage is not solely determined by its geographical coordinates but by its capacity to foster spatial agglomeration—the geographically bounded clustering of interconnected, specialized facilities.

For the Halal industry, supply chain integrity is strictly binary; it must be maintained entirely from origin to destination. The current fragmentation of logistics services in Vietnam forces Halal-certified goods to traverse multiple unverified touchpoints between isolated temporary warehouses and conventional general-cargo terminals. This spatial dispersion exponentially increases the statistical probability of cross-contamination (Haram).

Consequently, without state-directed spatial planning to create concentrated, physically walled-off "Halal Hubs" directly integrated into primary deep-water ports like Cai Mep - Thi Vai and Lach Huyen, the physical infrastructure fails to achieve economies of agglomeration. This lack of a cohesive spatial ecosystem renders Vietnam's strategic proximity to the global supply chain a passive, unexploited trait rather than an active competitive catalyst for Islamic investors.

5.3. Administrative Friction and Regulatory Voids

Drawing on Institutional Theory (North, 1990), physical infrastructure operates as the hardware of economic development, which cannot function effectively without the software of a supportive institutional framework. The current deficit in Vietnam's Halal supply chain is not merely a failure of physical investment but fundamentally highlights a severe institutional void (Khanna, 1997) in local administrative governance.

Currently, Vietnam lacks a synchronized national technical standard specifically regulating Halal logistics and port clearance procedures. This regulatory ambiguity creates profound "administrative friction" at the micro-level. For instance, when Halal-certified containers require physical inspection at conventional ports, customs authorities and local port operators lack standardized, non-cross-contamination protocols to execute these checks. Consequently, Islamic investors and logistics providers face unpredictable bureaucratic hurdles, arbitrary delays, and a lack of specific facilitation mechanisms.

In the logistics industry, temporal delays directly translate into escalated financial costs, particularly for temperature-sensitive Halal goods requiring cold-chain integrity. Therefore, this administrative inertia acts as a secondary barrier. It demonstrates that without reforming the institutional environment to actively support niche religious compliance, the sheer expansion of port capacity is insufficient to attract efficiency-seeking MNEs from the Islamic bloc.

5.4. International Experience: Spatial and Institutional Agglomeration in Malaysia

To provide a comparative perspective, this study examines Malaysia's state-driven Halal logistics model. Malaysia successfully operationalized the concept of spatial agglomeration by establishing dedicated Halal parks under the management of the Halal Industry Development Corporation. These parks are physically demarcated zones integrated with major maritime gateways, notably Port Klang. By concentrating Halal-certified warehouses, cold chains, and transport fleets within one geographic area, the Malaysian model effectively eliminates cross-contamination risks and achieves economies of agglomeration (Ab Talib & Hamid, 2014).

Furthermore, from an institutional perspective, the Malaysian government actively minimizes administrative friction. They provide integrated customs clearance protocols and targeted financial instruments, such as pioneer status tax incentives, specifically for Halal logistics operators. This synergy of localized physical infrastructure and centralized institutional support successfully internalizes compliance costs. Consequently, Malaysia has transformed its logistics sector into the primary destination for Islamic efficiency-seeking foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia. This international model provides a highly viable blueprint for Vietnam to overcome its current logistical and administrative bottlenecks.

5.5. Macro-Policy Recommendations

To systematically dismantle the Halal logistics bottleneck and capture efficiency-seeking Islamic foreign direct investment, state intervention in Vietnam must transcend passive facilitation. The empirical evidence and theoretical analysis strongly indicate that overcoming this barrier requires a proactive, dual-pronged strategy focusing simultaneously on spatial infrastructure development and institutional governance reforms.

The primary dimension of this policy intervention involves strategic spatial zoning combined with Public-Private Partnerships. Addressing the physical infrastructure deficit requires the Ministry of Transport, in direct coordination with regional authorities such as Ba Ria - Vung Tau and Hai Phong, to enact immediate spatial planning directives. This initiative must mandate the demarcation of exclusive, walled-off zones within the Cai Mep - Thi Vai and Lach Huyen port ecosystems to serve strictly as dedicated Halal Hubs. By structurally eliminating cross-contamination risks, these hubs will foster the necessary spatial agglomeration. However, establishing physically segregated cold chains and retrofitting terminals demands massive initial capital expenditure, a burden the private sector cannot independently shoulder. Therefore, the State must actively deploy targeted financial instruments. Developing a robust PPP framework that offers extended tax holidays, substantial land lease subsidies, and preferential credit lines specifically for logistics enterprises investing in Halal-certified infrastructure is essential to stimulate rapid private sector participation.

Parallel to physical infrastructure development, institutional reforms are critically required to mitigate administrative friction. While dedicated ports establish the baseline physical capacity, efficient governance constitutes the crucial supporting condition. Strategically, the central government should formally integrate Halal-support readiness indicators into the PCI framework (VCCI, 2024). Applying this top-down institutional pressure will compel local authorities to proactively streamline their bureaucratic procedures. Ideally, this reform should culminate in the establishment of a decentralized one-stop-

shop administrative mechanism at major port cities, designed specifically to guide Islamic investors and logistics providers through customs clearance and Halal certification seamlessly. Ultimately, it is this precise synergy between state-backed physical infrastructure upgrades and progressive local governance reforms that will effectively transform Vietnam's passive geographic proximity into an active, competitive location advantage.

5.6. Halal Infrastructure as a Catalyst for Sustainable Development

While the immediate objective of upgrading Halal logistics is to capture efficiency-seeking FDI, the long-term macroeconomic impact aligns fundamentally with broader sustainable development goals. The rigorous traceability, ethical handling, and absolute hygiene protocols mandated by Halal standards seamlessly converge with Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) criteria. Specifically, investing in dedicated, physically segregated cold chains directly mitigates food loss and waste within the global supply chain. Furthermore, the institutional push for transparent third-party auditing and standardized non-cross-contamination procedures forces the domestic logistics sector to adopt more accountable and robust operational models. Therefore, establishing Halal-certified maritime hubs transcends niche religious accommodation; it serves as a structural catalyst that drives Vietnam's logistics infrastructure toward greater resilience, transparency, and sustainable economic growth.

6. Conclusion

The strategic development of Halal-certified logistics transcends basic transport upgrades; it constitutes a critical intervention to capture the efficiency-seeking FDI shift from Islamic economies. This paper demonstrates that Vietnam's current general-cargo-centric infrastructure exponentially inflates compliance costs, creating an absolute physical barrier to Islamic MNEs. Overcoming this bottleneck necessitates proactive State intervention focused primarily on physical infrastructure. By implementing strategic spatial planning for dedicated Halal Hubs at primary deep-water ports, and supplementing this with local administrative reforms, the government can structurally eliminate cross-contamination risks.

Ultimately, solving this logistics equation delivers a dual dividend. It not only unlocks a lucrative FDI corridor from Islamic economies but also structurally elevates Vietnam's supply chain to meet global sustainability benchmarks, securing long-term economic resilience.

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HALAL ECONOMY IN ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR VIETNAM

Abstract

The Halal economy has emerged as a significant component of global trade, driven by the growing Muslim population and increasing demand for Halal products and services. This study explores the potential of the Halal economy as an instrument of economic diplomacy, focusing on the experiences of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Using document analysis and case study methodology, the research identifies three key mechanisms for leveraging the Halal economy: standard-setting, regulatory compliance, and value chain integration. Malaysia demonstrates the importance of institutionalizing Halal standards and using them as tools for economic diplomacy, while Indonesia highlights the role of domestic market power and legal frameworks in driving supply chain upgrading. The UAE exemplifies the strategic use of logistics and finance to control trade and financial flows across regions. For Vietnam, the study identifies a significant gap between its agricultural production capacity and limited participation in the global Halal value chain. It proposes a hybrid strategy for Vietnam, emphasizing compliance diplomacy, institutional capacity-building, and leveraging geoeconomic advantages to evolve into a regional connector. By integrating infrastructure, standards, and diplomacy, Vietnam can enhance its trade competitiveness and establish itself as a credible player in the global Halal economy.

Keywords: *Halal economy; Economic diplomacy; Global value chains; Halal certification; Vietnam.*

1. Research Context and Rationale

In the context of global value chain restructuring following trade disruptions and the COVID-19 pandemic, the Halal economy has transcended its role as a purely religious consumer market to become a strategic pillar in the economic diplomacy of many nations. According to the *State of the Global Islamic Economy 2023/24* report by DinarStandard (2023), total Muslim spending on Halal products and services reached approximately USD 2.29

trillion in 2022 and is projected to rise to USD 3.1 trillion by 2027. The primary driver of this growth lies in the global Muslim population, estimated at around 1.9 billion people—nearly 24% of the world’s population—and identified as the fastest-growing religious community (Pew Research Center, 2017). Engagement with the Halal ecosystem not only enables countries to diversify export markets and reduce dependence on traditional partners but also serves as a crucial instrument of economic diplomacy, expanding trade influence and strengthening connections with Islamic economies.

For Vietnam, despite being recognized as a country with significant advantages in agricultural production and annual export revenues exceeding USD 50 billion (World Bank, 2023), the actual implementation of the Halal economy reveals a considerable strategic gap. Estimates from the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) and sectoral reports (2024–2025) indicate that the proportion of Vietnamese enterprises holding Halal certification remains very small compared to the total number of active businesses. The disparity between the trillion-dollar market potential and the limited domestic participation raises a critical research question: how can Vietnam effectively leverage economic diplomacy tools to overcome standard-related barriers and achieve deeper integration into the global Halal value chain? This study aims to clarify the tension between existing production capacity and the lack of compatible standards, thereby identifying policy and implementation bottlenecks.

To address this issue, the research focuses on three main dimensions: (i) systematizing the theoretical foundations of the Halal economy in relation to economic diplomacy; (ii) analyzing the experiences of representative countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and the UAE; and (iii) assessing Vietnam’s current situation to propose policy recommendations. The findings contribute to a deeper understanding of how the Halal economy can be utilized as an instrument of economic soft power in international relations, while also providing a reference framework for the implementation of Decision No. 10/QĐ-TTg of the Prime Minister on the approval of the Halal Market Development Scheme to 2030.

2. Literature Review and Research Methodology

2.1. Literature Review

In the era of deepening economic globalization, the Halal economy has emerged as a significant component of the global trade system, reflecting the convergence of cultural–religious values with the mechanisms of modern markets. Wilson and Liu (2011), in their study on Islamic Branding, argue that Halal is no longer merely a religious standard but has evolved into a global consumer value system, wherein religious belief and cultural empathy are

directly integrated into brand value structures. Nations that succeed in this domain are often those capable of branding ethical commitments, thereby establishing sustainable competitive advantages in international markets.

From an empirical perspective, DinarStandard (2023) reports that Muslim spending on Halal products and services reached approximately USD 2.29 trillion in 2022 and is projected to grow to USD 3.1 trillion by 2027, corresponding to a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of around 7%. This scale not only reflects rising consumer demand but also indicates the formation of a multi-sectoral economic ecosystem, wherein Islamic finance, tourism, pharmaceuticals, and logistics are closely interconnected and mutually reinforcing. The growth dynamic is strongly linked to the demographic characteristics of the global Muslim community. Pew Research Center (2017) notes that the Muslim population currently stands at about 1.9 billion—nearly 24% of the world’s population – and may reach 2.2 billion by 2030, thereby generating a self-reinforcing demand base that sustains stable growth in the Halal market. This observation is reinforced by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2021), which emphasizes that consumer markets grounded in stable demographic foundations tend to maintain long-term growth, confirming that the Halal economy is structural rather than cyclical.

In terms of research trajectory, early studies primarily focused on consumer behavior and the mechanisms of trust formation in the Halal market. Bonne and Verbeke (2008) demonstrate that trust and risk perception are decisive factors in Halal food consumption, highlighting the role of Halal standards as mechanisms for reducing uncertainty in markets. Mukhtar and Butt (2012) further assert that the combination of religious factors and quality perceptions creates a distinctive consumption model, wherein Halal standards function as trust-assurance mechanisms between producers and consumers. These studies laid the foundation for conceptualizing Halal as a trust-based structure that transcends purely religious boundaries.

From a supply chain perspective, Zailani et al. (2010) show that compliance with Halal standards positively impacts export performance, particularly in Muslim markets. Tieman (2011) and Tieman et al. (2012) advance the concept of “Halal integrity,” defined as the assurance that a product, service, or entire supply chain consistently adheres to Halal requirements across all stages – from raw materials, production, processing, storage, and transportation to distribution and consumption. They emphasize the necessity of comprehensive supply chain control and the critical role of logistics in maintaining Halal integrity. These studies mark a shift from behavioral approaches to value-chain perspectives, positioning Halal as a complete economic operating system.

At the institutional level, Bergeaud-Blackler, Fischer, and Lever (2016), along with Fischer (2016), argue that the development of the Halal economy is closely tied to institutionalization processes, wherein states establish certification systems and regulate markets. In the global trade context, the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2019), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2018), and UNCTAD (2022) highlight that technical standards increasingly function as critical non-tariff barriers, while the World Bank (2023) underscores the role of intermediaries such as standards and logistics in enhancing value within global value chains. This indicates that Halal standards are not merely technical instruments but also mechanisms for allocating market power.

At the ecosystem level, recent studies reveal deeper integration between Halal and other economic sectors. The Islamic Financial Services Board (2023) reports that global Islamic financial assets reached approximately USD 3 trillion, while Battour and Ismail (2016) and the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO, 2022) identify Halal tourism as one of the fastest-growing segments. These findings demonstrate that the Halal economy has evolved into a multi-sectoral ecosystem with significant spillover potential across the global economy.

Nevertheless, despite the growing richness of research on consumer behavior, supply chains, and institutions, the role of the Halal economy as an instrument of economic diplomacy remains underexplored, particularly in the context of transitional economies such as Vietnam. Bayne and Woolcock (2017) define economic diplomacy as the use of economic instruments to advance national interests in international relations. Within this framework, the Halal economy can be viewed as a strategic means of expanding trade networks and strengthening connections with Islamic economies. Implementation extends beyond trade promotion to encompass standard-setting, mutual recognition negotiations, and institutional cooperation, thereby reducing non-tariff barriers and constructing economic power based on standards.

This approach aligns with theories of non-tariff barriers, as WTO (2019) and OECD (2018) emphasize the regulatory role of technical standards in trade. In the case of Halal, certification standards function as market-filtering mechanisms, creating asymmetric power structures and giving rise to compliance diplomacy. Simultaneously, North's (1990) institutional theory underscores the role of formal institutions in reducing transaction costs and building trust, thereby positioning Halal certification systems as institutional infrastructures for international trade.

2.2. Research Methodology

This article employs the Global Value Chain (GVC) theory of Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005) as its central analytical framework. At the core of GVC theory lies the concept of governance, which reflects how lead actors establish standards, control information, and coordinate market flows. Within the Halal ecosystem, compliance with stringent standards is not merely a technical requirement but also a form of governance, wherein countries that hold certification systems (such as Malaysia or the UAE) assume the role of coordinators across the entire global supply chain.

Building upon this foundation, the study specifies the capacity of a nation to participate in and upgrade its position within the Halal ecosystem through a four-component analytical model:




Figure 1. The analytical framework is built upon the global value chain theory of Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005)

Within this framework, input capacity refers to the evaluation of production resources, demographic advantages, and, most importantly, institutional infrastructure. This constitutes the necessary condition for a nation to initiate its integration into the value chain. Chain participation involves analyzing the current position of a country (e.g., raw material supply, processing, or distribution) and the specific segments it occupies within the international Halal network. Upgrading capacity – the central focus of Gereffi’s theory – captures the ability to transition from low-value activities to higher value-added functions, such as product upgrading, process upgrading, or functional upgrading (e.g., mastering logistics technologies and controlling certification standards). Finally, economic outcomes and positioning are reflected in quantitative indicators such as export revenues, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, and, more importantly, economic

diplomacy status – the ability to exert influence and lead standard-setting within the Islamic economic community.

This model demonstrates that competitive advantage in the Halal economy derives not only from production capacity but also from the ability to control standards and engage deeply in the value chain. Countries may adopt different strategies – such as establishing standards, controlling markets, or developing logistics hubs – corresponding to distinct positions within the global value chain. This theoretical foundation provides the basis for analyzing the cases of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the UAE in the subsequent section.

The study employs secondary data analysis to collect and process information from highly reliable sources, including international reports, Halal policy documents, and relevant academic research. Key sources include the State of the Global Islamic Economy Report, reports from the World Bank and Pew Research Center, as well as policy documents from the selected countries. This method enables the construction of a foundational database on market scale, development trends, and policy approaches to the Halal economy at the global level.

In addition, the study applies a case study method to analyze the experiences of representative countries in developing the Halal economy. Using a purposive case selection approach, the criteria include: (i) significant role in the global Halal industry; (ii) comprehensiveness of national Halal development strategies; and (iii) degree of influence within the international Halal trade network. Based on these criteria, three countries are selected: Malaysia—pioneering in international Halal certification through the Halal Development Corporation; Indonesia—the world’s largest Muslim population with the Halal Product Assurance Law; and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—leveraging its global logistics hub advantage to advance Islamic economic strategies through the Dubai Islamic Economy Development Centre. Comparative analysis of these cases clarifies differences in strategies and institutional development, thereby generating policy implications relevant to Vietnam. The study does not employ primary data but focuses on secondary sources to ensure feasibility given resource and scope constraints.

3. Major Research Findings

Malaysia

From the perspective of Global Value Chain theory, Malaysia represents a paradigmatic case of leveraging institutions and standards as instruments for upgrading its position within the global Halal value chain. Unlike countries that rely primarily on production capacity or market size, Malaysia approaches Halal as an integrated economic structure in which standards, logistics, and

finance are interconnected into a cohesive ecosystem. This process can be analyzed through four dimensions: input capacity, chain participation, upgrading, and economic outcomes.

At the level of input capacity, Malaysia's core advantage lies not in domestic market scale or production strength, but in its ability to institutionalize Halal as a national governance system with international reach. The establishment of a certification system in the 1990s and the creation of the Halal Development Corporation (HDC) in 2006 illustrate Malaysia's transformation of Halal from a religious requirement into a public policy instrument. The Halal Industry Master Plan (HIMP) 2008–2020 explicitly aimed to position Malaysia as a Global Halal Hub, with targets including the expansion of Halal exports, development of value-added sectors (pharmaceuticals, logistics, finance), and construction of an integrated Halal ecosystem. By 2023, JAKIM's certification system had accredited more than 9,000 enterprises and over 200,000 products, recognized in more than 40 countries and territories.

The significance of these figures lies less in their absolute scale than in Malaysia's success in establishing a reference standard in Halal trade. Once widely recognized, a certification standard functions as a form of soft infrastructure, reducing transaction costs and facilitating international market access. This provides the foundation for Malaysia's participation in higher value-added segments of the chain. Nonetheless, Malaysia's input-level limitations include a relatively small domestic market of approximately 33 million people, which constrains reliance on internal demand and necessitates dependence on exports. Moreover, several sectors remain reliant on imported raw materials, reducing supply chain autonomy.

Building on this foundation, Malaysia engages in chain participation through a strategy of "standard diplomacy," whereby Halal certification is deployed as a tool to expand international economic relations. Specifically, Malaysia has established multiple mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) with foreign governments and certification bodies. These mechanisms enable JAKIM's Halal certification to be accepted in importing markets without revalidation. Economically, this reduces compliance costs, shortens market entry timelines, and enhances competitiveness for Malaysian firms. In parallel, Malaysia has developed more than 20 Halal industrial parks (Halal Parks) with multi-billion-dollar investments, serving as intermediary nodes in the value chain by integrating production, logistics, inspection, and export functions. Its major export destinations include the Middle East, ASEAN, China, and the EU, reflecting Malaysia's broad integration into the global Halal trade network.

From the perspective of economic diplomacy, this strategy allows Malaysia not only to export products but also to export standards, thereby amplifying its influence within the Halal ecosystem. However, the limitation of this approach lies in the fragmentation of the global Halal system, as other countries (e.g., Indonesia, GCC members) have developed their own certification regimes, reducing Malaysia's ability to act as the sole rule-setter.

On the basis of chain participation through "standard diplomacy," Malaysia has gradually shifted its position from a production-oriented participant to an actor capable of coordinating intermediary segments within the global Halal value chain. This upgrading process has not primarily occurred through expanding production scale, but rather through controlling decisive elements of value flows – particularly standards, finance, and national branding.

A clear manifestation of this trajectory is Malaysia's proactive integration of Halal with Islamic finance, thereby creating a supportive foundation for the entire ecosystem. According to the Islamic Financial Services Board (2023), Malaysia accounts for approximately 30% of global Islamic financial assets, demonstrating that the country not only participates in production but also controls a significant portion of capital flows. The linkage between Halal production and Shariah-compliant finance enables enterprises to access appropriate funding while enhancing their capacity to expand into international markets. In parallel, the development of the "Halal Malaysia" brand as a quality assurance marker has strengthened consumer and partner trust, thereby increasing intangible value within the supply chain.

Nevertheless, this upgrading process has not been uniform across sectors. While Malaysia has achieved leadership in Halal food and Islamic finance, other areas highlighted in the Halal Industry Master Plan (HIMP) – such as specialized Halal logistics and pharmaceuticals – have not reached commensurate levels of development. This reflects a structural limitation: controlling all high-value segments of the chain is difficult, particularly amid intensifying competition from other nations. The rise of the UAE in logistics and Indonesia in domestic standard-setting illustrates the pressures Malaysia faces in maintaining comprehensive dominance, rather than sharing intermediary roles within the chain.

In terms of economic outcomes, the Halal Development Corporation reports that Malaysia's Halal exports reached approximately RM 59.46 billion (over USD 13 billion) in 2022, accounting for around 7–8% of total national exports. Malaysia has also consistently ranked among the top performers in the Global Islamic Economy Indicator for several years, underscoring the competitiveness of its Halal ecosystem at the global scale. However, when measured against the strategic ambition of the HIMP to establish Malaysia as

a “Global Halal Hub” with full value-chain leadership, these results suggest that only partial expectations have been realized.

Overall, Malaysia has succeeded in enhancing its participation and upgrading capacity within the Halal value chain, yet has not fully transformed its institutional advantages into global rule-setting power. The fragmentation of Halal certification systems, coupled with increasing competition from other nations in intermediary segments, has diluted Malaysia’s ability to centralize authority. This indicates that in the global Halal value chain, competitive advantage is not monopolized but tends to be distributed among multiple countries occupying diverse roles.

Indonesia

Indonesia represents a model of Halal economic development based on domestic market scale and legal instruments, where the state’s role lies not in establishing global standards but in shaping the behavior of international actors through domestic consumer demand. From the perspective of the global value chain, this constitutes a distinctive entry point: integration into the chain is driven not by production or standards, but by market power.

At the level of input capacity, Indonesia’s strategy is grounded in demographic structure and exceptional consumption scale. With approximately 231 million Muslims, accounting for nearly 87% of the population (Pew Research Center, 2017), Indonesia is the largest Halal consumer market worldwide. According to DinarStandard (2023), Indonesia’s total Halal expenditure reached about USD 218 billion in 2022, of which food alone accounted for USD 135 billion—nearly 12–13% of global Halal spending. The significance of these figures lies not only in their absolute scale but in their ability to generate a market pull strong enough to compel international producers and exporters to adjust practices to meet Indonesia’s Halal requirements. In this context, Halal standards cease to be voluntary and become mandatory conditions for market entry.

Building on this consumer demand, Indonesia has undertaken a critical shift from socially oriented governance to legally institutionalized governance through the Halal Product Assurance Law (Law No. 33/2014). The establishment of the BPJPH centralized certification and oversight functions, replacing the previously fragmented system. By 2023, Indonesia had certified more than 1.2 million products and around 800,000 enterprises, most of which were small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The value of this system lies not only in its scale but in its creation of a mandatory legal framework, whereby all goods circulating in the market – including imports – must comply with national Halal standards.

This legal mechanism has generated a distinctive form of chain participation, closely tied to international economic relations. Indonesia is one

of the largest food importers in ASEAN, with annual imports of food and agricultural products amounting to tens of billions of USD (UNCTAD, 2022). Its major trade partners include Brazil (beef, poultry), Australia (grains, meat), India (spices), and ASEAN countries, reflecting significant reliance on external supply. Rather than allowing the market to operate freely, Indonesia deploys Halal law as a trade regulatory instrument, compelling exporters from these countries to adjust production processes, supply chains, and certification systems to align with BPJPH standards. This creates a form of compliance diplomacy, in which domestic standards become prerequisites for sustaining trade relations.

However, this strategy also reveals limitations in extending influence externally. Unlike Malaysia, which promotes mutual recognition agreements, Indonesia primarily applies standards domestically, with limited internationalization. As a result, Indonesia's Halal standards exert strong influence within its domestic market but have not yet become global reference points. Moreover, mandatory Halal requirements increase compliance costs for foreign enterprises and occasionally generate potential trade disputes within the WTO framework.

In terms of upgrading, Indonesia's position in the Halal value chain has advanced mainly through standardization and formalization of the domestic market, rather than through control of intermediary segments such as international standards or finance. Incorporating hundreds of thousands of SMEs into mandatory certification has enhanced production standardization, particularly in a sector that contributes more than 60% of Indonesia's GDP. At the same time, Indonesia has gradually promoted Halal exports, with total food and related product exports estimated at USD 40–50 billion annually, targeting ASEAN, the Middle East, and South Asia. Yet most of this export value remains concentrated in low value-added segments, while the ability to control intermediary functions in the global chain remains limited.

These characteristics are reflected in Indonesia's overall economic outcomes. Indonesia is currently the world's largest Halal consumer market and ranks among the leading Halal economies according to the Global Islamic Economy Indicator. However, in terms of global value chain governance, Indonesia's position remains disproportionate to its market scale. It can be estimated that the country has achieved around 50–60% of its strategic potential: successfully establishing a standardized national Halal market, but not yet transforming this advantage into international coordination power. The primary constraints lie in three factors: a development strategy oriented toward domestic priorities; limited internationalization of standards; and weak integration among Halal ecosystem components, particularly finance and logistics.

UAE

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) exemplifies a model of Halal economic development based on controlling cross-regional trade and financial flows, where competitive advantage derives not from production or consumption scale but from positioning the nation as a hub of transshipment and connectivity. From the perspective of the global value chain, this represents a distinctive form of upgrading, in which value is created through control of strategic chokepoints in supply chains.

The foundation of this strategy lies in input capacity, combining geoeconomic location with large-scale infrastructure investment. Situated along transport routes linking Asia, Europe, and Africa, the UAE occupies a position through which approximately 60–70% of global trade flows pass via nearby maritime corridors (UNCTAD, 2022). Yet geographic advantage becomes economic leverage only when transformed into logistics capacity. Over the past two decades, the UAE has invested heavily in ports and logistics centers, with Jebel Ali Port reaching a capacity of over 19 million TEU annually, ranking among the world's largest container ports. In parallel, Dubai International Airport and Al Maktoum International Airport form a multimodal transport network capable of handling goods at high speed. According to the World Bank (2023), the UAE ranks among the highest performers in the Middle East on the Logistics Performance Index (LPI), surpassing many developing economies.

The significance of this capacity lies not only in infrastructure scale but in the UAE's ability to establish a position within the global value chain as a mandatory intermediary node for diverse goods flows, including Halal products. Estimates from the Dubai Chamber suggest that 70–80% of imports into the UAE are re-exported to other markets, particularly the GCC, East Africa, and South Asia. In Halal food, the UAE functions as a critical transshipment hub for goods from Brazil, India, Pakistan, and Southeast Asia before distribution to Islamic markets. This demonstrates that the UAE not only participates in the chain but also controls a substantial portion of distribution flows.

On this basis, the UAE pursues a chain participation strategy of “connective diplomacy,” leveraging logistics infrastructure and open trade policies to establish economic relations across multiple regions simultaneously. The UAE is a major trading partner of GCC states while maintaining extensive ties with India, China, and ASEAN. Bilateral trade between the UAE and India alone exceeds USD 80 billion annually, while the UAE is also a leading investor in infrastructure and logistics across Africa. In this context, the UAE's role extends beyond transshipment to connecting fragmented Halal markets into an integrated network.

The upgrading trajectory of the UAE extends beyond logistics into finance, enabling control of capital flows accompanying goods flows. The Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) has become one of the region's leading financial hubs, hosting more than 4,000 registered institutions with assets under management amounting to hundreds of billions of USD. In Islamic finance, the UAE, together with Saudi Arabia, accounts for a significant share of global assets, estimated at over USD 700 billion within the GCC (IFSB, 2023). The integration of logistics and finance allows the UAE not only to control goods flows but also to participate in trade financing, insurance, and investment, thereby expanding influence into higher value-added segments of the chain.

Nonetheless, this model reveals structural limitations. First, the UAE lacks large-scale Halal production capacity, relying heavily on imports from other countries. Its role is therefore more intermediary than comprehensive control of the chain. Second, the transshipment model depends on the stability of global trade, making it vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions and supply chain shocks. Third, competition from emerging logistics hubs in the region, such as Saudi Arabia under Vision 2030, poses significant pressure on the UAE's position.

These dynamics are reflected in economic outcomes. The UAE is one of the largest logistics and trade centers in the Islamic world, with total merchandise trade exceeding USD 500–600 billion annually, of which re-exports account for a substantial share. Yet by the criterion of controlling the global Halal value chain, the UAE is not a standard-setter or production leader but a highly influential intermediary hub. It can be estimated that the UAE has achieved around 65–75% of its strategic objectives: successfully controlling trade and financial flows, but not fully transforming this advantage into rule-setting authority or production dominance.

4. Discussions

Malaysia's experience demonstrates how Halal standards can be transformed from religious requirements into institutional instruments for global value chain governance. JAKIM's certification system – covering over 200,000 products and recognized in more than 40 countries (JAKIM, 2023) – illustrates functional upgrading in GVC theory (Gereffi et al., 2005), whereby control over certification and standards substitutes for mere production. In an era where non-tariff barriers dominate trade (WTO, 2019), Halal standards operate as a form of economic soft power.

For Vietnam, this lesson is highly relevant. As a major food and agricultural exporter with annual revenues exceeding USD 50 billion (World Bank, 2023), Vietnam can enhance value not by expanding production, but by

institutionalizing Halal certification. Participation in new-generation FTAs further facilitates international recognition. Yet challenges remain: Vietnam lacks the religious legitimacy underpinning Malaysia's system, and institutional coordination across sectors is limited. Without a central authority, certification risks fragmentation and weak global acceptance.

Malaysia also illustrates how Halal standards can function as tools of economic diplomacy. Through mutual recognition agreements (MRAs), Malaysian firms reduce compliance costs and accelerate market access. For Vietnam – an economy with high trade openness (exports and imports exceeding twice GDP) – leveraging bilateral and multilateral channels to secure Halal MRAs could significantly lower entry barriers into ASEAN and Middle Eastern markets. However, Vietnam's current position as a standard taker rather than a standard setter limits its ability to shape rules, raising the risk of symbolic rather than substantive participation.

Finally, Malaysia's integrated Halal ecosystem – linking production, logistics, Islamic finance, and tourism under the HIMP 2008–2020 – shows the importance of cross-sectoral synergy. With 30% of global Islamic financial assets located in Malaysia (IFSB, 2023), the country demonstrates how Halal can evolve into a multi-sectoral economic system. For Vietnam, this suggests opportunities to align Halal development with strengths in logistics, tourism, and agro-food exports. A domestic Halal ecosystem could serve both export preparation and local consumption, particularly in tourism. Yet strategic focus is essential: without prioritization, resources risk dilution, and Vietnam's limited domestic Muslim market necessitates outward-oriented strategies tied to tourism and international trade.

Indonesia illustrates a distinctive pathway in the Halal value chain, where domestic demand functions not only as consumption but as a mechanism of governance. For Vietnam, this highlights the strategic role of market demand in economic diplomacy, beyond production or standards.

First, Indonesia's legal standardization of its Halal market – anchored in the Halal Product Assurance Law – shows how consumer demand can drive supply chain upgrading. With Halal expenditure reaching USD 218 billion (DinarStandard, 2023), the sheer scale compels compliance from both domestic firms and international exporters. For Vietnam, while lacking a comparable Muslim population, a functional Halal market could be cultivated through tourism and urban consumption. Millions of international visitors, including rising numbers from Islamic countries, provide a potential domestic demand base. Yet without centralized policy coordination, such demand risks fragmentation and limited spillover effects.

Second, Indonesia demonstrates compliance diplomacy: using market power to force external producers to adapt to domestic standards. For

Vietnam, the lesson lies not in replicating Indonesia's market leverage, but in proactively aligning with the Halal regulations of major partners – particularly Indonesia within ASEAN. Strategic harmonization could reduce compliance costs and accelerate market entry. However, passive compliance risks locking Vietnam into low-value segments unless paired with efforts to shape standards over time.

Third, Indonesia's legal institutionalization of Halal certification – covering over 800,000 enterprises – shows how standards can formalize and upgrade SMEs, enhancing transparency and production quality. For Vietnam, where SMEs account for over 90% of enterprises, embedding Halal certification into quality management could strengthen competitiveness. The challenge, however, lies in enforcement capacity: without effective monitoring and support, mandatory standards may impose burdens rather than benefits.

Ultimately, Indonesia's case suggests that upgrading in the Halal value chain can be demand-driven, combining market scale with institutionalization. For Vietnam, a hybrid strategy is required: selective development of domestic Halal demand (via tourism), proactive compliance with major markets, and gradual institutional capacity-building. Absent these three pillars, Vietnam risks remaining a peripheral player in the global Halal economy.

In its turn, the UAE demonstrates how power in the Halal value chain can derive not from production or standards, but from controlling trade and financial flows across regions. This represents a form of structural upgrading, shifting from value creation to value coordination through logistics and finance – particularly relevant in geographically fragmented Halal supply chains.

First, the UAE highlights logistics as a governance tool. With Jebel Ali Port handling over 19 million TEU annually and re-exports accounting for 70–80% of imports (Dubai Chamber), the UAE has positioned itself as a mandatory transshipment hub. Control of such chokepoints enables influence over costs, timing, and distribution structures. For Vietnam, rising trade volumes (over USD 700 billion annually) and deep-water ports such as Cái Mép–Thị Vải provide a foundation for similar regional roles. Integrating Halal standards into logistics could allow Vietnam to function as a connector within ASEAN. Yet current limitations in high-value logistics services, cold-chain management, and Halal integrity constrain the transformation of geographic advantage into strategic power.

Second, the UAE shows the value of combining logistics with finance. Through the DIFC and a GCC Islamic finance sector exceeding USD 700 billion (IFSB, 2023), the UAE simultaneously controls goods and capital flows, extending influence into trade finance, insurance, and investment. For

Vietnam, this lesson is strategic but challenging: while logistics can be upgraded through infrastructure investment, Islamic finance requires complex legal and institutional frameworks. Without such integration, Vietnam risks remaining confined to low-value physical transshipment.

Third, the UAE demonstrates connective diplomacy: using its hub position to link diverse producers (India, China, ASEAN) with consumers (GCC, Africa). For Vietnam, this suggests a pathway of regional economic diplomacy – leveraging ASEAN location and maritime routes to act as a bridge to Middle Eastern markets. Achieving this, however, requires a unified policy framework integrating logistics, trade, and Halal standards. Absent such coordination, geographic advantages may remain underutilized.

Ultimately, the UAE's model cannot be replicated wholesale – its geostrategic location and institutional depth are unique. Yet the core lesson is clear: in the Halal value chain, power can be generated by controlling flows and connections. For Vietnam, the strategic priority is to gradually build Halal-compliant logistics capacity, align it with international standards, and embed it within a proactive diplomatic strategy. Only by combining infrastructure, standards, and diplomacy can Vietnam move from a production role toward a higher-value intermediary position in the global Halal economy.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

This study underscores that the Halal economy has evolved beyond a religiously defined sector into a structural component of global trade, increasingly deployed as an instrument of economic diplomacy. The comparative analysis of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the UAE reveals three complementary mechanisms for upgrading positions in the Halal value chain: standard control, market power, and flow coordination (trade and finance). For Vietnam, the strategic vision lies not in replicating any single model but in hybrid adaptation:

- Short term: Focus on compliance diplomacy by aligning production with Halal standards of key partners (Indonesia, Malaysia, Middle East). This reduces technical barriers and supports exporters through mutual recognition agreements and market intelligence.

- Medium term: Build institutional capacity with a national Halal certification system and inter-agency coordination. The aim is not to dominate standards but to establish credibility for integration into international recognition networks.

- Long term: Leverage Vietnam's geoeconomic position and logistics infrastructure to evolve into a regional connector. By integrating Halal standards into logistics and trade diplomacy, Vietnam can move into

higher value-added intermediary roles, linking ASEAN with Middle Eastern markets.

The critical insight is that Vietnam's success will depend less on production scale than on its ability to combine infrastructure, standards, and diplomacy into a coherent strategy. Without this triad, Halal participation risks remaining at the level of export expansion rather than genuine upgrading in the global value chain. With it, Vietnam can reposition itself as a credible and influential player in the Halal economy, enhancing both trade competitiveness and diplomatic leverage.

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STATE GOVERNANCE AND THE SPORTS ECONOMY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN HANOI, VIETNAM

Abstract

The sports economy in Hanoi, Vietnam, has undergone significant transformation between 2021 and 2024, evolving from a traditional subsidy-based model to a market-oriented approach. This study examines the state management of Hanoi's sports economy, highlighting its dual role as a socio-cultural asset and a strategic driver of urban development. Drawing on international practices, the research underscores the potential of sports as a high value-added service industry, contributing to job creation, tourism, media, and cultural industries, while enhancing national prestige. Despite notable achievements, including a steady increase in medal counts and a surge in event-driven tourism, Hanoi's sports economy faces structural challenges. These include an incomplete legal framework, insufficient public-private partnership mechanisms, slow digital transformation, and underutilization of post-event infrastructure. The study employs a mixed-methods approach, integrating policy analysis, descriptive statistics, content analysis, and case studies to assess the effectiveness of governance mechanisms and identify bottlenecks. Findings reveal the need for tailored policies, such as preferential tax and capital incentives for sports enterprises, alongside the development of a professional sports industry model emphasizing event organization, sponsorship, and commercialization of athlete branding. The research advocates for a transition to an "Enabling State" that fosters private investment, accelerates digital transformation, and integrates sports with tourism and culture to create sustainable urban products. By addressing these challenges, Hanoi can establish a comprehensive sports ecosystem, positioning its sports economy as a strategic pillar of growth and a globally recognized economic sector. The study concludes with recommendations for future research, including comparative analyses with ASEAN cities and exploration of Industry 4.0 technologies to innovate business models for urban sports development.

Keywords: *Sports economy; state management; public-private partnerships; urban development; digital transformation.*

1. Introduction

From the perspective of a specialist in sports economics and public management, the development of the sports economy in Hanoi between 2021 and 2024 exemplifies both the opportunities and challenges faced by emerging urban economies in the global context. In the era of international economic integration and constant institutional transformation under new geo-strategic realities, sport has transcended its traditional role as a purely recreational or cultural activity to become a high value-added service industry, contributing significantly to the sustainable development of modern cities. International experience demonstrates that in advanced economies, the sports economy typically accounts for 2% to 4% of GDP, while simultaneously generating strong spillover effects into tourism, equipment manufacturing, media, and cultural industries. This underscores the dual role of sport as both a socio-cultural asset and a strategic economic driver.

For Hanoi, as the political, administrative, cultural, and economic center of Vietnam, the development of the sports economy is not merely a professional objective but a strategic mission within the broader modernization of the capital. The period 2021–2024 marked a decisive transformation, with Hanoi consolidating its leading position in elite sports nationwide and making substantial contributions to Vietnam’s success at the SEA Games and Asiad. Yet, the transition from a subsidy-based management model to a market-oriented sports economy has posed urgent demands on state governance capacity, particularly in optimizing social resources and balancing the pursuit of sporting achievements with the commercialization of economic value.

Despite its considerable potential and impressive record of achievements, Hanoi’s sports economy continues to face structural challenges. First, the legal framework remains incomplete, lacking specific regulations to govern sports business as a professional service industry. Second, mechanisms for mobilizing resources, especially public–private partnerships (PPP), are insufficiently robust, limiting the attraction of private and foreign direct investment into large-scale infrastructure projects. Third, digital transformation has been slow, with data management, licensing, and post-audit processes still reliant on traditional methods, resulting in fragmented coordination across administrative levels. Finally, there exists a persistent tension between sporting success and economic exploitation: while Hanoi achieved an impressive 3,369 medals in 2024, the commercialization of athlete branding, event broadcasting rights, and post-event infrastructure utilization remains underdeveloped.

To overcome these bottlenecks, policy research must focus on establishing tailored mechanisms, including preferential tax, land, and capital

policies for sports enterprises, alongside the completion of a legal framework that enables the sports economy to operate as a fully professional service industry. In parallel, the development of an industrial sports model – emphasizing event organization, broadcasting rights, sponsorship, and service provision – will be essential to creating sustainable value chains. The socialization of infrastructure investment, particularly through the involvement of major domestic conglomerates, can facilitate the construction of modern multi-functional sports complexes, thereby enhancing Hanoi’s capacity to host international events. Moreover, integrating sports with tourism and culture through marathons, golf tournaments, and adventure sports will generate distinctive urban products. Finally, accelerating digital transformation and cultivating a professional cadre of sports managers aligned with international standards will be critical to sustaining long-term growth.

The strategic vision for 2026–2030 is to establish a comprehensive sports ecosystem in which enterprises, investors, public authorities, and communities jointly create sustainable socio-economic value. If implemented effectively, the sports economy will emerge as a new pillar of Hanoi’s GRDP growth, elevate the city’s position on the global sports map, and drive innovation and modern urban development. In this way, Hanoi can realize its ambition of becoming a global city where sport functions simultaneously as a form of soft power and as a strategic economic engine.

2. Literature review

2.1 Conceptualizing the Sports Economy and Industry

The sports economy can be understood as a dynamic and interconnected ecosystem that transcends traditional boundaries, encompassing elite professional sports, participatory physical activities, and related industries such as tourism, wearables, and media. Scholars have long distinguished the “sport industry” as a market offering products – goods, services, people, and ideas – specifically related to athletic activity (Li, MacIntosh, & Bravo, 2008; Slack, 2004). This sector is characterized by its transversal nature, serving as an engine of development that involves multiple economic layers, from manufacturing and infrastructure to high-value service sectors. In emerging economies such as Vietnam, repositioning sports as a value-added economic sector rather than merely a social cause is a prerequisite for leveraging its potential to contribute directly to the national Gross Domestic Product (Dang, 2021).

2.2. The Economic Impact and Growth Drivers

Globally, the sports economy has been recognized as a major growth driver, with projections highlighting its potential to reach trillions in value in the coming decades (World Economic Forum, 2026). Key factors include the

acceleration of sports tourism, the mainstreaming of women's sport, and the rebalancing of growth within emerging economies (Zhang, Huang, & Nauright, 2018). Research further indicates a “multiplier effect,” whereby the development of the sports industry stimulates related sectors, including fixed asset investment, fiscal revenue, and the tertiary industry (Gümüşdağ, 2024; Liu, 2021). Nevertheless, the economic success of sports organizations is often hindered by the “peculiar economics” of the field, where uncertainty of outcome and competitive balance are essential to maintaining consumer demand (Smith & Stewart, 2010). Effective management must therefore balance revenue generation from media rights and sponsorships with the long-term sustainability of sports facilities and community participation (Girginov, 2008).

2.3. Theoretical Perspectives on State Intervention

State management in the sports economy is grounded in theories of interventionism, which suggest that while the market is the primary driver of growth, state measures are necessary to coordinate international standards and address social goals (Nguyen, 2005; Le, 2019). The role of the state is evolving from a direct provider of services to a planner, regulator, and controller, involving the exercise of “trusteeship” through legal and policy instruments (European Commission, 2007). In contexts such as Hanoi, the state must address systemic bottlenecks by refining institutional frameworks and creating a policy environment that enables the mobilization of diverse social capital and private investment (Hanoi Department of Culture and Sports, 2021; Hanoi People's Committee, 2023).

2.4. Governance and Administrative Professionalization

The efficacy of state management is highly dependent on a robust organizational hierarchy and the professionalization of administration at the municipal level. Modern sports governance increasingly requires mixed management models and Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), where the state establishes regulatory oversight while professional organizations operate according to market logic (Díez-Martín, Blanco-González, Díaz-Iglesias, & Prado-Román, 2017; Estelles-Miguel, Juárez Tarraga, Palmer Gato, & Albarracín Guillem, 2017). Key pillars of this framework include financial transparency, ethical oversight, and the integration of technology and data analytics to optimize performance and decision-making (Nguyen, M. H., 2023). For a city like Hanoi, establishing a clear administrative structure is vital to ensure that sports infrastructure development aligns with urban well-being and environmental resilience (Hanoi Department of Culture and Sports, 2025).

2.5. Research Orientation and Policy Implications

Future research on the state management of Hanoi's sports economy should focus on the causal connections between policy interventions and the "sportiness rate" of the region, which impacts public health and social cohesion. Comparative studies with ASEAN cities such as Bangkok or Kuala Lumpur could provide valuable lessons in smart urban governance (Chikish, Carreras, & García, 2018). Moreover, integrating sports into sustainable urban design and promoting indigenous development models that build on local community strengths are critical pathways for prosperity. By addressing the risks of physical inactivity and environmental degradation, state management can ensure that the sports economy serves as a powerful catalyst for Hanoi's long-term economic and social development (Huynh, 2026).

3. Methodology

The research is designed under a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative analysis and quantitative statistics to provide a comprehensive perspective on the current state of public governance in relation to the sports economy of Hanoi within the evolving geo-strategic context. This methodological orientation ensures that both empirical data and institutional frameworks are systematically examined, thereby enhancing the robustness of the findings.

Data Sources

To establish a solid evidentiary foundation, the study employs two principal groups of data. First, quantitative data are extracted from official statistical series in the Hanoi Statistical Yearbook for the period 2021–2024, focusing on indicators such as service sector output, the number of sports business establishments, and metrics related to human resource training. Second, qualitative data are systematized from regulatory documents, strategic plans issued by the Hanoi People's Committee, and specialized reports of the Department of Culture and Sports. In addition, field reports and secondary materials on exemplary event-based economic models are incorporated to enrich the analytical framework.

Analysis Methods

Given the diversity of data sources, the study applies a set of complementary analytical techniques. Policy analysis is employed to assess the relevance and effectiveness of current regulatory instruments vis-à-vis the practical demands of the sports economy in the Capital. Descriptive statistics are used to process time-series data from the Statistical Yearbook, thereby identifying trends in high-performance achievements, workforce scale, and event-based economic activities during 2021–2024.

To deepen the institutional and managerial insights, the study integrates content analysis, reviewing existing legal provisions to evaluate coherence and feasibility of the regulatory framework governing the sports economy. A case study approach is applied to the organization and economic exploitation of the 31st SEA Games hosted in Hanoi, which serves as a paradigmatic example of resource coordination and large-scale event management under contemporary geo-strategic conditions. Furthermore, empirical observation and analysis are conducted through monitoring the implementation of socialized sports projects in public spaces, thereby identifying administrative bottlenecks and inter-sectoral coordination challenges. Finally, a SWOT analysis synthesizes the results to clarify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats inherent in the current system of state governance over the sports economy.

This integrated methodological design not only ensures analytical rigor but also provides a multidimensional understanding of the dynamics shaping Hanoi's sports economy, laying the groundwork for strategic recommendations in the subsequent phases of research.

4. Results and discussion

The current state of sports economy development in Hanoi during the period 2021–2024 demonstrates robust growth in athletic achievements, human resource training, and event-based economic activities, yet it also reveals persistent limitations in the commercialization of economic value and the effectiveness of socialization mechanisms. Based on the Hanoi Statistical Yearbook and sectoral reports, the number of medals won increased steadily from 3,071 in 2022 to 3,369 in 2024, with domestic medals accounting for more than 80 percent, thereby reflecting the stability of the national competition system. However, international medals fluctuated, peaking at 476 in 2023 before declining to 327 in 2024, indicating that international competitiveness remains unstable and requires long-term strategic planning to sustain Hanoi's position.

In terms of training and coaching, 2024 recorded more than 5,429 athletes and 961 coaches participating in the competition system, which illustrates the strong investment of public budgets in developing sports human resources. Nevertheless, the financial burden is considerable, as expenditures on nutrition, salaries, and specialized equipment have not been offset by revenues from the commercialization of achievements. From the perspective of event economics, the number of tourists associated with cultural and sports activities rose sharply from 1.7 million in 2022 to 3.3 million in 2023, highlighting the attractiveness of sports events to the tourism sector. Yet, the absence of comprehensive data for 2024 points to deficiencies in statistical

and data management systems, complicating long-term evaluations of effectiveness.

This situation confirms that Hanoi has consolidated its leading position in elite sports nationwide and has begun to establish linkages between sports and tourism. However, the gap between professional achievements and economic value remains substantial, as state management continues to prioritize medal targets rather than fully exploiting event broadcasting rights, athlete branding, or ancillary services. Furthermore, socialization and PPP mechanisms have not yet proven effective, with non-budgetary capital concentrated mainly in short-term services rather than sustainable infrastructure investment.

In the context of international integration and global competition, the data from 2021–2024 demonstrate that Hanoi must transition from a subsidy-based management model to an “Enabling State,” focusing on creating a transparent legal environment, encouraging private investment, and maximizing economic value from post-event infrastructure. Systematizing data should not only serve performance reporting but also provide the foundation for constructing economic forecasting scenarios, thereby enabling the capital to proactively attract international investment flows and enhance its position under new geo-strategic conditions.

Table 1
Summary of Sports Development Indicators in Hanoi City
(2021 - 2024)*

Group	Statistical Criteria	Unit	2021	2022	2023	2024
High Achievements	1. Total number of medals won	Medal	n/a	3,071	3,309	3,369
	- International medals	Medal	n/a	384	476	327
	- Domestic medals	Medal	n/a	2,692	2,833	3,042
Training & Competition	1. Total number of athletes participating	Number of people	n/a	n/a	n/a	5,429
	2. Total number of coaches participating	Number of people	n/a	n/a	n/a	961
Event Economics	Number of tourists (Culture - Sports)	Number of people	n/a	1.7 million	3.3 million	n/a

**Source: Systematized from the Hanoi City Statistical Yearbook and the Department of Culture and Tourism's Report (2025)*

The analysis of data indicates that 2021 was a period of “freezing” for large-scale sports events due to the pandemic, during which state management primarily focused on preserving resources and maintaining public infrastructure. However, from 2022 to 2024, the sports economy experienced a significant breakthrough. The steady growth in medal achievements, reaching 3,369 in 2024, not only reaffirmed Hanoi’s professional standing but also provided a foundation for the commercialization of sports images and broadcasting rights. Particularly, the surge in event-driven economics, exemplified by the SEA Games 31 and 32, directly boosted the capital’s tourism sector, which recorded 3.3 million visitors in 2023 – an increase of 1.9 times compared to 2022.

In examining the factors influencing state management of Hanoi’s sports economy, it is evident that the legal framework and governance mechanisms play a foundational role in shaping market operations. Existing instruments such as the Law on Physical Education and Sports (2018) and strategic plans issued by the municipal government have established a basic regulatory corridor for licensing and supervising private sports service businesses. The implementation of digital transformation initiatives has begun to simplify administrative procedures, thereby increasing the number of newly registered enterprises. Nonetheless, major limitations persist, particularly the absence of detailed regulations for professional sports services, post-audit standards, and brand valuation, which has resulted in a management approach that remains more administrative than enabling.

At the same time, financial resources and socialization mechanisms are decisive in determining the scale and pace of development. Public budgets continue to play a dominant role in sustaining elite sports, with investment concentrated on upgrading facilities for SEA Games 31 and recurrent expenditures allocated to training thousands of athletes and coaches. This has imposed substantial fiscal pressure, as expenditures on nutrition, wages, and specialized equipment have not been offset by revenues from commercialization. Socialization, while identified as a key solution to ease budgetary burdens, has encountered institutional barriers. Non-budgetary capital has largely flowed into short-term, high-return services such as fitness, premium yoga, artificial turf fields, and more recently pickleball, while PPP models, despite having a legal framework, remain difficult to implement due to the lack of detailed guidelines on public asset valuation, deterring strategic investors concerned about legal risks and extended capital recovery periods.

Furthermore, the post-event utilization of infrastructure has been inefficient. Many facilities built or upgraded for SEA Games 31 have been underutilized, serving primarily for training purposes without sufficient supplementary commercial activities, leading to waste of public resources.

Meanwhile, the demand for standardized sports spaces from citizens and private event organizers remains unmet. From the perspective of state management, stakeholder participation is also critical. The Department of Culture and Sports plays a coordinating role but is overloaded with inspection tasks due to the rapid growth of private enterprises. The private sector is dynamic but lacks strong linkages with associations to form value chains, while citizens, whose demand for sports services has surged after the pandemic, face difficulties due to insufficient official information on service quality.

These findings carry theoretical significance as they illustrate the dynamics of New Public Management, where the shift toward event-driven economics and professional training reflects the trend of marketization in the public sector. Yet, the gap between medal counts and service revenues demonstrates that the “sports value chain” theory has not been fully operationalized. Practically, under new geo-strategic conditions, Hanoi cannot rely solely on public budgets to maintain its leading position. Instead, it must transform into an “Enabling State,” proactively systematizing data not only for performance reporting but also for constructing economic forecasting scenarios, thereby attracting international investment flows and ensuring the sustainable development of the capital’s sports industry.

In conclusion, the period 2021–2024 marks an important advancement in Hanoi’s sports economy, but to become a strategic pillar of growth, the city must overcome limitations in economic value extraction, improve socialization mechanisms, and strengthen data management capacity.

5. Conclusion and recommendations

The study of state management of Hanoi’s sports economy during 2021–2024 reveals a critical institutional transformation from a traditional administrative model toward modern urban governance under new geo-strategic conditions. First, the shift in the growth model is evident as the capital’s sports economy moved beyond the pandemic phase of infrastructure maintenance into a cycle of event-driven expansion, with major tournaments attracting millions of tourists and positioning sport as a vital component of the urban service economy. Second, the professionalization of human resources, with more than 6,000 athletes and coaches trained annually, has created a substantial “human capital asset,” though its economic value remains largely confined to medal achievements rather than effective commercialization. Third, the research identifies institutional and socialization bottlenecks, particularly delays in issuing detailed guidelines for Public–Private Partnerships (PPP) and technical economic standards, which have limited the optimal utilization of public infrastructure and restricted private investment in

large-scale projects. Fourth, challenges in digital governance persist, as data management and post-audit processes remain fragmented and insufficiently integrated to support forecasting and long-term policy planning.

From these findings, several policy implications emerge: governance must transition from administrative control to an enabling and regulatory role; a tailored legal framework for PPP should be established to attract socialized capital; a digital sports economy ecosystem must be developed to accurately measure the sector's contribution to GRDP; and commercialization of athlete branding, event rights, and sports services should be professionalized to generate sustainable revenue streams.

Given the temporal and data limitations, future research should expand in three directions: comparative analysis with ASEAN cities such as Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur to derive lessons in smart urban governance; application of econometric models to quantify the spillover effects of major sports events on auxiliary industries; and deeper exploration of the impact of Industry 4.0 technologies – particularly artificial intelligence and big data – on personalized sports services and consumer behavior, thereby proposing innovative business models for the urban sports industry.

To sum up, the findings not only provide empirical evidence of the dynamics of Hanoi's sports economy but also outline strategic directions for state management to transform sport into a leading, sustainable, and internationally integrated economic sector.

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RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN UKRAINE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FORMATION OF A NEW WORLD ORDER

Abstract

This article examines how Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine has accelerated changes in the international order through security and economic channels. Using a qualitative policy-economy approach and recent evidence from the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, the EU and SIPRI, the paper traces how the war reshaped rules and institutions, intensified sanctions and financial statecraft, reconfigured energy markets, and lifted defence spending across Europe. The findings suggest that the conflict has strengthened alliance-based security, moved the EU faster towards energy diversification, and created new precedents around the immobilisation of Russian sovereign assets and the use of extraordinary revenues to support Ukraine. At the same time, divergent positions across the Global South and commodity-market shocks deepen the risk of geoeconomic fragmentation. The paper concludes that the emerging order is more competitive and transaction-based, yet still offers scope for cooperation if multilateral institutions adapt and Ukraine's recovery is financed in a predictable, rules-consistent way.

Keywords: *world order, geoeconomic fragmentation, sanctions, energy security, defence spending, Ukraine's recovery.*

Introduction

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 did not only trigger a humanitarian catastrophe; it also tested the practical meaning of sovereignty, borders and economic interdependence in a way that few events have in recent decades. In the early post-Cold War period, economic globalization was often treated as a stabilising force: deep trade and financial ties were expected to raise the costs of military conflict. The war exposed the limits of that assumption. It revealed that, under acute security rivalry, the same networks that connect economies – payments systems, energy infrastructure, supply chains, reserve assets and technology standards – can be repurposed as instruments of power.

From an economic point of view, the war has become a stress-test for the "rules-based" order in three dimensions. First, it confronts international law with a clear act of aggression. The UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/ES-11/1, adopted with 141 votes in favour, reaffirmed Ukraine's

sovereignty and territorial integrity and demanded Russia's withdrawal, indicating broad formal support for the core norm against territorial conquest (UN General Assembly, 2022). Second, it has changed the incentive structure of states and firms by accelerating a turn towards security-driven policy: the "economics of security" is now shaping trade, industrial policy and finance. Third, it has forced a rapid revaluation of Europe's economic model, especially in energy, defence and fiscal choices.

Purpose

The purpose of this article is to assess how Russia's aggression against Ukraine contributes to the formation of a new world order and to identify the main channels through which this change is occurring. The central research questions are: (1) How has the war altered Europe's security and economic architecture? (2) How has financial and trade statecraft changed, and what precedents does it create for the international monetary system? (3) Does the war push the world towards fragmentation into competing blocs, or can multilateral cooperation be preserved?

Methodological approach and sources

The article uses a policy-economy approach that combines institutional evidence with macroeconomic and sectoral indicators. It draws on official materials and datasets from the United Nations, the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Council of the European Union and the European Commission, NATO, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The analysis is interpretive rather than econometric: its goal is to connect observable policy shifts - sanctions, energy diversification, defence spending, technology and industrial policy, and reconstruction finance - to broader patterns in global governance and economic integration.

1. A new world order as a "security-economy" nexus. In international economics, "world order" is often discussed indirectly - through the stability of trade rules, the credibility of contracts, and the predictability of cross-border payments. Yet the war has made the link between security and prosperity explicit. In practice, a more security-driven order means that states are willing to pay higher economic costs to reduce strategic dependence on rivals, even if that implies less efficiency. The IMF frames this as a risk of policy-driven geoeconomic fragmentation that can affect trade, technology diffusion, capital flows and the international monetary system (Aiyar et al., 2023).

Two implications follow. First, the "price" of aggression is increasingly imposed not only through military resistance but through collective economic

restrictions. Second, economic policy becomes more politicised: energy pipelines, ports, insurance services, payment infrastructure and export controls are treated as elements of national security rather than neutral market plumbing. The result is a shift from a world where economic integration is assumed to be the default, to a world where integration must be justified against security risk.

2. Security architecture: alliances, NATO enlargement and the rearmament cycle. The most visible institutional response to the invasion has been the consolidation of Western security arrangements. Finland joined NATO on 4 April 2023 and Sweden on 7 March 2024, ending long traditions of military non-alignment and reshaping the security map of Northern Europe (NATO, 2024a; NATO, 2024b). In economic terms, this matters because alliance commitments translate into long-term budget priorities, defence-industrial demand, and technology procurement choices.

Military expenditure data confirm a structural shift. SIPRI reports that world military expenditure reached \$2,718 billion in 2024, a 9.4% real increase from 2023, with Europe a main contributor to the rise (SIPRI, 2025). For Ukraine, high defence effort is unavoidable for survival; for European states, the war is driving a rearmament cycle that affects fiscal trade-offs, industrial policy and the balance between social and security spending.

This trend also changes the global distribution of public investment. When defence budgets rise sharply, governments may reallocate resources from other areas or increase borrowing. Over time, the composition of demand shifts towards defence and dual-use technologies, which can reshape supply chains and innovation patterns. In a more militarised environment, economic cooperation with strategic rivals becomes harder to justify, further feeding fragmentation.

3. Geoeconomic statecraft: sanctions, finance and the credibility of the international monetary system. Sanctions and financial restrictions have been central to the response to Russia's aggression. The EU has steadily expanded restrictive measures since 2022, including trade restrictions, individual listings, technology controls and measures aimed at limiting Russia's ability to finance the war (Council of the European Union, 2025a). From the perspective of global economic order, the key novelty is the scale and institutionalisation of financial measures against a major economy.

One of the most consequential precedents is the immobilisation of Russian central bank assets held in the EU. The Council notes that around €210 billion of the Central Bank of Russia's assets have been immobilised within the EU due to sanctions, and that EU rules adopted in 2024 enable the use of extraordinary revenues from these assets to support Ukraine, including through EU-G7 extraordinary revenue acceleration loans (Council of the

European Union, 2025b). While the principal remains legally protected, the decision to redirect windfall profits is a significant innovation in financial statecraft.

For the international monetary system, this has two opposing effects. On one hand, it strengthens deterrence by raising the expected cost of aggression, making sovereign assets in Western jurisdictions conditional on adherence to international norms. On the other hand, it encourages some states to reassess reserve composition, settlement currencies and cross-border payment links, especially if they fear political exposure. The IMF warns that fragmentation of capital flows and payment systems can increase volatility and weaken global safety nets (Aiyar et al., 2023). The risk is not an immediate collapse of the dollar- and euro-centred system, but a gradual growth of parallel arrangements that reduce the efficiency benefits of a unified global financial architecture.

Another lesson is institutional: the effectiveness of sanctions depends on coordination capacity. The EU's sanctions timeline shows a recurring pattern of renewals and packages, including measures aimed at sanction circumvention and the so-called "shadow fleet" (Council of the European Union, 2025a). This demonstrates that, in the emerging order, enforcement and compliance infrastructure (customs controls, financial intelligence, shipping services monitoring) becomes a strategic asset in its own right.

4. Energy security and the reconfiguration of Europe's economic model. Energy has been the most direct economic transmission mechanism from the battlefield to global markets. Europe's pre-war reliance on Russian fossil fuels was a structural vulnerability. The REPowerEU measures and related policy actions have delivered a rapid diversification. The Council of the EU reports that imports of Russian gas fell from 45% of EU gas imports in 2021 to 13% in 2025; Russian coal imports were banned; and oil imports were reduced from 27% to below 3% by 2025 (Council of the European Union, 2025c).

These numbers indicate a strategic break: the EU treated energy not only as a market commodity but as a geopolitical dependency to be reduced. The economic costs of adjustment were real – high prices, infrastructure investment, and the need for new supply contracts. Yet the shift also accelerated investments in renewables and efficiency, reinforcing the idea that security shocks can speed up structural transformation. In the longer run, the European response may alter global energy trade routes, liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets, and the investment outlook for fossil fuel exporters.

More broadly, the war has shown how energy and climate policy are becoming intertwined with strategic autonomy. In a new world order shaped by rivalry, countries may prefer diversified and regional energy systems even

if that implies higher unit costs. This logic extends beyond energy to critical raw materials and clean-tech supply chains, where “friend-shoring” and industrial policy can become central instruments.

5. Trade, commodities and the risk of bloc formation. The invasion also affected global commodity markets, particularly food, fertilizers and energy. The initial shock created distributional consequences that were felt most acutely in low-income economies. IMF analysis links fragmentation in commodity markets to increased trade restrictions and warns that further fragmentation could generate price volatility and disproportionate burdens for vulnerable countries (Alvarez, Benatiya Andaloussi and Stuermer, 2023).

At the systemic level, the risk is that economic relations become increasingly aligned with geopolitical affinities. The WTO’s World Trade Report 2023 argues against a turn to fragmentation and stresses that “re-globalization” can be a more effective response to security, inclusion and sustainability challenges than dividing into rival blocs (WTO, 2023). At the same time, empirical work at the WTO documents that trade tensions between major powers and the uncertainty created by the war have reduced certain bilateral flows and can reinforce decoupling dynamics (Blanga-Gubbay and Rubínová, 2024).

Ukraine itself illustrates both dynamics. On one hand, the country has moved closer to European economic structures through trade logistics, finance and the prospect of deeper integration. On the other hand, Russia’s attempt to use blockade, infrastructure attacks and export disruptions as leverage demonstrates how trade can be weaponised. The lesson for many states is to treat critical trade corridors and essential imports as strategic assets.

6. Technology and defence-industrial policy: resilience over efficiency. A defining feature of the emerging order is the return of strategic industrial policy. The war in Ukraine exposed a gap between Europe’s security commitments and its industrial ability to produce ammunition, air defence systems and other critical capabilities at scale. In response, the European Commission presented the first-ever European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) in March 2024, explicitly linking industrial readiness to the new security environment created by Russia’s war of aggression (European Commission, 2024a).

EDIS is important economically because it formalises demand for ‘European’ production and encourages joint procurement, aiming to reduce fragmentation across national markets. As an implementation step, the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) was proposed with a €1.5 billion package for 2025-2027, designed to bridge short-term emergency measures and a more structural approach to defence-industrial readiness (Council of the European Union, 2025d). The logic is similar to energy

diversification: critical inputs should be reliable under stress, even if that implies higher costs or redundancy.

Technology policy follows the same pattern. Sanctions and export controls restrict Russia's access to dual-use goods and advanced technologies (Council of the European Union, 2025a). More broadly, firms are adapting by screening suppliers, investing in cybersecurity, and redesigning supply chains around trusted jurisdictions. Over time, this can reduce the scale economies that made global production efficient, especially in sectors where standards and intellectual property are concentrated. The economic outcome is a more regional and security-screened pattern of innovation diffusion.

7. Human displacement, labour markets and the social side of world order. The new world order is not only about states; it is also shaped by people moving across borders. The war has generated one of the largest displacement crises globally. UNHCR reports that millions of Ukrainians have sought refuge abroad and millions remain internally displaced (UNHCR, 2025). For host economies, large inflows affect labour supply, housing, education and public services; for Ukraine, the long-term risk is human-capital loss if returns are delayed.

Economic integration within Europe partly offsets these costs, because refugees can access labour markets and social protection mechanisms. Over time, integration outcomes depend on language acquisition, recognition of qualifications and childcare availability - factors that determine whether displacement becomes a temporary shock or a permanent demographic shift. In this sense, migration is a channel through which war directly influences the distribution of skills and the future growth potential of both the sending and receiving economies.

8. Global governance, legitimacy and the “multipolar” narrative. A common claim in debates about a “new world order” is that the world is becoming multipolar. The war both supports and complicates this narrative. The UN vote on A/RES/ES-11/1 demonstrated wide formal condemnation of aggression (UN General Assembly, 2022), but it also revealed substantial abstentions. Divergent voting patterns reflect different threat perceptions and economic interests - especially among states balancing relations with the West, Russia and China.

Economic policy is central to these choices. For many emerging economies, the war's spillovers arrived as higher food and energy prices and tighter global financial conditions. If the benefits of the liberal economic order are perceived as uneven, the legitimacy of Western-led rule-making weakens. This is why the economic dimension of Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction is not only a national issue; it is part of the credibility contest over whether international institutions can deliver public goods in a crisis.

9. Ukraine's recovery as an element of the new order. The scale of destruction in Ukraine creates a long-term test for international cooperation and financing. The World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the European Commission and the United Nations estimate that, as of 31 December 2024, the cost of recovery and reconstruction over the next decade was \$524 billion (World Bank, 2025). A subsequent update covering damage through December 2025 places direct damage above \$195 billion and highlights rising needs in housing, transport and energy (World Bank, 2026).

Financing such a recovery is impossible without predictable external support and credible domestic reform. The EU has created the Ukraine Facility, providing up to €50 billion for 2024-2027 to support macro-financial stability, reforms and investment mobilisation (Council of the European Union, 2025b; European Commission, 2024b). Predictability is strategically important: successful recovery would demonstrate that aggression fails economically as well as militarily, while stalled reconstruction would amplify migration pressures, investment risk and long-term insecurity.

Reconstruction also connects to broader debates about the use of immobilised assets and the design of security guarantees. If extraordinary revenues from immobilised sovereign assets can be channelled in a rules-consistent way, it may become part of a new toolkit for responding to violations of international norms. However, any such mechanism must be transparent and legally robust; otherwise it could increase uncertainty for cross-border asset holding.

10. Wartime macroeconomics: resilience, fiscal capacity and conditional support. A major difference between this war and many earlier conflicts is the degree to which Ukraine's macroeconomic stability has been sustained through coordinated external financing. This matters for the world order because it shows that economic institutions and donors can "buy time" for a country under attack to keep basic state functions running - paying wages, maintaining services and preserving financial stability - while reforms continue under extreme uncertainty.

The IMF's 2023 decision to approve a four-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement highlighted both the scale of the shock and the stabilising role of a rules-based financing framework. The IMF noted that economic activity contracted by around 30% in 2022, capital stock was heavily damaged, and poverty rose, yet macro-financial stability was maintained with support and policy discipline (IMF, 2023). The EFF programme was designed to anchor fiscal, external and price stability, strengthen governance and institutions, and support recovery on a path toward EU accession. The programme's structure is itself a governance instrument: it links budget

support to measurable commitments, while attempting to preserve social spending and central bank independence.

Subsequent reviews underscore a key feature of the emerging order: conditionality and transparency become part of wartime resilience. In June 2024, the IMF's Fourth Review stated that performance remained strong despite exceptionally high uncertainty and emphasised the need for sustained reform momentum and timely disbursement of external support to restore fiscal and debt sustainability (IMF, 2024). By March 2025, the Seventh Review again stressed domestic revenue mobilisation and governance reforms, while noting continued resilience and the importance of predictable partner financing (IMF, 2025). From an economic perspective, this illustrates a new model of 'macro-stabilisation under fire': the state remains solvent and the financial system functions, not because markets are calm, but because official support is coordinated and conditional.

This mechanism has wider implications. First, it reinforces the credibility of multilateral institutions when they can operate effectively in extreme environments. Second, it deepens the integration of Ukraine's public finance management with European standards, because reforms increasingly align with accession-related requirements. Third, it raises a practical question for the future order: to what extent will large-scale support packages be available to other countries facing security shocks, and under what political conditions? If such support becomes selective or inconsistent, the legitimacy gap between different regions may widen.

11. What kind of “new order” is emerging? Three scenarios and policy implications. The direction of the international order is not predetermined. The evidence reviewed above points to three plausible scenarios. In a first scenario - managed competition - major powers accept rivalry but keep core economic rules functional. Sanctions remain exceptional and rule-based; trade and finance stay broadly open with targeted controls in sensitive sectors. This path is closest to the WTO's vision of 're-globalization' that preserves openness while addressing security and resilience concerns (WTO, 2023).

In a second scenario – bloc consolidation – economic relations follow security alignments more strictly. Payment systems, technology standards and supply chains become segmented, with higher transaction costs and lower global productivity growth. The IMF's analysis suggests that such fragmentation can be materially costly, especially if it spreads from trade to capital flows and technology (Aiyar et al., 2023). For small open economies, this would be the most difficult environment, as they would face pressure to choose sides and would lose the benefits of diversified markets.

A third scenario, selective multilateralism, lies between these extremes: competition intensifies, but cooperation persists in areas where incentives align, such as food security, climate finance and nuclear safety. Under this scenario, the legitimacy of institutions depends on their ability to deliver concrete benefits to countries beyond the West. Supporting Ukraine's recovery becomes a demonstration case: if institutions can mobilise finance, coordinate donors, and create credible accountability mechanisms, multilateralism gains resilience.

Policy implications follow from these scenarios. First, deterrence and economic openness must be balanced. Broad sanctions should remain tied to clear legal and political criteria to limit uncertainty and avoid normalising financial coercion. Second, resilience requires investment: energy infrastructure, defence production, cybersecurity and critical raw materials supply chains need coordinated planning across allies. The EU's move towards a defence-industrial strategy illustrates this shift, but it also requires fiscal realism - industrial readiness has to be financed sustainably (European Commission, 2024a; Council of the European Union, 2025d). Third, the distributional effects of shocks must be addressed. If low-income economies experience the war mainly through higher food and fuel prices, they will have fewer incentives to support the norms embedded in the existing order.

Conclusions

Russia's aggression against Ukraine has accelerated the emergence of a new world order by tightening the link between security and economic policy. The war has reinforced alliances and pushed Europe into a durable rearmament cycle, visible in the sharp rise of military expenditure. It has also triggered a rapid reconfiguration of energy dependence, with the EU reducing Russian fossil fuel imports to a small share within a few years. In parallel, the use of sanctions and the immobilisation of Russian sovereign assets have expanded the frontier of financial statecraft, creating new precedents for deterrence and for debates about the neutrality of the international monetary system.

At the global level, the war has intensified pressures towards geoeconomic fragmentation. Commodity shocks, divergent voting behaviour in multilateral forums, and security-driven industrial policies all increase the probability of a more bloc-based, transactional order. Yet fragmentation is not inevitable. The policy lesson is that the costs of aggression should remain clear, but global public goods - food security, climate, financial stability – still require cooperation. Preserving that space depends on adapting multilateral institutions, keeping sanction design transparent, investing in resilience, and providing predictable financing for Ukraine's recovery.

For Ukraine and its partners, the practical task is to turn resilience into long-term capability: rebuilding energy infrastructure with modern standards, restoring transport corridors, mobilising private investment, and anchoring reforms that reduce governance risk. For the broader international community, the lesson is that “order” cannot be sustained by markets alone. It requires enforceable rules, credible institutions and the economic capacity to support victims of aggression. The direction of the new world order will therefore depend on whether the post-2022 response becomes a one-off mobilisation or the foundation of a more resilient and cooperative - though more security-conscious - global system.

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GENDER EQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES: CHALLENGES, ECONOMIC IMPACT, AND DIGITAL INCLUSION

This study examines gender equality in the United States, focusing on key challenges, economic implications, and the role of digital inclusion. Despite progress, persistent issues such as the gender wage gap, underrepresentation in leadership, and gender-based violence continue to limit women's full participation in society. The paper highlights the economic costs of inequality, emphasizing that closing gender gaps could significantly increase national GDP. Particular attention is given to the digital divide, which restricts women's access to emerging opportunities in technology-driven sectors. The study concludes that addressing gender disparities requires integrated policy approaches combining economic, social, and digital strategies.

Keywords: gender equality; wage gap; digital divide; labor market; economic growth; leadership representation; United States.

Gender equality is a basic human right and an essential pillar for building a peaceful, prosperous, and sustainable future. The United Nations highlights its importance by making it a key part of the Sustainable Development Goals – specifically Goal 5, which focuses on achieving equality and empowering women and girls. For the United States, advancing this goal is vital to creating a truly inclusive society where every individual can reach their full potential.

At the same time, the practical implementation of gender equality in the United States reveals a significant gap between formal commitments and real outcomes. Structural barriers, deeply rooted in socio-economic and cultural norms, continue to shape unequal access to resources, career opportunities, and decision-making processes. These disparities are particularly evident in the labor market, where differences in wages, employment patterns, and career advancement persist despite high levels of education among women. Moreover, the intersection of gender with factors such as race, ethnicity, and social background further amplifies inequality, creating multidimensional disadvantages for certain groups of women. In this context, a systematic overview of the most pressing and persistent challenges is required to better understand the scope and nature of these issues. The key challenges currently affecting gender equality in the United States are presented in Table 1.

Table 1

Current Challenges in the USA*

Wage gap	Representation in Leadership	Gender-Based Violence
Despite significant progress, the wage gap between men and women persists. On average, women earn about 82 cents for every dollar earned by men. This disparity is even greater for women of color, highlighting the intersection of racial and gender inequalities.	Women remain underrepresented in leadership roles across various sectors, including politics, business, and academia. As of recent years, women hold approximately 25% of seats in the U.S. Congress, and similar disparities exist in corporate boardrooms.	Gender-based violence continues to be a significant issue. Approximately 1 in 4 women in the USA have experienced some form of intimate partner violence. This not only affects their health and well-being but also limits their ability to participate fully in society.

**Source: U.S. Department of State, 2025.*

The challenges outlined above are not merely theoretical but are clearly reflected in measurable socio-economic indicators. Among them, the gender wage gap remains one of the most visible and quantifiable manifestations of inequality. However, this disparity is not uniform across all groups and is further intensified by additional factors such as race and ethnicity. To illustrate these differences more clearly, Figure 1 presents the variation in wage gaps across different demographic groups in the United States.




Fig. 1. Wage gap: earnings of woman compared to men in the USA*

**Source: (UN Women, 2025).*

As it has been shown in Fig. 1, wage gaps depend not only on gender, but also on race.

While these definitions highlight the importance of ensuring equal rights and opportunities for all genders, real-world data shows that the United States still faces substantial challenges in achieving true equality. These inequalities are visible not only in social and political spheres but also in the country's

overall economic performance. In fact, several large-scale analytical studies demonstrate that gender inequality has significant economic consequences. One of the most comprehensive analyses comes from McKinsey, whose research provides a deeper understanding of how gender disparities directly limit the nation's economic potential and what the U.S. could gain by addressing them.

After analyzing McKinsey's "The Power of Parity," we can come to an interesting conclusion: the issue of gender equality is not just a topic about social justice – it's a powerful economic resource that the United States still hasn't fully utilized (Ellingrud, K. et al., 2016). According to their calculations, if full equality of opportunities between women and men were achieved, the country's economy could gain around US\$ 4.3 trillion in additional GDP by 2025. Even a more realistic scenario, where each state simply catches up to the best-performing regions, would still add US\$ 2.1 trillion.

This growth doesn't come "out of nowhere" – it is driven by very concrete changes: higher participation of women in the labor force, an increase in full-time employment among women, and a shift into higher-paying and more productive sectors. But despite being a highly developed country, the U.S. still has significant inequality across six out of ten key areas. The biggest gaps appear in leadership, politics, unpaid domestic work, and issues of safety. To realize this potential, the country would need investments of about US\$ 475 billion – this means creating millions of new jobs and implementing systemic policies such as paid parental leave, expanded care infrastructure, and career-support programs for women.

It may seem completely illogical that a country with so many resources and opportunities is essentially losing trillions of dollars simply because half of its population doesn't have equal access to professional and economic opportunities. If the economy can grow this significantly purely through equality, it seems strange not to take advantage of such a chance. This is one of those cases where "social justice" and "economic benefit" align perfectly. Some labor indicators can be summarized in Table 2.

In addition to these domestic challenges, it's important to consider the role of technology and digital access in shaping gender equality. Recent research by UN Women (2025) shows that the so-called gender digital divide – the unequal access of women and girls to the internet and digital tools – is not only a social concern but also a major economic issue. Globally, ensuring that women have the same digital opportunities as men could potentially lift 30 million women out of poverty and contribute trillions of dollars to the global economy.

Table 2

Labor indicators of the USA*

Potential US GDP growth under perfect equality	\$4.3 trillion by 2025
GDP growth in the “best-in-class” scenario	\$2.1 trillion
Share of growth due to increased female labor force participation	~40%
Necessary investments	\$475 billion
Number of potential new jobs	6.4 million
Women per 100 men in leadership positions	66/100
Number of spheres with high inequality	6 out of 10 indicators
Main problem areas	Leadership, politics, unpaid work, violence, single mothers, teenage pregnancy

**Source: U.S. Department of State, 2025.*

Thinking about the United States specifically, we can assume that similar dynamics are at play. Even in a highly developed country, unequal access to technology, online education, and digital career paths can limit women’s participation in high-growth, tech-driven sectors. From my perspective, this is particularly striking: in a country with so much innovation, ignoring the digital gap among women seems like an unnecessary loss of both human potential and economic power. Investing in digital skills, online access, and technology-driven opportunities for women is not just a moral imperative – it is a practical strategy to enhance overall productivity and growth.

It can be noticed that these digital opportunities align closely with solutions to the broader gender inequalities already discussed. Just as closing wage gaps and expanding leadership opportunities can add trillions to the U.S. economy, bridging the digital divide can amplify these effects. Providing women with the tools and platforms to participate fully in the digital world could increase workforce participation, foster entrepreneurship, and open new career paths in ways that traditional policies alone might not achieve.

Tackling gender inequality in the United States requires a multifaceted approach: policies addressing pay, leadership, safety, and care work need to be complemented by strong initiatives in digital inclusion. Only by combining these approaches can the country truly unlock the full potential of its workforce and ensure that economic growth benefits everyone equally.

Gender inequality in the United States continues to limit both social and economic progress. Persistent wage gaps, underrepresentation in leadership, and the digital divide prevent women from fully participating in the workforce. Addressing these challenges requires concrete solutions, such as investing in equal pay initiatives, expanding leadership and career-support programs, strengthening safety and care policies, and ensuring equal digital access for women. Implementing these measures is not only a moral

imperative but also a strategic economic decision – by closing these gaps, the U.S. can unlock trillions in potential GDP and create a more inclusive, prosperous society for everyone.

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ZACHOWANIA KONSUMENCKIE STUDENTÓW WOBEC ZRÓWNOWAŻONEJ KONSUMPCJI

Abstrakt

Celem pracy było zbadanie świadomości ekologicznej oraz zachowań konsumentów w kontekście zrównoważonej konsumpcji. Zrównoważona konsumpcja obejmuje podejmowanie świadomych decyzji zakupowych, ograniczanie nadmiernego zużycia zasobów oraz minimalizowanie negatywnego wpływu na środowisko. Badania pilotażowe przeprowadzono w marcu 2026 roku wśród 160 studentów Państwowej Akademii Nauk Stosowanych w Krośnie za pomocą kwestionariusza online. Wyniki wskazują, że większość respondentów uwzględnia aspekty ekologiczne przy zakupach sporadycznie, a jedynie niewielka grupa stosuje zasady zrównoważonej konsumpcji konsekwentnie. Główne bariery obejmowały wysokie ceny produktów ekologicznych, brak informacji oraz przekonania, że indywidualny wybór ma ograniczony wpływ na środowisko. Respondenci częściej zwracali uwagę na opakowanie, skład i możliwość recyklingu produktów niż na inne kryteria. Wyniki podkreślają potrzebę wzmacniania edukacji ekologicznej wśród studentów, promowania produktów lokalnych oraz przekazywania praktycznych wskazówek, wdrażania proekologicznych nawyków w codziennym życiu.

Kluczowe słowa: *zrównoważona konsumpcja, zachowania konsumentów, świadomość ekologiczna, Polska.*

Wstęp

Zachowania konsumenckie to całokształt procesów decyzyjnych oraz działań z zakresu zakupu, użytkowania i zbycia dóbr podejmowanych przez nabywców pod wpływem wielu czynników. (Encyklopedia Zarządzania mfiles.pl 2026). Zrównoważona konsumpcja to sposób korzystania z dóbr i usług, który uwzględnia nie tylko bieżące potrzeby człowieka, ale także dobro środowiska naturalnego oraz przyszłych pokoleń. Oznacza to, świadome i racjonalne podejmowanie decyzji zakupowych w taki sposób, aby ograniczać negatywny wpływ na planetę (Edukacja Ekologiczna, 2026). Celem pracy jest przedstawienie definicji zachowań konsumenckich i zrównoważonej konsumpcji oraz podział czynników kształtujących te zachowania. Dodatkowo przedstawiono wyniki badań zachowań konsumentów oraz

świadomości ekologicznej wśród studentów w kontekście zrównoważonej konsumpcji.

Zachowania konsumentów a zrównoważona konsumpcja

Zachowania konsumenta odgrywają kluczową rolę w funkcjonowaniu rynków i przedsiębiorstw. Preferencje zakupowe kształtują popyt i wyznaczają kierunki rozwoju dla przedsiębiorstw, które z kolei ze strony podaży kształtują strukturę i rodzaj produktów i usług. Same zachowania konsumentów to proces złożony i zależą od wielu czynników. Aby zrozumieć zachowania konsumentów na rynku trzeba poznać czynniki, które mają wpływ na decyzje podejmowane przez konsumentów. W literaturze stosuje się różne podziały uwarunkowań wpływających na zachowania konsumentów. Na podstawie przeglądu literatury przedstawiono własny podział czynników wpływających na zachowania konsumenta mający podejście kompleksowe (rys.1.). Ważne jest również to, że wymienione grupy czynników nie są niezależne względem siebie, ale wzajemnie na siebie oddziałują lub są ze sobą powiązane.



Rysunek 1. Schemat uwarunkowań zachowań konsumenckich*

*Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie Adamowicz, Krasula 2016, Kiężel, 2000, Rudnicki, 2012, Światowy 2026, Kotler 1999, 2025, Wiśniewska 2025, Sznajder 1993.

W obliczu zmian klimatycznych oraz rosnącej ilości odpadów coraz większego znaczenia nabiera ograniczanie nadmiernej konsumpcji i wybieranie bardziej odpowiedzialnych form użytkowania zasobów. Zrównoważona konsumpcja dotyczy nie tylko przedsiębiorstw i przemysłu, ale również codziennych wyborów podejmowanych w gospodarstwach domowych. Nawet niewielkie zmiany w nawykach mogą realnie wpłynąć na stan środowiska naturalnego (Edukacja Ekologiczna, 2026). Zrównoważona konsumpcja stanowi jeden z kluczowych warunków ograniczenia nadmiernej eksploatacji zasobów przyrodniczych. Istotną rolę odgrywają zmiany w postawach i zachowaniach konsumentów, które wpływają na sposób wykorzystania zasobów oraz skalę oddziaływania na środowisko. Współczesne wzorce konsumpcji, silnie związane z konsumpcjonizmem, prowadzą do nadmiernego zużycia dóbr oraz generowania dużych ilości odpadów. Rosnące potrzeby konsumpcyjne, wspierane przez marketing i rozwój gospodarczy, zwiększają presję na środowisko naturalne. W odpowiedzi na te zjawiska rozwija się koncepcja ekokonsumpcji, zakładająca bardziej świadome, odpowiedzialne i oszczędne korzystanie z dóbr (Rumianowska, 2013).

Kluczową rolę w realizacji założeń zrównoważonej konsumpcji odgrywają konsumenci, ponieważ to ich decyzje zakupowe wpływają na poziom zużycia zasobów, ilość produkowanych odpadów oraz kierunki rozwoju rynku. Współczesne zachowania konsumentów są jednak w dużej mierze kształtowane przez działania marketingowe i kulturę konsumpcjonizmu, co często prowadzi do nadmiernego nabywania dóbr. Skutkiem tego jest m.in. marnowanie żywności, wzrost ilości odpadów oraz zwiększona presja na środowisko. Badania wskazują także na wyraźną rozbieżność między deklarowaną świadomością ekologiczną a rzeczywistymi zachowaniami konsumentów — mimo rosnącej wiedzy, decyzje zakupowe często nadal uzależnione są od ceny i wygody (Dąbrowska & Shulhina, 2024).

Jak podaje Portal Edukacji klimatyczno-środowiskowej do najważniejszych zasad zrównoważonej konsumpcji należą:

- kupowanie tylko potrzebnych rzeczy i unikanie marnowania,
- wybieranie produktów ekologicznych oraz ograniczanie plastiku,
- korzystanie z toreb i opakowań wielokrotnego użytku,
- zwiększenie udziału produktów roślinnych w diecie,
- segregowanie odpadów,
- wybór bardziej ekologicznych środków transportu,
- oszczędzanie wody i energii,
- wykorzystywanie nowoczesnych technologii wspierających ochronę środowiska,

- edukowanie innych i dawanie dobrego przykładu (Edukacja Ekologiczna, 2026).

W różnych wymiarach życia obserwuje się jednak stopniowe zmiany w kierunku bardziej odpowiedzialnej konsumpcji. W aspekcie ekonomicznym konsumenci częściej kierują się racjonalnością finansową i analizują swoje możliwości budżetowe. W wymiarze społecznym rośnie znaczenie takich praktyk jak ponowne wykorzystanie produktów, ich odsprzedaż czy wybór firm odpowiedzialnych społecznie. Z kolei w aspekcie środowiskowym coraz większą rolę odgrywa ograniczanie nadmiernej konsumpcji, redukcja odpadów oraz bardziej świadome planowanie zakupów (Dąbrowska & Shulhina, 2024).

Material i metody badań

W marcu 2026 roku zostały przeprowadzone badania za pomocą sondażu diagnostycznego z wykorzystaniem kwestionariusza ankiety w Formularzu Google Forms. W badaniu wzięło udział 160 studentów z Państwowej Akademii Nauk Stosowanych w Krośnie (PANS Krosno). Z kwestionariusza badawczego do publikacji wybrano osiem pytań oraz metryczkę. Otrzymane wyniki zostały zweryfikowane pod względem poprawności udzielonych odpowiedzi, zliczone i zaprezentowane w formie tabel, wykresów oraz opisów słownych.

Wyniki

W badaniach wzięło udział 160 studentów PANS Krosno. W badaniu liczniejszą grupą były kobiety, stanowiły 68,8%. Najwięcej respondentów 42,5% było w wieku 23-27 lat. Studenci w wieku 18-22 lata stanowili 1/3 badanych. Udział studentów w wieku 28-32 oraz 33-37 lat wynosił po 9,4%. Najmniejszą grupę stanowiły osoby w wieku 38-42 lata - 4,4% oraz w wieku 43 lata i więcej - 3,7% (Tabela 1.).

Większość uczestników kształciła się na studiach inżynierskich (44,4%). Studia magisterskie podejmowało 30,6% badanych, natomiast 25% stanowiły osoby studiujące na poziomie licencjackim (Tabela 1).

Najwięcej ankietowanych mieszkało na wsi – 48,1%, 1/4 studentów mieszkała w miastach powyżej 100 tys. mieszkańców (Tabela 1).

W badaniu dotyczącym świadomości ekologicznej w zachowaniach zakupowych, 24% respondentów zadeklarowało, że zawsze zwraca uwagę na wpływ kupowanych produktów na środowisko, 41% – że czasami, a 35% – że nie. Wyniki wskazują, że najwięcej badanych podejmuje decyzje zakupowe uwzględniając aspekty środowiskowe w sposób umiarkowany (wykres 1).


Tabela 1

Charakterystyka grupy badanej*

Płeć	Liczba uczestników [N]	[%]
Kobiety	110	68,8
Mężczyźni	50	31,2
Wiek	Liczba uczestników [N]	[%]
18-22 lata	49	30,6
23-27 lat	68	42,5
28-32 lata	15	9,4
33-37 lat	15	9,4
38-42 lata	7	4,4
43 lata i więcej	6	3,7
Stopień studiów	Liczba uczestników [N]	[%]
Studia licencjackie	40	25
Studia inżynierskie	71	44,4
Studia magisterskie	49	30,6
Miejsce zamieszkania	Liczba uczestników [N]	[%]
Wieś	77	48,1
Miasto do 20 tys. mieszkańców	15	9,4
Miasto 21-50 tys. mieszkańców	22	13,7
Miasto 51-100 tys. mieszkańców	6	3,8
Miasto powyżej 100 tys. mieszkańców	40	25

*Źródło: badania własne.


Grupę respondentów, którzy odpowiedzieli „nie” na pytanie, czy zwracają uwagę podczas zakupów na wpływ kupowanych produktów na środowisko – zapytano o powody.



Wykres 1. Uwzględnianie podczas zakupów wpływu produktów na środowisko wśród respondentów [%]*

*Źródło: badania własne.

Najwięcej, bo 49 osób, wskazało, że w ogóle nie bierze takiego powodu pod uwagę podczas zakupów, natomiast inne odpowiedzi, które zostały zaznaczone to, że powodem są wysokie ceny produktów ekologicznych (35 odpowiedzi), brak informacji o wpływie produktów na środowisko (29 odpowiedzi) oraz przekonanie, że pojedynczy wybór konsumencki niewiele zmienia (28 odpowiedzi). Rzadziej wymieniano trudności w rozpoznawaniu produktów przyjaznych środowisku - 22 wskazania (Wykres 2).




Wykres 2. Deklarowane powody wśród respondentów, którzy nie uwzględniają podczas zakupów wpływu tych produktów na środowisko (możliwość zaznaczenia więcej niż 1 odpowiedzi)*

**Źródło: badania własne.*

W grupę 64 osób, która odpowiedziała „tak” na pytanie, czy zwracają uwagę podczas zakupów na wpływ kupowanych produktów na środowisko - zapytano na co zwracają uwagę? Najwięcej wskazań miały odpowiedzi: opakowanie produktu (64), skład produktu lub stopień przetworzenia (62), kraj lub miejsce produkcji (42), możliwość ponownego użycia lub recyklingu (34) oraz markę znaną z działań proekologicznych (18) (Wykres 3).


W odpowiedzi na pytanie, jak ważne są dla respondentów kwestie ekologiczne przy wyborze produktów, najwięcej osób uznało je za raczej ważne (42%), natomiast raczej nieważne było dla 24% respondentów (Wykres 4).



Wykres 3. Przyczyny uwzględniania wpływu środowiskowego produktów w decyzjach zakupowych (możliwość zaznaczenia więcej niż 1 odpowiedzi)*

**Źródło: badania własne.*


Dalsze odpowiedzi to: obojętne – 22%, bardzo ważne – 6% oraz zupełnie nieważne – 6%. Wyniki wskazują, że prawie połowa badanych studentów traktuje kwestie ekologiczne jako co najmniej ważne przy decyzjach zakupowych. Zastanawiające są odpowiedzi wśród młodego pokolenia „nieważne” i „raczej nieważne”, które stanowią w sumie 30% (Wykres 4).



Wykres 4. Znaczenie kwestii ekologicznych przy wyborze produktów*

**Źródło: badania własne.*


W odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy respondenci starają się ograniczać liczbę zakupów ze względu na ochronę środowiska, 42% zadeklarowało, że nie, 31% – czasami, a 27% – tak. Wyniki pokazują, że mniej niż jedna trzecia badanych regularnie ogranicza zakupy z powodów ekologicznych, podczas gdy znaczna część podejmuje takie działania jedynie sporadycznie lub wcale (Wykres 5).



Wykres 5. Deklaracje dotyczące ograniczania zakupów z powodów ekologicznych*

Źródło: badania własne


W odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy respondenci wybierają produkty od lokalnych producentów, jeśli mają taką możliwość, 38% zadeklarowało, że często, 56% – czasami, a 6% – nigdy. Wyniki pokazują, że zakupy produktów od lokalnych producentów mają dla dużej grupy badanych istotne znaczenie (Wykres 6).



Wykres 6. Preferowanie produktów od lokalnych producentów*

**Źródło: badania własne.*


W odpowiedzi na pytanie, jak respondenci oceniają swoją wiedzę na temat zrównoważonej konsumpcji, 51% uznało ją za przeciętną, 31% – dobrą, 11% – niską, 5% – bardzo dobrą, a 2% – bardzo niską. Wyniki wskazują, że większość badanych dysponuje wiedzą umiarkowaną lub dobrą, przy czym tylko niewielka część deklaruje jej wysoki poziom (Wykres 7).



Wykres 7. Samoocena wiedzy na temat zrównoważonej konsumpcji*

**Źródło: badania własne.*

W odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy respondenci stosują zasady zrównoważonej konsumpcji w codziennym życiu, 53% zadeklarowało, że czasami je stosuje, 23% – tak, 6% – nie, a 18% wskazało - nie wiem. Wyniki wskazują, że większość badanych wdraża zasady zrównoważonej konsumpcji przynajmniej sporadycznie, przy czym stosunkowo niewielka grupa stosuje je konsekwentnie (Wykres 8).



Wykres 8. Stosowanie zasad zrównoważonej konsumpcji w codziennym życiu wśród respondentów*

**Źródło: badania własne.*

Wnioski i rekomendacje

1. Świadomość ekologiczna wśród badanych jest umiarkowana – większość respondentów uwzględnia aspekty środowiskowe przy zakupach przynajmniej sporadycznie, lecz tylko niewielka część działa konsekwentnie.

2. Najważniejsze bariery proekologicznych decyzji konsumenckich to wysokie ceny produktów ekologicznych, brak informacji o wpływie na środowisko oraz przekonanie o ograniczonym wpływie indywidualnych wyborów konsumenckich.

3. Decyzje zakupowe dotyczące wpływu na środowisko kupowanych produktów determinowane są rodzajem opakowania, składem i stopniem przetworzenia, miejscem produkcji oraz możliwością recyklingu.

4. Deklarowana wiedza na temat zrównoważonej konsumpcji jest głównie przeciętna lub dobra, natomiast jej praktyczne zastosowanie pozostawia wiele do poprawy. Ograniczanie liczby zakupów ze względu na ochronę środowiska nie jest realizowane przez ponad 40%, a ponad 30% robi to czasami.

5. W celu zwiększenia stosowania zasad zrównoważonej konsumpcji zaleca się kontynuowanie edukacji ekologicznej, promocji lokalnych produktów, udostępnianie praktycznych wskazówek dotyczących wyboru produktów przyjaznych środowisku, promowanie mody ograniczania nadmiernej konsumpcji i podnoszenie świadomości, że pojedyncze działania jednostki przekładają się na wyniki ogółu.

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CANADA AS A SOURCE AND DESTINATION OF MIGRANT LABOUR

This paper delves into Canada's multifaceted role in the global system of labour mobility, exploring its significance as both a recipient and a provider of migrant workers. The study identifies the main routes of labour migration to and from Canada and elucidates the reasons for the country's substantial involvement in international migration processes. It pays close attention to the economic sectors that actively recruit migrant labour, such as agriculture, healthcare, construction, and services. The article further investigates the key determinants of migration flows, including labour market needs, economic climates, demographic changes, and disparities in income and employment prospects. A significant emphasis is placed on governmental migration policies and programs that regulate the movement of labour migrants. Moreover, the research assesses the impact of migrant labour on Canada's economic development, the stability of its labour market, and the availability of its workforce. The study highlights both the positive consequences of migrant labour, such as economic expansion and the mitigation of labour shortages, and the obstacles associated with integration, working conditions, and social inclusion. In conclusion, the article demonstrates the importance of migrant labour for Canada and its integral role in the global economy.

Keywords: *migrant labour, international migration, labour market, Canada, workforce mobility, immigration policy.*

Introduction

Canada has traditionally been viewed as one of the world's leading countries in immigration policy, known for its inclusive approach and long-term planning. However, in recent years this vision has weakened, as migration policy has increasingly focused on short-term solutions to immediate problems. Immigrants are often blamed for issues such as rising housing costs and pressure on the health-care system, even though these challenges are largely caused by long-standing structural problems. As a result, negative attitudes toward immigration have become more visible in public discourse, despite the fact that a well-managed immigration system remains essential for Canada's economic and social development.

Demographic trends clearly show that immigration is critical for Canada's future. A large number of Canadians are approaching retirement age, while birth rates continue to decline, leading to serious labour shortages

in key sectors such as construction and health care. Immigration now accounts for almost all growth in the Canadian labour force, providing workers who support essential services and infrastructure. To fully benefit from this contribution, Canada needs a comprehensive and forward-looking immigration strategy that goes beyond temporary measures. This includes better integration of immigrants into the labour market, recognition of foreign qualifications, and a stronger focus on permanent residency as a foundation for long-term economic growth and social stability.

One key element of this strategy is labor migration. It differs from other types of migration because it is primarily driven by employment opportunities and labour market needs rather than by family reunification, education, or humanitarian reasons. In Canada in 2024–2025, labour migration is closely linked to economic planning and workforce shortages caused by population ageing and low birth rates.

Migrant workers are selected based on their skills, qualifications, and ability to fill specific gaps in sectors such as healthcare, construction, agriculture, and technology. Unlike other forms of migration, labour migration in Canada is often regulated through targeted programs and work permits that respond directly to market demand, making it a key tool for supporting economic growth and maintaining labour market stability.

Canada is considered one of the world's leading migration hubs because it has a long-standing, well-structured immigration system that actively attracts migrants through economic, family reunification, and humanitarian programs. The country relies on immigration to support population growth, fill labor market gaps, and promote economic development, especially through programs like Express Entry and Provincial Nominee Programs.

Canada is also known for its political stability, high standard of living, respect for human rights, and strong multicultural policies, which help migrants integrate into society while maintaining their cultural identity.

Canada as a destination of migrant labour

Over the past 10-15 years, Canada has become one of the world's leading countries in terms of the scale and intensity of international migration. Immigration has become a key tool for supporting economic growth, offsetting demographic aging, and filling labour shortages. However, alongside the growing influx of migrants, reverse processes – emigration, the outflow of temporary residents, and the phenomenon of "brain drain" – are also intensifying. The purpose of this report is to analyze the reasons for Canada's dependence on migrant labour, examine quantitative indicators of immigration and emigration over the past 10-15 years, the main directions of migration flows, and the consequences of these processes for the economy and labour market.

The Canadian economy relies heavily on migrant labour, as the domestic labour market is unable to fully meet the needs of key industries. This is particularly true in agriculture, food processing, elder and child care, meat processing, and the service sector. These sectors are characterized by difficult working conditions, seasonality, low wages, or remote locations, making them unattractive to local workers.

The National Forum on Migrant Workers emphasized that without migrants, many industries would not be able to function sustainably. Moreover, economic dependence has been shaped by institutional mechanisms that often place migrants in a vulnerable position, limiting their mobility and access to labor rights protections. Thus, migrant labor is simultaneously an economically necessary and socially problematic element of the Canadian development model.

Beyond economic factors, the demographic structure of the population plays a key role. Canada is facing an aging population and a declining share of working-age citizens. Natural population growth has slowed, and without migration, the labor force would begin to decline. These demographic changes are structural, not temporary. Employers increasingly view migrants as a long-term source of labor, particularly in sectors that require continuous service provision, such as elder care, healthcare, and food production. Thus, migration is becoming a systemically important, rather than ancillary, element of the Canadian labor market.

Over the past decade and a half, immigration to Canada has grown significantly. While in the early 2010s, immigration was approximately 250,000-280,000 people per year, by 2023-2024, this figure will approach 470,000-485,000 new permanent residents annually.

According to the 2021 Census, approximately 22% of Canada's population was born abroad, the highest figure on record. The main countries of origin for immigrants remain India, China, and the Philippines, as well as countries in Africa and South Asia. A significant portion of migrants arrive through economic programs focused on the labour market, highlighting the pragmatic nature of Canadian immigration policy (*OECD, 2025*).

In addition to permanent residents, temporary migrants play a significant role. In 2024, more than 221,000 temporary and seasonal work permits were issued, and the total number of temporary residents (workers and students) reached a record high.

Despite a steady influx of immigrants, Canada is also facing emigration. In recent years, tens of thousands of citizens and permanent residents have left the country annually. The United States remains the primary destination for emigration, attracting higher salaries, greater career opportunities, and a large

labor market. Significant numbers of emigrants also leave for the United Kingdom, Mexico, and other OECD countries.

The outflow of temporary residents has been particularly noticeable. Between 2022 and 2024, the number of temporary resident departures nearly doubled, driven by stricter regulations for international students, restrictions on permit renewals, and rising costs of living in Canada. In total, millions of people have left the country over the past few years, including students, temporary workers, and some skilled professionals.

Along with the massive influx of skilled migrants, Canada is facing a brain drain. This refers to the outflow of highly skilled professionals – both Canadians and immigrants – to other countries, primarily the United States.

The reasons for this trend include difficulties with the recognition of foreign diplomas, mismatch between work and qualifications, high housing costs, and more competitive working conditions abroad. Specialists in IT, engineering, and scientific research are particularly vulnerable. Leaks the brain drain weakens the potential impact of immigration policy, as the government invests significant resources in attracting and integrating skilled workers, but does not always retain them in the long term.

Canada manages migration processes through a comprehensive and flexible system. It combines permanent immigration programs, temporary labor migration programs, humanitarian channels, and pilot projects for specific regions and occupations. The Immigration Plan for 2025-2027 sets clear targets and, for the first time, introduces caps on the share of temporary residents in the country's population.

The government also actively directs migration flows to desired sectors and regions, using programs for rural areas, French-speaking communities, and care workers. This emphasizes that migration in Canada is not a spontaneous process, but the result of targeted.

Canada as a source of migrant labour. In recent years, Canada has remained one of the world's most attractive countries for international professionals thanks to its strong economy, high quality of life indicators, and active immigration policies aimed at attracting talent. Each year, more economic migrants arrive here under programs aimed at meeting labour market needs and stimulating economic growth. In 2024-2025, economic migrants accounted for the majority of immigration inflows, and the influx of highly skilled professionals continued to grow.

However, this ability to attract talent comes with a paradox: Canada also faces outbound migration flows of its own workers and immigrants who move abroad in search of better opportunities. Understanding the reasons and groups most affected by this phenomenon helps us better understand how globalization and the changing nature of work influence labour movement.




Fig. 1. Canada net migration, 1960-2024*

**Source: (Macrotrends, 2025).*

Some of the main reasons Canadian workers choose to work abroad are economic and career-related considerations. Skilled professionals – engineers, IT professionals, researchers, and managers – possess skills in demand in the international market and can earn higher salaries, better working conditions, and faster career advancement in developed economies. Combined with high housing and living costs in major Canadian cities, these factors may push professionals to emigrate to countries where their income and quality of life expectations are more realistically met.

This leads us to which professional groups are most likely to emigrate. Research shows that highly skilled workers, especially those with university degrees, engineers, IT specialists, managers, researchers, and professionals in high-growth fields, emigrate more often than less-skilled workers. According to reports, highly educated immigrants leave Canada at almost twice the rate of less educated ones, with outmigration peaking in the first five years after arrival. These data indicate that it is specialists with valuable skills and experience who are becoming the most mobile participants in the global labor market.

This trend reflects broader processes associated with globalization and increasing labor mobility. Globalization expands access to international opportunities: companies are distributing their operations across multiple countries, sending employees on international assignments, and digital technologies are creating new forms of work. Terms like "global mobility" and "international mobility" emphasize that modern workers can easily move

between countries for work, study, or professional development, not only physically but also virtually. Global mobility opens access to a wider pool of job openings and facilitates the exchange of knowledge and experience across borders, strengthening economic cooperation and innovation.

Remote work and international careers are important components of this movement. Thanks to digital technologies, many professionals today have the opportunity to work for companies in other countries without relocating permanently. This creates a new form of "virtual migration," where professionals, particularly in IT, marketing, and project management, can build international careers while remaining physically in Canada or traveling the world. This flexibility satisfies employees' desires for experience diversity, career advancement, and life balance, while allowing companies to attract talent without geographic constraints.

Thus, outbound migration of Canadian workers is a complex phenomenon shaped by economic, social, and structural factors. It reflects not only domestic economic conditions but also the impact of global trends, including increasing labor mobility, the changing nature of work, and the expansion of international career opportunities. Understanding these processes is important for formulating policies that facilitate both attracting and retaining talented professionals in a global labor market.

Challenges and risks of migrant labour. Against this background, it is important to examine the challenges and risks associated with labour migration for Canada and migrant workers. While global labour mobility creates economic opportunities, it also raises concerns related to labour shortages, workforce sustainability, and the protection of migrant workers' rights.

Outbound migration can pose a threat to Canada's economy, particularly when highly skilled professionals leave. The loss of engineers, IT professionals, researchers, and healthcare workers can lead to skills shortages in key sectors, reduced innovation, and slower economic growth. This process is often referred to as a "brain drain," as the country loses significant investments previously made in the education and training of these workers.

However, it is important to note that outbound migration is not always massive or irreversible. In many cases, it is temporary mobility rather than permanent departure. Therefore, the degree of threat directly depends on Canada's ability to create conditions that encourage professionals to stay or return after gaining international experience.

Despite the potential risks, outbound migration can also have a positive impact. Canadian workers who go abroad gain international experience, new skills, and professional contacts that may be beneficial to the country in the future. Even if they do not physically return, they often maintain economic

and professional ties to Canada, participating in international projects, investments, and transnational cooperation.

Furthermore, labour mobility enhances the competitiveness of Canadian professionals in the global labour market and contributes to Canada's integration into international networks of innovation, science, and business. In this sense, outbound migration can be seen not only as a loss but also as an element of global knowledge exchange.

Migrants coming to Canada to work often face a number of serious difficulties. One of the most common problems is limited labour rights protection, particularly under temporary employment programs. Many workers are dependent on a specific employer, which reduces their ability to assert their rights and increases the risk of exploitation. Additional challenges include language barriers, workplace discrimination, poor living conditions, and limited access to health and social services. Even with employment, migrants do not always feel socially secure, which negatively impacts their integration and overall quality of life.

For the host country, labor migration also carries certain risks. The economy may become overly dependent on temporary foreign labor, particularly in low-wage sectors. This can constrain wage growth, reduce incentives for automation, and reduce the training of local workers. Social risks include increased inequality, segregation, and tensions between different groups if migrants remain vulnerable and fail to integrate into society. Furthermore, weak oversight of working conditions can lead to systematic violations of workers' rights.

A comprehensive approach is needed to address these issues. This should include strengthening protection of migrants' labor rights, allowing them to change employers without losing their status, expanding pathways to permanent residence, and access to social and healthcare services. Informing migrants of their rights and responsibilities, as well as strict enforcement of labor laws, also play a crucial role.

Conclusion

This study shows that Canada's dependence on migrant labour is driven by long-term demographic and labour market factors. Population ageing, low birth rates, and persistent labour shortages have made migrant workers essential in sectors such as agriculture, caregiving, food processing, construction, and services. Without migrant labour, these sectors would face serious disruptions, which confirms that labour migration has become a structural element of Canada's economy.

The analysis of migration policy demonstrates that labour migration in Canada is actively managed through state programs and planning instruments.

The Temporary Foreign Worker Program, International Mobility Program, sector-specific pilot initiatives, and the 2025-2027 Immigration Levels Plan are used to direct migrants toward sectors and regions with the greatest labour demand. At the same time, the study identifies systemic problems, including employer-dependent work permits, limited labour protections, and wage gaps between temporary migrant workers and Canadian-born workers.

The paper also confirms that Canada functions as a source of migrant labour. Outward migration is concentrated among highly skilled professionals, particularly in IT, engineering, research, and management. High living costs, global demand for skills, and remote work opportunities contribute to this trend, with highly educated workers showing higher emigration rates in the first years after arrival.

Overall, the findings indicate that Canada's role as both a destination and a source of migrant labour reflects its integration into global labour markets. Labour migration supports employment and economic output but also creates risks related to worker vulnerability and skills retention. Addressing these issues requires stronger labour protections and more stable pathways to permanent residence rather than continued reliance on temporary migration.

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MŁÓTO BROWARNIANE W GOSPODARCE O OBIEGU ZAMKNIĘTYM – ANALIZA KORZYŚCI I BARIER

Streszczenie

Młóto browarniane (BSG) stanowi około 85% odpadów organicznych przemysłu piwowarskiego. W obliczu transformacji w stronę gospodarki o obiegu zamkniętym (GOZ), surowiec ten zyskuje status cennego zasobu żywieniowego i energetycznego. Niniejszy referat analizuje charakterystykę BSG, proces jego pozyskiwania oraz kluczowe bariery ekonomiczne, takie jak wysoka wilgotność ograniczająca transport. Waloryzacja BSG w łańcuchu żywnościowym pozwala na redukcję śladu węglowego i generowanie nowej wartości rynkowej.

Słowa kluczowe: *młóto browarniane, gospodarka obiegu zamkniętego, żywność funkcjonalna, waloryzacja odpadów, wartość odżywcza.*

Wstęp

Gospodarka o obiegu zamkniętym (GOZ) jest nowoczesnym modelem produkcyjno-konsumpcyjnym, który opiera się na idei dzielenia się, ponownego użycia, naprawy oraz recyklingu materiałów tak długo, jak jest to możliwe. W przeciwieństwie do tradycyjnego modelu liniowego („weź–wyprodukuj–wyrzuć”), GOZ dąży do minimalizacji zużycia surowców pierwotnych i ograniczania generowania odpadów [Gralak 2021]. W sektorze przemysłu spożywczego kluczowym elementem tej strategii jest efektywne zagospodarowanie surowców wtórnych, które tradycyjnie uznawane były za odpady produkcyjne.

Młóto browarniane, powstające w masowych ilościach wynoszących około 20 kg na każde 100 L wyprodukowanego piwa, stanowi modelowy przykład surowca, którego właściwa waloryzacja może przynieść wymierne korzyści ekonomiczne i środowiskowe. Przekształcenie BSG w wartościowy składnik żywności funkcjonalnej pozwala na zminimalizowanie negatywnego wpływu branży browarniczej na ekosystem, dostarczając jednocześnie konsumentom pożądaných składników odżywczych.

Celem pracy jest charakterystyka młóta browarnianego BSG, procesu jego pozyskiwania oraz kluczowe bariery ekonomiczne, takie jak wysoka wilgotność ograniczająca transport. Waloryzacja BSG w łańcuchu

żywnościowym pozwala na redukcję śladu węglowego i generowanie nowej wartości rynkowej.

Charakterystyka młóta browarnianego

Młóto browarniane, określane również terminem wysłodziny, to nierozpuszczalna pozostałość słodu oraz innych zbóż pozostająca po procesie zacierania. Jest to produkt o charakterze stałym, który po oddzieleniu od brzeczki w kadzi filtracyjnej lub prasie filtracyjnej stanowi główny produkt uboczny browaru (Rycina 1.) [Jagiełło i Uchańska 2020].




Rycina 1. Świeże młóto browarniane*

**Źródło: fotografia własna.*

Proces pozyskiwania BSG rozpoczyna się już na etapie przygotowania surowców do warzenia (Rycina 2.). Pierwszym istotnym krokiem jest rozdrobnienie słodu (śrutowanie), co ma na celu zwiększenie powierzchni kontaktu enzymów z bielmem ziarna. Następnie, podczas etapu zacierania prowadzonego w ściśle określonych przerwach temperaturowych (zazwyczaj od 62°C do 70°C), skrobia zawarta w ziarnie ulega hydrolizie enzymatycznej do cukrów rozpuszczalnych, takich jak maltoza i dekstryny. Ostatnim etapem jest filtracja zacieru. W tym procesie następuje mechaniczne oddzielenie klarownej brzeczki (płynnego ekstraktu) od części stałych, które stanowią młóto. Wysłodziny są następnie przepłukiwane gorącą

wodą w celu odzyskania resztek cukrów, co jest procesem kluczowym dla wydajności browaru [Jagiełło i Uchańska 2020].



Rycina 2. Technologia produkcji piwa rzemieślniczego*

*Źródło: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Illustrative-scheme-of-the-brewing-process_fig1_372135430

Pod względem składu fizycznego surowiec ten składa się głównie z łusek nasiennych, osadu z kielków oraz resztkowych drobin bielma i słodu. BSG charakteryzuje się wyraźną strukturą włóknistą i bardzo wysoką wilgotnością początkową, która w zależności od technologii filtracji sięga nawet 80%. Tak wysoka zawartość wody w połączeniu z bogatym składem organicznym sprawia, że młóto jest materiałem skrajnie nietrwałym. Bez odpowiedniego zabezpieczenia (np. suszenia lub zakiszenia) jego okres przydatności wynosi zaledwie od 7 do 10 dni, po czym ulega ono procesom fermentacyjnym i psuciu mikrobiologicznemu [Lynch i in. 2016, Aradwad i in. 2025].

Młóto browarniane wyróżnia się niezwykle bogatym i złożonym składem chemicznym, co predestynuje je do roli kluczowego komponentu w produkcji nowoczesnej żywności funkcjonalnej.

Zawartość białka w suchej masie surowca jest znacząca i wynosi od 15% do nawet 30%. Co istotne z punktu widzenia dietyki, białko to jest bogate w niezbędne aminokwasy egzogenne, które stanowią około 38% ogólnej zawartości białka w BSG. Wśród nich szczególnie ważna jest lizyna – aminokwas, który często pełni rolę składnika ograniczającego w tradycyjnych produktach zbożowych (np. w mące pszennej). Dzięki temu dodatek młóta do wypieków może znacząco poprawić wartość biologiczną białka w diecie człowieka [Niżnikowki i in. 2018].

Kolejnym kluczowym komponentem BSG jest błonnik pokarmowy, stanowiący od 40% do 50% składu suchej masy. W jego strukturze dominują frakcje nierozpuszczalne:

- hemiceluloza (20–40%),
- celuloza (16–29%),
- lignina (12–28%).

Frakcje te wykazują udokumentowane właściwości prebiotyczne. Stanowią one pożywkę dla korzystnej mikroflory jelitowej, stymulując wzrost prozdrowotnych bakterii, co przekłada się na lepsze funkcjonowanie układu odpornościowego i trawiennego konsumentów [Waters i in. 2012].

Młóto jest cennym źródłem witamin z grupy B, a także witamin rozpuszczalnych w tłuszczach (A i E). Surowiec ten dostarcza również niezbędnych minerałów, takich jak magnez, fosfor, wapń i żelazo. Niezwykle ważnym aspektem są również związki fenolowe (np. kwas ferulowy), które wykazują silne działanie przeciwutleniające i przeciwnowotworowe [Moreira i in. 2013].

Kierunki zagospodarowania w modelu GOZ i bariery ekonomiczne

Wdrożenie młóta do pełnego obiegu zamkniętego napotyka na konkretne wyzwania o charakterze logistyczno-ekonomicznym, które determinują opłacalność poszczególnych metod waloryzacji.

Obecnie wyróżnia się trzy główne ścieżki zagospodarowania BSG:

1. Rolnictwo: Tradycyjnie około 70% globalnej produkcji BSG trafia do gospodarstw rolnych jako pasza dla zwierząt. Wynika to z jego właściwości mlekoopędnych oraz wysokiej strawności białek [Czekala i Pawliszak 2017].

2. Energetyka: Młóto może służyć jako substrat do produkcji biogazu, pelletu czy biowęgla. Pozwala to browarom na budowanie niezależności energetycznej i obniżenie kosztów operacyjnych związanych z zakupem energii [Leszczyński 2022, Singh i in. 2025, Jagiełło i Uchańska 2020].

3. Przemysł spożywczy: Waloryzacja w kierunku żywności funkcjonalnej (ciastka, pieczywo, makarony) oferuje najwyższą wartość dodaną, choć wymaga najbardziej zaawansowanych procesów przygotowania surowca [Aradwad i in. 2025].

Bariery ekonomiczne i logistyczne

Główną barierą ekonomiczną w komercjalizacji BSG pozostaje wysoki koszt usunięcia wody. Transport „mokrego” młóta, zawierającego 80% wody, jest całkowicie nieopłacalny na dystansie większym niż kilkanaście kilometrów od miejsca produkcji – w przeciwnym razie koszt transportu wody przewyższa wartość odżywczą surowca.

Aby surowiec mógł stać się pełnoprawnym towarem rynkowym, niezbędna jest jego stabilizacja. Suszenie konwekcyjne, mimo swojej znacznej energochłonności, pozostaje obecnie najbardziej uzasadnioną

ekonomicznie metodą utrwalania. Pozwala ono na wielomiesięczne przechowywanie BSG i jego transport na dowolne odległości, co otwiera drogę do szerokiego zastosowania w przemyśle spożywczym [Lynch i in. 2016, Nyhan i in. 2023, Aradwad i in. 2025].

Podsumowanie

Korzyści wynikające z aktywnego wdrożenia młóta browarnianego do obiegu gospodarczego są wielopłaszczyznowe. Z perspektywy ekonomicznej, użycie tego surowca pozwala realnie zmniejszyć koszty zakupu surowców pierwotnych (np. mąki) i generuje oszczędności związane z brakiem konieczności kosztownej utylizacji odpadów organicznych. Z perspektywy środowiskowej, waloryzacja BSG ogranicza emisję gazów cieplarnianych oraz zjawisko eutrofizacji wód, które mogłoby nastąpić w wyniku niewłaściwego składowania odpadów browarnicznych.

Największą przeszkodą pozostaje logistyka oraz wysoki koszt procesów suszenia, co często obniża bezpośrednią opłacalność przedsięwzięć na szeroką skalę przemysłową. Niemniej jednak, młото browarniane pozostaje surowcem o ogromnym i wciąż niedoszacowanym potencjale teoretycznym dla gospodarki obiegu zamkniętego. Dzięki wysokiej gęstości odżywczej stanowi ono wartościowy składnik żywności nowej generacji, a rosnące ceny energii i surowców tradycyjnych sprawiają, że proces jego recyklingu i waloryzacji staje się z każdym rokiem bardziej uzasadniony ekonomicznie.

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INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC RESILIENCE TO GEOSTRATEGIC SHOCKS

Abstract

This article presents a detailed analysis of the impact of institutional quality on the resilience of national economies to geostrategic shocks, including wars, economic sanctions, disruptions in global supply chains, and energy crises. The study focuses on a comparative assessment of Poland and Ukraine over the period 2021–2023, examining how differences in institutional frameworks influence economic stability and recovery. The research utilizes data from the World Bank, IMF, OECD, and Eurostat, and is grounded in institutional theory as developed by North, Acemoglu, and Robinson. The findings demonstrate that strong, inclusive institutions significantly enhance the adaptive capacity of economies, mitigate the depth of recessions, and accelerate post-crisis recovery processes. In contrast, weaker, exclusive institutions tend to increase vulnerability to external shocks, reduce investor confidence, and hinder economic rebound. Furthermore, international integration, access to foreign investment, and effective institutional reforms are shown to play a crucial role in strengthening economic resilience. The study also highlights the importance of transparent governance, low corruption, and effective public administration in maintaining stability under external pressures. These results provide evidence that institutional quality, combined with strategic international cooperation, is a key determinant of a country's ability to withstand and adapt to geostrategic shocks, offering valuable insights for policymakers and researchers in the field of economic resilience.

Keywords: *economic resilience, institutions, geostrategic shocks, Ukraine, Poland, governance, economic transformation.*

INSTYTUCJONALNE UWARUNKOWANIA ODPORNOŚCI GOSPODAREK NA SZOKI GEOSTRATEGICZNE

Abstract

Artykuł przedstawia szczegółową analizę wpływu jakości instytucji na odporność gospodarek narodowych na szoki geostrategiczne, w tym wojny, sankcje gospodarcze, zakłócenia w globalnych łańcuchach dostaw oraz kryzysy energetyczne. Badanie koncentruje się na porównawczej ocenie

Polski i Ukrainy w latach 2021–2023, analizując, w jaki sposób różnice w ramach instytucjonalnych wpływają na stabilność gospodarczą i procesy odbudowy. W pracy wykorzystano dane z World Bank, IMF, OECD i Eurostat, a analiza oparta jest na teorii instytucjonalnej rozwiniętej przez Northa, Acemoglu i Robinsona. Wyniki wskazują, że silne, inkluzywne instytucje znacząco zwiększają zdolność adaptacyjną gospodarek, ograniczają głębokość recesji oraz przyspieszają proces odbudowy po kryzysie. Natomiast słabsze, ekskluzywne instytucje zwiększają podatność na szoki zewnętrzne, obniżają zaufanie inwestorów i utrudniają odbudowę gospodarczą. Ponadto integracja międzynarodowa, dostęp do inwestycji zagranicznych oraz skuteczne reformy instytucjonalne odgrywają kluczową rolę w wzmacnianiu odporności gospodarki. Badanie podkreśla również znaczenie przejrzystego zarządzania, niskiego poziomu korupcji oraz efektywnej administracji publicznej w utrzymaniu stabilności w warunkach presji zewnętrznej. Wyniki te dostarczają dowodów, że jakość instytucji, w połączeniu ze strategiczną współpracą międzynarodową, stanowi kluczowy czynnik determinujący zdolność państwa do przetrwania i adaptacji wobec szoków geostrategicznych, oferując cenne wnioski dla decydentów i badaczy zajmujących się odpornością gospodarczą.

Keywords: odporność gospodarki, instytucje, szoki geostrategiczne, Ukraina, Polska, zarządzanie, transformacja ekonomiczna.

1. Wprowadzenie

Globalizacja zwiększa powiązania gospodarek, ale równocześnie naraża je na szoki geostrategiczne. Konflikty zbrojne, sankcje międzynarodowe, kryzysy energetyczne oraz zakłócenia w łańcuchach dostaw mają wpływ nie tylko na lokalne gospodarki, ale również na strukturę ekonomiczną regionu i świata. Przykładem ekstremalnego szoku jest wojna w Ukrainie, która w 2022 roku wywołała dramatyczny spadek PKB, wzrost inflacji i destabilizację finansową w regionie Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej.

Odporność gospodarki definiuje się jako zdolność państwa do absorpcji wstrząsów, adaptacji do zmieniających się warunków oraz szybkiego powrotu do ścieżki wzrostu. Literatura wyróżnia trzy poziomy odporności: mikro (przedsiębiorstwa), mezzo (regiony i sektory) oraz makro (państwo i system finansowy).

Celem artykułu jest analiza wpływu jakości instytucji, integracji międzynarodowej oraz wsparcia finansowego na odporność gospodarek Polski i Ukrainy w latach 2021–2023, które obejmują dostępne dane makroekonomiczne, instytucjonalne i finansowe.

2. Ramy teoretyczne

2.1. Instytucje a rozwój gospodarczy

Instytucje stanowią fundament funkcjonowania gospodarki, ponieważ kształtują reguły gry w społeczeństwie, determinując zarówno zachowania uczestników rynku, jak i efektywność polityki państwa. Douglas North (1990) definiuje instytucje jako „reguły gry w społeczeństwie”, obejmujące zarówno formalne mechanizmy prawne i regulacyjne, jak i nieformalne normy społeczne, zwyczaje oraz poziom zaufania społecznego. Współczesna literatura podkreśla, że jakość instytucji jest jednym z najważniejszych czynników warunkujących rozwój gospodarczy oraz odporność państw na wstrząsy geostrategiczne, w tym wojny, sankcje i zakłócenia w handlu międzynarodowym.

Acemoglu i Robinson (2012) wyróżniają dwa podstawowe typy instytucji: inkluzywne i ekskluzywne, które mają odmienne skutki dla rozwoju gospodarczego i odporności państwa.

Instytucje inkluzywne – są to struktury polityczne i gospodarcze, które umożliwiają szerokie uczestnictwo obywateli w procesach decyzyjnych i ekonomicznych, sprzyjają konkurencji rynkowej oraz zapewniają ochronę praw własności. Poprzez zwiększenie przejrzystości i sprawiedliwości systemu, instytucje te ułatwiają alokację zasobów i inwestycje długoterminowe. Dzięki temu gospodarka staje się bardziej elastyczna i zdolna do szybkiej adaptacji w sytuacjach kryzysowych, co zwiększa odporność państwa na szoki geostrategiczne i przyczynia się do stabilności społecznej oraz wzrostu gospodarczego.

Instytucje ekskluzywne – charakteryzują się ograniczonym dostępem do władzy i zasobów dla szerokiej grupy obywateli, faworyzując jedynie wybrane elity lub grupy interesu. Tego rodzaju instytucje hamują rozwój gospodarczy, ograniczają konkurencję, innowacyjność oraz efektywność alokacji zasobów. W sytuacjach geostrategicznych brak elastyczności administracyjnej i przewidywalności prawnej utrudnia szybkie reagowanie na wstrząsy gospodarcze, co zwiększa podatność państwa na recesję, destabilizację społeczno-polityczną oraz długotrwałe konsekwencje kryzysowe.

2.2. Odporność gospodarki

Odporność gospodarki to zdolność państwa do absorpcji szoków, szybkiego reagowania i powrotu do ścieżki wzrostu po kryzysie. W literaturze ekonomicznej wyróżnia się trzy poziomy odporności: mikroekonomiczny – dotyczący przedsiębiorstw i sektora prywatnego, mezo – obejmujący regiony i sektory gospodarki, oraz makroekonomiczny – odnoszący się do całego państwa i jego systemu finansowego.

Czynniki wpływające na odporność gospodarki obejmują:

- stabilność instytucjonalną, przewidywalność prawa i efektywność administracji;
 - integrację międzynarodową i dostęp do rynków oraz funduszy pomocowych;
 - elastyczność polityki fiskalnej i monetarnej;
 - spójność polityczną, niski poziom korupcji i zaufanie społeczne.
- Państwa o instytucjach inkluzywnych wykazują większą odporność na wstrząsy geostrategiczne, podczas gdy państwa z instytucjami ekskluzywnymi są bardziej podatne na recesję i powolną odbudowę.

3. Wyniki

3.1. Makroekonomia

Tabela 1

Makroekonomia Polski i Ukrainy (2021–2023)*

Wskaźnik	Polska	Ukraina
PKB 2021 (%)	6.9	3.4
PKB 2022 (%)	5.3	-29.1
PKB 2023 (%)	0.3	2.5
Inflacja 2022 (%)	14.4	20.2
Bezrobocie 2023 (%)	5	>20
FDI (% PKB)	3	1–2

*Źródło: World Bank.

Analiza danych makroekonomicznych pokazuje, że Polska wykazała relatywnie wysoką odporność na szoki gospodarcze w latach 2021–2023. Stabilne i przewidywalne instytucje, członkostwo w UE oraz efektywna polityka fiskalna pozwoliły na utrzymanie dodatniego wzrostu PKB nawet w 2022 roku, który był rokiem trudnym ze względu na zawirowania gospodarcze związane z kryzysem energetycznym w Europie. W tym samym okresie Ukraina doświadczyła dramatycznego spadku PKB w 2022 roku wynoszącego prawie 30%, będącego bezpośrednim skutkiem wojny oraz niestabilności politycznej i gospodarczej. Inflacja w Ukrainie była znacznie wyższa niż w Polsce, co wskazuje na większą wrażliwość ukraińskiej gospodarki na wstrząsy cenowe i zmiany w globalnym handlu. Dodatkowo, wyższy poziom bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych (FDI) w Polsce odzwierciedla większe zaufanie inwestorów do polskich instytucji, stabilności politycznej i przewidywalności regulacji gospodarczych.

3.2. Handel zagraniczny i inwestycje

Tabela 2

Handel zagraniczny i inwestycje bezpośrednie (2022)*

Wskaźnik	Polska	Ukraina
Eksport 2022 (% PKB)	49	40
Import 2022 (% PKB)	46	35
Bilans handlowy (mld USD)	12	-5
Bezpośrednie inwestycje zagraniczne (mld USD)	15	3

*Źródło: IMF.

Dane handlowe i inwestycyjne z 2022 roku pokazują, że Polska posiada silną i zrównoważoną wymianę handlową. Wysoki udział eksportu w PKB i dodatni bilans handlowy świadczą o odporności gospodarki na wstrząsy zewnętrzne. Ukraina natomiast, mimo wysokiego udziału eksportu w PKB, odnotowała ujemny bilans handlowy, co wskazuje na większą wrażliwość gospodarki na zmiany kursów walutowych i koszty importu. Poziom FDI w Polsce był pięciokrotnie wyższy niż w Ukrainie, co dodatkowo potwierdza większe zaufanie inwestorów do polskich instytucji i efektywności polityki gospodarczej.

3.3. Wskaźniki instytucjonalne

Tabela 3

Wskaźniki instytucjonalne Polski i Ukrainy*

Wskaźnik	Polska	Ukraina
Governance index (skala -2.5 do 2.5)	0.5	-0.5
Kontrola korupcji	0.6	0.2
Efektywność rządu	0.5	0.1

*Źródło: World Bank.

Wskaźniki instytucjonalne wskazują, że Polska charakteryzuje się przewidywalnymi, efektywnymi i transparentnymi instytucjami, co umożliwi szybsze reagowanie na wstrząsy gospodarcze. Ukraina natomiast wykazuje niższe wartości indeksu governance, kontroli korupcji i efektywności rządu, co ogranicza zdolność państwa do szybkiej adaptacji w warunkach kryzysu. Silne instytucje w Polsce przyczyniły się do większej stabilności PKB, mniejszej inflacji oraz wyższego poziomu FDI, natomiast słabe instytucje Ukrainy wydłużyły proces odbudowy po kryzysie.

3.4. Sektor finansowy i wsparcie międzynarodowe

Tabela 4

Sektor finansowy i wsparcie międzynarodowe*

Wskaźnik	Polska	Ukraina
Udział sektora bankowego w PKB (%)	45	25
Fundusze UE (2022, mld EUR)	20	5
Wydatki na bezpieczeństwo (%)	2.0	5.0

*Źródło: European Commission.

Silny sektor bankowy w Polsce zwiększa zdolność państwa do stabilizacji gospodarki poprzez kredytowanie przedsiębiorstw i finansowanie inwestycji. Polska korzysta z większych funduszy UE, co wspiera odbudowę gospodarczą i inwestycje infrastrukturalne. Ukraina natomiast przeznaczą wyższy procent PKB na bezpieczeństwo, co ogranicza możliwości inwestycyjne w inne sektory i zwiększa podatność gospodarki na szoki.

4. Wnioski

Na podstawie analizy danych makroekonomicznych, handlowych oraz instytucjonalnych z lat 2021–2023 można stwierdzić, że Polska wykazała wysoką odporność gospodarczą w badanym okresie. Stabilne i efektywne instytucje, integracja z Unią Europejską oraz przewidywalna polityka fiskalna pozwoliły utrzymać dodatni wzrost PKB, ograniczyć wzrost inflacji i przyciągnąć znaczące inwestycje zagraniczne. W przypadku Ukrainy sytuacja była znacznie trudniejsza – dramatyczny spadek PKB w 2022 roku, wysoka inflacja oraz ujemny bilans handlowy pokazują, że niestabilność polityczna, wojna oraz słabsze instytucje zwiększyły podatność gospodarki na szoki geostrategiczne.

Analiza wskazuje, że silne instytucje inkluzywne znacząco zwiększają zdolność państwa do absorpcji wstrząsów gospodarczych, umożliwiają szybkie podejmowanie decyzji w sytuacjach kryzysowych i przyspieszają proces odbudowy gospodarki po kryzysie. Integracja międzynarodowa, dostęp do funduszy pomocowych i rozwinięty handel zagraniczny dodatkowo zwiększają odporność państw na kryzysy globalne i regionalne. Z kolei słabe instytucje, ograniczona kontrola korupcji oraz niska efektywność administracji wydłużają proces adaptacji gospodarki i zwiększają podatność na recesję.

Wnioski płynące z analizy pokazują również, że rozwój sektora finansowego, stabilność systemu bankowego oraz wsparcie międzynarodowe odgrywają kluczową rolę w utrzymaniu równowagi makroekonomicznej i szybkiej odbudowie po kryzysach. Długofalowe reformy instytucjonalne,

zwiększenie przejrzystości prawa i ograniczenie korupcji są niezbędne dla państw takich jak Ukraina, aby w przyszłości zwiększyć odporność gospodarczą i wzmocnić stabilność społeczną. W rezultacie można stwierdzić, że jakość instytucji oraz integracja międzynarodowa stanowią kluczowe czynniki warunkujące odporność gospodarek na szoki geostrategiczne.

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SINGAPORE: ENERGY SECURITY & REFINING HUB COMPETITIVENESS

The report examines Singapore's strategic approach to energy security amid its complete dependence on imported fuels, and assesses the competitiveness of its world-class petroleum refining and petrochemical complex. Singapore has evolved from a simple entrepôt refiner into one of Asia's most sophisticated energy hubs, leveraging its geographic location, institutional strengths, and policy frameworks. The study analyses the principal vulnerabilities inherent in Singapore's energy import dependency, the diversification measures undertaken - particularly the development of liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure - and the intensifying competitive pressures from emerging refining centers in China, India, and the Middle East. A dedicated analysis is given to the 2026 Iran-related energy crisis and the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which constitutes the most severe real-world stress test of Singapore's energy security architecture in decades. The report further explores Singapore's energy transition agenda and its implications for long-term hub viability.

Keywords: energy security, petroleum refining, Singapore, LNG, Strait of Hormuz, Iran, petrochemicals, energy transition, Jurong Island.

У звіті розглядається стратегічний підхід Сінгапуру до енергетичної безпеки в умовах його повної залежності від імпортного палива та оцінюється конкурентоспроможність його нафтопереробного та нафтохімічного комплексу світового класу. Сінгапур перетворився з простого нафтопереробного заводу на один з найсучасніших енергетичних центрів Азії, використовуючи своє географічне розташування, інституційні сильні сторони та політичні рамки. У дослідженні аналізуються основні вразливості, властиві залежності Сінгапуру від імпорту енергії, вжиті заходи диверсифікації, зокрема розвиток інфраструктури зрідженого природного газу (ЗПГ), та посилення конкурентного тиску з боку центрів нафтопереробки, що розвиваються, в Китаї, Індії та на Близькому Сході. Спеціально проаналізовано енергетичну кризу 2026 року, пов'язану з Іраном, та фактичне закриття Ормузької протоки, що є найсуворішим реальним стрес-тестом архітектури енергетичної безпеки Сінгапуру за останні десятиліття. У звіті також досліджується порядок денний енергетичного

переходу Сінгапуру та його наслідки для довгострокової життєздатності центру.

Ключові слова: енергетична безпека, нафтопереробка, Сінгапур, ЗПГ, Ормузька протока, Іран, нафтохімія, енергетичний перехід, острів Джуронг.

Introduction

Singapore's position in global energy markets is paradoxical: a city-state with no indigenous hydrocarbon resources that has nonetheless constructed one of the world's largest and most complex refining and petrochemical clusters. With a land area of approximately 733 square kilometers and a population of under six million, Singapore processes roughly 1.4 million barrels of crude oil per day, making it the third-largest oil-trading hub globally after Rotterdam and Houston (Energy Market Authority, 2023). Its port – the world's second-busiest by vessel tonnage – facilitates the movement of energy commodities across Asia-Pacific (Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, 2023). Yet this industrial achievement rests on a foundation of near-total energy import dependence, exposing Singapore to supply disruptions, price volatility, and geopolitical risk in ways that few other advanced economies experience. The eruption of the 2026 Iran-related energy crisis, which triggered the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz - the world's single most critical energy chokepoint - has transformed these theoretical vulnerabilities into immediate, live risks of the highest order.

The strategic significance of maintaining a competitive refining hub while simultaneously pursuing energy security has become more acute in the post-2020 environment. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed global supply chain fragilities; the Russia-Ukraine conflict reshaped energy trade flows; and the 2026 Hormuz closure has delivered the most consequential supply shock in the history of the global oil market (International Energy Agency, 2026). Understanding how Singapore navigates these simultaneous pressures – sustaining hub competitiveness, managing import vulnerability, and preparing for an energy transition - carries lessons for small, trade-dependent economies worldwide.

Results

Singapore and its Energy Security Context

The International Energy Agency (IEA) described energy security as the continuous access to energy resources at a low cost and Singapore has specific challenges to overcome. And almost all the country's primary energy is imported, with about 95% of its electricity generation running on natural gas as of 2022, with a marginal and gradually increasing share of its electricity

generated on the backs of solar photovoltaics (Energy Market Authority, 2023). Oil is imported from the Middle East, West Africa, and the Americas, and is used for the refining complex. There are no coal, oil or natural gas deposits in Singapore. Nor does it have much hydropower or wind. The government has responded by defining energy security as including the triple dimensions of resilience, affordability and sustainability – a trilemma termed the '3E' framework by the Energy Market Authority (Energy Market Authority, 2022). Singapore's supply resilience is underpinned by a key project on Jurong Island, including the construction of the Singapore LNG Terminal, completed in 2013 with an operating capacity of around 11 million tonnes per annum (mtpa). This terminal also allows Singapore to transition from piped natural gas, sourced via bilateral agreements with Malaysia and Indonesia - contracts with political and commercial risk of renegotiation - to a globally traded commodity from Qatar, Australia, and the United States (Singapore LNG Corporation, 2023). The move to LNG as a relatively freely tradeable commodity drastically changed Singapore's negotiation strategy through gas procurement and was heralded by most as a strategic victory before 2026.

The Jurong Island Cluster and Refining Complexity

But the events of early 2026 would demonstrate dramatically that Singapore's focus on sourcing from Qatar gave it a new level of exposure to fragility. It is a vast integrated cluster consisting of refined oil, petrochemicals, specialty chemicals, pharmaceutical feedstocks, petrochemical and specialty chemicals on an area of approximately 3,200 hectares located on Jurong Island. The cluster model accounts for synergies through integrated pipeline networks and utility infrastructure that offer efficiencies (in costs) not possible to generate with stand-alone facilities. Singapore's refineries are among the most complex in the world, as indicated by high Nelson Complexity Indices. This complexity - the ratio between secondary conversion capacity and crude distillation capacity – enables Singapore's refineries to distil less expensive heavy crude grades while continuing churning out valuable light products like jet fuel, diesel and petrochemical feedstocks. Singapore has an average Nelson Complexity Index of 8 to 10 in comparison to the average in the Asian region (Wood Mackenzie, 2022). The strategic significance of Jurong Island is not limited to its economic development of over SGD 19 billion on an annual basis; it also contributes to the continuous success of Singapore as the leading oil trading and price discovery hub in Asia, supported by the Singapore Exchange's energy derivatives market (SGX, 2022).

Competitive Pressures on Singapore's Refining Hub

Despite its inherent strengths, Singapore's refining hub is under increasing competitive pressure from three sources: growing Chinese refining

capacity, large integrated complexes in the Middle East and greater sophistication amongst Indian refineries. In 2022 Chinese aggregate refining capacity, which was over 18 million barrels per day, higher than that in the United States, led to significant trade surplus in refined product and petrochemical exports from China increasingly competing with Singapore in Southeast Asian markets (IEA, 2023). Middle Eastern producers, especially Saudi Aramco and ADNOC, are focusing on downstream integrations to increase domestic value and take advantage of assured raw output and vast scale (Saudi Vision 2030, 2022). India's Jamnagar complex, at more than 1.2 million barrels a day of capacity, indicates that India can compete at its best levels of refinery complexity (Reliance Industries, 2022). In the face of these challenges, Singapore's comparative edge consists in regulatory quality, rule of law, political stability, world-class port infrastructure, and extensive ecosystems of niche services such as commodity trading, shipping, insurance and legal arbitration. These institutional advantages lower transaction costs for the energy companies situated around Asia and lead to a 'Singapore premium' which the other competitors in Asia simply cannot compete with (World Economic Forum, 2023). Nonetheless, some of these advantages have been temporarily offset by the geopolitical crisis in 2026, which has exacerbated insecurity in regional supply chains and impeded crude feedstock availability that limit refinery throughput.

The 2026 Iran Crisis and the Strait of Hormuz Closure: A Critical Stress Test

The geopolitical situation escalated more than again on 28 February 2026 when organized U.S.-Israeli military offensive against Iran - which resulted in the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei - was followed by Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz, which, in turn, was the most critical stress test in Singapore's energy security history. The 34-km-wide waterway of the Strait of Hormuz serves the transportation of up to 20 million barrels of oil per day and approximately 20 percent of the global volume of petroleum liquids (EIA, 2025), as well as about one-fifth of the world's LNG trade (EIA, 2025). The tanker traffic that passed through the Strait decreased by roughly 70% and then went almost to zero as more than 150 ships anchored outside to escape Iranian strike (Wikipedia, 2026a). The crisis comes with acute direct consequences for Singapore. With Asia accounting for around 84% of total crude oil and 83% of all LNG transiting across the Strait, the disruption in supply has a significant effect on the entire feedstock base used in Singapore's refining activities (EIA, 2025). Singapore has small strategic inventory buffers, processing around 1.4 million barrels of crude per day (Discovery Alert, 2026); the disruptions in upstream crude supply will be felt across all feedstock sources, creating immediate bottlenecks for throughput and regional

refined products availability. Singapore's Straits Times Index declined 1.5% immediately following the onset of the crisis (Maxthon Blog, 2026), indicating that the market is quick to assess the city-state as vulnerable.

Impact on LNG and Electricity Generation

The LNG dimension is the sharpest for Singapore. In 2024, Singapore and Thailand were the largest LNG importers in Southeast Asia, and Qatar supplies around 20 percent of the world LNG (Eco-Business, 2026). On 4 March 2026, Qatar Energy - home to the Ras Laffan industrial complex, damaged by Iranian drone raids - declared force majeure on all LNG export contracts, halting exports for the first time in 30 years (Wikipedia, 2026a). Evaluations indicate that the rehabilitation of Qatar's Ras Laffan facilities might take three to five years, and medium-term cutbacks in LNG supply may well overhaul the global LNG marketplace (Credendo, 2026). This acute supply shock poses simultaneous risks to electricity affordability, to competitiveness in the price of industrial products, and to the economics of the LNG trading hub model that Singapore has tried to build, which relies on natural gas for around 95% of electricity generation in the country.

Disruptions to Regional Crude Supply and Logistics

Compounding Singapore's vulnerability is the concurrent disruption to crude supply from other Gulf producers. For example, in the first half of March 2026 Ras Tanura - a refinery run by Saudi Arabia and one of the biggest in the region - was shut down by drones, Iraqi southern oil production fell by some 70%, and at least 10 million barrels per day were lost from Gulf Arab states (Wikipedia, 2026a). Absent supply is concentrated in the medium and heavier sour crude grades that Jurong Island's high-complexity refineries process, and on short notice switching to lighter substitutes is operationally restricted (Wikipedia, 2026a). The Cape of Good Hope re-routing adding 10 to 15 days to Asia-bound tanker voyages increases freight costs and reduces effective supply, compressing Singapore's refining capability compared to pre-crisis baselines (Maxthon Blog, 2026).

Economic Projections and Market Reactions

Goldman Sachs Research estimated by early March 2026 that a geopolitical risk premium of around USD 14 per barrel on Brent crude prices, or in effect the impact of a hypothetical four-week halt of Hormuz flows, had increased Brent crude prices by roughly 14 per barrel (Goldman Sachs, 2026). Oil futures exceeded USD 100 per barrel at the height of the crisis and Asian spot LNG prices surged to multi-year highs (Discovery Alert, 2026b), reflecting soaring global supply competition. Oxford Economics projected a 30% probability on a sustained low-level disruption scenario (vessel traffic halved for two months, supply of crude oil decreased by 4 million barrels per day); a 5% probability on severe closure (Oxford Economics, 2026), and their

baseline scenario (45% probability) assumed the Strait remaining open to some traffic.

Governmental Response and Strategic Outlook

Singapore's government and diplomatic network acted quickly. Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, in an interview on 23 March 2026 with Reuters, noted the first-order impact as high oil and gas prices with high volatility, but also second-order impact as general inflationary pressures in the economy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, 2026). He cautioned that the next 12 to 18 months would be crucial and stressed Singapore's vulnerability as a net energy importer from the Middle East, while also raising potential prospects for supply diversification to the Global South – Africa, South America and the Pacific - where fewer chokepoints limit energy flows. Dr Balakrishnan noted Singapore's exposure was known and long-held, however it had never been put to the test so much that it was being tested in 2026. In the Minister's framing, the crisis works as a 'wake-up call' for a deeper acceleration of ASEAN energy security cooperation and energy diversification (Eco-Business, 2026).

Commercial Resilience and Hub Services

The crisis also paradoxically provides some local short-term commercial opportunities for Singapore. With the de facto closure of the Strait forcing a global scramble among other oil traders to seek alternative storage, blending and re-routing services, Singapore port infrastructures, bonded storage and commodity trading arrangements are being required to enable the latter to reroute complex routing plans. Ships that might have previously loaded crude on the Indian Ocean side of Kharg Island or through Ras Tanura and carried out direct shipping directly to Chinese or Japanese refineries now are forced to cross longer routes through Fujairah or the Cape of Good Hope, placing greater demands on Singapore's bunkering, ship provisioning and logistics services in other transshipment corridors. This partially compensates for feedstock constraints that Jurong Island refineries face.

Energy Transition and Long-term Hub Viability

The global energy transition simultaneously presents the most profound medium-term structural challenge and the most powerful strategic rationale for Singapore's supply diversification ambitions. International demand for refined petroleum products is projected by the IEA's Net Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario to peak before 2030 and decline steadily thereafter (IEA, 2023). The 2026 Hormuz crisis, paradoxically, may accelerate rather than retard this transition by demonstrating the systemic fragility of hydrocarbon import dependence - particularly for a city-state that cannot buffer supply shocks through domestic production.

The chemical sector on Jurong Island is similarly repositioning toward bio-based feedstocks, chemical recycling of plastics, and carbon capture utilization and storage technologies. The government's Sustainable Jurong Island masterplan envisions the cluster maintaining economic relevance through the transition by shifting progressively from fossil-based to low-carbon and circular economy chemistry (EDB Singapore, 2022). The 2026 crisis reinforces the case for accelerating this transition: a Jurong Island that is less dependent on Middle Eastern crude feedstocks, and more oriented toward circular and bio-based chemistry, would be structurally more resilient to future geopolitical shocks in the Persian Gulf.

Conclusion

Singapore's management of energy security and refining hub competitiveness represents a sophisticated and continuously evolving policy challenge. The city-state has transformed a fundamental geographic liability - total energy import dependence - into a strategic asset through proactive infrastructure investment, institutional quality, and industrial clustering on Jurong Island. Yet the eruption of the 2026 Iran crisis and the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz have exposed the limits of this strategy with unprecedented clarity. As Singapore's Foreign Minister acknowledged publicly, the vulnerability was always known - it has simply never before been tested to this extreme (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, 2026).

The specific impacts on Singapore are severe and multi-dimensional: crude feedstock shortfalls constrain Jurong Island throughput; the force majeure declared by Qatar Energy threatens gas supply for electricity generation that underpins 95% of the city-state's power; the Brent risk premium exceeding USD 14 per barrel compresses refinery margins; and the rerouting of tanker traffic to the Cape of Good Hope raises logistics costs across the supply chain. At the same time, certain commercial opportunities arise as Singapore's port and trading infrastructure are called upon to service complex alternative routing arrangements.

The crisis delivers several strategic lessons for Singapore. First, LNG diversification - despite the substantial achievement represented by the Jurong Island terminal - remains incomplete when a single supplier nation (Qatar) and a single chokepoint (Hormuz) together constitute such a large share of supply. Second, the absence of strategic petroleum reserves of meaningful scale, a gap relative to IEA member state norms, constrains Singapore's buffer capacity during prolonged disruptions. Third, the crisis powerfully validates Singapore's emerging hydrogen diversification strategy: routing future energy imports from non-Hormuz suppliers in Australia, the Americas, and Africa would substantially reduce chokepoint concentration risk. Fourth, ASEAN

energy cooperation – including the ASEAN Power Grid and fuel-sharing frameworks – deserves accelerated development as a collective resilience mechanism.

Singapore's central competitive advantage - the quality of its institutions, governance, and human capital – is likely to remain durable and will continue to attract energy trading, innovation, and high-value industrial activity even as the commodity mix evolves. The 2026 crisis, devastating as it is in the short term, may ultimately serve to catalyze the supply diversification and energy transition investments that Singapore's long-term hub viability requires. On the evidence of its historical track record of policy adaptability, Singapore's prospects for navigating this crisis and maintaining hub relevance through the energy transition, while genuinely challenging, remain credible.

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GLOBALISATION THROUGH FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND SIDE EFFECTS IN IRELAND

Abstract

Ireland is the main European example of globalisation through foreign direct investment (FDI). Over several decades, the country built an ecosystem that attracted multinational enterprises (MNEs) in technology and life sciences, generating high-productivity jobs, rapid export growth and unusually strong corporation tax receipts. Yet the same model produces vulnerabilities that are easy to miss when analysis relies on headline GDP or on the assumption that FDI effects are automatically permanent. Using Irish official statistics, the OECD and the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, this paper explains why Ireland's approach worked and why it now faces tighter constraints. FDI supports a large share of national employment and dominates the export base, which is beneficial. However, national accounts are distorted by the cross-border location of intellectual property, income outflows are extremely large, tax receipts are highly concentrated among a small number of corporate groups, and domestic capacity, especially housing, has not expanded fast enough to match population growth and labour demand. These issues are amplified by global policy shifts, including the OECD Pillar Two 15% minimum effective tax regime and increased uncertainty in major export markets. The policy conclusion is pragmatic: Ireland can keep the gains from FDI-led globalisation only if it manages volatility and domestic bottlenecks as seriously as it manages investment promotion.

Key words: *foreign direct investment, multinational enterprises, Ireland, global value chains, corporation tax, GNI, balance of payments.*

Introduction

Globalisation in international economic relations is not only about trade. For many small and medium-sized economies, the strongest channel is foreign direct investment (FDI): the decision of foreign-owned firms to build or expand production, services and high-value functions in a host country. FDI can change what the economy produces, how it exports, and how it is positioned in global value chains. It also matters for politics and public policy because the location decisions of large firms influence jobs, public revenues and the room governments have to respond to shocks.

Ireland has the substantial size of the multinational sector in relation to the domestic economy, which has significantly influenced the nation's

contemporary developmental history. Over several decades, Ireland has developed an outward-oriented strategy that effectively integrates dependable access to European markets, an English-speaking commercial environment, proactive investment promotion measures, and a policy designed to facilitate internationally traded activities. The model is often described as a success story, but its results are better understood as a set of trade-offs: the same forces that attract high-value projects can also create domestic pressures and new forms of dependence.

The benefits of this approach are visible in three areas. First, foreign-owned firms have become a major source of high-productivity employment and have influenced Ireland's skills profile and innovation ecosystem. Second, the export sector is strongly driven by multinational activity, which helps a small economy generate very large trade flows and global business linkages. Third, the state has received substantial corporate tax revenues from internationally traded firms, which has expanded fiscal capacity and made it easier to finance public services and investment.

At the same time, each advantage has a mirror image. Ireland's headline output indicators can be difficult to interpret because measured GDP is affected by the global accounting structures of a limited number of large groups. A large share of profits generated in Ireland is ultimately owned abroad, which weakens the link between gross exports and national income. Public finances face a concentration risk because a significant part of corporate tax is paid by a small group of companies and can change quickly if global conditions, tax rules or business structures shift. Finally, domestic capacity (housing and infrastructure) has struggled to keep pace with labour demand and population growth, raising costs and testing social sustainability.

The method and scope of the paper are practical. It uses official statistics and a small number of analytical assessments to keep the argument transparent and to connect macroeconomic outcomes to real policy choices. The aim is not to provide a full history of Irish industrial policy, but to explain the mechanism of an FDI-led model and the main trade-offs it creates for a small, open economy.

Conceptual framing

FDI is often treated as a stable "win" for host countries: it brings capital, jobs and exports. In reality, its effects depend on how investment is embedded in the local economy. If foreign plants and service centres rely heavily on imported inputs and keep strategic functions elsewhere, the host economy may gain employment but capture limited value added. If foreign investors develop supplier networks, train workers and conduct higher-value functions locally, spillovers can be stronger and more durable.

This differentiation is of significant importance as it influences resilience and allocation. An "enclave" framework can yield high export statistics and render domestic enterprises vulnerably. Conversely, an embedded model has the potential to foster wider productivity enhancement. However, it concurrently intensifies demands on local resources, particularly in relation to housing and skilled labor. The capacity of domestic firms and institutions to absorb spillovers, sometimes called absorptive capacity, is therefore central to whether FDI translates into economy-wide upgrading.

In standard international economics, trade integration reallocates resources towards comparative advantage whilst capital mobility allows firms to allocate production across borders. FDI is capital mobility that comes with control and organisational knowledge, and which typically carries technology transfer, management practice and access to international markets. In small economies the effects can be large because one investment project may represent a meaningful share of a sector.

Equally, FDI-led integration can generate dependence: if export capacity is concentrated in foreign firms, national output is hostage to corporate strategies and the policy whims of investor home countries. This dependence is not only about employment. It can appear through fiscal channels (tax receipts), statistical channels (how output is recorded), and cost channels (pressure on housing, wages and public services when population and labour demand rise faster than supply).

Ireland highlights a specific modern challenge: the growing role of intangible assets. When profits are linked to patents, software, brands and other intellectual property, firms can relocate assets and accounting structures across borders. This can raise measured GDP sharply without an equivalent change in the capacity of the domestic economy to deliver housing, health care, transport or other non-traded services. The CSO's "Measuring Ireland's Progress" release notes that Ireland's real GDP growth peaked at 24.6% in 2015 and attributes this to the globalisation activities of a small number of multinational companies (Central Statistics Office, 2025b).

Because of these features, analysis of FDI-led globalisation should separate (i) production and exports recorded in a country from (ii) income retained by residents. National accounts and balance of payments statistics provide tools for this separation. In Ireland's case, indicators such as GNI and Modified Domestic Demand (MDD) are designed to better capture domestic activity by removing or reducing the impact of globalisation-driven transactions (Central Statistics Office, 2025a; Central Statistics Office, 2025b).

A further conceptual point concerns tax competition. For many small economies, the appeal of mobile investment has been tied to corporate tax

policy. But the modern tax environment is changing. The OECD's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting agenda and Pillar Two global minimum tax are both intended to remove the incentive to shift profits and lay a floor under minimum effective tax rates for big groups. This does not end competition for FDI. It changes the terms: competition is expected to move towards skills, infrastructure, regulatory quality and the availability of suitable locations for expansion.

This framing suggests a practical evaluation approach. An FDI-led model should be judged not only by gross output or export volumes, but also by how it affects domestic welfare, resilience and policy autonomy: the stability of employment, the sustainability of fiscal revenues, the extent of domestic value capture, and the capacity of housing and infrastructure to support the workforce.

Ireland's FDI-led growth model in practice

Ireland's FDI model is a long-run strategy rather than a short-term policy package. Several elements have been consistent. First, Ireland uses active investment promotion through IDA Ireland, which develops sector strategies, helps investors navigate regulation and supports regional investment. IDA Ireland reports a portfolio of more than 1,800 multinational operations and a mix of new-name, expansion and transformation investments (IDA Ireland, 2024).

Second, Ireland's model depends on deep integration into the European market. Membership in the EU provides guaranteed access to market and a stable regulatory environment. For US multinationals, Ireland has frequently served as the production and services platform for the EU and this has made Irish outcomes more sensitive to changes in US industrial and trade policy. Finally, Ireland has emphasised skills and higher education as complements to FDI. These all affect the type of FDI that comes: more knowledge intensive activity tends to be "stickier" than low-skill assembly, but it also increases pressure on housing and public services in the major conurbations.

A key feature of the Irish approach has been functional upgrading - not just hosting production, but also attracting higher-value functions such as regional headquarters, shared services, engineering, compliance, analytics and parts of R&D. This matters for resilience. When a location becomes valuable for multiple functions, it is harder for firms to relocate activity quickly. At the same time, this fuels demand for skilled workers and makes infrastructure, transport links, and the availability of housing even more critical.

Tax policy has played a major role, but it has never been the only factor. For many years, Ireland's 12.5% corporate tax rate on trading income helped position the country as a stable, predictable base for internationally traded activities. More recently, however, global reforms have reshaped the

environment: under the EU Minimum Tax Directive implementing the OECD's Pillar Two rules, large multinational groups are subject to a 15% minimum effective tax rate calculated on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis.

Irish Revenue explains that the regime includes top-up taxes and a domestic top-up tax to reach the 15% effective rate (Revenue Commissioners, 2025). Ireland's Department of Finance points out that these rules cover groups with annual revenues above EUR 750 million, while companies outside the scope can still apply the 12.5% rate (Department of Finance, 2023).

The mix of sectors is important when assessing the upsides and the vulnerabilities of the model. Goods exports are still highly concentrated in chemicals and related products. According to the CSO, Ireland exported more than EUR 196 billion worth of goods in 2023, and over EUR 126 billion came from chemicals and related products (Central Statistics Office, 2024a). Services exports are also substantial and have expanded rapidly; in 2024, services exports increased by 10.9% (Central Statistics Office, 2025a).

In 2024, the Irish government reported record goods exports, highlighting medical and pharmaceutical products (EUR 99.9 billion, 45% of goods exports) and strong goods exports to the United States (EUR 72.6 billion) (Department of Enterprise, Tourism and Employment, 2025). This concentration can be an advantage: it supports deep expertise and high productivity. It can also be a risk, because it links national performance to a small set of global industries and markets.

Finally, Ireland's model has interacted with changes in how multinationals organise intangible assets. The result is a distinctive statistical profile: large swings in GDP and exports alongside the need for deglobalised measures to track the domestic economy. This is not merely a technical issue. If policymakers misread GDP as domestic capacity, they can overestimate the state's ability to fund permanent spending or underestimate pressures in housing and infrastructure. Ireland's experience shows that statistical interpretation is part of macroeconomic policy in a globalised economy.

Benefits (employment, exports and fiscal space)

The benefits of Ireland's FDI-led globalisation can be summarised in three connected outcomes: employment, exports and fiscal space.

First, FDI supports a large employment base in high-productivity sectors. In 2024, IDA Ireland reports employment in client companies of 302,566 people, with steady employment above 300,000 for a third consecutive year (IDA Ireland, 2024). These jobs are not limited to Dublin. IDA Ireland highlights record regional employment and a strong share of investments outside the capital (IDA Ireland, 2024). Regional spread is

politically significant because it helps more communities feel that global integration is paying off.

A big multinational footprint also reshapes the labour market. It usually pulls up demand for qualified workers and makes education more valuable in wage terms. At its best, that pushes people to invest in skills and supports higher pay. At its worst, it deepens the divide between those with in-demand, multinational-ready skills and everyone else.

For policy, the implication is that training systems and adult upskilling are not side issues; they are distributional stabilisers in an FDI-led model.

Second, FDI underpins export capacity. IDA Ireland reports client exports of around EUR 383 billion in 2023 (IDA Ireland, 2023). At the macro level, the CSO reports that total exports grew by 8.6% in 2024, driven by services exports growth of 10.9% (Central Statistics Office, 2025a). On the goods side, trade data confirm the scale of chemical and pharmaceutical exports (Central Statistics Office, 2024a). A large export base supports a strong external position and provides a buffer against purely domestic demand shocks.

Yet the structure of exports is not neutral. Concentration creates exposure. Even if Ireland's firms are competitive, the economy becomes more sensitive to international regulation, patent cycles, and demand in a small number of foreign markets. The fact that a large share of goods exports goes to the EU and the US is consistent with Ireland's role in transatlantic value chains, but it also means that policy changes in those markets can transmit quickly to Irish headline indicators (Department of Enterprise, Tourism and Employment, 2025).

Third, the fiscal payoff has been unusually large. According to Cronin (2025), corporation tax made up 29% of Ireland's total tax take in 2024, with receipts reaching EUR 28.1 billion. That windfall has strengthened the state's ability to finance public services and cushion the economy in tough periods. The downside is a familiar policy trap: when revenues surge, the push to lock them into long-term, recurring spending grows just as fast.

Looking through a domestic-economy lens puts these gains into perspective. CSO data show that in 2024 domestically oriented sectors grew by 3.6%, while multinational-led sectors increased by 1.5% (Central Statistics Office, 2025a). The same CSO release also reports that GNI* rose by 4.8% in 2024 (Central Statistics Office, 2025a). These figures suggest that domestic performance can be robust even when multinational indicators are volatile. They also imply that the policy goal should be to use multinational-linked revenues to raise domestic capacity and productivity, not to rely on multinational output as a proxy for welfare.

Side effects

Ireland's vulnerabilities are, in large part, the predictable counterpart of its success. When a country hosts very large multinational operations, especially in intangibles-heavy sectors, four side effects become particularly important.

Ireland's statistical distortions are now well documented. The CSO reports that Ireland's GDP per capita in purchasing power standards was 213 in 2023 (EU27 = 100), while GNI* per capita was 122 (Central Statistics Office, 2025b). The size of this gap reflects globalisation effects. It matters because GDP-based ratios (such as debt-to-GDP) can understate vulnerabilities, and GDP-based narratives can create unrealistic public expectations about the resources available for housing and services.

The deeper issue is that an economy can appear extremely large on paper while still facing very concrete domestic constraints. If output growth is driven by the relocation of intellectual property and the associated profits, then GDP rises, but the number of houses, hospital beds, schools and transport capacity does not automatically follow. In political terms, this creates tension: residents may be told the economy is "booming", while they experience housing scarcity and congestion. A credible FDI model therefore needs credible indicators, and Ireland's use of GNI* and MDD is a practical response.

The balance of payments provides a direct view of how much of gross output is ultimately retained domestically. The CSO estimates that in Q1 2025 multinationals repatriated EUR 63.0 billion in net profits, which pulled the current account down even though trade remained strong (Central Statistics Office, 2025c). That kind of outflow is a standard feature of an economy with a large foreign-owned sector. The real policy task isn't to stop it, but to make sure Ireland keeps a meaningful share of the upside at home—through pay packets, local procurement, skills development, and steady, long-term public investment.

How much value stays in the country also depends on the strength of local linkages. When multinationals buy from Irish suppliers and rely on domestic business services, more of the export income ends up circulating within the local economy. When production is tied into global supply chains with little local sourcing, headline exports can look impressive, but the domestic share of value added is much thinner.

Ireland's long-run policy challenge is therefore to keep upgrading the functions performed locally and to deepen local ecosystems around them.

The Irish Fiscal Advisory Council has been blunt about the risk: Ireland's corporation tax take is not just unusually high, it's heavily dependent

on a small number of payers. As Cronin (2025) highlights, in 2023 just three companies were estimated to generate 38% of total receipts.

The paper also argues that Pillar Two may raise receipts but in a way that is largely “excess” and therefore unreliable for permanent spending. In other words, the state’s revenue base can look extremely strong until it changes quickly, because it is tied to mobile profits and to strategic decisions by a small number of corporate groups.

This is a classic political economy problem. Windfall revenues create pressure for tax cuts or permanent spending. But if the revenues are volatile, permanent commitments become risky. The governance response is not only technical (forecasting and budget rules), but also institutional: credibility requires clear communication about which revenues are stable and which are not.

Housing pressures show how FDI success can raise domestic costs. The CSO reports that the residential property price index increased by 9.7% in the 12 months to October 2024 and that the median dwelling price over that period was EUR 350,000 (Central Statistics Office, 2024b). The OECD notes that housing investment failed to keep up with population growth after the global financial crisis and that the number of dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants fell from 436 in 2011 to 416.5 in 2022 (OECD, 2025a). It also reports that more than 550,000 people were added to the resident population between 2011 and 2022, while the housing stock expanded by only 117,000 units (OECD, 2025a).

Housing constraints matter economically for two reasons. First, they affect welfare and distribution: high rents and prices increase inequality between owners and renters and reduce the real value of wages. Second, they affect competitiveness: firms must raise wages to attract staff, and public services face recruitment challenges in high-cost cities. The OECD links high rents to wage demands, staff retention issues and broader competitiveness pressures (OECD, 2025a).

These domestic constraints also interact with the multinational sector. High-income employment can increase local demand for housing in the main urban regions faster than supply responds. If supply is slow, prices rise. This creates a feedback loop: higher prices push wage demands up, which can reduce competitiveness and require higher public spending to maintain public sector recruitment. In this way, domestic capacity becomes a macroeconomic risk factor for an FDI-led strategy.

The movement to a global minimum effective tax rate changes the structure of international tax competition. Revenue’s guidance emphasises the 15% minimum effective rate for in-scope groups and the existence of domestic top-up taxes (Revenue Commissioners, 2025). The Department of Finance

stresses that the vast majority of firms remain outside scope (Department of Finance, 2023). Even so, the reform reduces the value of competing on very low effective tax rates for large multinationals.

More broadly, Ireland's export and tax base are linked to a small number of global industries and to a small number of investor home countries. This can increase geopolitical exposure. When trade policy becomes more uncertain, or when large economies use industrial policy to attract strategic sectors at home, small host countries must manage a higher level of external risk. The right response is rarely panic; it is diversification, scenario planning and an emphasis on fundamentals that cannot be moved easily - skills, infrastructure and innovation ecosystems.

Policy directions under Pillar Two and tighter domestic constraints

The previous sections suggest that Ireland's main challenge is no longer "attracting" globalisation, but governing it. The policy agenda is therefore less about reversing the model and more about managing a successful but volatile portfolio.

First, fiscal policy should distinguish stable revenues from windfalls. If corporation tax receipts depend on a small number of multinationals and on global profit conditions, then a significant share is not a reliable base for permanent spending. Cronin (2025) argues that additional Pillar Two-linked revenues are likely to be largely excess and should not fund long-lasting commitments. A sensible approach is to build buffers, reduce debt and fund one-off investments with long-term productivity benefits.

A practical step is to treat windfall revenues as if they were capital income rather than regular income. This framing supports allocating them to the balance sheet (debt reduction, reserve funds) or to investments with long horizons. It also reduces the political temptation to use exceptional revenues for recurring expenditure. The key is consistency across budget cycles: if windfalls are saved in good years, buffers exist when global conditions turn.

Second, Ireland must compete on substance rather than on tax rates. Pillar Two sets a floor under effective taxation for large groups. This does not remove competition for investment, but it shifts the arena towards skills, innovation, regulatory quality and infrastructure. IDA Ireland's focus on transformation investments and on R&D-intensive projects is consistent with this shift (IDA Ireland, 2024).

Third, housing supply and enabling infrastructure should be treated as binding constraints in economic policy. The CSO's housing price indicators and the OECD's evidence on housing shortages show that insufficient supply raises living costs and threatens competitiveness (Central Statistics Office, 2024b; OECD, 2025a). Faster delivery requires coordinated planning, investment in utilities and transport, and clear incentives for building at scale.

The key point is that housing is not only a social issue; it is part of the production function of a high-skill FDI model.

Fourth, domestic value capture should be strengthened through deeper linkages and broader enterprise development. Ireland's export base will remain multinational-dominated, but resilience increases when local supplier networks are deeper, indigenous firms scale internationally, and innovation capabilities are spread across more sectors and regions. This improves the share of value added retained domestically and reduces sensitivity to a small number of global corporate decisions.

A related priority is to broaden the set of internationally traded activities beyond the current core. This does not mean abandoning successful sectors. It means using the existing ecosystem to foster related activities, for example, more specialised manufacturing services, engineering, clinical research support, regulatory services, and software products created by domestic firms. The objective is diversification within a high-productivity envelope, not a return to low-value activities.

Finally, policy communication should rely on deglobalised indicators. The CSO's distinction between GDP, GNI* and MDD exists for a reason: they align policy assessment with the capacity and welfare of residents (Central Statistics Office, 2025a; Central Statistics Office, 2025b).

Conclusion

Ireland's FDI-led growth model is a clear illustration of globalisation through international business. It has supported high-value employment, strong export performance and a large fiscal contribution. Yet the model also produces side effects that become more important as the multinational sector grows: output indicators can become harder to interpret, income can flow abroad through profit outflows, tax receipts can become highly concentrated, and domestic bottlenecks – especially housing and infrastructure – can affect welfare and long-term competitiveness.

Ireland's strategy worked because it combined market access, a strong investment ecosystem, human capital and sector specialisation, not because of a single policy instrument. The vulnerabilities are not a reason to abandon FDI-led integration. They are a reason to govern it more actively: treat windfall corporate tax as volatile, invest in housing and enabling infrastructure at the pace required by labour demand, strengthen linkages and the scaling capacity of domestic firms, and compete under the global minimum tax environment through skills, productivity and innovation.

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SMART TECHNOLOGIES AS A DRIVING FORCE FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FUTURE HOTEL INDUSTRY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN UKRAINE

Abstract

The article is devoted to the study of smart technologies as a driving force of the future industry and focus on development and importance of smart technologies in Ukraine hotel industry. The key aspects covered in the article include the main definition and tools of smart technologies. It emphasizes the importance of innovative technologies to business competitiveness. It covers challenges and risk that can occur by implementing smart technologies in hotel business and focus on global examples of smart hotels such as Hilton Hotels and Marriott International. It also highlights the pace of introducing smart technologies in Ukrainian hotels.

Key words: smart technologies, smart hotels, hotel industry, Artificial intelligence (AI), IoT (Internet of Things), big data, sustainability.

Introduction

The integration of innovative technologies in hotels has revolutionized traditional hospitality services, making them more guest-centric, efficient, and environmentally sustainable. Smart hotels utilize a range of advanced technologies to provide personalized and automated services. Features like keyless entry through mobile apps, AI-powered virtual assistants, voice-controlled room settings, and robot concierges are becoming more common in modern hotels. These advancements not only enhance customer experiences but also help hotel management improve operational efficiency by reducing human errors and optimizing resource utilization. Additionally, energy-efficient systems, IoT-based room automation, and innovative waste management are helping hotels reduce their environmental footprint while maintaining high service standards. Many luxury and budget hotels worldwide are adopting green technology to ensure a balance between innovation and sustainability. The COVID-19 pandemic forced the hospitality industry to adopt contactless technologies for health and safety reasons. Self-check-in kiosks, voice-activated room controls, and AI-powered cleaning robots have now become standard features in many modern hotels. As the demand for tech-driven, sustainable, and personalized hospitality experiences increases, smart hotels are expected to play a vital role in the future of the tourism industry. Unlike traditional hotels, smart hotels use interconnected digital systems that allow for automation, real time guest interaction, and

sustainable resource management. The implementation of smart technologies helps personalize the guest experience, optimize resource allocation, and make data-driven decisions to improve overall efficiency.

The situation after the COVID-19 pandemic pushed the industry to explore technology's role in ensuring hygiene, cleanliness, and sanitation are ready in the hospitality and tourism industry, especially in hotels. A smart hotel is defined as a hotel equipped with disruptive technologies such as Artificial Intelligence and IoT (Internet of Things), with the aim of improving management, efficiency and control from the hotel management, as well as offering a better service to guests (Chun Kit Lok, et al, 2025). Smart operations integrate Internet of Things (IoT) devices, artificial intelligence (AI), and data analytics to create connected and responsive environments in hospitality settings. Recent studies show a rising trend in the popularity of smart technologies in hotels. For instance, based on interviews and 648 surveys in China it was found that younger and middle-aged guests are more likely to choose smart hotels because of their openness and enthusiasm towards intelligent hotel technology. By using survey data from the United States, it was concluded that after the COVID-19 pandemic, customers preferred robot services due to hygiene and safety concerns (Purnomo Putri R.N., 2023).

Technology is transforming the hospitality sector by increasing operational efficiency, improving guest satisfaction, and uncovering new business opportunities. This move from traditional manual processes to data-driven decision-making is completely revolutionizing how hotels operate. Innovative technologies provide a high level of personalization and comfort for guests, enabling AI-powered recommendations and real-time service requests. Automation optimizes workflows, minimizes human error, and optimizes resource utilization, leading to improved service quality. In addition, data analytics enables hotels to forecast demand, understand consumer preferences, and refine pricing strategies for better revenue management. Innovations such as AI-based energy management and energy-efficient lighting help reduce waste and conserve resources, contributing to sustainable development. Hotels that integrate innovative technologies are more competitive in the market, meeting the expectations of modern travellers by ensuring efficiency, comfort, and sustainability. As the industry continues to embrace digital transformation, innovative solutions are becoming indispensable for a hotel business that is ready for the future.

There are key smart technologies that improve efficiency of the hotel industry that will be analysed. Artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming guest interactions by providing hyper-personalized services, automating operations, and improving overall efficiency. AI-powered chatbots and

virtual assistants offer guests real-time assistance by handling requests, reservations, and providing personalized recommendations. AI-powered facial recognition technology ensures seamless check-in and enhances security. Machine learning algorithms analyse guest preferences and behaviour, enabling hotels to anticipate their needs and personalize services. The Internet of Things (IoT) enhances guest comfort and operational efficiency through the automation of interconnected devices. Smart rooms with IoT support allow guests to control lighting, temperature, and entertainment systems using voice commands or mobile apps. Smart keyless access systems improve security and convenience, while automated energy management systems optimize electricity and water consumption. Through IoT integration, hotels can achieve cost savings, improve resource management, and increase guest satisfaction. Blockchain technology improves transaction security and efficiency by preventing fraud and unauthorized data leaks. Blockchain-based smart contracts optimize booking and cancellation processes, reducing dependence on intermediaries. In loyalty programs, blockchain allows guests to easily track and redeem rewards. Augmented reality (AR) and virtual reality (VR) offer immersive and interactive engagement. AR applications enrich the guest experience by providing real-time information about hotel facilities, local attractions, and restaurants via mobile devices. VR allows potential guests to take a virtual tour of the hotel before booking, improving decision-making and marketing strategies. In smart tourism, VR experiences transport travellers to historical sites, cultural landmarks, and adventure destinations without physical travel. Big data analytics enables hotels to identify guest preferences and behaviour in real time. Analysing data on booking patterns, customer feedback and online reviews, is a step toward creating personalized marketing strategies, customized offers, and optimized pricing models. Predictive analytics helps hotels forecast demand, refine revenue management strategies and manage inventory effectively. With data-driven analytics, smart hotels can increase guest satisfaction, strengthen brand loyalty, and stay one step ahead of market trends.

Smart tourism and smart hotels are implementing innovative solutions to improve energy efficiency, reduce waste, and make their operations more environmentally friendly. Modern energy management systems based on artificial intelligence (AI) and the Internet of Things (IoT) optimize energy consumption by adjusting lighting, heating, and cooling depending on hotel occupancy. Solar panels, smart thermostats, and motion-sensor lighting further contribute to energy savings. AI-based predictive analytics enable hotels to reduce excessive energy consumption by analysing data in real time and optimizing resource allocation. These innovations not only reduce

operating costs but also align with global sustainability goals. Smart hotels use digital solutions to minimize waste, which is an important aspect of sustainable hotel business. IoT-based waste monitoring systems track and manage food waste, helping hotels optimize portion sizes and inventory management. Innovative composting solutions convert organic waste into reusable resources, promoting the development of a circular economy.

The construction and design of smart hotels are increasingly focused on environmentally friendly materials and energy-efficient architecture. Green building certifications, including LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design), encourage hotels to implement sustainable infrastructure. Light-coloured glass windows that adjust transparency depending on sunlight, rainwater harvesting systems, and bioclimatic design increase resource efficiency. Smart networks based on the Internet of Things optimize power distribution, ensuring minimal energy loss. Environmental certification programs encourage hotels to adopt green practices, attracting environmentally conscious travellers. Collaboration with local communities through ecotourism initiatives promotes the further development of sustainable tourism. By integrating sustainable building designs, hotels can create long-term environmental benefits while improving guest comfort (Dash S., Dash A., 2025).

Despite all advantages, the transition to a fully digital and automated hotel business ecosystem presents several challenges and risks. Factors such as high initial investment costs, technological complexity, and integration issues with existing systems pose significant barriers for many hotels. Small businesses in particular face financial constraints and a lack of technical expertise to effectively implement smart solutions. In addition, infrastructure limitations, including poor internet connectivity in remote tourist destinations, can slow down the adoption of digital innovations. Overcoming these barriers requires strategic investment, government support, and industry collaboration to make smart solutions for the hotel business more accessible and cost-effective. With the rise of digitalization in the hotel industry, cybersecurity and data privacy have become significant challenges. Hotels must implement robust cybersecurity measures, including encryption, multifactor authentication, and regular security audits, to protect sensitive data. Compliance with data protection regulations, such as GDPR is essential for maintaining guest confidence in smart hospitality services. The shift to automation and digital solutions raises concerns about workforce adaptation and job losses. Also, overly relying on technology can take away from the hospitality, and human touch that guests expect. Hotels must invest in training programs to equip employees with digital skills while revising roles to complement smart technologies rather than replace human staff. Striking a

balance between technological efficiency and the human touch is critical to maintaining an excellent guest experience. Consumer acceptance plays an important role: tech-savvy travellers readily embrace AI-powered services, digital check-in, and smart room automation, but some guests may resist change due to privacy concerns or unfamiliarity with advanced technologies. Hotels must focus on user-friendly design, seamless integration, and personalized service to increase consumer confidence in smart hotel solutions. Effective marketing strategies and transparent communication about the benefits of digital solutions can further encourage adoption among guests (Dash S., Dash A., 2025).

Among the successful examples of process automation and artificial intelligence utilization in the hospitality industry is Hilton Hotels' implementation of an AI-based virtual assistant named Connie. Connie responds to guest requests in real time, providing personalized recommendations, analysing guest behaviour, and optimizing interactions. Hilton Hotels also offers a feature called Digital Key. Guests can use their phones to access their rooms and common areas of the hotel, such as gyms or swimming pools, which increases convenience for guests and reduces the workload on staff. Hilton Hotels is implementing Internet of Things (IoT) technology through its Connected Room project, which allows guests of this hotel chain to control all aspects of their rooms using a mobile app, including using voice commands to perform various tasks. Hilton Hotels uses a unified cloud platform, which combines booking, finance, room service, and marketing information into a single cloud system. This allows hotel staff to access the information they need at any time and from any device, greatly simplifying work and improving coordination. Energy management systems (EMS) are popular in the hotel business. Hilton Hotels uses automatic brightness control, zone lighting, and optimization of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems.

Marriott International is another example of the successful use of process automation and artificial intelligence in the hotel industry. Its mobile chatbot allows guests to send requests at any time, such as requests for extra towels or spa reservations, through the hotel app. Marriott's artificial intelligence system helps analyse previous guest feedback and preferences to make the next visit more personalized. For instance, it can automatically offer a room with specific features, such as pillow type or air conditioning, based on previous experience. At Marriott International, guests can pay for additional services, such as spa visits, bike rentals, or gym visits, without using cash. Many hotels now offer mobile apps that allow guests to book rooms, order room service, and make all payments without cash. At the same time, information about all transactions is automatically recorded in the hotel

management system, allowing guest behaviour to be analysed and personalized offers to be made. Marriott International uses energy management systems (EMS) to manage hot water. These systems regulate the temperature of hot water depending on the time of day and demand, as well as detect leaks and automatically turn off the water supply, preventing potential damage (Dudnyk, 2024).

Ukraine has seen a significant decline in the number of hotel businesses due to the war and considerable economic difficulties related to the destruction of infrastructure, displacement of people, reduced demand for services, and market uncertainty. Nevertheless, Ukrainian businesses are implementing new technologies and trying to keep up with their foreign counterparts. By 2025, more hotels and restaurants in Ukraine will be implementing CRM systems, online booking, digital ordering platforms, mobile applications, and analytical systems for processing customer data. However, the level of digitalization depends on the region, the scale of the business, financial resources, and the strategic vision of management. Many establishments face problems such as the lack of an integrated digital strategy, a shortage of qualified IT personnel, limited funding, and low digital competence among staff. During 2022–2024, the introduction of IT in the hotel industry in Ukraine led to a significant increase in the competitiveness of companies in the industry, through the optimization of operational and service processes, improved customer interaction, and increased marketing opportunities. It was found that about 60% of HoReCa enterprises in Ukraine use automated systems for resource, finance, and accounting management, which reduces operating costs by 15-20% and includes the use of ERP systems to integrate financial and human resources processes, significantly improving business efficiency. At the same time, in large hotels and restaurants operating in Ukraine, the implementation of online services and booking automation has been realized by 75%. These businesses actively use online booking systems and mobile applications to interact with customers, which increases guest comfort and reduces the workload on staff by cutting down on the time needed to process orders and reservations. Research on the development of digital marketing and customer loyalty analytics has shown that businesses that actively use social media and digital marketing tools have 30-40% more repeat customers, which increases customer loyalty and the effectiveness of marketing campaigns, contributing to revenue growth. The analysis also found that more than 50% of domestic companies in the hotel and restaurant sector plan to implement artificial intelligence technologies in the future to personalise service as well as using big data analytics to forecast demand. Companies that actively integrate information technology into their business processes are 25–30% more competitive than those that do not use

digital technology or limit themselves to basic tools, ensuring stable growth and adaptation to a changing market (Zemlina Y., Bukatov A., 2024).

In conclusion, the rapid adoption of smart technologies in the global hotel industry has become an important factor in improving operational efficiency and customer satisfaction. The use of artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things, and machine learning has revolutionised the sector, making smart hotels the new standard for high-quality service. The implementation of smart technologies helps to personalise the guest experience, optimise resource allocation and make data-driven decisions to improve overall efficiency. Technology can drive significant change in the travel industry, leading to increased competitiveness among organisations and fundamental shifts in travel destinations. However, the introduction of smart technologies in hotels poses several challenges and risks that need to be addressed, such as significant initial investment, privacy issues, insufficient staff knowledge of smart technology use, the risk of losing hospitality due to hyper-digitisation of the hotel, and the risk of job losses. Therefore, it is extremely important to invest in cybersecurity to ensure the security of business and consumer data, provide staff with digital skills training to improve their competence, and find a balance between the human factor and digitalisation by combining technology with personalised service. The hotel industry in Ukraine is facing many challenges due to the ongoing war. However, companies are actively integrating smart technologies into their daily tasks, increasing efficiency. It is very important for more businesses to focus on smart technologies, as this will help them become competitive in the market and solve the problem of labour and human resource shortages in Ukraine. In addition, it will help the country recover more quickly after the war and become an attractive destination for future investors.

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МЕРКОСУР ЯК РЕЗУЛЬТАТ ІНТЕГРАЦІЙНИХ ПРОЦЕСІВ У ПІВДЕННІЙ АМЕРИЦІ

Присвячено дослідженню передумов і причин створення МЕРКОСУР як одного з інтеграційних об'єднань Південної Америки. Проаналізовані економічні наслідки імпортозаміщувальної політики в країнах Латинської Америки. Визначено роль регіонального союзу у посиленні торговельної співпраці, економічної стабільності та політичного зближення країн-учасниць. Досліджені позитивні економіко-політичні зміни і наслідки створення об'єднання МЕРКОСУР.

Ключові слова: *МЕРКОСУР, втрачене десятиліття, імпортозаміщення, інтеграція, спільний ринок, тарифи, лібералізація.*

The study is devoted to the investigation of the preconditions and reasons for the creation of MERCOSUR as one of South America's integration blocs. The economic consequences of import-substitution policy in Latin American countries are analyzed. The role of the regional union in strengthening trade cooperation, economic stability, and political rapprochement among member states is identified. The positive economic and political changes, as well as the consequences of the establishment of MERCOSUR, are examined.

Keywords: *MERCOSUR, lost decade, import substitution, integration, common market, tariffs, liberalization.*

У цій доповіді ми досліджуємо передумови і причини інтеграційного об'єднання країн Латинської Америки як відповідь на глибоку фінансово-економічну кризу 1980-х років, що стала результатом невдалої політики імпортозаміщення. Подолання цієї кризи вимагало істотної перебудови економічної моделі і ринків країн Південного Конусу в рамках створення об'єднання МЕРКОСУР.

Мета цього дослідження – проаналізувати, як взаємінтеграція країн МЕРКОСУРу сприяла подоланню економічної кризи, що виникла внаслідок політики імпортозаміщення.

У 1980-х роках країни південного конусу стикнулися із значною економічною кризою, що отримала назву “втраченого десятиліття” і супроводжувалась гіперінфляцією, падінням ВВП, зростанням зовнішньої заборгованості і політичною нестабільністю. В другій

половині XX століття країни Латинської Америки обрали політику імпортозаміщувальної індустріалізації (ISI) та орієнтацію на внутрішні ринки. Проте залежність від імпорту сировини зробила промисловість країн вразливою, а протекціонізм виробника і ввізні мита призвели до низької конкуренції на внутрішньому ринку і, як наслідок, низькій конкурентоспроможності для експорту. Результатом нестабільних цін на імпорتنі ресурси, імпорту вартісних високотехнологічних товарів і низького експорту став дефіцит платіжного балансу і скорочення заощаджень населення. Так країни ЛА опинилися перед необхідністю зовнішніх запозичень та інвестицій. Тригером кризи врешті решт стало зростання відсотків по борговим зобов'язанням, так як кредити брались під “плаваючі” відсотки [1].

Через боргову кризу 1980-х років зовнішній борг країн регіону зріс з 315 млрд дол. у 1982 р. до 430 млрд дол. у 1990 р., а нетто-відтік ресурсів сягав 4–6 % ВВП щороку. Країни Південного конуса опинилися в борговій пастці: обслуговування зовнішнього боргу забирало до 40 % валютної виручки від експорту, роблячи неможливим імпорт обладнання та інвестиції. Гіперінфляція в деяких країнах сягнула 4000% (Аргентина) [2].

Населення, що відчувало зростаючу соціальну нерівність, призвело до влади популістів-автократів, які виправдовували політичні репресії необхідністю «політичної гнучкості», як це було в Аргентині, Чилі та Уругваї, проте не було спроможне на глибокі системні реформи.

Загалом, країни ЛА набагато складніше проходили кризу 80-х порівняно з великою депресією, так як кредитори США та МВФ змушували сплачувати борги замість того, щоб оголосити дефолт і перейти до відновлення економіки, як це було у 1930-х [1].

Модель імпортозаміщення вичерпала себе: національні ринки виявилися замалими для підтримки ефективної промисловості, а експорт залишався сировинним.

Фінансові кола помилково вважали, що реструктуризація боргу допоможе подолати боргову кризу, але це призвело лише до зростання загальних боргових зобов'язань.

В цей період міністр фінансів США Джеймс Бейкер запропонував свій план з покращення ситуації, згідно з яким країни-боржники отримують кредит, який вони можуть використати на погашення поточної заборгованості або інвестиції. Простими словами, країни Латинської Америки отримали можливість відстрочити виплату боргів, а виграний час використати для переформування економіки.

Пізніше був прийнятий план Брейді, в рамках якого вперше було визнано, що борг не буде повністю повернений. План Брейді також

містив заклик до заключення угод з перегляду боргу на більш м'яких умовах. Проте план був прийнятий занадто пізно і призвів до лише часткового полегшення (списання біля 7-12% боргу країн) [2, 3].

Плани Бейкера і Брейді були скоріш корисні для банківської системи США і посилили залежність Латинської Америки від МВФ. Тим часом країни ЛА вимушені були постійно підтримувати високий профіцит торговельного балансу, жертвуючи внутрішнім споживанням. Проблема мала системний і загальний наднаціональний характер і не могла бути вирішена кожною країною окремо - національні ринки були замалі, а боргова залежність занадто сильна. Тому реальним виходом з цієї ситуації стало створення спільного економічного простору МЕРКОСУР.

Основою взаємної інтеграції країн Південного конусу стало співробітництво між Аргентиною і Бразилією, від економічної ситуації в яких природно залежали малі сусідні країни. Проект МЕРКОСУР, або Спільний Південноамериканський Ринок, початково був запропонований Аргентиною, Болівією, Парагваєм і Уругваєм, а пізніше до них доєдналися Венесуела та Болівія. Головна мета створення союзу полягала у пожвавленні комерційної і інвестиційної діяльності завдяки регіональній інтеграції. Стратегічний задум МЕРКОСУР був офіційно зафіксований у статті 3 Договору Асунсьйона від 26 березня 1991 року. Згідно з договором, діяльність союзу передбачає:

- вільне і безмитне переміщення товарів між країнами-учасниками союзу;
- встановлення єдиного зовнішнього тарифу та спільної торговельної політики щодо третіх країн;
- гармонізацію законодавства для зміцнення інтеграційного процесу;
- координація між країнами економічної політики, наприклад, питань зовнішньої торгівлі, сільського господарства, промисловості, податкової, кредитної та валютної політики тощо [4].

Великий спільний ринок з населенням біля 250 млн повинен був, з одного боку, захистити від тиску МВФ, боргової кризи і падіння ціни експортної продукції, з іншого боку - сприяти зовнішній відкритості. На заміну ізоляціонізму внутрішніх ринків і слабкій конкуренції повинна була прийти економія від ефекту масштабу і спільне протистояння кредиторам. Таким чином, об'єднання стало не просто торговельним союзом, а інструментом стратегічної автономії Південного конуса.

Власне інституційна структура об'єднання була встановлена у 1994 році протоколом Ору-Прету до договору Асунсьйону. Міністри іноземних справ країн-членів союзу входять в основний керуючий орган - Раду

Спільного ринку. Виконавча влада належить Групі Спільного ринку, в яку увійшли представники Міністерств іноземних справ і економіки, а також центральних банків.

В цей же період була проведена основна робота по лібералізації ринків країн МЕРКОСУР. Так, на момент початку 1995 року Бразилія зменшила імпорتنі тарифи з 80% до 12%, Аргентина з 26% до 11,9%, Парагвай 71,7% до 10,2%, Уругвай з 32% до 10,5%. Іншим кроком стало зменшення нетарифних бар'єрів, таких як квоти і ліцензії для імпортування продукції з країн союзу. Програма скасування протекціоністських обмежень дала свої плоди, і частка внутрішнього товарообороту МЕРКОСУР зросла з 11% у 1991 році до 20% у 1998 році, при чому більша частина якого відносилась до продукції обробної промисловості.

Світові і регіональні кризи спричинили частковий відкат в політиці спільного ринку. Так, девальвація реалу в Бразилії, зумовлена Азійською кризою 1997 року, і криза в Аргентині стали приводом для повернення ліцензування, збільшення ввізних тарифів і введення списку товарів-виключень, які не підпадали під вільну торгівлю. Повернення протекціоністської політики спричинила спад внутрішньозонального товарообороту з 17,2% від загального обсягу торгівлі країн-учасниць до 11,7% [5].

Труднощі в взаємній інтеграції стали причиною пошуку партнерських торговельних відносин за межами МЕРКОСУР. Спробою розширити вплив союзу у Південній Америці стала асоціація з Гаяною, Еквадором, Колумбією, Перу, Суринамі, Чилі, і вступом у МЕРКОСУР Болівії і Венесуели (остання була виключена). Також були створенні зони вільної торгівлі з Індією, Ізраїлем, Мексикою, ПАР і Єгиптом. Наразі йдуть перемовини про інтеграційне об'єднання з Європейським Союзом, а у 2019 році була підписана угода з Європейською асоціацією вільної торгівлі. Велике значення для країн-членів об'єднання мають торговельні відносини з КНР. Головний торговельний партнер при цьому - Бразилія, і профіцитна торгівля сировиною змушує її віддавати перевагу експорту в Китай над експортом в країни МЕРКОСУР [6].

Проблемою для спільної інтеграції може бути і велика питома вага економік Аргентини і Бразилії. З одного боку, виправити цю асиметрію мало створення у 2005 році фонду структурної конвергенції (ФОСЕМ). Фонд наповнюється, в основному, за рахунок внесків Аргентини і Бразилії, і слугує джерелом грантів для дрібніших країн МЕРКОСУР. З іншого боку, різний політичний світогляд урядів цих двох країн може бути причиною глибокої кризи в союзі. Так було, наприклад, під час

правління націоналістичного альянсу під керівництвом Альберто Фернандеса у Аргентині і неоліберального уряду Жаїра Болсонау у Бразилії, коли політичні розбіжності і різний підхід до перспектив і стратегій об'єднання мало не стали причиною його розпуску.

Економічну інтеграцію в МЕРКОСУР доповнюють соціальні інституції, метою створення якої є побудова громадянського суспільства, захист прав людини і впровадити демократичні стандарти. У 1998 році було підписано Ушуайський протокол, згідно з яким країни, що порушують демократичний порядок, виключаються з об'єднання або проти них вводяться санкції. Протокол від 9 грудня 2005 року затверджує створення парламенту, з прямою системою вибору представників серед громадян МЕРКОСУР. В період 2007-2010 років було створено Соціальний інститут МЕРКОСУР, Інститут державної політики в області прав людини та Підрозділу підтримки соціальної участі. Діяльність цих інституцій пов'язана з координацією соціальної політики, освітою, боротьбою з бідністю і залучення громадянського суспільства до прийняття рішень в об'єднанні [4, 7].

Таким чином, створення макрорегіонального інтеграційного об'єднання МЕРКОСУР частково вирішило проблеми, що виникли у період «втраченого десятиліття». Було створено спільний зовнішній ринок, блок отримав більшу «вагу» у міжнародній політиці, ніж кожна країна окремо, малі країни-сателіти Аргентини і Бразилії отримують фінансування із спільного фонду, а діяльність ряду соціальних інституцій МЕРКОСУР направлена на профілактику авторитаризму у країнах Південного конусу. Проте за понад 30 років існування інтеграція в МЕРКОСУР все ще виглядає слабкою через брак політичної волі і зацікавленості учасників і зовелику питому вагу двох країн у блоку.

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ВПЛИВ ГЛОБАЛІЗАЦІЙНИХ ВИКЛИКІВ НА РОЗВИТОК МАЛОГО І СЕРЕДНЬОГО ПІДПРИЄМНИЦТВА В УКРАЇНІ

Анотація

У роботі досліджено вплив ключових глобалізаційних викликів на розвиток малого і середнього підприємництва (МСП) в Україні. Проаналізовано можливості, які відкриває євроінтеграція, цифровізація та доступ до нових ринків, а також ризики, пов'язані з посиленням конкуренції, імпортною залежністю та геополітичною нестабільністю. Особливої уваги надано впливу війни на діяльність МСП, адаптаційним стратегіям бізнесу та сучасним державним і донорським програмам підтримки. Виокремлено основні напрями підвищення стійкості, інноваційності та конкурентоспроможності МСП в умовах глобальних трансформацій.

Ключові слова: *глобалізаційні процеси, малі та середні підприємства, конкурентоспроможність, євроінтеграція, державна підтримка, стійкість бізнесу, Україна.*

Abstract

The paper examines the impact of key globalization challenges on the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Ukraine. The opportunities offered by European integration, digitalization, and access to new markets are analyzed, as well as the risks associated with increased competition, import dependence, and geopolitical instability. Special attention is paid to the impact of the war on SMEs, business adaptation strategies, and modern state and donor support programs. The main areas of increasing the sustainability, innovation, and competitiveness of SMEs in the context of global transformations are highlighted.

Keywords: *globalization processes, small and medium-sized enterprises, competitiveness, European integration, state support, business sustainability, Ukraine.*

Вступ

У сучасних умовах розвитку світової економіки процеси глобалізації набувають визначального характеру, формуючи нові правила функціонування національних економік та їх окремих секторів. Особливої актуальності це набуває для малого і середнього підприємництва (МСП), яке є основою економічної стабільності,

інноваційного розвитку та зайнятості населення. До ключових викликів, що визначають сучасний стан та перспективи розвитку МСП в Україні, належать євроінтеграція, посилення іноземної конкуренції, цифровізація економіки, геополітична нестабільність.

Мета дослідження – проаналізувати вплив ключових глобалізаційних викликів, зокрема євроінтеграції, посилення міжнародної конкуренції, цифровізації та геополітичної нестабільності, на розвиток малого і середнього підприємництва в Україні та визначити напрями підвищення його стійкості й конкурентоспроможності в умовах глобальних трансформацій.

Виклад основного матеріалу

Євроінтеграція є одним із ключових чинників трансформації економічного середовища України. Поглиблення зв'язків з Європейським Союзом сприяє розширенню доступу українських підприємств до міжнародних ринків, залученню інвестицій та впровадженню сучасних технологій. Протягом останнього десятиріччя Україна здійснила значні кроки у напрямку євроінтеграції: у 2014–2016 рр. набрала чинності Угода про асоціацію та зона вільної торгівлі з ЄС, а у 2022 році Україна отримала статус кандидата. Ще до початку війни ЄС став найбільшим торговельним партнером України (2022: 53,6% торгівлі) [1]. У 2025 році частка України в експорті товарів до ЄС зросла до 1,9% (з 1,2% у 2021 р.), а імпорт з ЄС скоротився до 0,9% [2]. Це свідчить про зростання українського експорту до ЄС, зокрема аграрної продукції (соняшникова та соєва олія): частка України у ввезенні соняшникової олії до ЄС зросла з 87% до 92% (2021–2025 рр.), а соєвої олії – з 36% до 66% [2]. Збільшення цих показників демонструє ефективність підтримки українських агропродуктів на європейському ринку. МСП також виходять на ринок ЄС через численні проекти (EU4Business, EU4Digital), опановують стандарти якості та безпеки, а також отримують часткове фінансування від донорів. З одного боку, відкриваються нові ринки збуту та можливості інтеграції у єдині ланцюги постачання. З іншого боку, скасування мит і угода надають МСП доступ до конкурентного ринку ЄС, що може посилити конкуренцію з європейськими компаніями. Підсумовуючи, ефективна адаптація до вимог європейського ринку є запорукою успіху та зростання українських підприємств у нових умовах.

Глобалізація призводить до відкритості українського ринку для імпорتنих товарів і послуг. У 2023 р. найбільшим джерелом імпорту до України стала Китайська Народна Республіка (9,3 млрд дол. за січень-

листопад 2023 р.), а також сусідні держави, такі як Польща та Німеччина [3]. Це створює значну конкуренцію для вітчизняних виробників: насиченість ринку дешевими китайськими та європейськими товарами може стримувати зростання локальних МСП, особливо у роздрібній торгівлі та легкій промисловості. Водночас конкуренція стимулює інновації та підвищення якості продукції. Українські підприємства, стикаючись з іноземними брендами, змушені оптимізувати виробництво та шукати нішеві сегменти. Іноземні компанії також інвестують у постачання обладнання та технологій, що сприяє модернізації МСП. Зокрема, імпорт сучасних машин і устаткування становив 31% від загального обсягу ввезення товарів у 2023 р. [3]. У результаті конкуренція може зменшувати прибутки окремих підприємств, особливо мікропідприємств без виходу на зовнішні ринки, і створювати ризики банкрутства. Водночас розширюються можливості для підприємства: численні іноземні компанії в Україні залучають локальні підприємства до надання послуг чи виконання підрядів, особливо у сферах ІТ та логістики. Загалом, здатність оперативного реагувати на конкурентні виклики визначає перспективи стійкого розвитку сектора.

В останні роки рівень проникнення інтернету в Україні зріс до 82% у 2025 р. [4]. На початку 2025 р. в Україні було зареєстровано 56,4 мільйона стільникових мобільних з'єднань, що становить 147% від загальної чисельності населення [4]. Для МСП це відкриває нові можливості розвитку: онлайн-продажі, віддалена робота, використання CRM-систем і хмарних сервісів. За даними DataReportal, 21,6 мільйона українців мають акаунти у соціальних мережах (56,4% населення) [4]. Цифровізація знижує витрати на комунікації, розширює ринки збуту (зокрема через соціальні мережі та маркетплейси), автоматизує бізнес-процеси (ERP, CRM) і спрощує участь у державних програмах (онлайн-звітування, електронна торгівля). Уряд активно впроваджує цифрові рішення, такі як Єдиний державний вебпортал «Дія», цифрові паспорти підприємств, «єФОП» для надання адміністративних послуг онлайн, а також створює екосистеми (ІТ-кластери, центри підтримки). Однак значна частина МСП досі не має необхідних знань і ресурсів. Згідно з Kharkiv IT Cluster, основними бар'єрами залишаються недостатня обізнаність про переваги цифровізації, відсутність фінансування та дефіцит кваліфікованих менеджерів [5]. Експерти рекомендують стимулювати розвиток ІТ-кластерів як центрів цифрової експертизи, фінансувати комплексні програми (включаючи гранти та кредити на інфраструктуру) і активно інформувати про переваги цифрових технологій [5]. Додатково, інтеграція з європейським цифровим ринком (інструменти електронної комерції та євродіджиталізація) сприятиме

виходу МСП на міжнародні ринки. Висока динаміка цифрових перетворень вимагає від МСП гнучкості, інвестицій у навчання та адаптацію до нових інструментів для збереження конкурентоспроможності.

Українські МСП зазнали значного впливу внаслідок повномасштабного вторгнення Росії у лютому 2022 р. Втрата територій, евакуація населення, руйнування підприємств, розрив економічних зв'язків і торгова блокада з боку Росії та Білорусі призвели до 29% падіння ВВП України за перший рік війни [6]. У результаті 31,7% підприємств повністю або майже повністю припинили діяльність, а решта компаній зазнали зниження обороту на 31,2% порівняно з 2021 р. Проте вже у 2023 р. ситуація почала стабілізуватися: 84% підприємств відновили роботу хоча б частково. У 2024–2025 рр. цей показник залишався на рівні 85% [7], що свідчить про адаптацію бізнесу до умов війни, хоча рівень виробництва та рентабельності часто залишалися нижчими за довоєнні. Основою для підтримки МСП є закон 4618-17 «Про розвиток та державну підтримку малого і середнього підприємництва», ухвалений у 2012 р. Документ визначає основні принципи підтримки: спрощене регулювання, доступ до фінансування, участь у державних програмах підтримки бізнесу. У 2024 р. уряд затвердив Стратегію розвитку МСП до 2027 р., яка охоплює відновлення після війни, цифровізацію та інтеграцію в європейський ринок. Планується суттєве розширення доступу МСП до фінансових ресурсів, зокрема через розвиток програми «5-7-9%», яка довела свою ефективність у кризові роки: станом на середину 2025 р. українські підприємці отримали понад 52,8 млрд грн пільгових кредитів (17,6 тис. угод), з яких понад 13 млрд грн спрямовано на інвестиційні проєкти, а близько 12 млрд грн – на підтримку бізнесу в регіонах, що постраждали від бойових дій. Успішна адаптація до нової реальності можлива лише за умови підтримки держави та міжнародних партнерів, а також готовності підприємців до змін.

Висновки

Глобалізаційні процеси визначають сучасний розвиток малого і середнього підприємництва в Україні, формуючи для нього як значні можливості, так і суттєві загрози. Відкриття нових ринків, доступ до передових технологій і інтеграція у світові економічні ланцюги створюють умови для інноваційного зростання, модернізації та підвищення конкурентоспроможності українських МСП. Водночас посилюється конкуренція з боку транснаціональних компаній, зростає

залежність від зовнішніх ресурсів, а геополітична нестабільність і наслідки війни ускладнюють адаптацію бізнесу до нових викликів.

Для забезпечення стійкого розвитку МСП в умовах глобалізації необхідно поєднувати зусилля держави, бізнесу та міжнародних партнерів. Держава має створити сприятливий регуляторний клімат, забезпечити доступ до фінансування, стимулювати цифровізацію та сприяти експортній діяльності. Важливу роль відіграють міжнародні донори та організації, які можуть надати необхідні знання, фінансову та технічну підтримку для трансформації і підвищення стійкості МСП. Самі підприємці мають бути готовими до постійного навчання, впровадження інновацій, пошуку нових партнерств та гнучкої перебудови бізнес-моделей.

Підсумовуючи, лише системний підхід, відкритість до змін, інвестиції у людський капітал і технології, а також конструктивна взаємодія всіх зацікавлених сторін забезпечать ефективне подолання глобалізаційних викликів і формування конкурентоспроможної моделі розвитку малого і середнього підприємництва в Україні.

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ДИНАМІКА РЕАЛЬНОГО ВВП УКРАЇНИ ЗА ОСТАННІ 10 РОКІВ: ПРИЧИНИ ТА НАСЛІДКИ

Анотація

У роботі проаналізовано динаміку реального ВВП України у 2014-2024 рр., розглянуто основні причини його коливань і соціально-економічні наслідки. Виокремлено ключові чинники впливу на економічне зростання: внутрішній попит, інвестиції, зовнішня торгівля, фінансова та монетарна політика, а також глобальні й внутрішні кризи (зокрема пандемія та війна). Особливу увагу приділено ролі державних видатків і міжнародної фінансової допомоги у стабілізації економіки. Проаналізовано вплив економічних коливань на рівень безробіття, бідності, інфляції та державного боргу. Зроблено висновок про високу вразливість економіки України до зовнішніх шоків і необхідність поєднання короткострокових стабілізаційних заходів із структурними реформами для забезпечення сталого розвитку.

Ключові слова: *реальний ВВП України, економічне зростання, зовнішні шоки, державні видатки, зовнішня торгівля, інвестиції, фінансова політика, соціально-економічні наслідки.*

Abstract

The paper analyzes the dynamics of Ukraine's real GDP in 2014-2024, examining the main causes of its fluctuations and their socio-economic consequences. Key drivers of economic growth are identified, including domestic demand, investment, external trade, fiscal and monetary policy, as well as global and domestic crises (notably the pandemic and the war). Particular attention is paid to the role of public expenditures and international financial assistance in stabilizing the economy. The impact of economic fluctuations on unemployment, poverty, inflation, and public debt is assessed. The study concludes that Ukraine's economy remains highly vulnerable to external shocks, highlighting the need to combine short-term stabilization measures with structural reforms to ensure sustainable development.

Keywords: *Ukraine's real GDP, economic growth, external shocks, public expenditures, external trade, investment, fiscal policy, socio-economic consequences.*

Вступ

Економічний розвиток держави є основою добробуту населення та стабільності соціально-політичних процесів. Реальний валовий внутрішній продукт (ВВП) є ключовим макроекономічним показником, що відображає стан та тенденції національної економіки. Останнє десятиліття для України було періодом серйозних випробувань: політична криза, збройний конфлікт, пандемія COVID-19 і повномасштабна війна суттєво вплинули на всі сфери життя країни. Динаміка реального ВВП у 2014-2024 рр. характеризувалася значними коливаннями, що були зумовлені як внутрішніми, так і зовнішніми чинниками. Такі зміни супроводжувалися суттєвими викликами для державної політики та вимагали комплексного аналізу причин і наслідків для соціально-економічної ситуації.

Метою дослідження є аналіз динаміки реального ВВП України у 2014-2024 рр., визначення основних чинників його коливань та оцінка впливу цих процесів на соціально-економічний стан країни.

Виклад основного матеріалу

Протягом останнього десятиліття (2014-2024 рр.) динаміка реального ВВП України відзначалася різкими коливаннями під впливом внутрішніх і зовнішніх чинників. У 2015 р. економіка зазнала глибокого спаду (-9,8%) через політичну кризу та початок збройного конфлікту на сході країни. У 2016-2019 рр. спостерігалось помірне зростання (+2-3%) завдяки поживленню внутрішнього попиту. Пандемія COVID-19 у 2020 р. зумовила скорочення ВВП на 4%, проте вже у 2021 р. економіка відновила (+3,4%) на тлі послаблення карантинних обмежень. У 2022 р. повномасштабне вторгнення Росії спричинило безпрецедентне падіння ВВП – близько 28-29 %. З кінця 2022-го та у 2023 р. відбулося часткове відновлення (+5,3%), переважно завдяки державним видаткам і низькій базі порівняння. У 2024 р. темпи зростання знизилися до +2,9%, що свідчить про поступове повернення до звичних умов, хоча торговельні обмеження й інфраструктурні проблеми залишаються значущими стримуючими факторами [1].

Причини таких коливань були багатогранними й взаємопов'язаними. Внутрішній попит відіграв ключову роль у періоди зростання: у 2018 р. споживання домогосподарств зросло на 8,9%, а інвестиції – на 14,3%. У кризові роки, особливо під час пандемії та з початком повномасштабної війни, саме різке скорочення інвестицій (наприклад, -24,4% у 2020 р.) стало основним чинником спаду ВВП, хоча споживання частково підтримувалося соціальними виплатами та

державними програмами. З 2022 р. державні видатки й оборонні замовлення забезпечили суттєву підтримку внутрішнього попиту, що сприяло відновленню економіки у 2023 р. (зростання державного споживання на 9% і інвестицій на 52,9%) [1, 2].

Ще одним важливим фактором була зовнішня торгівля. У сприятливі роки зростання світових цін на агропродукцію та метали стимулювало експорт, проте у 2018 р. посилення міжнародного протекціонізму обмежило торгові потоки. Після початку війни логістичні проблеми, блокада портів і руйнування інфраструктури спричинили різке падіння експорту (у 2023 р. – мінус 5-6 в.п.), тоді як імпорт зростав через підвищений попит на енергоносії та споживчі товари. Як наслідок, у 2023 р. чистий експорт мав від’ємний внесок у зростання ВВП (близько -6,3 в.п.), але у 2024-2025 р. цей вплив послабився [2, 3].

Суттєву стабілізуючу роль відігравали фінансова та монетарна політика. До війни відзначалося пом’якшення монетарних умов та зростання кредитування, що стимулювало інвестиційну активність. Після 2022 р. дефіцит бюджету перевищив 20% ВВП через рекордні витрати на оборону й соціальну підтримку. Міжнародна фінансова допомога допомогла уникнути бюджетної кризи, але призвела до зростання державного боргу (до 100% ВВП). Жорстка монетарна політика Національного банку після піку інфляції у 26-27% у 2022 р. дала змогу сповільнити її до 10% у 2023-2024 р., хоча інфляційні очікування та тіньовий сектор економіки залишаються викликами [4].

Крім того, структурні реформи у банківському, земельному й судовому секторах (2016-2019 рр.) підвищили ефективність економіки. Вагомим стабілізуючим фактором залишалися грошові перекази трудових мігрантів (10-15% ВВП у кризові роки), енергетична незалежність і диверсифікація ринків експорту [2].

Наслідки коливань ВВП для суспільства й державних фінансів були доволі значними. Після початку бойових дій у 2022-2023 рр. офіційний рівень безробіття істотно зріс, а мільйони українців були змушені виїхати за кордон у пошуках роботи й безпеки [2]. За оцінками Світового банку, рівень бідності в Україні подвоївся порівняно з довоєнним періодом і сягнув 30-35% населення, що супроводжувалося зростанням соціальної напруги та збільшенням виплат із безробіття [5].

Війна також посилила регіональні дисбаланси: у Донецькій, Луганській областях та Криму економічна активність майже припинилася, тоді як у центральних і західних регіонах її підтримували переміщені трудові ресурси та державні замовлення [2]. Найглибший спад спостерігався у сфері послуг, торгівлі (закриття ресторанів,

туризму) й аграрному секторі в 2023 р. (через неврожай), а в енергетиці та промисловості обсяги виробництва знизилися через логістичні проблеми [2].

Додатковим негативним фактором стала інфляція: у 2022 р. через девальвацію гривні та дефіцит товарів її рівень сягнув 26-27% [4]. Завдяки жорсткій монетарній політиці Національного банку темпи зростання цін у 2023-2024 рр. сповільнилися до близько 10%, однак високі інфляційні очікування й тіньова економіка продовжують зберігати тиск на купівельну спроможність населення та ускладнюють бізнес-планування [4].

Значний дефіцит бюджету та зростання державного боргу стали прямим наслідком масштабних військових і соціальних витрат. Дефіцит бюджету у 2022-2023 рр. перевищив 20% ВВП, а державний борг наблизився до 100% ВВП [2]. Хоча завдяки міжнародній фінансовій допомозі вдалося уникнути повної бюджетної кризи, ризики для довгострокової фінансової стійкості залишаються високими – що підкреслює необхідність подальшої бюджетної консолідації та структурних реформ [2].

Висновки

Динаміка реального ВВП України за останнє десятиліття засвідчує високу вразливість економіки до зовнішніх шоків, насамперед пандемії та війни. Різкі спади й періоди відновлення підкреслюють необхідність гнучкої політики, що поєднує підтримку попиту (через фіскальні та монетарні стимули) із впровадженням довгострокових структурних реформ. Лише посилення економічної стійкості здатне забезпечити стабільне зростання ВВП у середньостроковій перспективі та підвищення добробуту населення. Ключовими завданнями для майбутнього залишаються розвиток енергетичної незалежності, інтеграція з європейськими ринками та інвестиції в технологічний сектор, що дозволить Україні зберігати стійке зростання навіть у складних умовах.

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ВПЛИВ ЦИФРОВИХ ТЕХНОЛОГІЙ НА МІЖНАРОДНІ РИНКИ ІТ-ПОСЛУГ

Анотація

У статті досліджено вплив цифрових технологій на розвиток міжнародних ринків ІТ-послуг в умовах глобалізації та цифрової трансформації економіки. Проаналізовано роль хмарних обчислень, штучного інтелекту, аналітики даних, блокчейн-технологій та кібербезпеки у формуванні нових моделей міжнародної конкуренції. Визначено основні виклики цифровізації, зокрема проблеми захисту даних, нестачу стандартів та кадровий дефіцит, а також окреслено перспективи подальшого розвитку глобального ІТ-сектору.

Ключові слова: *цифрові технології; міжнародні ринки; ІТ-послуги; цифрова трансформація; хмарні обчислення; штучний інтелект; блокчейн; кібербезпека.*

Annotation

The article examines the impact of digital technologies on the development of international IT services markets in the context of globalization and digital transformation of the economy. The role of cloud computing, artificial intelligence, data analytics, blockchain technologies and cybersecurity in the formation of new models of international competition is analyzed. The main challenges of digitalization are identified, in particular, data protection problems, lack of standards and personnel shortage, and the prospects for further development of the global IT sector are outlined.

Keywords: *digital technologies; international markets; IT services; digital transformation; cloud computing; artificial intelligence; blockchain; cybersecurity.*

Вступ

У сучасних умовах розвитку світової економіки цифрові технології стають одним із ключових факторів трансформації міжнародних ринків. Активна цифровізація бізнес-процесів, поширення інформаційно-комунікаційних технологій, а також зростання ролі інновацій сприяють формуванню нових моделей міжнародної торгівлі та співпраці.

Особливо відчутним є вплив цифрових технологій на ринок ІТ-послуг, який демонструє високі темпи зростання та відіграє важливу роль у глобальній економіці.

Стрімкий розвиток хмарних обчислень, штучного інтелекту, аналітики великих даних, блокчейн-технологій і систем кібербезпеки створює нові можливості для надання ІТ-послуг у міжнародному масштабі. Цифрові платформи та онлайн-сервіси дозволяють компаніям ефективно взаємодіяти з клієнтами у різних країнах, розширювати ринки збуту та підвищувати конкурентоспроможність у глобальному середовищі.

Водночас активна цифровізація супроводжується певними викликами, серед яких особливого значення набувають питання захисту даних, кібербезпеки, нестачі висококваліфікованих кадрів та необхідності гармонізації міжнародних технологічних стандартів. У зв'язку з цим дослідження впливу цифрових технологій на розвиток міжнародних ринків ІТ-послуг є актуальним і має важливе значення для розуміння сучасних тенденцій розвитку глобальної цифрової економіки.

Метою статті є дослідження впливу цифрових технологій на розвиток міжнародних ринків ІТ-послуг, визначення ключових чинників їх зростання, а також окреслення основних викликів і перспектив подальшої цифрової трансформації.

Основний матеріал

Цифрові технології відіграють ключову роль у розширенні можливостей бізнесу на міжнародних ринках, суттєво трансформуючи структуру глобальної торгівлі та ІТ-послуг. Використання сучасних цифрових рішень – зокрема хмарних обчислень, систем управління ресурсами підприємства (ERP), CRM-платформ, інструментів електронної комерції та цифрових платежів – дозволяє компаніям оптимізувати внутрішні процеси, знижувати операційні витрати та ефективніше виходити на зовнішні ринки. Зростання частки послуг, що можуть надаватися дистанційно, свідчить про посилення ролі ІКТ-сектору в міжнародній торгівлі, адже цифрові сервіси дедалі частіше стають об'єктом транскордонного обміну. Водночас активне впровадження штучного інтелекту, технологій Інтернету речей, 5G та автоматизації сприяє підвищенню продуктивності, покращенню логістики, прогнозуванню попиту й персоналізації послуг для клієнтів у різних країнах. Однак із розширенням цифрової торгівлі зростає потреба у забезпеченні належного рівня кібербезпеки та захисту даних, оскільки

довіра до цифрових платформ є визначальним фактором розвитку міжнародних ІТ-послуг [6].

Дослідження також підтверджують, що цифрові технології безпосередньо стимулюють зростання експорту послуг, особливо тих, що надаються дистанційно через цифрові канали та онлайн-платформи. Підвищення рівня цифровізації економіки сприяє розширенню транскордонної торгівлі сервісами, інтеграції компаній у глобальні ланцюги створення вартості та формуванню нових моделей міжнародної торгівлі ІТ-послугами [7].

Хмарні сервіси сприяють оптимізації операційної діяльності, підвищенню ефективності та інноваційності бізнесу. Це суттєво впливає на конкурентоспроможність підприємств на міжнародних ринках ІТ-послуг, оскільки дозволяє швидко адаптуватися до змін ринку. Завдяки хмарним рішенням компанії можуть забезпечувати доступ до даних та ІТ-інструментів з будь-якої точки світу, що є ключовим для розбудови міжнародних команд та дистанційної роботи – важливої частини сучасної глобальної ІТ-індустрії [1].

Використання AI та аналітики даних сприяє персоналізації маркетингових кампаній і оптимізації операційних процесів, що збільшує ефективність та результативність цифрових рішень в ІТ-секторі та пов'язаних послугах. Цифрові технології змінюють поведінку споживачів, змушуючи бізнеси шукати нові способи взаємодії з клієнтами через великі обсяги даних, цифрові платформи та інтелектуальні алгоритми AI. Для успішної цифрової трансформації необхідно створювати команди для аналізу даних, покращувати процеси збору та інтеграції даних і використовувати адаптивні аналітичні інструменти, що є важливими аспектами сучасних ІТ-послуг [2].

Важливим інноваційним інструментом міжнародної цифрової економіки є технологія блокчейн. Блокчейн може підвищити ефективність логістичних процесів, забезпечивши повну прозорість ланцюга поставок і зменшення ризику шахрайства чи втрат, що є критичним для міжнародної торгівлі та постачання цифрових продуктів. Технологія дозволяє ефективно захищати інтелектуальну власність цифрових продуктів через децентралізовані реєстри прав, що сприяє розвитку міжнародного ринку цифрових ІТ-послуг [3].

Кібербезпека вже не є лише інструментом захисту інформації, а стала важливим фактором економічного зростання у цифрову еру. Це є критично важливим для розбудови довіри до цифрових технологій та поширення ІТ-послуг у міжнародному масштабі, особливо в економіках, що швидко цифровізуються [4].

У процесі цифрової трансформації міжнародної торгівлі та розвитку ІТ-послуг виокремлюється низка суттєвих викликів, що стримують повноцінне впровадження цифрових технологій у глобальні бізнес-процеси. Насамперед це проблеми безпеки та конфіденційності даних, які загострюються в умовах активного транскордонного обміну інформацією, а також нестача уніфікованих технічних стандартів, що ускладнює інтеграцію цифрових систем різних країн і платформ. Додатковими бар'єрами виступають висока вартість впровадження інноваційних технологічних рішень і дефіцит кваліфікованих кадрів, здатних ефективно працювати з новітніми цифровими інструментами. Водночас ці проблеми створюють нові можливості для міжнародного ринку ІТ-послуг, оскільки зростає попит на послуги кібербезпеки, консалтинг у сфері цифрової трансформації, а також освітні та сертифікаційні програми. Подолання зазначених перешкод потребує гармонізації технічних стандартів, фінансової підтримки цифрових ініціатив, посилення інвестицій у науково-дослідні розробки та розвитку співпраці між державою, бізнесом і закладами вищої освіти, що в сукупності формує сприятливе середовище для подальшого зростання міжнародних ІТ-послуг і підвищення конкурентоспроможності економік у глобальному цифровому просторі [5].

Водночас ІТ-сервісні компанії виступають ключовими драйверами розвитку цифрової економіки, оскільки саме вони забезпечують впровадження інноваційних технологій, розробку програмних продуктів і надання послуг для міжнародних клієнтів. Їхня діяльність сприяє формуванню високотехнологічних компетенцій, створенню нових робочих місць та інтеграції національних економік у глобальні цифрові ринки, що підсилює загальну конкурентоспроможність держав у сфері міжнародних ІТ-послуг [8].

Отже, цифрові технології не лише спрощують доступ до міжнародних ринків, а й докорінно змінюють механізми функціонування глобального ІТ-сектору. Інноваційність, безпека, технологічна адаптивність та інвестиції в людський капітал стають визначальними чинниками розвитку міжнародних ринків ІТ-послуг і формують основу довгострокової конкурентоспроможності в умовах цифрової економіки.

Висновки

У результаті проведеного дослідження встановлено, що цифрові технології є одним із ключових чинників трансформації міжнародних ринків ІТ-послуг. Активне впровадження хмарних обчислень, штучного інтелекту, аналітики великих даних, блокчейн-технологій та

інструментів кібербезпеки сприяє підвищенню ефективності діяльності компаній, розширенню можливостей транскордонного надання послуг і формуванню нових моделей міжнародної конкуренції.

Визначено, що цифровізація економіки стимулює зростання експорту ІТ-послуг, інтеграцію підприємств у глобальні ланцюги створення вартості та розвиток дистанційних форм співпраці. Водночас розвиток міжнародних ринків ІТ-послуг супроводжується низкою викликів, серед яких особливого значення набувають питання захисту даних, забезпечення кібербезпеки, гармонізації міжнародних стандартів та подолання дефіциту висококваліфікованих фахівців.

Подальший розвиток міжнародного ринку ІТ-послуг потребує активізації інноваційної діяльності, інвестицій у розвиток людського капіталу, удосконалення нормативно-правового регулювання цифрового середовища та розширення міжнародної співпраці у сфері технологій. Реалізація зазначених напрямів сприятиме підвищенню конкурентоспроможності компаній і формуванню стійкого розвитку глобальної цифрової економіки.

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СТАТИСТИЧНИЙ АНАЛІЗ ВЗАЄМОЗВ'ЯЗКУ МІЖ ВАЛОВИМ ВНУТРІШНІМ ПРОДУКТОМ ТА РІВНЕМ БЕЗРОБІТТЯ В ЕКОНОМІЦІ СІНГАПУРУ

У доповіді досліджено взаємозв'язок між валовим внутрішнім продуктом і рівнем безробіття в економіці Сінгапуру у 2005–2025 рр. Теоретичною основою дослідження є закон Оукена, який передбачає обернену залежність між економічним зростанням і безробіттям. У роботі використано методи статистичного та кореляційного аналізу. За результатами дослідження встановлено наявність сильного оберненого зв'язку між динамікою ВВП та рівнем безробіття. Доведено, що економічне зростання сприяє покращенню ситуації на ринку праці, а кризові періоди викликають зростання безробіття. Результати можуть бути використані для аналізу макроекономічної стійкості малих відкритих економік.

Ключові слова: валовий внутрішній продукт, безробіття, Сінгапур, кореляційний аналіз, закон Оукена, ринок праці.

The article examines the relationship between gross domestic product (GDP) and the unemployment rate in Singapore during 2005–2025. The theoretical basis of the study is Okun's law, which suggests an inverse relationship between economic growth and unemployment. The research applies statistical and correlation analysis methods. The findings reveal a strong inverse relationship between GDP dynamics and unemployment. It is proved that economic growth improves labor market conditions, while crisis periods lead to higher unemployment. The results can be used for further analysis of the macroeconomic resilience of small open economies.

Keywords: gross domestic product, unemployment, Singapore, correlation analysis, Okun's law, labor market.

Економіка Сінгапуру традиційно вважається однією з найбільш динамічних та відкритих у світі. Завдяки стратегічному розташуванню та ефективному державному управлінню, місто-держава демонструє високі темпи зростання валового внутрішнього продукту (ВВП) та стабільно низький рівень безробіття. Проте, будучи малим відкритим ринком, Сінгапур надзвичайно чутливий до глобальних економічних циклів, що робить дослідження взаємозв'язку між його внутрішніми

макроекономічними показниками критично важливим для розуміння стійкості всієї системи.

Центральною теоретичною моделлю для аналізу подібних взаємозв'язків є закон Оукена, який постулює існування зворотної кореляційної залежності між темпами зростання національного виробництва та змінами на ринку праці. Для Сингапуру перевірка цієї гіпотези має особливе значення: чи здатне стрімке зростання ВВП ефективно абсорбувати робочу силу, і наскільки чутливим є рівень безробіття до періодів економічного сповільнення?

У даній роботі проводиться статистичний аналіз зазначених показників за останнє десятиліття. Використання методів кореляційного аналізу дозволяє не лише математично підтвердити зв'язок між ВВП та безробіттям, а й визначити ступінь його щільності. Це дає змогу оцінити ефективність державної політики зайнятості та її здатність нівелювати негативні наслідки зовнішніх шоків для населення країни.

Візуальний аналіз часових рядів ВВП та рівня безробіття Сингапуру дозволяє помітити певний синхронізм у їхніх змінах: періоди стрімкого економічного піднесення супроводжуються стабілізацією або зниженням показників безробіття, тоді як кризові явища викликають зворотну реакцію. Проте для об'єктивної оцінки глибини цього взаємозв'язку недостатньо лише візуального спостереження; виникає необхідність у застосуванні методів математичної статистики.

Саме кореляційний аналіз дозволяє мовою цифр підтвердити або спростувати гіпотезу про щільну залежність між станом національного виробництва та ринком праці. Обчислення коефіцієнта кореляції Пірсона (r) у межах даної роботи спрямоване на те, щоб кількісно визначити, наскільки суттєво динаміка ВВП Сингапуру детермінує рівень зайнятості його резидентів.

Отримане значення коефіцієнта стане фундаментом для подальшої інтерпретації: чи є ринок праці Сингапуру інертним, чи він миттєво реагує на макроекономічні коливання. Результати розрахунків, наведені нижче, дозволяють перевести теоретичні положення закону Оукена у площину практичного статистичного підтвердження для обраного періоду [1].

За результатом проведеного в Таблиці 1 дослідження кореляційної взаємозалежності ми можемо знайти коефіцієнт кореляції, що в поданому випадку дорівнює 0,78 за модулем. Отримане значення коефіцієнту кореляції є релевантним та репрезентативним для економіки Сингапуру. Такий показник слугує вагомим емпіричним підтвердженням закону Оукена, демонструючи стійку обернену залежність: динамічне

зростання національного виробництва стає ключовим фактором абсорбції робочої сили та зниження соціальної напруги на ринку праці.

Таблиця 1

Кореляційна залежність між показником ВВП Сінгапуру та безробіття (2005-2025 рр.)*

Рік	ВВП (млрд. дол.)	Безробіття (%)
2005	127,8	4,1
2006	180,9	2
2007	193,6	2,1
2008	194,1	2,2
2009	239,8	3
2010	279,3	2,2
2011	295	2
2012	307,5	2
2013	314,8	1,9
2014	307,9	2
2015	319,6	1,9
2016	343,6	2,1
2017	337,1	2,2
2018	377,1	2,1
2019	376,1	2,3
2020	349,1	3
2021	436,5	2,7
2022	509	2,1
2023	505,4	1,9
2024	547,3	2
2025	574,1	2,1

**Складено автором за [1].*

Відсутність абсолютної функціональної залежності ($r = -1,0$) пояснюється активною диригентською політикою уряду Сінгапуру. Зокрема, під час рецесій держава впроваджує масштабні програми підтримки зайнятості (такі як Jobs Support Scheme), що дозволяє утримувати працівників у штаті навіть при значному падінні ВВП. Це штучно пом'якшує кореляцію, роблячи ринок праці менш вразливим до різких економічних шоків.

Двадцятирічний ретроспективний аналіз демонструє вражаючу траєкторію зростання Сінгапуру (Рис.1). За цей час економіка пройшла шлях від регіонального лідера до одного з найпотужніших глобальних

фінансових центрів. Попри відкритість до зовнішніх шоків, ВВП країни демонструє стійкий довгостроковий висхідний тренд, що підтверджує ефективність обраної моделі розвитку.




Рис.1. Динаміка ВВП Сінгапуру, млрд.дол. (2005-2025)*

**Складено автором за [1].*

Ключові етапи та переломні моменти:

Докризове зростання та шок 2008–2009 років: У період 2005–2007 рр. Сінгапур демонстрував надвисокі темпи зростання. Проте Світова фінансова криза 2008 року призвела до першого серйозного випробування. У 2009 році спостерігалось різке уповільнення та короткочасна рецесія. Важливо зазначити, що вже у 2010 році Сінгапур показав феноменальне відновлення – зростання ВВП склало близько 14,5%, що стало одним із найвищих показників у світі.

Десятиліття зрілої трансформації (2011–2019): Цей етап характеризується переходом від кількісного зростання до якісного. Уряд зробив ставку на інновації та підвищення продуктивності праці. ВВП зростав стабільно (в середньому на 3-4% на рік), попри турбулентність на ринках сировини та торговельні війни між США та Китаєм [2].

Пандемічна криза та цифрова адаптація (2020–2025): Рецесія 2020 року стала найглибшою з часів незалежності країни, проте вона ж і прискорила цифрову трансформацію. Період 2021–2025 рр. став часом «нової нормальності», де драйверами ВВП виступають хмарні обчислення, фінтех та зелена енергетика. Сінгапур не просто повернувся до докризових рівнів, а й зміцнив свої позиції як безпечна гавань для капіталу в Азії.

Аналіз за 20 років чітко показує, що економіка Сінгапуру працює циклами, які тісно пов'язані зі світовим попитом.

Стійкість: Кожен наступний вихід із кризи відбувався швидше за попередній, що свідчить про накопичення значного фінансового «запасу міцності» (державних резервів).

Зв'язок із ринком праці: Така динаміка ВВП створює ідеальні умови для перевірки закону Оукена, оскільки ми маємо кілька чітких точок падіння та бурхливого зростання, де безробіття мало б реагувати дзеркально.

Сінгапур підтримує один із найнижчих рівнів безробіття серед розвинених країн світу. Протягом 2005–2025 років середній рівень безробіття серед резидентів коливався в межах 2,0% – 3,5%. Така стабільність є результатом не лише гнучкості ринку праці, а й активної державної політики «трипартизму» (співпраці уряду, роботодавців та профспілок) [3].

Ключові етапи та реакція на кризи:

Світова фінансова криза (2008–2009): У 2008 році безробіття почало зростати, досягнувши піку у вересні 2009 року (близько 3,3% для резидентів). Це було прямою реакцією на падіння ВВП. Однак завдяки урядовим програмам перекваліфікації та субсидіям на збереження робочих місць, показник повернувся до докризового рівня вже протягом року, що значно швидше, ніж у США чи Європі.

Період структурної трансформації (2010–2019): У це десятиліття ринок праці стикнувся з проблемою старіння населення та обмеження на залучення іноземної робочої сили. Рівень безробіття залишався вкрай низьким (близько 2,1–2,3%), що часто описується економістами як «стан повної зайнятості» [4]. Будь-які невеликі коливання були пов'язані з «фрикційним» безробіттям – моментом, коли люди змінювали професію на більш високотехнологічну.

Пандемічний сплеск та «Нова економіка» (2020–2025): У 2020 році рівень безробіття серед резидентів підскочив до найвищої позначки за понад 10 років (близько 4,1% у пікові місяці). Це було зумовлено зупинкою секторів авіації, туризму та роздрібною торгівлі. Проте період 2022–2025 рр. характеризується «великим перерозподілом»: кадри масово перейшли у цифрові сектори, фінтех та охорону здоров'я, що знову повернуло показник до стабільно низьких значень [5].

З цього ми можемо зробити висновок про дзеркальність графіку безробіття, адже він і дійсно є дзеркальним відображенням графіку ВВП (Рис. 2). Там, де на графіку ВВП ми бачимо «провали» (2009 та 2020), на графіку безробіття ми бачимо «піки».

Стійкість до шоків: Навіть у найгірші часи безробіття в Сінгапурі не перевищувало 4-5%, що свідчить про високу ефективність соціальних демпферів.

Гнучкість: Сингапурський працівник швидко адаптується до нових умов, що дозволяє економіці зростати без тривалих періодів стагнації на ринку праці.



Рис.2. Динаміка безробіття Сингапуру у %, (2005-2025)*

**Складено автором за [1].*

Проведене дослідження макроекономічної динаміки Сингапуру за період з 2005 по 2025 роки дозволяє сформулювати комплексний погляд на взаємозв'язок між економічним зростанням та станом ринку праці. Отриманий у ході роботи коефіцієнт кореляції Пірсона $r = -0,78$ математично підтверджує гіпотезу про наявність сильного зворотного зв'язку між ВВП та рівнем безробіття. Це свідчить про те, що економіка Сингапуру розвивається у чіткій відповідності до закону Оукена, де кожне циклічне піднесення виробництва стає надійним фундаментом для створення нових робочих місць та підвищення добробуту резидентів.

Аналіз двадцятирічного періоду показав, що попри відкритість до глобальних шоків, таких як фінансова криза 2008 року та пандемія 2020 року, Сингапур демонструє виняткову адаптивність. Дзеркальна реакція ринку праці на коливання ВВП вказує на відсутність структурних перекосів: економічна система швидко саморегулюється, не допускаючи тривалих періодів стагнації. Водночас той факт, що кореляція не є абсолютною, підкреслює високу ефективність державного регулювання. Соціальні демпфери та фінансові стимули уряду Сингапуру здатні розривати пряму залежність у критичні моменти, запобігаючи різкому зростанню безробіття навіть за негативної динаміки ВВП [6].

Підсумовуючи, можна стверджувати, що виявлений кореляційний зв'язок є «доброякісним» показником стабільного розвитку. Для майбутніх прогнозів це означає, що підтримка темпів зростання ВВП залишатиметься пріоритетним інструментом соціальної політики країни. Робота доводить, що сінгапурська модель успішно поєднує ринкову гнучкість із інституційним захистом, створюючи унікальний кейс макроекономічної стійкості, який може слугувати прикладом для інших малих відкритих економік світу.

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ФРАНЦУЗЬКІ ПРЕЗИДЕНТИ ТА ЇХНІ «НЕБЕЗПЕЧНІ ЗВ'ЯЗКИ» З РОСІЄЮ: ВПЛИВ НА ВІЙНУ В УКРАЇНІ

Анотація

У доповіді аналізується еволюція відносин між президентами П'ятої республіки та Росією в контексті розгортання війни в Україні. Автор досліджує концепцію «небезпечних зв'язків», розглядаючи дипломатичні стратегії Ж. Ширака, Н. Саркозі, Ф. Олланда та Е. Макрона. Основна увага приділяється голлістській традиції стратегічної автономії та ілюзії «соціалізації» Москви через діалог. У роботі доводиться, що прагнення Франції до партнерства з Кремлем призвело до когнітивної розриву між дипломатичними очікуваннями Парижа та ревізійністською реальністю путінського режиму. Зроблено висновок, що хоча політика Франції не була прямою причиною війни, вона сприяла створенню контексту стратегічної засліпленості та недооцінки ризиків, що підірвало європейську безпеку.

Ключові слова: *Французька дипломатія, російсько-українська війна, «небезпечні зв'язки», стратегічна автономія, голлізм, європейська безпека, ревізійнізм, когнітивний розрив.*

Abstract

The report analyzes the evolution of relations between the Presidents of the Fifth Republic and Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine. The author explores the concept of «dangerous liaisons» (liaisons dangereuses), examining the diplomatic strategies of J. Chirac, N. Sarkozy, F. Hollande, and E. Macron. Particular focus is placed on the Gaullist tradition of strategic autonomy and the illusion of «socializing» Moscow through dialogue. The work argues that France's pursuit of partnership with the Kremlin led to a cognitive dissonance between Paris's diplomatic expectations and the revisionist reality of the Putin regime. It concludes that while French policy was not the direct cause of the war, it contributed to a context of strategic blindness and underestimation of risks, which ultimately undermined European security.

Keywords: *French diplomacy, Russo-Ukrainian war, «dangerous liaisons», strategic autonomy, Gaullism, European security, revisionism, cognitive dissonance.*

Від моменту заснування П'ятої республіки відносини між Францією та Росією становлять наскрізний та амбівалентний вектор французької зовнішньої політики. Коливаючись між стратегічним діалогом, економічним співробітництвом та політичною поблажливістю, ці відносини подекуди набували форми того, що чимало французьких аналітиків характеризують як «небезпечні зв'язки» (*liaisons dangereuses*). Під цим терміном маються на увазі взаємодії, здатні послабити європейську безпеку, сприяти посиленню російського впливу або підірвати стратегічну цілісність Заходу [1].

У цій роботі з критичної перспективи проаналізовано те, у який спосіб низка французьких президентів підтримувала тісні відносини з Росією, подекуди ціною тривалої недооцінки супутніх геополітичних ризиків. Дане дослідження розмежовує чинники зовнішньої політики, що могли вплинути на стратегічний контекст, та прямі каузальні події, з метою уникнення необґрунтованих історичних спрощень.

Французька політика щодо Росії історично вписується в голлістську традицію стратегічної автономії, що має на меті підтримання діалогу з Москвою незалежно від Сполучених Штатів [2]. Ця установка ґрунтується на переконанні, що Росія є невід'ємним актором європейської безпеки. Проте такий підхід поступово трансформувався у форму «поблажливого реалізму», в межах якого порушення міжнародного права з боку Росії релятивізувалися заради стабільності та діалогу. Франція тривалий час виходила з переконання, що Росію можна «соціалізувати» шляхом діалогу, не усвідомлюючи глибоко ревізійністського характеру путінського режиму [3].

Війна, розв'язана внаслідок широкомасштабного військового вторгнення Росії у лютому 2022 року, є передусім одностороннім рішенням московської влади, продиктованим імперіалістичною стратегією, що має на меті відновлення «сфери впливу» над колишніми радянськими республіками. Безумовно, основна відповідальність за цю війну покладається на російську державу та її керівництво (прагнення до стратегічної експансії, заперечення міжнародного порядку періоду після холодної війни). Водночас видається можливим проаналізувати, якою мірою попередня політика європейських лідерів – зокрема президентів Франції – сформувала той геополітичний контекст, що передував цій війні.

Коли ми говоримо про Ж. Ширака, то характер його відносин із Росією можна визначити як політичну дружбу, що межувала зі стратегічною засліпленістю. Адже в період президентства Ж. Ширака (1995–2007) франко-російські відносини досягли безпрецедентного рівня зближення. Ж. Ширак вибудував міцні особисті зв'язки спочатку з

Б. Сльциним, а згодом із В. Путіним, представляючи останнього як легітимного стратегічного партнера. Під час свого виступу в Москві у 1997 році Ж. Ширак проголосив: «Росія має покликання стати провідним партнером Європейського Союзу» [4]. Це бачення втілюється у політичній поблажливості до війни в Чечні та перших серйозних зазіхань на політичні свободи в Росії. Цей період знаменує собою структурну недооцінку російського авторитаризму з боку Парижа [5].

Н. Саркозі (2007–2012) дотримується курсу на глибоко персоналізовану дипломатію у відносинах із Москвою. Його роль посередника під час російсько-грузинської війни 2008 року дала йому змогу виступити ключовою фігурою на міжнародній арені, проте його водночас звинувачують у фактичному (*de facto*) закріпленні територіальних загарбав Росії [6]. Угода, узгоджена за посередництва Н. Саркозі, дозволила Росії зміцнити свої військові позиції, не зазнавши при цьому жодних тривалих санкцій [7]. Такий підхід часто сприймається як непряма легітимізація політики сили, що посилювало відчуття безкарності у Кремля.

Отже, протягом 1990-х та 2000-х років французькі президенти просуvalи політику тісного діалогу з Росією, подекуди на шкоду реалістичному розумінню стратегічних амбіцій Москви. Зокрема, Ж. Ширак (1995–2007) та Н. Саркозі (2007–2012) прагнули зміцнити зв'язки з Кремлем, виходячи з бачення Росії як стратегічного партнера, а не потенційного суперника. Цей постулат виявився помилковим після подальших військових дій Росії (наприклад, у Грузії 2008 року).

Як зазначає Інститут стратегічних досліджень (SWP), французька політика зростаючої підтримки військової та дипломатичної співпраці з Москвою «не була простою тактикою, а ґрунтувалася на переконанні, що Росія одного дня розділить спільні стратегічні інтереси із Заходом» [8] – гіпотеза, що виявилася хибною у світлі останніх подій. Це не означає, що французька політика «спричинила» війну, а радше вказує на те, що Захід – і Франція зокрема – не приділили належної уваги сприйняттю «безпеки» самою Росією та її імперіалістичним амбіціям у своїх політичних стратегіях. Це створило дипломатичний вакуум, яким скористалася Москва, оскільки після кожних військових дій, у Росії лише зміцнювалося відчуття власної безкарності.

Президентство Ф. Олланда (2012–2017) позначилося частковим розривом із попереднім курсом. Після анексії Криму в 2014 році та військового втручання Росії на Донбасі, Франція підтримала європейські санкції та скасувала продаж військових кораблів типу «Містраль» Росії. Ф. Олланд ретроспективно визнав: «Ми були занадто наївними у наших відносинах із Росією» [9]. Водночас збереження «Нормандського

формату» ілюструє тривалу переконаність Франції у тому, що жодне врегулювання в Європі не є можливим без участі Москви. З цього, безумовно, можна зробити висновок, що для Росії це стало черговим сигналом про всюдозволеність без наслідків та покарання. Щоразу після військового втручання з Росією ведуть діалог, зважають на її позицію та «поважають» її, і зрештою Росія не лише не отримує покарання, а навпаки – досягає всього, чого прагне. Менше з тим, анексія Криму та війна на Донбасі стали важливим поворотом у французькій політиці 2014 року: Ф. Олланд засудив анексію та закликав до запровадження європейських санкцій, розірвавши з політикою поблажливості. Цей розрив свідчить про те, що французька стратегія поступово перейшла до менш оптимістичного трактування стратегічних намірів Росії.

Е. Макрон з 2017 року відновлює курс на відкритий діалог із В. Путіним, зокрема під час саміту в Брегансоні у 2019 році. Він стверджує, що прагне «переосмислити архітектуру європейської безпеки разом із Росією» [10]. Така позиція піддається гострій критиці з боку багатьох французьких дослідників. Як зазначають Делькур та Факон: «Стратегія Е. Макрона ґрунтується на переоцінці кооперативної раціональності Кремля» [11].

У серпні 2019 року президент Е. Макрон запросив В. Путіна на зустріч до своєї літньої резиденції у форті Брегансон, що поблизу Бормле-Мімоза на Лазуровому узбережжі (Середземномор'я), за кілька днів до саміту G7 у Біарріці [12]. Форт є офіційною літньою резиденцією президентів Французької Республіки та іноді слугує місцем для проведення неформальних дипломатичних дискусій [12]. Під час зустрічі 19 серпня 2019 року в Брегансоні Макрон виступив із публічною заявою разом із В. Путіним. В офіційному тексті спільної декларації, опублікованій Єлисейським палацом, зазначено: «Насамперед я дуже радий вітати Президента Путіна і дякую йому за присутність сьогодні в Брегансоні [...] я дуже радий можливості приймати його в цьому надзвичайно символічному місці, на берегах Середземного моря, які завжди мали велике значення для відносин між нашими двома країнами та для російської уяви» – Е. Макрон, заява для преси [10]. Ця цитата взята з офіційної заяви, виголошеної Е. Макроном 19 серпня 2019 року під час цієї двосторонньої зустрічі. Необхідно нагадати про геополітичний контекст, адже зустріч відбулася в умовах серйозної напруженості між Росією та Заходом, спричиненої анексією Криму (2014), війною на Донбасі, європейськими економічними санкціями проти Москви та виключенням Росії з «Великої вісімки» (яка стала «Великою сімкою»).

Вибір форту Брегансон, літньої президентської резиденції, свідчить про прагнення до привілейованого та особистого діалогу поза межами традиційних багатосторонніх форматів. Ця дипломатична інсценізація мала на меті створити атмосферу довіри, проте вона також сприймалася як суперечливий політичний жест щодо лідера, якого на той час гостро критикували в Європі. Отже, можна зробити загальний висновок, що дискурс Е. Макрона ґрунтується на кількох ключових ідеях: Росія є невід'ємним суб'єктом європейської безпеки; ізоляція Москви була б контрпродуктивною; Європа має розбудувати архітектуру безпеки, яка включала б Росію. Однак Е. Макрон недооцінює фундаментальні розбіжності між Росією та ЄС, зокрема щодо верховенства права, суверенітету сусідніх держав та використання сили як політичного інструменту. Для В. Путіна ця зустріч стала очевидним дипломатичним успіхом: вона забезпечила йому символічне визнання з боку провідного західного лідера, сприяла прориву дипломатичної ізоляції Росії та відбулася напередодні саміту G7, зміцнюючи імідж поступового повернення Москви у велику міжнародну гру. Не йдучи на жодні суттєві поступки (щодо України, Сирії чи прав людини), В. Путін здобув: міжнародну видимість, політичну легітимізацію та послаблення єдиної позиції Заходу. Отже, надаючи пріоритет особистим відносинам із В. Путіним, Е. Макрон ризикує послабити європейську згуртованість, надіслати двозначний сигнал щодо демократичних цінностей та зміцнити уявлення про те, що сила має перевагу над принципами. Стратегія збереження діалогу задля уникнення ескалації не спрацювала, оскільки Росія не змінила своєї стратегічної позиції.

Після вторгнення в Україну у 2022 році Е. Макрон переходить до більш жорсткої лінії, проте зберігає канали зв'язку, що підживлює дискусії про тривалу двозначність між твердістю та схильністю до примирення [13]. Водночас слід зазначити, що після вторгнення 2022 року Франція чітко стала на бік України. У 2024 році Франція підписала угоду про співробітництво у сфері безпеки з Україною, яка передбачає постачання озброєнь, військової техніки та посилену допомогу для зміцнення обороноздатності України [14].

Тепер необхідно розглянути «небезпечні зв'язки»: вплив, залежності та безпеку. Франко-російські відносини також породили внутрішні вразливості, зокрема: мережі інтелектуального та медійного впливу, прихильні до Москви [, ризики політичного та інформаційного втручання, минулі енергетичні та промислові залежності. Адже Росія використовувала «сірі зони» французької дипломатії для розробки стратегії тривалого впливу [1].

Отже, аналіз відносин між французькими президентами та Росією виявляє незмінну рису: спокусу діалогу за будь-яку ціну, подекуди на шкоду стратегічній розсудливості. Ці «небезпечні зв'язки» сприяли затримці європейського усвідомлення ревізійністського проєкту Росії. Нещодавній досвід доводить, що діалог без надійного співвідношення сил може стати чинником вразливості, а не стабільності.

Дослідження відносин між французькими президентами та Росією висвітлює структурну константу французької дипломатії: стійку віру в добродішність стратегічного діалогу з Москвою. Ця позиція, успадкована від голлізму та продовжена в різних формах його наступниками, часто призводила до «небезпечних зв'язків» – не в сенсі прямої змови, а через стратегічну засліпленість, недооцінку авторитарних ризиків та переоцінку здатності Франції здійснювати вплив. Отже, французька політика щодо Росії не стала безпосередньою причиною війни в Україні, проте вона сприяла формуванню складного стратегічного контексту, в якому поєдналися: помилки в оцінці намірів Москви, розбіжності у сприйнятті європейської безпеки та недостатньо рішуча відповідь на російську агресію. Сукупний досвід президентств Ж. Ширака, Н. Саркозі, Ф. Олланда та Е. Макрона демонструє, що Франція тривалий час проєктувала на Росію нормативне бачення – бачення раціонального партнера, інтегрованого або здатного до інтеграції в європейський порядок, – що не відповідало політичній реальності російської влади. Цей когнітивний розрив затримав французьке та європейське усвідомлення глибоко ревізійністської природи путінського режиму. «Небезпечні зв'язки» не обмежуються лише офіційною дипломатією. Вони є частиною розширеної стратегії впливу, яку реалізує Росія: інтелектуальний та медійний вплив через політичні та культурні канали; створення енергетичної залежності тощо. Таким чином, прагнення Франції підтримувати канали зв'язку відкритими іноді сприймалося не як протягнута рука, а як вразливість чи слабкість, якою можна скористатися.

Франко-російські відносини часто були менш інституційними, ніж особистими, що робило їх вразливими до політичних маніпуляцій. Франція не просто вела діалог із Росією; вона вірила у конвергенцію (зближення) інтересів, якої не існувало. Ця віра пояснює, чому тривожні сигнали – Чечня, Грузія, Крим, Донбас – тлумачилися як винятки, а не як прояви цілісного проєкту, спрямованого на перегляд європейського порядку. Війна в Україні доводить, що мир у Європі не може ґрунтуватися на ілюзіях; він має базуватися на усвідомленій стратегічній розсудливості, навіть якщо вона вимагає відмови від певних основоположних міфів французької дипломатії.

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**ІННОВАЦІЙНІ ПІДХОДИ ДО ПІСЛЯВОЄННОГО
ВІДНОВЛЕННЯ УКРАЇНИ:
SECURITY–DEVELOPMENT NEXUS ТА РОЛЬ ПРОГРАМ
МІЖНАРОДНОЇ ДОПОМОГИ**

У дослідженні аналізується взаємозв'язок безпеки та економічного розвитку у післявоєнній трансформації України через призму концепції Security–Development Nexus. Визначено роль програм міжнародної допомоги у підтримці цієї взаємодії та обґрунтовано значення оборонної промисловості як інструменту одночасного зміцнення економічного розвитку та національної безпеки.

Ключові слова: *післявоєнне відновлення, Security–Development Nexus, міжнародна допомога, оборонна промисловість, економічний розвиток.*

**INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO UKRAINE'S POST-WAR
RECOVERY:
THE SECURITY–DEVELOPMENT NEXUS AND THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES**

The paper examines the relationship between security and economic development in Ukraine's post-war recovery through the lens of the Security–Development Nexus. It highlights the role of international assistance programmes in supporting this interaction and argues that the defence industry can serve as an instrument linking economic modernisation with national security.

Keywords: *post-war recovery, security–development nexus, international assistance, defence industry, economic development.*

Повномасштабна війна Росії проти України спричинила значні соціально-економічні втрати, які мають комплексний характер і впливають на всі сектори економіки. Станом на 31 грудня 2025 року загальний обсяг збитків оцінювався у 195,1 млрд доларів США [1, с.10]. Це включає не лише руйнування інфраструктури та скорочення виробничих потужностей, але й значні демографічні втрати,

переміщення населення, руйнування економічних ланцюгів та структурні зміни на ринку праці. У таких умовах післявоєнне відновлення України постає як складний і тривалий процес, який має передбачати не лише реконструкцію зруйнованих об'єктів. Беручи до уваги, що повномасштабні війни руйнують організаційні системи [2, с.10], для післявоєнного відновлення України доцільно розглядати формування нової моделі економічного розвитку.

Водночас, геополітичний баланс сил у регіоні дає підстави стверджувати, що безпековий фактор і в майбутньому залишатиметься ключовим при формуванні національних стратегій розвитку України. Таким чином, екзистенційний характер загроз уможливорює розглядання економічного розвитку і безпеки як взаємопов'язаних елементів єдиної системи, що виходить за межі політичного виміру, а отже дозволяє обґрунтовувати необхідність «сек'юритизації економічного розвитку» [3, с.23].

Security–Development Nexus (зв'язок безпеки та розвитку)

Сек'юритизація розвитку на практиці може виражатися через впровадження концепції Security–Development Nexus, сформованої на перетині досліджень міжнародної безпеки та політичної економії. Її основна ідея полягає в тому, що безпека та розвиток взаємно підсилюють одна одного [4, с.5]. З одного боку, стабільне економічне середовище створює умови для політичної стабільності та зниження передумов для виникнення конфліктів. З іншого, ефективна система безпеки формує передбачувані інституційні умови, необхідні для економічного зростання, інвестиційної активності та технологічного розвитку.

У країнах, які перебувають у стані тривалих конфліктів або мають високий рівень геополітичних ризиків, взаємозалежність безпеки та розвитку проявляється особливо сильно [5, с.96]. Відповідно до цього підходу економічна політика держави повинна розглядатися не ізольовано, а як складова ширшої системи стратегічного управління, що включає питання національної безпеки, оборонної політики та інституційної стійкості держави.

Security–Development Nexus в українському контексті

Для України концепція Security–Development Nexus має вирішальне значення, оскільки російська агресія радикально змінила структуру економічних і безпекових пріоритетів держави. В українських умовах тривалого воєнного протистояння доцільно розглядати економічну політику не лише як інструмент забезпечення економічного зростання та забезпечення довгострокової стійкості національної економіки, а і наділяти її функцією підтримки обороноздатності держави, створюючи таким чином контекстно-специфічну модель розвитку [6, с.15]. При

цьому ефективність такого процесу вимагатиме трансформації державних інституцій та посилення контролю за прозорістю управлінських практик. Це відповідатиме підходу до інституцій як до інструменту встановлення «правил гри» та формування стимулів для забезпечення відповідного економічного розвитку [7, с.3].

У цьому контексті післявоєнне відновлення України доцільно розглядати як комплексний процес економічної та інституційної трансформації, спрямований на формування нової моделі розвитку, яка поєднує інституційні зміни, технологічні інновації та зміцнення системи безпеки.

Роль оборонної промисловості в Security–Development Nexus

Важливим елементом побудови взаємозв'язку між безпекою та розвитком може слугувати оборонна промисловість. Історичний досвід різних країн свідчить, що програми розвитку оборонного сектору можуть виступати каталізатором інноваційного розвитку економіки [8, с.14]. У різні періоди саме оборонні дослідження та технологічні програми сприяли появі нових технологій у сфері авіації, електроніки, космічних досліджень та інформаційних систем.

Для України розвиток оборонної промисловості має подвійне значення. З одного боку, він забезпечує зміцнення обороноздатності держави. З іншого боку, оборонний сектор може створювати так звані spillover effects (ефекти поширення), коли технології, розроблені для військових потреб виступають одним із драйверів технологічного розвитку економіки, стимулюючи інновації та розвиток суміжних галузей [8, с.15]. Такі технологічні ефекти поширення можуть сприяти розвитку нових секторів економіки, зокрема у сфері високих технологій, цифрової економіки та інженерії.

Роль програм міжнародної допомоги у забезпеченні Security–Development Nexus

На сьогодні міжнародна фінансова підтримка є одним із ключових факторів стабілізації української економіки. В першу чергу міжнародні фінансові ресурси направляються на відновлення критичної інфраструктури, забезпечення безперервності основних послуг та підтримку економічного відновлення [1, с.46]. Окрім того, теперішні перемовини щодо надання кредиту ЄС під заставу російських заморожених активів передбачають дозвіл на направлення частини отриманих ресурсів на фінансування військових витрат [9].

Водночас, потенціал впливу міжнародної допомоги на Security–Development Nexus є значно ширшим. Європейські дослідження стверджують, що за умов ефективної інституційної інтеграції програми міжнародної допомоги можуть стати важливим інструментом

структурної трансформації економіки. Прогнозується, що зростання витрат ЄС на оборону з 2% до 3,5% ВВП може призвести до зростання ВВП ЄС на 0,9–1,5%, але такі показники будуть можливими лише за умови залучення боргових фінансових інструментів, включаючи міжнародні, замість зростання внутрішніх податкових надходжень [10, с. 1]. При цьому роль міжнародної допомоги може не обмежуватися лише наданням фінансових ресурсів. Програми міжнародної допомоги можуть сприяти розвитку оборонної індустрії через різні механізми: фінансування інноваційних проєктів, підтримку дослідницьких програм, розвиток спільних виробничих проєктів із міжнародними партнерами та стимулювання технологічного трансферу.

Таким чином, спрямування Україною міжнародної допомоги на розвиток секторів оборонної промисловості потенційно може призвести як до позитивних ефектів переливу, так і до прямого зростання ВВП, одночасно забезпечуючи економічне відновлення і зміцнення безпеки держави в процесі стратегічного формування нової економічної моделі розвитку.

Висновки

Післявоєнне відновлення України має розглядатися як довгостроковий процес структурної трансформації економіки, який виходить далеко за межі традиційної реконструкції інфраструктури та має ознаки сек'юритизованого розвитку. У цьому процесі особливого значення доцільно надати концепції Security–Development Nexus, яка підкреслює взаємозалежність економічного розвитку та національної безпеки.

В цьому контексті, іноземні дослідження та українські реалії дозволяють обґрунтовувати необхідність розвитку оборонної індустрії не лише як елементу системи безпеки, але і як ключового інструменту економічного відновлення, що у поєднанні з програмами міжнародної допомоги та інституційними реформами може стати важливою основою формування довгострокової моделі післявоєнного розвитку України.

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ІНВЕСТИЦІЙНИЙ КЛІМАТ ВЕЛИКОЇ БРИТАНІЇ: УМОВИ І МЕТОДИ ФОРМУВАННЯ І РЕГУЛЮВАННЯ

Анотація

В роботі досліджено особливості формування та регулювання інвестиційного клімату Великої Британії в умовах сучасних глобальних трансформацій. Проаналізовано ключові макроекономічні показники, динаміку інвестиційних потоків та інституційні фактори, що визначають привабливість країни для інвесторів. Визначено основні ризики та переваги інвестування, а також роль державної політики у забезпеченні стабільності інвестиційного середовища. Обґрунтовано, що Британія зберігає позиції одного з провідних центрів міжнародного інвестування.

Ключові слова: *інвестиційний клімат, пряма іноземна інвестиція, державне регулювання, макроекономічна стабільність, Велика Британія, інституційне середовище, інвестиційні ризики.*

Abstract

The article examines the features of the formation and regulation of the investment climate in the United Kingdom under current global transformations. Key macroeconomic indicators, investment flow dynamics, and institutional factors determining the country's attractiveness to investors are analyzed. The main risks and advantages of investing are identified, along with the role of public policy in ensuring the stability of the investment environment. It is substantiated that the UK maintains its position as one of the leading centers of international investment.

Keywords: *investment climate, foreign direct investment, government regulation, macroeconomic stability, United Kingdom, institutional environment, investment risks.*

Метою дослідження є аналіз умов формування інвестиційного клімату Великої Британії, оцінка впливу макроекономічних та інституційних факторів на інвестиційну привабливість країни, а також визначення ключових ризиків і механізмів державного регулювання.

Вступ

У сучасних умовах глобалізації інвестиційний клімат виступає одним із ключових чинників забезпечення економічного розвитку країни та її конкурентоспроможності на світовому ринку. Зростання

міжнародної мобільності капіталу посилює конкуренцію між державами за залучення інвестиційних ресурсів. У цьому контексті Велика Британія є одним із провідних світових фінансових центрів, що зумовлює актуальність дослідження особливостей формування та регулювання її інвестиційного середовища.

Виклад основного матеріалу

Інвестиційний клімат є одним із ключових чинників економічного розвитку будь-якої держави, оскільки саме він визначає привабливість країни для внутрішніх та іноземних інвесторів. У сучасних умовах глобалізації конкуренція між країнами за залучення капіталу постійно зростає, що обумовлює необхідність формування сприятливого інвестиційного середовища. Велика Британія традиційно займає провідні позиції у світовій економіці та вважається однією з найбільш привабливих країн для інвестування. Саме тому дослідження умов і методів формування та регулювання інвестиційного клімату цієї країни є актуальним і важливим.

Під інвестиційним кліматом розуміють сукупність економічних, політичних, правових та соціальних умов, які впливають на процес здійснення інвестиційної діяльності. Основними факторами його формування є макроекономічна стабільність, рівень розвитку інфраструктури, ефективність державного управління, прозорість законодавства, рівень корупції та захист прав власності. Для оцінки інвестиційного клімату використовуються різноманітні міжнародні індекси та рейтинги, зокрема індекс глобальної конкурентоспроможності, індекс легкості ведення бізнесу та інші показники, що дозволяють порівнювати країни між собою.

За останні роки економіка Великої Британії демонструє коливання динаміки ВВП, що зумовлені внутрішніми та глобальними факторами, включно з пандемією COVID-19 та подальшими економічними змінами. На Рисунку 1 відображена динаміка ВВП у 2019–2024 рр. Ми можемо прослідкувати, що у 2019 р. економіка зросла на 1,6 %, а у 2020 р. зазнала суттєвого спаду на -10,3 % через вплив пандемії та карантинних обмежень. Але у 2021 р. спостерігалось стрімке відновлення зі зростанням ВВП на 8,6 %, у 2022 р. темп зростання залишалися високим – 4,8 %, у 2023 р. зростання суттєво сповільнилося до 0,3 %, а у 2024 р. економіка показала помірний приріст на 1,3 %, що свідчить про поступове стабілізування та вихід на більш стійкий рівень розвитку.




Рис. 1. Динаміка ВВП Великої Британії, 2019–2024рр. (%)*

**Складено і розраховано автором за [1].*

Паралельно важливо оцінити динаміку інфляції, яка безпосередньо впливає на реальну прибутковість інвестицій та купівельну спроможність населення. Як видно з Рисунка 2, рівень інфляції у 2019 р. становив 1,7 %, а у 2020 р. впав до 1 % через падіння попиту під час локдаунів. Починаючи з 2021 р., спостерігалось поступове зростання: 2,5 % у 2021 р. та стрімке підвищення до 7,9 % у 2022 р. У 2023 р. інфляція знизилася до 6,8 %, а у 2024 р. становила 3,3 %, що відображає часткове стабілізування цінового рівня після пікових показників попередніх років.




Рис. 2. Інфляція, споживчі ціни, 2019–2024рр. (%)*

**Складено автором за [1].*

Важливим макроекономічним індикатором, що впливає на вартість капіталу, є облікова ставка Банку Англії, яка протягом 2024 р. підтримувалася на рівні 5,25% для стримування інфляційного тиску [2]. Це зумовило відповідне зростання ставок за банківськими депозитами для юридичних осіб, які в середньому коливаються в межах 4,2–4,8% річних залежно від терміну розміщення коштів. Для інвестора це означає високу альтернативну вартість капіталу, проте одночасно свідчить про жорстку монетарну політику, спрямовану на фінансову стабілізацію в країні.

Показники свідчать, що економіка Великої Британії є розвиненою та здатною до швидкого відновлення після кризових потрясінь, однак водночас залишається чутливою до зовнішніх факторів і глобальних змін. Різкий спад у 2020 р. змінився стрімким відновленням, але подальше уповільнення зростання та інфляційні коливання вказують на наявність структурних викликів. Тобто, перехід до етапу поступової стабілізації, означає для інвесторів відносно надійне, але не повністю безризикове середовище, де поєднуються можливості для довгострокових вкладень із необхідністю врахування макроекономічної нестабільності та зовнішніх ризиків. Водночас наявні ризики значною мірою компенсуються активною роллю держави у формуванні сприятливого інвестиційного клімату. Важливу роль у формуванні інвестиційного клімату Великої Британії відіграють спеціалізовані державні інституції, зокрема Міністерство бізнесу та торгівлі, а також агентство Служба підтримки інвестицій у Великій Британії, які надають консультативну та організаційну підтримку іноземним інвесторам. Вони допомагають у виборі сектору інвестування, пошуку партнерів і супроводі проєктів на всіх етапах реалізації.

У 2024 р. країна забезпечила другу позицію в Європі за кількістю прямих іноземних інвестиційних проєктів, поступаючись лише Франції, що свідчить про її високу привабливість для інвесторів [2]. Велика Британія не лише активно експортує капітал, інвестуючи у підприємства та інфраструктуру в різних регіонах світу, а й залишається одним із ключових реципієнтів прямих іноземних інвестицій.




Рис. 3. Вхідні інвестиційні потоки до Великої Британії, 2019–2024 (млн дол.) *

**Складено автором за [3].*

Аналіз динаміки вхідних інвестиційних потоків до Великої Британії за період 2019–2024 рр. (Рис. 3) демонструє нестабільні та суперечливі тенденції у сфері прямих іноземних інвестицій. Це зумовлено як

глобальними факторами (пандемія, війна в Україні, інфляція), так і внутрішніми (наслідки Brexit, політична турбулентність, зміна урядів).

Різке падіння обсягів інвестицій до від'ємних значень у 2021 р. (-72 077 млн дол.) пояснюється не лише наслідками пандемії COVID-19, а й завершенням перехідного періоду виходу країни з ЄС, що спричинило період високої невизначеності для іноземних інвесторів.

Після виходу з Європейського Союзу Велика Британія отримала більшу регуляторну автономію, що дозволило формувати власну торговельну та інвестиційну політику. Водночас це призвело до зростання бар'єрів у торгівлі з країнами ЄС, що частково знижує привабливість країни для інвесторів, орієнтованих на європейський ринок. У відповідь уряд активізував укладення двосторонніх угод про вільну торгівлю (зокрема з Австралією, Японією та Канадою), що сприяє диверсифікації зовнішньоекономічних зв'язків.

Подальше відновлення у 2022–2023 рр. свідчить про збереження статусу Британії як одного з ключових фінансових хабів світу, проте від'ємна динаміка у 2024 р. вказує на чутливість інвестиційного клімату до внутрішньої політичної турбулентності та високих відсоткових ставок Банку Англії (5,25%). Така нестабільність потоків ПІІ змушує інвесторів більш ретельно оцінювати ризики, пов'язані з податковим навантаженням та зміною регуляторного поля в країні-реципієнті.

До ключових ризиків інвестування у Великій Британії можна віднести: високий рівень податкового навантаження для великих корпорацій, нестабільність валютного курсу фунта стерлінгів, залежність економіки від глобальних фінансових ринків, а також політичні фактори, включно зі змінами урядової політики. Окремим викликом залишається зростання вартості енергоресурсів та інфляційний тиск.

Важливо також відзначити, що інвестиційне середовище Великої Британії характеризується значною секторальною диверсифікацією. Найбільші обсяги іноземних інвестицій спрямовуються у фінансовий сектор, інформаційні технології, нерухомість, енергетику та сферу послуг. Це свідчить про високий рівень розвитку постіндустріальної економіки та орієнтацію країни на інноваційні види діяльності.

Однією з ключових переваг Великої Британії є високий рівень розвитку людського капіталу та інноваційного потенціалу. Країна має провідні університети світу, потужні науково-дослідні центри та розвинену стартап-екосистему, особливо у сферах фінансових технологій, штучного інтелекту та біотехнологій. Це створює сприятливе середовище для венчурного інвестування та розвитку високотехнологічного бізнесу.

Крім того, значну роль відіграє географічне положення країни, що забезпечує зручний доступ до європейських і світових ринків. Незважаючи на вихід із ЄС, Велика Британія зберігає тісні торговельно-економічні зв'язки з країнами Європи та активно укладає нові міжнародні торговельні угоди.

Водночас, з метою мінімізації зазначених ризиків та підтримки стабільності інвестиційного середовища, держава застосовує комплекс стимулюючих заходів.

Методи державного регулювання інвестиційного клімату у Великій Британії включають:

- фіскальні стимули (податкові пільги, інвестиційні кредити);
- монетарну політику (регулювання процентних ставок Банком Англії);
- нормативно-правове регулювання (захист прав інвесторів, антимонопольне законодавство);
- інституційну підтримку (державні агентства, програми розвитку регіонів);
- стимулювання інновацій (гранти, підтримка R&D).

Крім того, Велика Британія характеризується прозорою та передбачуваною системою державного управління, що забезпечує стабільність урядових рішень і знижує ризики політичної невизначеності. Це створює сприятливі умови для довгострокового планування інвестиційної діяльності.

Важливим елементом інвестиційної привабливості також є високий рівень розвитку правової системи країни. Сильне верховенство права, ефективне функціонування судових інститутів та чітке регулювання відносин власності забезпечують надійний захист інвестицій і контрактів. Інвестори мають впевненість у дотриманні їхніх прав на активи, а також у неупередженому вирішенні спорів незалежними судами. Крім того, система корпоративного регулювання передбачає прозорі вимоги до реєстрації підприємств, ведення бухгалтерської документації та фінансової звітності, що знижує ризики шахрайства та підвищує рівень довіри до бізнес-середовища.

Порядок реєстрації підприємства у Великій Британії є відносно простим і чітко регламентованим, що сприяє її привабливості для бізнесу. Реєстрацію здійснює Реєстраційна палата компаній відповідно до Закону про компанії 2006 р. На першому етапі засновник визначає основні характеристики компанії: унікальну назву, юридичну адресу, вид діяльності та інформацію про директорів і засновників. Після цього

готується пакет установчих документів, до якого входять форма IN01, меморандум і статут (можна використовувати типовий варіант).

Документи подаються онлайн або у паперовій формі. Електронна реєстрація зазвичай триває до 24 годин, тоді як паперова – 3-5 днів. У середньому, з урахуванням підготовки, процес відкриття бізнесу займає близько 10–12 днів. Діє принцип «єдиного вікна», тому дані автоматично передаються до податкових органів [4].

Після реєстрації компанія стає учасником податкової системи. Основним податком є корпоративний: ставка становить 19% для прибутку до 50 000 фунтів і зростає до 25% для великих компаній. Також підприємство може сплачувати VAT – податок на додану вартість, який застосовується, якщо річний оборот перевищує 90 000 фунтів, або добровільно за рішенням компанії [5]. Якщо є працівники, діють соціальні внески, але передбачені пільги, зокрема Допомога по працевлаштуванню, що зменшує податкове навантаження. Після перевірки документів компанія отримує сертифікат інкорпорації та може офіційно розпочинати діяльність.

Висновки

Отже, інвестиційний клімат Великої Британії характеризується високим рівнем розвитку, стабільністю інституційного середовища та значною роллю держави у його регулюванні. Незважаючи на вплив зовнішніх і внутрішніх факторів, країна зберігає привабливість для інвесторів завдяки прозорому законодавству, ефективній правовій системі та розвиненій економіці. Водночас наявність певних ризиків вимагає від інвесторів ретельного аналізу умов інвестування, що робить інвестиційне середовище не лише перспективним, але й таким, що потребує зваженого підходу.

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ПОЗИЦІЇ ВЕЛИКОЇ БРИТАНІЇ У ГЛОБАЛЬНОМУ ПЕРЕРОЗПОДІЛІ ФАКТОРІВ ВИРОБНИЦТВА

Присвячено дослідженню участі Великої Британії у глобальному перерозподілі факторів виробництва – капіталу, праці, технологій та підприємницьких здібностей. Розглянуто ключові аспекти руху фінансового капіталу, трудових ресурсів та інновацій, а також роль Великої Британії як суб'єкта вихідних і вхідних міжнародних потоків. Визначено головні фактори, що впливають на зміцнення її позицій у міжнародному економічному середовищі.

Ключові слова: *глобальний перерозподіл факторів виробництва, прями іноземні інвестиції, трудові ресурси, інновації, міжнародні фінансові потоки*

The article is devoted to the study of the role of the United Kingdom in the global redistribution of production factors – capital, labor, technology, and entrepreneurship. The key aspects of capital movement, labor migration, and innovation activities are analyzed, as well as the country's position as both a donor and a recipient of international flows. The article identifies the main factors influencing the strengthening of the UK's positions in the international economic environment.

Keywords: *global redistribution of production factors, foreign direct investment, labor resources, innovation, international financial flows*

У сучасній системі світового господарства глобальний перерозподіл факторів виробництва – капіталу, праці, технологій і підприємницьких здібностей є визначальним чинником конкурентоспроможності національних економік. Велика Британія традиційно посідає провідні позиції у цих процесах, виступаючи одночасно донором і реципієнтом міжнародних потоків капіталу, висококваліфікованої робочої сили та інновацій. Її роль у глобальному економічному середовищі визначається високим рівнем фінансової інтеграції, розвиненою інституційною системою, потужним сектором послуг і значним науково-технологічним потенціалом.

Перш за все, вагоме місце Великої Британії у міжнародному русі капіталу обумовлене її статусом одного з провідних світових фінансових центрів. Лондон є головним місцем банківських, страхових та інвестиційних послуг, що забезпечує концентрацію транснаціональних

фінансових потоків. Через Лондонську фондову біржу проходить великий обсяг угод з акціями міжнародних компаній, що допомагає залучати інвестиції у світовому масштабі. Велика Британія стабільно входить до числа найбільших експортерів і імпортерів прямих іноземних інвестицій, а її транснаціональні корпорації активно інвестують у країни Європи, Північної Америки та Азії. Водночас країна залишається привабливою для іноземних інвесторів завдяки прозорій правовій системі, високому рівню захисту прав власності та сприятливому діловому клімату.

Це можна довести, здійснивши аналіз динаміки прямих іноземних інвестицій за такими показниками, як вхідні та вихідні потоки, а також вхідні та вихідні накопичені обсяги інвестицій.

У п'ятирічній перспективі інвестиційна активність у сфері ПІІ не мала стабільного характеру, що відображає вплив комплексних кризових явищ. Серед ключових чинників варто виділити світові економічні шоки: пандемію, війну в Україні, інфляцію; та внутрішні структурні зміни, спричинені адаптацією економіки після виходу з ЄС та частими політичними змінами [1].




Рис.1 Вхідні інвестиційні потоки до Великобританії у млн. дол., 2019–2023*

**Складено і розраховано автором за [3].*

З аналізу графіка видно, що у 2020–2021 роках відбулося суттєве скорочення припливу капіталу, що частково трансформувалося у від'ємні значення (Рис.1). Це означає, що процеси вилучення або репатріації інвестицій переважали над новими вкладеннями. У 2022 році спостерігалася тенденція до відновлення, однак уже у 2023 році знову зафіксовано відтік капіталу, що підтверджує нестабільність інвестиційного середовища.

Водночас аналіз накопичених інвестиційних фондів демонструє іншу картину, а саме те, що довгострокові позиції країни залишаються відносно стійкими (Рис.2).




Рис.2 Вхідні накопичені фонди до Великобританії у млн. дол., 2019-2023*

**Складено і розраховано автором за [3].*

Попри коливання річних потоків, загальний обсяг накопичених ПІІ має тенденцію до поступового зростання. Це свідчить про збереження стратегічної ролі Великої Британії як одного з ключових реципієнтів міжнародного капіталу.

Окремо слід розглянути динаміку вихідних інвестицій, які відображають позицію країни як експортера капіталу (Рис. 3).




Рис.3 Вихідні інвестиційні потоки до Великобританії у млн. дол., 2019-2023*

**Складено і розраховано автором за [3].*

У 2020 році британські компанії скоротили активність за кордоном, що проявилось у від'ємному значенні інвестиційного потоку. Це можна пояснити як повернення частини активів або перегляд міжнародної присутності бізнесу. Надалі спостерігалось часткове відновлення, однак показники залишаються чутливими до глобальної кон'юнктури.

Таким чином, поєднання нестабільних короткострокових потоків і відносно стабільної динаміки накопичених фондів свідчить про

трансформаційний характер поточних процесів. Це дозволяє зробити висновок, що Велика Британія перебуває у фазі структурної перебудови своєї ролі в глобальному русі факторів виробництва. Її позиції не можна охарактеризувати як втрачені, проте вони зазнають адаптації в умовах нової гео економічної реальності.

Наступним важливим аспектом глобального перерозподілу є рух трудових ресурсів. Велика Британія історично була центром притоку мігрантів, що зумовлено високим рівнем заробітної плати, розвинутою соціальною інфраструктурою та потребою економіки у кваліфікованих кадрах. Після виходу країни з Європейський Союз міграційна політика зазнала трансформації, проте держава зберігає відкритість для висококваліфікованих спеціалістів, зокрема у сферах фінансів, інформаційних технологій, медицини та науки [3]. Таким чином, Велика Британія є активно інтегрована у глобальний ринок праці, поєднуючи імпорт людського капіталу з експортом власних професіоналів, які працюють у міжнародних компаніях та організаціях.

Не менш значущим є перерозподіл технологічного та інноваційного факторів виробництва. Велика Британія має потужну науково-дослідну базу, представлену провідними університетами та дослідницькими центрами, зокрема University of Oxford та University of Cambridge, які формують глобальні наукові тренди та забезпечують комерціалізацію інновацій [4]. Країна активно залучає венчурний капітал і розвиває стартап-екосистему, особливо у сферах фінансових технологій, біотехнологій і штучного інтелекту. Це сприяє переміщенню інтелектуального капіталу та формуванню нових ланцюгів доданої вартості у міжнародному масштабі.

У структурі національної економіки домінує сектор послуг, що становить понад 70 % ВВП, що відображає постіндустріальний характер розвитку [5]. Велика Британія спеціалізується на фінансових, консалтингових, освітніх та креативних послугах, активно експортує їх на світові ринки, формуючи значну частку валютних надходжень. Водночас промисловий сектор зосереджений на високотехнологічних галузях – авіакосмічній, фармацевтичній, оборонній. Таке поєднання сприяє інтеграції країни у глобальні виробничі ланцюги та забезпечує її участь у перерозподілі матеріальних і нематеріальних ресурсів.

Окремої уваги заслуговує роль Великої Британії у міжнародних економічних організаціях, зокрема у Світової організації торгівлі та Міжнародний валютний фонд. Активна участь у цих інституціях дозволяє країні впливати на формування глобальних правил гри у сфері торгівлі, фінансів і регулювання міжнародних потоків капіталу. Після Brexit держава активізувала укладання двосторонніх торговельних угод,

що сприяє диверсифікації зовнішньоекономічних зв'язків і посиленню позицій у світовій економіці.

Отже, можна зробити висновок, що на сучасному етапі Велика Британія зберігає важливе місце у глобальному перерозподілі факторів виробництва, навіть попри економічні та політичні зміни останніх років. Високий рівень розвитку фінансової системи, якісна освіта, науковий потенціал і сприятливе інституційне середовище формують її конкурентні переваги у світовій економіці. На мою думку, подальша роль Великої Британії у глобальних економічних процесах значною мірою залежатиме від здатності держави швидко реагувати на виклики цифровізації, посилення міжнародної конкуренції та змін у гео економічній структурі світу, а також від ефективності її політики щодо залучення інвестицій і розвитку людського капіталу.

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РОЛЬ МІЖНАРОДНИХ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙ ПІД ЧАС ВІЙНИ В УКРАЇНІ

Анотація

У тезах досліджено роль міжнародних організацій під час війни в Україні, зокрема їхній вплив на гуманітарну підтримку, зміцнення національних інституцій, моніторинг дотримання прав людини, післявоєнне відновлення держави та утвердження принципів міжнародного права. Обґрунтовано, що в умовах повномасштабної війни міжнародні організації стали важливим інструментом консолідації світової спільноти навколо підтримки України, забезпечуючи не лише матеріальну допомогу, а й політичну, правову та соціальну підтримку. Визначено основні напрями їхньої діяльності, а також окреслено проблеми, пов'язані з бюрократичними обмеженнями, політичною залежністю та недостатньою ефективністю окремих міжнародних механізмів безпеки. Зроблено висновок, що діяльність міжнародних організацій має довгострокове значення для відновлення України, посилення її міжнародної суб'єктності та формування нової архітектури міжнародної безпеки.

Ключові слова: міжнародні організації; війна в Україні; гуманітарна допомога; міжнародна безпека; післявоєнне відновлення.

Після початку повномасштабної збройної агресії Російської Федерації проти України 24 лютого 2022 року міжнародна система безпеки та механізми колективного реагування опинилися перед одним із найсерйозніших викликів початку XXI століття. Війна в Україні стала не лише масштабною гуманітарною катастрофою, а й своєрідним індикатором інституційної спроможності сучасних міжнародних організацій виконувати покладені на них функції у сферах підтримання миру, захисту прав людини, надання гуманітарної допомоги та сприяння відновленню постраждалих держав. За даними Управління Верховного комісара ООН з прав людини, станом на початок 2026 року внаслідок

бойових дій верифіковано понад 15 тис. загиблих і більш як 41 тис. поранених цивільних осіб, що свідчить про тривалий і системний характер гуманітарних втрат [1]. Одночасно, за оцінками УВКБ ООН, наприкінці 2025 року за межами України перебувало близько 5,86 млн українських біженців, з яких близько 5,3 млн – у країнах Європи, тоді як ще 3,7 млн осіб залишалися внутрішньо переміщеними в межах України [2]. Додатково ситуація ускладнюється значними економічними та інфраструктурними втратами: за спільною оцінкою Світового банку, Європейської Комісії, ООН та Уряду України, станом на лютий 2026 року прямі збитки перевищили 195 млрд дол. США, а загальні потреби на відновлення та реконструкцію України оцінено майже у 588 млрд дол. США протягом наступного десятиліття [3]. За таких умов діяльність міжнародних організацій набула не лише гуманітарного, а й виразного політико-правового, соціально-економічного та безпекового значення, оскільки саме вони стали важливим інструментом консолідації міжнародної спільноти навколо підтримки України, захисту цивільного населення, документування порушень міжнародного права та формування передумов для повоєнного відновлення держави [1; 2; 3].

Одним із найвагоміших напрямів участі міжнародних організацій стала гуманітарна допомога. Війна спричинила найбільшу гуманітарну кризу в Європі з часів Другої світової. Мільйони людей втратили домівки, роботу, доступ до базових послуг. У цих умовах Організація Об'єднаних Націй (ООН), Всесвітня продовольча програма (WFP), ЮНІСЕФ, Міжнародна федерація Червоного Хреста та інші структури запустили масштабні програми підтримки: грошові виплати, продовольчі пакети, засоби гігієни, підтримку переселенців і людей з інвалідністю. За даними Міністерства соціальної політики України, понад 400 тисяч пенсіонерів отримали фінансову допомогу, а ЮНІСЕФ спільно з урядом України реалізує програми для багатодітних і малозабезпечених сімей, що забезпечує мінімальний рівень соціальної стабільності навіть у прифронтових регіонах [4].

Не менш важливим напрямом діяльності міжнародних організацій є підтримка національних інституцій та адаптація законодавства до європейських стандартів. В умовах війни Україна потребує не лише матеріальної допомоги, а й експертної підтримки у сферах права, освіти, державного управління, соціального захисту. Європейський Союз, Рада Європи, ПРООН та Світовий банк активно залучають українські урядові структури до спільних проєктів з реформування соціальної системи, відновлення інфраструктури, децентралізації управління. Наприклад, ПРООН реалізує програми підтримки місцевих громад, які прийняли найбільше переселенців [5]. Такі ініціативи мають довгостроковий ефект, адже формують основи післявоєнної стійкості держави.

Особливої уваги заслуговує роль міжнародних організацій у сфері моніторингу та звітності. У сучасній війні інформаційний вимір має безпрецедентне значення. Саме міжнародні структури забезпечують достовірне документування подій, що стає основою для політичних рішень і судових процесів. Місія ООН з моніторингу прав людини в Україні регулярно публікує звіти, які відображають реальний стан дотримання прав цивільного населення. Ці дані використовуються міжнародними судами, дипломатичними інституціями та впливають на санкційну політику щодо країни-агресора. Як зазначають науковці Харківського політехнічного інституту (2023), міжнародний моніторинг є не лише інструментом контролю, але й засобом формування глобальної громадської думки, що посилює солідарність із Україною [6].

Не менш значущою є роль міжнародних організацій у процесі відбудови України. Попри те, що бойові дії тривають, уже сьогодні формується багаторівнева архітектура повоєнного відновлення, до якої активно залучені Світовий банк, Європейський інвестиційний банк, ПРООН, система ООН, Європейський Союз та інші міжнародні партнери. Саме ці інституції забезпечують не лише фінансову й технічну підтримку, а й методологічну основу для оцінки збитків, визначення пріоритетів реконструкції та координації відновлювальних заходів. Щонайменше 20 млрд дол. США потреб уже було покрито завдяки невідкладним ремонтам та заходам раннього відновлення у сферах житла, енергетики, освіти, транспорту та інших базових послуг [7]. Це свідчить про те, що міжнародні організації вже сьогодні виконують не допоміжну, а системоутворюючу функцію у відновленні держави.

Важливо, що діяльність міжнародних організацій не обмежується лише фінансуванням відбудови. Вона охоплює підтримку місцевої стійкості, відновлення громад, збереження інституційної спроможності держави та недопущення соціальної деградації постраждалих територій. ПРООН підкреслює, що її діяльність в Україні базується на поєднанні гуманітарних, розвиткових і миробудівних цілей, щоб термінові потреби були безпосередньо пов'язані з довгостроковими завданнями відновлення [8]. Зокрема, ПРООН підтримує органи влади у проведенні оцінки руйнувань, плануванні відновлення, відбудові шкіл, медичних закладів, адміністративних центрів, відновленні енергетичної інфраструктури, розмінуванні, вивезенні завалів, а також у реалізації програм зайнятості, підтримки малого бізнесу та соціальної згуртованості. Такі ініціативи мають не лише економічний, а й виразний соціальний ефект, оскільки сприяють поверненню базових послуг, підтримують зайнятість населення, посилюють довіру до інституцій і зменшують ризик соціальної фрагментації у громадах, що постраждали від війни [8].

Водночас політико-правова роль міжнародних організацій залишається не менш важливою. Через резолюції, моніторингові місії, звіти та публічні заяви вони підтримують міжнародну легітимність України, документують факти порушення міжнародного гуманітарного права та прав людини, а також перешкоджають нормалізації агресії як допустимого інструменту міжнародної політики [9]. Навіть якщо такі документи не мають прямої примусової сили, вони формують політичний і моральний тиск, який впливає на позиції держав, міжнародних донорів, судових інституцій і глобального громадського дискурсу. У цьому контексті участь України в роботі міжнародних структур не лише посилює її позиції як держави, що діє в межах міжнародного права, а й створює основу для майбутнього притягнення винних до відповідальності.

Разом із тим ефективність міжнародної підтримки не є безумовною і супроводжується низкою серйозних викликів. Насамперед ідеться про бюрократичну інерцію великих міжнародних структур, складність багаторівневого погодження рішень, політичні суперечності між державами-донорами та ризик фрагментації зусиль між різними інституціями. Додатковою проблемою є обмежений або відсутній доступ до тимчасово окупованих територій і частини прифронтових районів, що ускладнює верифікацію порушень, об'єктивну оцінку потреб та безпечно надання допомоги. За даними ОСНА, у липні–серпні 2025 року було зафіксовано 47 інцидентів, що вплинули на гуманітарний доступ, з яких 31 був безпосередньо пов'язаний з активними бойовими діями. Це означає, що навіть за наявності політичної волі та фінансових ресурсів частина допомоги неминуче наштовхується на фізичні, безпекові та логістичні бар'єри [10]. Окремим ризиком є і залежність міжнародних програм від донорського фінансування: зміна політичних пріоритетів у країнах-партнерах, в тому від тривалої війни, конкуренція з іншими глобальними кризами або внутрішньополітичні зміни можуть послаблювати сталість зовнішньої підтримки [10].

Крім того, сама логіка відбудови породжує стратегічні ризики. Йдеться про небезпеку нерівномірного розподілу ресурсів між регіонами, ризик відновлення за застарілими моделями без структурної модернізації, корупційні викривлення, перевантаження місцевих інституцій та недостатню синхронізацію між короткостроковими ремонтами і довгостроковими реформами. Не менш серйозним є ризик того, що реконструкція буде сприйматися лише як фізичне відновлення зруйнованих об'єктів, а не як можливість для глибокої трансформації країни на засадах стійкості, інклюзивності, енергоефективності, цифровізації та європейської інтеграції [8]. У цьому контексті міжнародні організації постають не просто як донори, а як

співархітектори нової інституційної моделі України. Зокрема, Європейський інвестиційний банк ще у 2023 році схвалив новий пакет підтримки України в межах ініціативи EU for Ukraine, який передбачав довірчий фонд, гарантійні механізми та подальше фінансування критично важливих проєктів відновлення [11].

Отже, роль міжнародних організацій під час війни в Україні є не просто важливою, а стратегічно визначальною для збереження державної стійкості, підтримки суспільства та майбутньої реконструкції країни. Вони одночасно виступають джерелом ресурсів, механізмом міжнародної легітимації, платформою документування воєнних злочинів, інструментом підтримки соціальної згуртованості та одним із ключових чинників формування нової моделі повоєнного розвитку. Водночас їхня ефективність безпосередньо залежить від здатності подолати бюрократичну повільність, забезпечити координацію між донорами, зберегти довгострокове фінансування та поєднати гуманітарні, безпекові, правові й економічні пріоритети в єдину стратегію. Український досвід доводить, що міжнародна солідарність є дієвою лише тоді, коли вона підкріплена внутрішньою інституційною спроможністю, прозорим управлінням і стратегічним баченням майбутнього. Саме тому значення міжнародних організацій для України полягає не лише у допомозі пережити війну, а й у створенні передумов для побудови більш стійкої, модернізованої та європейсько інтегрованої держави після її завершення [7; 8; 9].

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ГЛОБАЛІЗАЦІЙНІ ПРОЦЕСИ ТА ЇХ ВПЛИВ НА ЕКОНОМІЧНИЙ РОЗВИТОК УКРАЇНИ

Анотація

У доповіді проаналізовано вплив глобалізаційних процесів на економічний розвиток України за сучасних умов. Вивчено ключові переваги й виклики глобалізації, зокрема її ефекти на інвестиційну сферу, міжнародну торгівлю, ринок праці та конкурентоспроможність. Особливий акцент зроблено на оцінці позицій України в глобальному індексі інновацій, що дає змогу визначити рівень інноваційного потенціалу країни в глобалізованому світі. Виявлено негативну тенденцію в рейтингових показниках, яка вказує на системні проблеми в інноваційній сфері - зокрема, низьке фінансування, недорозвинену інноваційну інфраструктуру та зростання глобальної конкуренції. Обґрунтовано потребу в посиленні державної підтримки інновацій, формуванні інноваційних кластерів та розширенні міжнародного партнерства для зростання конкурентних позицій України на глобальному ринку.

Ключові слова: *глобалізація, економічний розвиток, Україна, глобальний індекс інновацій, інноваційна діяльність, конкурентоспроможність, міжнародна економіка, інвестиції, інноваційна інфраструктура, світовий ринок.*

Abstract

The report examines the impact of globalization on the economic development of Ukraine in modern conditions. The main benefits and challenges of globalization are identified, including its influence on investment, international trade, the labor market, and competitiveness. Special attention is given to Ukraine's position in the Global Innovation Index, which helps to evaluate the level of its innovation development in a globalized world. The analysis shows a negative trend in Ukraine's ranking, which indicates the presence of problems in the innovation sphere, such as low funding, weak innovation infrastructure, and growing global competition. The report highlights the need to strengthen government support for innovation, develop innovation clusters, and expand international cooperation in order to improve Ukraine's competitiveness in the global market.

Keywords: *globalization, economic development, Ukraine, global innovation index, innovation activity, competitiveness, international economy, investments, innovation infrastructure, world market.*

Вступ

Глобалізація виступає визначальним чинником, що формує траєкторії еволюції національних економічних систем. Цей процес пронизує всі галузі суспільного буття, посилюючи взаємні зв'язки між державами та створюючи інтегрований економічний простір. Завдяки глобалізаційним тенденціям трансформуються структура виробництва, міжнародна торгівля, інвестиційні потоки та інноваційна динаміка. Для України глобалізація прокладає шлях до поглибленої інтеграції у світову економіку, залучення зовнішнього капіталу та освоєння передових технологій. Разом з тим, вона породжує суттєві ризики, зокрема загострення конкуренції, вразливість до зовнішніх ринків та нагальну потребу в підвищенні конкурентних позицій національної економіки.

Метою даної доповіді є дослідження впливу глобалізаційних процесів на економічний розвиток України, а також визначення основних переваг і викликів, які виникають у результаті інтеграції країни у світову економіку. Особлива увага приділяється аналізу інноваційного розвитку України на основі показників глобального індексу інновацій та визначенню напрямів підвищення її конкурентоспроможності.

Виклад основного матеріалу

У сучасному світі спостерігається поширення впливу глобалізаційних процесів на всі сфери життєдіяльності людства. Під її впливом світова економіка зазнає кардинальних трансформацій. Економічна глобалізація призводить до зростання світової взаємозалежності та створює як можливості, так і виклики для розвитку національних економік. Процес глобалізації поглиблює міжнародний поділ праці між регіонами та країнами, і тому є результатом оптимальних цінових стратегій та підвищення продуктивності праці. Під впливом глобалізації світ стає все більш схожим на єдиний світовий ринок, що перетворює його на єдину світову економіку. Цей процес визначає напрями національного виробництва та зовнішньоекономічну діяльність країн, а також ступінь їх інтеграції у світову економіку. На сьогодні жодна країна не може уникнути впливу цього процесу на різні аспекти суспільного життя, включаючи Україну, яка активно інтегрується до міжнародних організацій та ринків. Серед позитивних

наслідків глобалізації в Україні можна виділити присутність прямих іноземних інвестицій, які вирішують ряд існуючих проблем. Інвестування в економіку сприяє прискоренню темпів зростання країни та покращанню рівня життя українського населення. Також глобалізація може відкрити двері для продажу української продукції ширшому колу клієнтів у всьому світі. Це може створити робочі місця та підняти економіку країни. У культурній сфері позитивними наслідками можна відзначити, що українці мають доступ до інформації з різних сфер діяльності інших країн, можуть подорожувати за кордон на відпочинок або на роботу, користуватися різноманітною технікою та комп'ютерами, а також брати участь у спільних проєктах в інформаційній сфері, отримувати а також віддавати технології та знання через міжнародні співпрацю та обмін досвідом, що може сприяти підвищенню інноваційності та конкурентоспроможності [1].

Але важливо відзначити, що глобалізація також має потенційні недоліки. Глобалізація економічної діяльності суттєво впливає на економічне життя, а також тягне за собою політичні, соціальні і навіть культурно-цивілізаційні наслідки. Ці наслідки поступово відчують практично всі країни, включаючи Україну, яка активно працює над інтеграцією в світову економіку. Глобалізація прискорює поширення економічних та фінансових криз, яким багато країн світу просто не можуть протидіяти. Основними викликами глобалізаційних процесів є нерівномірний розподіл переваг між країнами та галузями, переміщення контролю над економікою до більш сильних та розвинутих держав, а також до транснаціональних корпорацій. В процесі її поширення здобувають користь від цього процесу та продовжують нарощувати свої багатства найрозвиненіші країни, віддаляючись від країн які розвиваються (до яких можна зарахувати й Україну) в результаті чого можливе зазнавання втрат. Чим менш розвинена країна, тим менше вона виграє від глобалізації. Ще однією з найбільших загроз процесу світової інтеграції є масове безробіття та зростаюча мобільність робочої сили. Масова міграція населення стає глобальним явищем і відіграє значну роль у загостренні соціально-економічної ситуації в світі [2].

Також одним з недоліків є конкуренція, яка на світовій арені вимагає від українських компаній постійного удосконалення та конкурентоспроможності. Це може бути важко для деяких галузей, які потребують значних інвестицій у технологічний розвиток та якість продукції. Натомість конкуренти України широко застосовують високі й запатентовані технології, стимулюють виробництво унікальних товарів, всебічно залучають наукову еліту, кредитують інновації.

Отримані результати дозволяють країнам- конкурентам знижувати собівартість виробництва й оволодівати новими ринками збуту.

Одним із ключових індикаторів рівня інноваційного розвитку держави в умовах глобалізації є глобальний індекс інновацій. У 2025 році Україна посіла 66 місце у глобальному інноваційному індексі (Табл. 1).

Таблиця 1

Рейтинг глобального індексу інновацій України*

Рік	Позиція ГІ	Вхідні інновації	Вихідні інновації
2020	45 місце	71 місце	37 місце
2021	49 місце	76 місце	37 місце
2022	57 місце	75 місце	48 місце
2023	55 місце	78 місце	42 місце
2024	60 місце	78 місце	54 місце
2025	66 місце	80 місце	54 місце

**Складено автором за [3].*

Аналізуючи таблицю можна побачити, що порівняно з попередніми роками позиція країни знизилася, оскільки у 2020 році вона займала 45 місце, а в 2025 році 66 місце. Причинами такої ситуації можна назвати наявність певних проблем у сфері інноваційного розвитку та посилення конкуренції у глобальному середовищі. Разом з тим завдяки структурам індексу можна більш чітко оцінити позицію. Показник (вхідні інновації), що включає освіту, наукові дослідження, інфраструктуру а також інституційний розвиток, демонструє негативну тенденцію, з 71 місця у 2020 році до 80 у 2025 році. За показником (вихідні інновації) у 2020 році Україна посідала 37 місце, а у 2025 році 54 місце. Результативність інноваційної діяльності відображає загальне погіршення. Погіршення позицій України у глобальному інноваційному індексі зумовлене рядом об'єктивних факторів. Насамперед, значний вплив має повномасштабна війна, яка спричинила економічну нестабільність, руйнування інфраструктури та скорочення інвестицій у науково-дослідну діяльність.

Падіння позицій України в Глобальному інноваційному індексі пояснюється низкою об'єктивних причин. Головним чином, повномасштабна війна спричинила економічну дестабілізацію, знищення інфраструктури та зменшення вкладень у дослідження та розробки. Водночас скоротилося державне фінансування інновацій і витрати компаній на інноваційні ініціативи через те що бізнес повинен адаптуватися до кризових умов. Також посилення глобальної конкуренції, в умовах якої країни з більш розвиненими інноваційними системами швидше впроваджують нові технології та займають вищі позиції у міжнародних рейтингах.

Отже, глобалізація є сучасним, об'єктивним і закономірним процесом, який визначає новий підхід до глобального розвитку як невід'ємної складової світової економіки. Для України вона створює як можливості для інтеграції у міжнародний економічний простір, так і значні виклики, пов'язані з посиленням конкуренції та необхідністю підвищення конкурентоспроможності національної економіки. Проведений аналіз показав, що позиції України у глобальному інноваційному індексі у 2020-2025 роках мають негативну динаміку, і можна вважати про наявність системних проблем у сфері інноваційного розвитку. В умовах глобалізаційних процесів інновації стають ключовим фактором економічного розвитку, тому для України важливо забезпечити збалансовану взаємодію наукового, технічного та виробничого потенціалів, удосконалити механізми активізації інноваційної діяльності суб'єктів підприємництва та сприяти поширенню інновацій у всіх сферах економіки.

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АНАЛІЗ ЗОВНІШНЬОЕКОНОМІЧНОЇ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ ШВЕЙЦАРІЇ ЗА 2015-2024 РОКИ

Ця робота присвячена дослідженню зовнішньоекономічної діяльності Швейцарії за 2015-2024 роки. Було розкрито такі теми: динаміка ВВП , експорту та імпорту товарів і послуг , сальдо торговельного балансу , структура торговельних потоків та ключові партнери на міжнародному ринку. Було проаналізовано вплив глобальних економічних чинників на зовнішньоекономічну діяльність країни.

Ключові слова: *зовнішньоекономічна діяльність Швейцарії, експорт, імпорт, ВВП, сальдо торговельного балансу, зовнішньоторговельна квота, міжнародна торгівля.*

The article is devoted to the study of Switzerland's foreign economic activity for 2015-2024. The following topics were covered: GDP dynamics, exports and imports of goods and services, trade balance, trade flow structure, and key partners in the international market. The impact of global economic factors on the country's foreign economic activity is analysed.

Keywords: *Switzerland's foreign economic activity, exports, imports, GDP, trade balance, foreign trade quota, international trade.*

Швейцарія є однією з найбільш стабільних і розвинених країн світу як з політичної, так і з економічної точки зору. Її офіційна назва – Швейцарська Конфедерація, форма правління – федеративна парламентська республіка. Її політичний устрій ґрунтується на принципах федералізму та прямої демократії, що надає громадянам значний вплив на процеси ухвалення рішень. Федерація складається з 26 кантонів, кожен з яких має власну конституцію, парламент, уряд та судову систему.

Історично Швейцарія формувалася як союз незалежних громад, що поступово еволюціонував у сучасну державу. Відлік сучасної Швейцарської Конфедерації бере початок з 1848 року, коли було ухвалено першу федеральну конституцію. Саме вона заклала основи демократичної системи та поділу влади, які зберігаються донині.

Швейцарська модель прямої демократії є унікальною: громадяни мають право ініціювати референдуми щодо змін до законодавства або рішень парламенту. Це сприяє високому рівню політичної стабільності, залученню населення до управління та формує довіру до інституцій.

Економічне середовище Швейцарії характеризується високим рівнем стабільності, помірним зростанням та ефективною макроекономічною політикою. Оцінка ключових показників дозволяє зробити висновки щодо конкурентоспроможності, інвестиційної привабливості та адаптивності економіки.

Швейцарія входить до числа країн із найвищим рівнем ВВП на душу населення у світі. У 2024 році номінальний ВВП країни становив приблизно 936,56 млрд доларів США, а на душу населення – понад 103 тис. дол. США за поточним курсом [1]. Високий рівень ВВП пояснюється розвинутою індустрією фінансових послуг, фармацевтики, машинобудування та експортом високотехнологічної продукції. Структура ВВП Швейцарії свідчить про домінування сектора послуг, на який припадає близько 74% валової доданої вартості. Промисловість формує ще 25%, тоді як сільське господарство займає близько 1%, що типово для постіндустріальних економік [1].

Динаміка зростання економіки Швейцарії упродовж 2015-2024 рр. характеризується помірними, але загалом стабільними темпами (Рис.1). У 2015-2017 роках темпи зростання ВВП коливалися в межах 1,4 - 2,1%, що свідчило про поступовий розвиток економіки за умов стриманого зовнішнього попиту. У 2018 році було зафіксовано прискорення економічного зростання до 2,9%, зумовлене активізацією інвестиційної діяльності та зростанням експорту високотехнологічної продукції. У 2019 році темпи зростання сповільнилися до 1,1%, що відображало загальне уповільнення світової економіки. Найбільш значний спад спостерігався у 2020 році, коли ВВП скоротився на 2,1% внаслідок пандемії COVID-19, обмежувальних заходів та порушення глобальних ланцюгів постачання.

Починаючи з 2021 року, економіка Швейцарії продемонструвала швидке відновлення: темп зростання ВВП сягнув 5,6%, що стало найвищим показником за досліджуваний період. У 2022 році зростання сповільнилося до 3% на тлі інфляційного тиску, енергетичної кризи та геополітичної нестабільності в Європі. У 2023 році темпи зростання знизилися до 0,7%, що було пов'язано зі скороченням зовнішнього попиту та посиленням глобальної невизначеності. Водночас у 2024 році економіка Швейцарії знову перейшла до помірного зростання на рівні 1,3%, що свідчить про її високу адаптивність і стійкість до зовнішніх шоків.




Рис.1. Динаміка реального ВВП Швейцарії за 2015-2024 рр. (млрд.дол.США)*

**Складено автором за [1].*

Насамперед варто зазначити, що участь країни в міжнародному поділі праці можна оцінити за показниками експорту та імпорту товарів і послуг, їх часткою у валовому внутрішньому продукті, динамікою зовнішньоторговельного сальдо, а також структурою торговельних потоків. Усі ці аспекти демонструють глибину залученості Швейцарії у глобальні економічні процеси.

Протягом 2015-2024 років Швейцарія зберігала доволі стійке позитивне зовнішньоторговельне сальдо (Рис.2). У 2024 році воно склало понад 42,4 млрд дол. США. Позитивне сальдо товарної торгівлі щороку компенсувало незначне від'ємне сальдо у сфері послуг.

Швейцарська економіка є експортно-орієнтованою. Країна постійно продає за кордон більше, ніж купує, що дозволяє їй щороку отримувати чистий прибуток. Якщо у 2015 році цей загальний залишок складав близько 39,43 млрд дол. США, то протягом наступних років він хоч і коливався, але залишався в плюсі. Найскладнішим став 2020 рік, коли через пандемію цей показник різко впав до свого мінімуму – всього 8,73 млрд дол. США. Це сталося тому, що світова торгівля буквально зупинилася. Проте країна дуже швидко оговталася, і вже до 2024 року прибуток від торгівлі зріс до рекордних 42,44 млрд дол. США.

Аналізуючи 2015-2024 роки можна помітити, що Швейцарія заробляє величезні гроші на товарах, але витрачає дедалі більше на послуги. Прибуток від продажу товарів за цей час виріс удвічі – з 36,86 млрд дол. США у 2015 році до 77,19 млрд дол. США у 2024 році. Це означає, що швейцарські ліки, годинники та техніка стають дедалі популярнішими у світі. Водночас у сфері послуг ситуація зворотна. Якщо раніше Швейцарія мала тут невеликий прибуток, то з 2017 року вона почала витрачати на іноземні послуги (консультації, цифрові технології, сервіси) на багато більше, ніж заробляти сама. У 2024 році цей мінус у послугах склав понад 34 млрд дол. США, але величезні успіхи у продажі товарів перекривають ці витрати.



Рис. 2. Динаміка зовнішньоторговельного сальдо Швейцарії за 2015-2024 рр (млрд дол.США)*

**Складено автором за [2].*

Експорт є ключовим джерелом економічного зростання Швейцарії. У 2024 році обсяг експорту товарів досяг 446,9 млрд дол. США, що є високим показником для країни [2]. Цікаво, що навіть у 2020 році, коли більшість країн зазнала різкого скорочення експорту через пандемію COVID-19, Швейцарія зберегла зростання експорту товарів, завдяки високому попиту на медичну продукцію та фармацевтику. Це демонструє антикризову стійкість швейцарської моделі експорту.

Основними експортними статтями Швейцарії є фармацевтичні препарати, годинники, ювелірні вироби, електроніка та хімічні продукти, а також фінансові, страхові та ІТ-послуги. Щодо основних торговельних партнерів з експорту країни, то розглянемо їх в Табл. 1.

Таблиця 1

Найбільші партнери з експорту (2024)*

Країна	Частка в експорті	Основні товарні групи
США	16,49%	Фармацевтика, хімія, біотехнології, фінансові послуги
Німеччина	11,50%	Фармацевтика, машини, годинники
Китай	9,49%	Годинники, ювелірні вироби, фармацевтика, продукція машинобудування
Словенія	6,71%	Фармацевтична сировина
Італія	6,25%	Фармацевтика, вироби з чорних металів, електроенергія

**Розраховано за даними [3].*

Імпорт Швейцарії також стабільно зростає, досягнувши 369,7 млрд дол. США у 2024 році. Не маючи значних ресурсів, країна змушена імпортувати велику частину необхідних товарів. Однак її імпорт є виваженим, продуктивно орієнтованим і тісно пов'язаним із внутрішнім виробництвом та реекспортом.

Швейцарія практично не має власних джерел енергії, тому імпортує нафту, газ, вугілля та електроенергію. Водночас активно переходить на чисті джерела енергії (гідроелектростанції, сонячні батареї). Імпорт

сировини (метали, хімікати) забезпечує сталість виробничого циклу у фармацевтиці, точній інженерії та машинобудуванні.

Багато з імпортованої продукції є частиною глобальних ланцюгів виробництва (Табл. 2). Наприклад, електронні компоненти, частини машин, оптичні елементи імпортуються для подальшої інтеграції в готову продукцію, яку потім Швейцарія експортує. Це демонструє її участь не лише в торгівлі готовими товарами, а й у високорівневій виробничій кооперації.

Країна імпортує значну частину харчових продуктів – від овочів до морепродуктів, адже кліматичні та географічні умови не дозволяють забезпечити повне продовольче самозабезпечення. Водночас споживачі вимагають високої якості, тому часто імпортуються органічні продукти, товари з країн ЄС.

Швейцарський імпорт має в своїй товарній структурі також електроніку, побутову техніку та транспортні засоби, що свідчить про високий рівень життя в країні. Внутрішній попит на сучасні технології, автомобілі, ІТ-рішення задовольняється за рахунок імпорту, здебільшого з ЄС, США та Китаю.

Таблиця 2

Найбільші партнери з імпорту (2024)*

Країна	Частка в імпорті	Основні товарні групи
Німеччина	18,39%	Машини, побутова техніка, сталь, технологічне обладнання й системи автоматизації
Італія	8,22%	Текстиль, взуття та одяг, продукти харчування, сільськогосподарська продукція, обладнання для енергетики
США	7,93%	Електроніка, фармацевтика, продукція авіабудування
Франція	5,71%	Парфуми, продукти харчування, одяг, техніка та авіаційні компоненти
Словенія	5,52%	Фармацевтика, готові ліки
Китай	5,49%	Електроніка, техніка, текстиль та товари широкого вжитку

**Розраховано за даними [3].*

Як вже було проаналізовано, географічна структура зовнішньої торгівлі Швейцарії концентрується навколо економічно розвинених країн, з якими встановлено стабільні торговельні відносини. Найбільшим торговельним партнером є Німеччина – на неї припадає велика частина імпорту та експорту. Це обумовлено географічною близькістю, економічною інтеграцією через ЄАВТ та галузевою кооперацією. США займають провідну позицію серед країн-імпортерів швейцарської фармацевтики, ІТ-рішень і фінансових послуг. Водночас Китай відіграє ключову роль у торгівлі технікою, сировиною та дорогоцінним камінням. Стратегічна гнучкість Швейцарії дозволяє їй

уникати торговельної залежності від одного партнера і водночас підтримувати міцні зв'язки з усіма головними економіками світу.

Тепер варто звернути увагу на ступень відкритості та інтеграції економіки. В Табл. 3 зазначено значення показників експортної, імпорتنної та зовнішньоторговельної квоти.

Таблиця 3

**Динаміка експортної, імпорتنної та зовнішньоторговельної квоти
Швейцарії за 2015-2024 роки***

Рік	Експортна квота	Імпорتنна квота	Зовнішньоторговельна квота
2015	63,80%	53,31%	117,1%
2016	66,81%	56,70%	123,5%
2017	66,35%	57,27%	123,6%
2018	67,48%	56,95%	124,4%
2019	66,97%	57,16%	124,1%
2020	64,10%	57,69%	121,8%
2021	71,12%	58,90%	130,0%
2022	76,14%	62,36%	138,5%
2023	73,33%	61,99%	135,3%
2024	72,16%	61,94%	134,1%

**Розраховано за даними [4].*

Експортна квота Швейцарії протягом останнього десятиліття демонструвала позитивну динаміку. Якщо у 2015 році вона складала 63,80%, то до 2022 року показник виріс до 76,14%. Станом на 2024 рік експортна квота становить 72,16%. Для порівняння, економіки з квотою близько 10% вважаються закритими, тоді як швейцарські цифри характерні для малих, але високорозвинених країн, чий добробут безпосередньо залежить від глобального попиту. Така висока експортна орієнтованість зумовлена глибокою спеціалізацією на товарах з високою доданою вартістю.

Імпорتنна квота також відображає значну інтеграцію країни у міжнародну торгівлю. Протягом аналізованого періоду вона зросла з 53,31% у 2015 році до 61,94% у 2024 році. Це свідчить про суттєву залежність Швейцарії від іноземної сировини, енергоносіїв та комплектуючих, необхідних для підтримки високотехнологічного виробництва.

Зовнішньоторговельна квота, яка є сумою експортної та імпорتنної часток, у 2024 році склала 134,1%. Цей показник найкраще ілюструє ступінь відкритості: Швейцарія фактично пропускає крізь свою економіку обсяги товарів та послуг, що значно перевищують її власний ВВП. Така модель забезпечує країні доступ до інновацій, сприяє економічному зростанню та дозволяє утримувати високу конкурентоспроможність.

Однак варто зауважити, що такий рівень відкритості, окрім значних переваг, несе в собі й певні ризики. Економіка стає вразливою до зовнішніх шоків, що було чітко помітно у 2020 році, коли на тлі пандемії експортна квота тимчасово знизилася до 64,10%. Глобальні фінансові кризи, порушення логістики або зміни в торговельній політиці ключових партнерів, таких як США, Німеччини чи Китаю, мають прямий і швидкий вплив на внутрішню стабільність країни.

Висновки

За період 2015–2024 років зовнішньоекономічна діяльність Швейцарії продемонструвала стабільний розвиток та високу адаптивність до глобальних змін. Країна зберегла свої провідні позиції на міжнародному ринку завдяки високорозвиненій інфраструктурі, стратегічному розташуванню, технологічним інноваціям та відкритій економічній політиці. Протягом цих років Швейцарія активно співпрацювала з ключовими торговельними партнерами, включаючи Німеччину, США, Китай, Італію, Францію та Словенію.

Для подальшого зміцнення зовнішньоекономічної діяльності Швейцарії важливо продовжувати диверсифікувати експортні ринки, щоб уникати торговельної залежності від окремих партнерів. Необхідно й надалі інвестувати в інноваційні сектори, зокрема фармацевтику та біотехнології, які забезпечують стійкість експорту. Важливим вектором залишається розвиток «зеленої» енергетики для зменшення імпортозалежності від енергоносіїв, а також ефективне управління зростаючим попитом на іноземні цифрові та технологічні послуги. Це дозволить створити більш стійку та конкурентоспроможну економіку, здатну ефективно реагувати на глобальні виклики та забезпечувати процвітання в майбутньому.

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ПРОБЛЕМИ ТА ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ ЗОВНІШНЬОЇ ТОРГІВЛІ ШВЕЙЦАРІЇ

Анотація

У роботі досліджено сучасний стан, проблеми та перспективи розвитку зовнішньої торгівлі Швейцарії. Проаналізовано динаміку експорту та імпорту, товарну і географічну структуру торгівлі, а також роль високотехнологічних галузей у забезпеченні конкурентоспроможності країни. Визначено ключові виклики, зокрема валютні коливання, геополітичну нестабільність і залежність від зовнішніх ринків. Обґрунтовано перспективи розвитку, пов'язані з інноваціями, диверсифікацією ринків та цифровізацією зовнішньоекономічної діяльності.

Ключові слова: *зовнішня торгівля, Швейцарія, експорт, імпорт, конкурентоспроможність, диверсифікація, високотехнологічна продукція.*

Abstract

The paper examines the current state, challenges, and prospects of Switzerland's foreign trade. It analyzes export and import dynamics, as well as the commodity and geographical structure of trade, and the role of high-tech industries in ensuring competitiveness. Key challenges are identified, including currency fluctuations, geopolitical instability, and dependence on external markets. Prospects for development are substantiated, particularly those related to innovation, market diversification, and the digitalization of foreign economic activity.

Keywords: *foreign trade, Switzerland, exports, imports, competitiveness, diversification, high-tech products*

Метою дослідження є аналіз сучасного стану, основних проблем і перспектив розвитку зовнішньої торгівлі Швейцарії з урахуванням структурних особливостей економіки та впливу глобальних економічних чинників.

Вступ

У сучасних умовах глобалізації зовнішня торгівля є одним із ключових чинників економічного розвитку будь-якої держави. Для країн із невеликим внутрішнім ринком, але високим рівнем економічного

розвитку, значення міжнародної торгівлі є особливо важливим. Саме до таких країн належить Швейцарія – одна з найбільш конкурентоспроможних, інноваційних та відкритих економік світу.

Швейцарія займає особливе місце у світовій торговельній системі завдяки високій якості продукції, розвиненому фінансовому сектору, потужній фармацевтичній та хімічній промисловості, конкурентоспроможній годинниковій галузі, афінажу золота, торгівлі дорогоцінним камінням та активній участі у міжнародному поділі праці. Попри відносно невелику територію та обмежені природні ресурси, країна демонструє високі показники експорту та імпорту, підтримуючи стабільні торговельно-економічні зв'язки з багатьма країнами світу.

Водночас зовнішня торгівля Швейцарії стикається з низкою викликів, пов'язаних із коливанням валютного курсу, геополітичною нестабільністю, змінами у світовому попиті, високою залежністю від окремих ринків збуту та трансформацією глобальних ланцюгів постачання. У зв'язку з цим особливої актуальності набуває аналіз сучасного стану, основних проблем та перспектив розвитку зовнішньої торгівлі Швейцарії.

Виклад основного матеріалу

Почати варто з того, що особливість швейцарської торгівлі полягає в тому, що вона базується не на експорті масової дешевої продукції, а на постачанні товарів із високою доданою вартістю, які потребують значного науково-технічного, інноваційного та інтелектуального ресурсу. Це дозволяє країні залишатися конкурентоспроможною навіть за умов високих виробничих витрат та дорогого національного валютного курсу.

За офіційними даними Федерального управління митниці та прикордонної безпеки Швейцарії, у 2025 році експорт країни досяг рекордного рівня – 287 млрд швейцарських франків, що на 1,4% більше, ніж роком раніше. Імпорт у 2025 році також зріс – до 232,7 млрд швейцарських франків, тобто на 4,5%. Внаслідок цього позитивне сальдо зовнішньої торгівлі становило 54,3 млрд франків [1].

Такі показники свідчать про стабільну експортну орієнтацію економіки Швейцарії та її здатність зберігати сильні позиції на міжнародних ринках навіть у складних глобальних умовах.

Товарна структура швейцарського експорту має чітко виражений високотехнологічний характер. У Таблиці 1 видно, що провідною товарною категорією залишаються дорогоцінні метали та каміння, експорт яких зріс із 80,1 млрд дол. США у 2019 році до 137 млрд дол. США у 2024 році. Вагоме значення для економіки Швейцарії має також

фармацевтична галузь: обсяги експорту лікарських засобів і медичних препаратів за досліджуваний період збільшилися з 83 до 110,5 млрд дол. США. Крім того, стабільно високий рівень експорту зберігають годинникова промисловість і виробництво точних приладів, які разом із хімічною продукцією становлять основу конкурентних переваг Швейцарії на світовому ринку.

Таблиця 1

Обсяги експорту товарів зі Швейцарії за 2019-2024 рр (млрд дол. США)*

Товарна група	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Дорогоцінні метали та камені	80,1	86,2	106,5	120,4	127,5	137,0
Фармацевтична продукція	83,0	88,4	101,6	98,1	99,1	110,5
Органічні хімічні сполуки	22,0	25,5	29,7	31,0	40,3	47,2
Годинники	21,8	18,1	24,4	26,0	29,8	29,5
Реактори, котли, обладнання	22,9	21,1	24,0	24,3	25,9	25,3

**Розраховано за даними [2].*

Щодо сфери послуг, Швейцарія впевнено зберігає позиції одного з провідних світових інтелектуальних і фінансових центрів. Найбільшу частку в структурі експорту послуг займають професійні ділові послуги, обсяг яких у 2024 році досяг 32,8 млрд дол. США, а також доходи від використання інтелектуальної власності (патентів, ліцензій), що становили 34,3 млрд дол. США. Важливу роль продовжує відігравати й фінансовий сектор, який, незважаючи на трансформації у сфері міжнародного регулювання, залишається стабільним джерелом значних доходів, приносячи країні понад 26,8 млрд дол. США щороку. Надходження від поїздок іноземних громадян до Швейцарії досягли майже 22 млрд дол. США у 2024 році [2].

Швейцарія не має достатньої кількості власних природних ресурсів, тому значною мірою залежить від імпорту (Табл.2). Водночас імпорт країни має не споживчий, а переважно виробничий характер, оскільки значна частина ввезених товарів використовується у промисловості або в подальшому реекспорті. Основу імпорту становлять дорогоцінні метали й каміння, фармацевтична продукція, технічне обладнання та механічні пристрої.

Важливе місце в імпорті займають і енергетичні ресурси, адже країна не може повністю забезпечити себе паливом та енергією. Разом із цим Швейцарія поступово переорієнтовується на екологічніші джерела енергії, насамперед гідроенергетику та сонячну енергію.

Частина імпортованої продукції є складовою міжнародних виробничих процесів. Наприклад, окремі деталі, електронні компоненти та оптичні елементи надходять до країни для подальшої обробки, складання або використання у виробництві готової високотехнологічної

продукції. Це свідчить про глибоку інтегрованість Швейцарії у світові виробничі ланцюги.

Крім того, країна імпортує значну частину продовольчих товарів, оскільки природні умови не дозволяють повністю покривати внутрішні потреби за рахунок власного виробництва. При цьому швейцарський ринок орієнтується насамперед на високу якість продукції, що також впливає на структуру імпорту.

Таблиця 2

Обсяги імпорту товарів в Швейцарію за 2019-2024 рр (млрд дол. США)*

Товарна група	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Дорогоцінні метали та камені	86,5	104,5	111,0	117,7	122,7	124,1
Фармацевтична продукція	31,6	38,9	42,3	48,7	58,5	67,8
Реактори, котли, обладнання	19,6	19,1	21,1	21,9	22,7	22,5
Наземний транспорт	16,1	15,1	16,0	16,7	20,5	19,1
Електричне обладнання	14,6	14,9	17,1	18,5	18,6	17,2
Мінеральне паливо	9,3	5,8	10,9	23,6	14,4	11,1

**Розраховано за даними [2].*

Географічно зовнішня торгівля Швейцарії орієнтована насамперед на європейський ринок, хоча країна активно співпрацює також зі США, Китаєм, Великою Британією та іншими державами.

Найважливішим торговельним партнером Швейцарії є Європейський Союз (найбільшу частку займає Німеччина). ЄС залишається основним ринком збуту для швейцарських товарів, а також головним джерелом імпорту. За даними Європейської Комісії, у 2024 році двостороння торгівля товарами між ЄС і Швейцарією становила 328 млрд євро, а сама Швейцарія була четвертим найбільшим торговельним партнером ЄС після США, Китаю та Великої Британії [3].

Це свідчить про те, що, попри глобальний характер швейцарської торгівлі, економіка країни все ж значною мірою залежить від ситуації на окремих великих ринках. Зокрема, зміни попиту в ЄС чи США можуть безпосередньо впливати на темпи зростання швейцарського експорту.

Таким чином, географічна структура зовнішньої торгівлі Швейцарії є відносно диверсифікованою, але водночас зберігає високу залежність від європейського економічного простору.

Отже, попри високий рівень розвитку та стабільність, зовнішня торгівля Швейцарії стикається з низкою серйозних проблем, які можуть стримувати її подальший розвиток.

1. Геополітична напруженість

Першою проблемою варто виділити геополітичну напруженість. Зростання протекціонізму, воєнні конфлікти та складність у відносинах між провідними економіками, зокрема США та Китаєм, ставлять під

загрозу стабільності глобальних ланцюгів постачання. Для Швейцарії це є проблемою, адже її ключові галузі – фармацевтика, годинникова промисловість, машинобудування та фінансовий сектор – залежать від безперешкодного доступу до міжнародних ринків і ресурсів. У відповідь країна змушена переорієнтовувати зовнішньоекономічну політику та розширювати співпрацю з новими партнерами в Азії, Латинській Америці й Африці.

2. Зміцнення швейцарського франка

Другою важливою проблемою є сильний курс швейцарського франка. Через те, що франк вважається однією з найбезпечніших валют світу, в умовах глобальної нестабільності попит на нього зростає. Це веде до зміцнення національної валюти, а отже – до подорожчання швейцарських товарів на міжнародних ринках.

У 2026 році швейцарський національний банк прямо сигналізував про готовність активніше втручатися у валютний ринок, щоб стримувати надмірне зміцнення франка, яке шкодить експортерам і створює ризики для цінової стабільності [4].

Для країни, де значна частина економіки орієнтована на експорт, така валютна ситуація є серйозним викликом. Особливо це стосується тих секторів, де важливу роль відіграє не лише якість, а й цінова конкурентоспроможність.

3. Залежність від зовнішніх ринків та імпортової сировини

Як вже було зазначено, Швейцарія має невеликий внутрішній ринок і водночас обмежену природно-ресурсну базу. Це означає, що країна сильно залежить: від зовнішнього попиту на власну продукцію; від імпорту енергоносіїв, сировини та продовольства; від стабільності міжнародної логістики.

Будь-які порушення глобальних транспортних маршрутів, зростання цін на енергоресурси, перебої в постачанні або торговельні конфлікти можуть негативно вплинути як на експорт, так і на імпорт Швейцарії.

4. Послаблення окремих традиційних галузей

Ще одним тривожним сигналом є те, що деякі традиційно сильні експортні галузі Швейцарії демонструють уповільнення. Зокрема, у 2025 році негативну динаміку показали: годинникова промисловість, машинобудування, електроніка. Це може свідчити про зміну структури світового попиту, посилення міжнародної конкуренції та необхідність технологічного оновлення окремих секторів швейцарської економіки.

Попри зазначені проблеми, перспективи зовнішньої торгівлі Швейцарії залишаються доволі сприятливими. Це пояснюється високим

рівнем інноваційності, розвиненою інфраструктурою, стабільною інституційною системою та потужною міжнародною репутацією країни.

1. Подальший розвиток високотехнологічного експорту

Однією з головних перспектив є подальший розвиток експорту високотехнологічної продукції. Швейцарія вже сьогодні займає провідні позиції у світі в галузях фармацевтики, біотехнологій, медичного обладнання, точної механіки та хімічної промисловості. У майбутньому попит на таку продукцію, ймовірно, лише зростатиме, оскільки світова економіка дедалі більше орієнтується на інновації, наукові розробки та товари з високою доданою вартістю. Це дає Швейцарії можливість не лише зберігати, а й посилювати свої конкурентні переваги у міжнародній торгівлі.

2. Диверсифікація ринків збуту

Важливою перспективою є також диверсифікація зовнішньоторговельних зв'язків. Хоча країни Європейського Союзу залишаються основними торговельними партнерами Швейцарії, у майбутньому зростатиме значення співпраці з іншими регіонами світу, зокрема з країнами Азії, Північної Америки, Близького Сходу та Латинської Америки. Розширення географії експорту дає можливість зменшити залежність від окремих ринків і зробити зовнішню торгівлю більш стійкою до економічних криз та регіональних потрясінь.

3. Розширення мережі угод про вільну торгівлю

Швейцарія має потужний інструмент зміцнення зовнішньої торгівлі – мережу угод про вільну торгівлю. Станом на 2025 рік країна мала 35 угод про вільну торгівлю з 45 партнерами, а також продовжувала розширювати торговельне співробітництво через механізми Європейської асоціації вільної торгівлі [5].

Крім того, у 2025 році EFTA, до якої входить і Швейцарія, завершила переговори відносно угоди про вільну торгівлю з MERCOSUR, що відкриває для країни додаткові перспективи на ринках Південної Америки [6].

Отже, подальше розширення мережі торговельних угод може стати важливим фактором диверсифікації експорту та зменшення зовнішніх ризиків.

4. Цифровізація та модернізація торгівлі

Ще одним перспективним напрямом є цифровізація зовнішньоекономічної діяльності. Використання сучасних інформаційних технологій, автоматизація логістичних процесів, електронний документообіг та розвиток цифрових платформ відкривають нові можливості для оптимізації міжнародної торгівлі. Для Швейцарії, яка має високий рівень технологічного розвитку та

ефективну інфраструктуру, цифрова трансформація може вплинути на зниження витрат, прискорення торговельних операцій та підвищення гнучкості бізнесу в умовах глобальної конкуренції.

Висновки

Підсумовуючи, зовнішня торгівля Швейцарії є однією з ключових складових її економічного розвитку, міжнародної конкурентоспроможності та фінансової стабільності. Країна демонструє високий рівень інтеграції у світову економіку та зберігає сильні позиції на глобальному ринку завдяки експорту високотехнологічної, наукоємної та якісної продукції.

Аналіз показав, що сучасна зовнішня торгівля Швейцарії характеризується значним позитивним сальдо та високими показниками експорту. Водночас така модель має і певні слабкі сторони: високу залежність від окремих галузей, сильного швейцарського франка, зовнішнього попиту, імпортої сировини та загальної нестабільності світової економіки.

Разом із тим перспективи розвитку зовнішньої торгівлі країни залишаються позитивними. Їх пов'язують із подальшим розвитком високотехнологічних виробництв, диверсифікацією ринків збуту, розширенням мережі угод про вільну торгівлю і цифровізацією зовнішньоекономічної діяльності.

Таким чином, Швейцарія має всі передумови для збереження й посилення своїх позицій у міжнародній торгівлі, однак для цього їй необхідно не лише підтримувати наявні конкурентні переваги, а й активно адаптуватися до нових глобальних економічних викликів.

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МОНІТОРИНГ ІНОЗЕМНИХ ІНВЕСТИЦІЙ У КОНЦЕПЦІЇ ВІДКРИТОЇ СТРАТЕГІЧНОЇ АВТОНОМІЇ ЄС²

Анотація

У доповіді досліджується політика моніторингу та скринінгу прямих іноземних інвестицій у контексті реалізації концепції відкритої стратегічної автономії Європейського Союзу. Показано, що посилення гео економічної конкуренції, зростання ролі інвестицій як інструмента політичного та технологічного впливу, а також зміна характеру трансатлантичних відносин зумовили перегляд підходів ЄС до економічної безпеки. Особливу увагу приділено аналізу Регламенту ЄС 2019/452, який створив рамковий механізм скринінгу прямих іноземних інвестицій, а також додаткових інструментів, що доповнюють його функціонування, зокрема Антипримусового інструмента та Регламенту щодо іноземних субсидій.

На основі офіційних звітів Європейської Комісії проаналізовано практичні результати застосування механізму скринінгу, зокрема його вплив на якість інвестиційних потоків, рівень прозорості інвесторів та захист стратегічних секторів економіки. Виявлено ключові проблеми функціонування системи, серед яких неоднорідність процедур у державах-членах, різний рівень інституційної спроможності та правові суперечності з принципом свободи руху капіталу.

² Доповідь підготовлена у рамках реалізації міжнародного проєкту «Висвітлення нової архітектури європейської безпеки у викладанні та наукових дослідженнях» № 101126795 – EuSANU – ERASMUS-JMO-2023-HEI-TCH-RSCH



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Фінансується Європейським Союзом. Проте висловлені погляди та думки належать лише автору(ам) і не обов'язково відображають погляди Європейського Союзу чи Європейського виконавчого агентства з питань освіти та культури. Ні Європейський Союз, ні грантодавець не можуть нести за них відповідальність.

Окремий акцент зроблено на можливостях використання європейського досвіду скринінгу прямих іноземних інвестицій в Україні в умовах війни та післявоєнного відновлення. Обґрунтовано доцільність формування національної системи скринінгу, яка поєднуватиме відкритість для інвестицій із ефективною оцінкою безпекових ризиків та сприятиме зміцненню економічного суверенітету держави.

Ключові слова: відкрита стратегічна автономія, прямі іноземні інвестиції, скринінг інвестицій, економічна безпека, Європейський Союз, стратегічні сектори, економічний суверенітет, Україна.

Abstract

The report examines the policy of monitoring and screening of foreign direct investments in the context of the implementation of the concept of open strategic autonomy of the European Union. It is shown that the strengthening of geo-economic competition, the growing role of investment as an instrument of political and technological influence, as well as the changing nature of transatlantic relations have led to a review of the EU's approaches to economic security. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of EU Regulation 2019/452, which created a framework mechanism for screening foreign direct investments, as well as additional instruments that complement its functioning, in particular the Anti-Coercive Instrument and the Foreign Subsidies Regulation.

Based on official reports of the European Commission, the practical results of the application of the screening mechanism are analyzed, in particular its impact on the quality of investment flows, the level of investor transparency and the protection of strategic sectors of the economy. Key problems in the functioning of the system are identified, including the heterogeneity of procedures in the Member States, different levels of institutional capacity and legal contradictions with the principle of free movement of capital.

Special emphasis is placed on the possibilities of using the European experience of screening foreign direct investments in Ukraine in the context of war and post-war reconstruction. The feasibility of forming a national screening system that would combine openness to investments with effective assessment of security risks and contribute to strengthening the economic sovereignty of the state is substantiated.

Keywords: open strategic autonomy, foreign direct investments, investment screening, economic security, European Union, strategic sectors, economic sovereignty, Ukraine.

Вступ

Тривалий час Європа знаходилась ніби в тіні США. Саме Сполучені Штати Америки взяли на себе основний тягар відповідальності за безпеку європейських країн через активну участь у НАТО. США були ключовим економічним партнером: зовнішньоторговельний оборот був найбільший саме з цією країною, основа частина закордонних інвестицій теж надходила із-за океану. Європа в цілому і ЄС, зокрема, сприймалися не як важливий самостійний гравець у світовій економіці та міжнародній політиці, а як союзник США. Однак уже за першої президентської каденції Д. Трампа ситуація почала змінюватися. З деяких питань світової політики та економіки позиції США та ЄС перестали співпадати. Це легко помітити, наприклад, за результатами голосувань в ООН, де резолюції, які підтримують країни ЄС, викликають спротив з боку США. Змінилося й ставлення США до ЄС. Зараз його уже важко назвати партнерським. Це знайшло прояв і у ставленні до НАТО, і у тарифній політиці, і у питаннях війни в Україні...

Усвідомлення європейцями необхідності набуття більшої суб'єктності у міжнародних відносинах почало формуватися у другій половині десятих років XXI століття. У 2021 р. була прийнята концепція «відкритої стратегічної автономії» – Open Strategic Autonomy (OSA), яка має за мету послідовно розширити інструментарій захисту внутрішнього ринку від ризиків, пов'язаних із зовнішніми економічними впливами [1]. Зокрема, особливу увагу в цій стратегії приділено моніторингу та контролю іноземних інвестицій, що можуть впливати на безпеку та суспільний порядок Союзу. Зростання гео економічної конкуренції, використання інвестицій як інструмента політичного та технологічного тиску, а також збільшення обсягу поглинань європейських компаній державними або пов'язаними з урядами інвесторами після 2015–2018 рр. створили необхідність формування системної політики скринінгу.

Метою нашого дослідження є аналіз механізмів моніторингу іноземних інвестицій у ЄС, їх ролі у реалізації відкритої стратегічної автономії та напрямків подальшого вдосконалення з огляду на нові виклики економічної безпеки. Розуміння цих процесів дозволить виробити ефективну політику для українського бізнесу, який має намір розширювати свою присутність на європейських ринках.

Виклад основного матеріалу

Як витікає з Комунікації Європейської Комісії «Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy» (2021) [1], відкритість для глобальної торгівлі та інвестицій має поєднуватися з інструментами

захисту критичної інфраструктури, технологій та ланцюгів доданої вартості. Відмінність відкритої стратегічної автономії (OSA) від традиційних протекціоністських підходів полягає в прагненні зберегти привабливість європейського ринку для інвесторів, одночасно зменшуючи залежність від вразливих чи політично ризикованих джерел.

Іноземні інвестиції у стратегічні активи, такі як енергетика, телекомунікації, напівпровідники, біотехнології чи виробництво військового призначення, дедалі частіше розглядаються як фактор потенційного впливу на економічний суверенітет ЄС. Саме тому механізм скринінгу став одним з ключових елементів реалізації OSA.

Базовим документом, який описує механізм скринінгу є Регламент ЄС 2019/452 [2]. У відповідності до нього були запроваджені спільні критерії оцінки ризику, які мають використовувати усі країни-члени ЄС. До таких критеріїв віднесено: а) вплив на безпеку; б) контроль над критичною інфраструктурою; в) доступ до чутливих даних; г) участь державних структур третіх країн. Документ також визначає, які з іноземних інвестицій підпадають під скринінг. Країни мають координувати свої дії між собою (обмін інформацією про інвесторів та транзакції) та з Європейською Комісією. Однак важливо зазначити, що позиція Європейської Комісії має лише рекомендаційний характер: кінцеве рішення приймають країни-члени ЄС.

Як зазначається у щорічному звіті Європейської Комісії, опублікованому у жовтні 2025 р., за 2024 р. по усьому ЄС національні органи скринінгу прямих іноземних інвестицій здійснили перевірку 3136 транзакцій або шляхом повідомлення, або через виклик національного органу. З усіх транзакцій, які були офіційно перевірені 86% були безумовно дозволені; 9% були дозволені з певними умовами; 4% були відкликані та 1% були заборонені. Таким чином, лише кожна двадцята транзакція не була здійснена. Слід підкреслити, що цей показник залишається стабільним протягом останніх трьох років. Дещо вищим (9%) він був лише у першому році запровадження скринінгу (2020 р.). У наступні роки інвестора більш чітко враховують вимоги ЄС до прямих іноземних інвестицій, а тому відмов стало менше [3].

Також звіт містить перелік факторів, які використовувалися для оцінки критичності виробничого сектору під час оглядів прямих іноземних інвестицій. Ці фактори були такими: критичні технології (49%), критична інфраструктура (26%), постачання критично важливих ресурсів (20%) та доступ до конфіденційної інформації (5%), включаючи персональну інформацію [3].

В останні роки ЄС доповнив регламент 2019/452 низкою додаткових механізмів, які розширюють можливості моніторингу та

управління інвестиційними ризиками. Так, у 2023 р. був запроваджений Антипримусовий інструмент – Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI). Він дозволяє ЄС реагувати на економічний примус третіх країн, який може включати маніпуляції інвестиційними потоками з політичних мотивів. Хоча ACI не є класичним механізмом скринінгу, він дає змогу протидіяти політично вмотивованим інвестиційним обмеженням або тиску на європейські компанії. Як заявлено у документі, «Економічний примус, спрямований проти Європейського Союзу або держави-члена ЄС, може впливати на будь-яку сферу політики та може набувати форми законодавства чи інших формальних чи неформальних дій чи бездіяльності» [4].

У тому ж році набув чинності ще один Регламент ЄС 2022/2560 «Про іноземні субсидії, що спотворюють внутрішній ринок». Цей інструмент дає змогу розслідувати злиття та поглинання, якщо учасники ринку отримують суттєві державні субсидії з третіх країн, що спотворюють конкуренцію. Він істотно підсилює моніторинг транзакцій, які формально можуть не підпадати під FDI Screening, але несуть ризики для внутрішнього ринку [5].

Одночасно з моніторингом вхідних потоків Європейський Союз намагається певним чином відслідковувати й вихідні інвестиції, що спрямоване на запобігання витоку критичних технологій до стратегічних конкурентів. У червні 2023 р. Комісія представила Joint Communication on European Economic Security, де вперше окреслено необхідність такого інструмента. На думку Європейської комісії, «хоча ЄС та його держави-члени вже перевіряють прямі іноземні інвестиції в ЄС та контролюють експорт технологій подвійного використання за межі ЄС, наразі немає жодної перевірки інвестицій, що виходять з ЄС до третіх країн» [6]. Наразі цей документ не прийнятий, але тривають активні консультації щодо його поступового запровадження.

Результати перших років скринінгу прямих іноземних інвестицій до ЄС неоднозначно оцінюються дослідниками. Перш за все, вони звертають увагу на необхідності гармонізації політики відкритості ринку і захисту стратегічних секторів. Механізм скринінгу – це не лише технічний інструмент, але й політично-правова конструкція, що віддзеркалює актуальні геополітичні настрої і виклики [7].

Ще однією проблемою є різний підхід до скринінгу у різних країнах-членах ЄС. Є серйозні розбіжності у критеріях оцінки та ресурсах, які держави виділяють на процес скринінгу, що ускладнює ефективну кооперацію. Наявний механізм створює важливі можливості для інформаційного обміну, але ще не може повністю вирішити

проблеми єдиного підходу до стратегічно важливих секторальних інвестицій [8].

На думку автор дослідження [9], Регламент створив новий правовий інструмент, який дозволяє державам-членам і Комісії впливати на прийняття рішень щодо стратегічних інвестицій. Разом з тим, існують суттєві правові суперечності, зокрема, у взаємодії з нормами про свободу руху капіталу в межах Союзу. Практичне застосування механізму потребує високого рівня координації, інакше існує ризик суперечностей між національними і наднаціональними підходами.

Досить часто у дослідженнях звертають увагу на деяку розмитість тлумачення тих чи інших понять, що залишає коридор свободи при їх тлумаченні та створює додаткові проблеми при практичному застосуванні [7].

Однак, як би там не було, досвід країн-членів ЄС свідчить, що система скринінгу не обмежує інвестиційний потік, а підвищує його якість. Як наслідок застосування скринінгу в ЄС в останні роки спостерігається:

- зменшення кількості ризикових угод у сферах критичної інфраструктури та високих технологій;
- зростання прозорості інвесторів, особливо з державним капіталом третіх країн;
- удосконалення координації політики безпеки на рівні ЄС через обмін інформацією;
- зменшення кількості випадків поглинання високотехнологічних компаній інвесторами, пов'язаними з урядами третіх країн, що було характерним напередодні запровадження скринінгу.

Серед типових проблем, які Європейській Комісії та країнам-членам ЄС потрібно буде вирішувати у найближчі роки слід виділити неоднорідність процедур між державами-членами, тривалі строки розгляду, відсутність уніфікованих підходів до оцінки впливу на економічну безпеку, а також недостатня інтегрованість із промисловою політикою ЄС.

Європейський досвід скринінгу прямих іноземних інвестицій є для України не лише нормативним орієнтиром у процесі євроінтеграції, а й практичним інструментом підвищення економічної та національної безпеки в умовах війни та післявоєнного відновлення. Україна розраховує на значне залучення іноземних інвестицій у повоєнний період. Однак при цьому необхідно поєднувати економічну доцільність іноземного інвестування з дотриманням безпекових вимог. Ймовіріше за все, необхідно буде прийняти спеціальний закон про скринінг прямих

іноземних інвестицій, до якого закласти основні підходи, що уже використовуються у ЄС. А саме:

- відкритість для інвестицій;
- оцінку безпекових ризиків;
- інституційну координацію;
- недискримінаційний характер процедур.

Для України уже зараз важливо створити закритий перелік стратегічних секторів та запровадити обов'язкову перевірку походження капіталу. Необхідно оцінювати не лише юридичну форму інвестора, а й кінцевого бенефіціара. Скринінг повинен відсіювати ризикові інвестиції, водночас пріоритизувати «якісних» інвесторів та бути інструментом промислової політики, а не лише безпеки. Скринінг дозволяє поєднати принцип відкритості ринку з політикою de-risking, не вдаючись до протекціонізму.

Висновки

Таким чином, політика моніторингу іноземних інвестицій стала одним із ключових вимірів реалізації відкритої стратегічної автономії Європейського Союзу. Вона формує збалансований підхід, який поєднує відкритість європейської економіки із необхідністю захисту від ризиків, що зумовлені геоекономічним змаганням, технологічною конкуренцією та політичним тиском. Подальше удосконалення механізму скринінгу, зокрема можливе запровадження контролю вихідних інвестицій, сприятиме зміцненню економічного суверенітету та конкурентоспроможності ЄС у довгостроковій перспективі. Цей європейський досвід може стати хорошим підґрунтям для розробки української національної системи скринінгу прямих іноземних інвестицій у період війни та повоєнної відбудови.

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ШЛЯХ ПІДВИЩЕННЯ КОНКУРЕНТОСПРОМОЖНІСТЬ ЄВРОПИ В УМОВАХ ГЕОПОЛІТИЧНОЇ НЕВИЗНАЧЕНОСТІ ТА ПЕРЕХОДУ ДО ПОЛІЦЕНТРИЗМУ³

Анотація

У статті досліджено ключові напрями підвищення конкурентоспроможності Європейського Союзу в умовах геополітичної невизначеності та формування поліцентричного світового порядку. Проаналізовано роль цифрової трансформації, енергетичної безпеки, оборонної інтеграції та стратегічної автономії як взаємопов'язаних чинників економічної стійкості ЄС. Обґрунтовано необхідність комплексного підходу, що поєднує інноваційний розвиток, зниження зовнішніх залежностей і поглиблення внутрішньої інтеграції для збереження глобальних позицій Європи.

Ключові слова: *Європейський Союз, конкурентоспроможність, геополітична невизначеність, поліцентризм, цифрова трансформація, енергетична безпека, оборона, стратегічна автономія, економічна безпека.*

Abstract

The paper examines the key directions for enhancing the competitiveness of the European Union under conditions of geopolitical

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Фінансується Європейським Союзом. Проте висловлені погляди та думки належать лише автору(ам) і не обов'язково відображають погляди Європейського Союзу чи Європейського виконавчого агентства з питань освіти та культури. Ні Європейський Союз, ні грантодавець не можуть нести за них відповідальність.

uncertainty and the emergence of a polycentric world order. It analyses the role of digital transformation, energy security, defence integration and strategic autonomy as interrelated factors of the EU's economic resilience. The study substantiates the need for a comprehensive approach combining innovative development, reduction of external dependencies and deeper internal integration in order to maintain Europe's global position.

Keywords: *European Union, competitiveness, geopolitical uncertainty, polycentrism, digital transformation, energy security, defence, strategic autonomy, economic security.*

Вступ

Європа зараз перебуває в умовах зростаючої геополітичної невизначеності: війна в Україні, конкуренція між США та Китаєм, наростання гібридних загроз формують поліцентричний світ, де жодна держава не домінує одноосібно. У таких умовах інтерес ЄС полягає в тому, щоб зберегти своє економічне лідерство та глобальний вплив, водночас мінімізуючи вразливості. Згідно з позицією Європарламенту, сучасні виклики оголили критичну вразливість ЄС. Пріоритетне зміцнення оборонного та фінансового секторів розглядається як необхідний фундамент для здобуття стратегічної автономії. Тільки гарантувавши власну безпеку, Союз зможе приймати суверенні рішення та незалежно реалізовувати свій політичний курс [1]. Саме поєднання економічної конкурентоспроможності з високим рівнем безпеки стає ключовим завданням у нових реаліях.

Метою дослідження є визначення стратегічних кроків на європейському рівні задля підвищення конкурентоспроможності Європи в умовах поляризації міжнародної політики. Це передбачає аналіз пріоритетів цифрової трансформації, енергетичної безпеки, оборони та стратегічної автономії, а також пропозиції конкретних заходів із використанням досвіду зарубіжних дослідників і офіційних даних.

Виклад основного матеріалу

В сучасному конкурентному світі особливе значення мають здібності економічних моделей швидко та гнучко адаптуватися під динамічні аспекти міжнародного середовища. В першу чергу наразі мова йде про цифрову трансформацію. Цифрові технології стали критичною рушійною силою економічного розвитку. Переважна кількість експертів вважає, що проблема конкурентоспроможності ЄС – це перш за все питання інновацій і продуктивності: ключовими сферами є розвиток штучного інтелекту, хмарних сервісів та високошвидкісного

зв'язку. Наразі Євросоюз відстає від США та Китаю: в ньому бракує світових цифрових «чемпіонів» та великомасштабних ІТ-компаній, що ускладнює конкурентну боротьбу. Дослідження показують, що більшість цифрових продуктів і послуг у ЄС надходять із-за кордону, бо на внутрішніх ринках домінують неєвропейські гравці [2]. Ситуація ускладнюється і браком кваліфікованих фахівців: лише близько 56% європейців мають базові цифрові навички (замість мети 80% до 2030 р.) [3], а ринок хмарних і AI-послуг на 90% контролюють американські компанії [4].

Для подолання розриву Європа активізує свої цифрові ініціативи. Єврокомісія у 2025 р. опублікувала «Звіт про стан Цифрового десятиліття», де наголошується на потребі терміново пришвидшити розвиток цифрової інфраструктури: розгортання волоконно-оптичних мереж та 5G-програм виявилось повільнішим, ніж планувалося [3]. Паралельно вводяться регуляторні акти (Digital Services Act, AI Act тощо), щоб захистити цифрові ринки та прискорити впровадження інновацій. Аналітики пропонують формувати поліцентричну цифрову архітектуру, де європейські виробники телекомунікаційних технологій грають більшу роль, забезпечуючи баланс між суверенітетом і відкритістю [2]. Зміцнення цифрової суб'єктності Європи базується на тріаді ключових ініціатив: впровадженні цифрового євро, розгортанні мережі AI-центрів та масштабній хмарній модернізації бізнесу. У цьому контексті форсована діджиталізація (від освітніх трансформацій до глибоких R&D-розробок у сферах ШІ та кіберзахисту) виступає фундаментальним драйвером виробничої ефективності та глобальної конкурентоспроможності регіону.

Наступна проблематика, яка стала особливо актуальною після початку Росією повномасштабної агресії проти України – це питання енергетичної безпеки. Енергетична незалежність тісно пов'язана з економічною стабільністю та конкурентоспроможністю. ЄС протягом десятиліть залежав від імпорту російського газу та нафти, що стало вразливістю в умовах війни в Україні. На фоні використання енергетики як політичного інструменту лідери ЄС ухвалили проєкт REPowerEU, спрямований на різке скорочення залежності від російських енергоносіїв. За даними Ради ЄС, впровадження нового регламенту щодо поступової заборони імпорту російського газу стало ключовим кроком до досягнення мети REPowerEU – повного звільнення від російських поставок [5]. Нові правила забороняють імпорт трубопровідного та зрідженого газу з РФ, передбачають чітке планування диверсифікації до 2027 р. і навіть штрафи за порушення. Це забезпечить газовому ринку підвищену міцність, резильєнтність та диверсифікацію. Окрім

регуляторних заходів, Єврокомісія мобілізує сотні мільярдів євро на фінансування REPowerEU: близько 300 млрд євро вже спрямовано на проекти вітро- та сонячної генерації, енергоефективності, водневої інфраструктури тощо [6].

Дослідження підтверджують, що такий сценарій може зробити Європу незалежною від російського газу до 2030 р. В одному з енергетичних аналізів прогнозують скорочення попиту на природний газ на 133 млрд м³ – рівно стільки, скільки раніше постачала Росія. Крім того, завдяки програмам відновлюваної енергетики частка «зелених» джерел у загальному енергоспоживанні ЄС може зрости до близько 45% до 2030 р. [7]. Така трансформація зміцнює енергетичну безпеку: наприклад, масове розгортання вітрових турбін і систем акумулювання енергії знижує чутливість енергоринку до зовнішніх шоків. Одночасно ЄС розвиває інфраструктуру диверсифікації (термінали СПГ, міжєвропейські газогони), підвищуючи взаємозв'язок країн – так званий Європейський енергетичний союз. У результаті модернізації енергетики не лише зміцнює безпеку, а й створює нові високотехнологічні галузі в економіці ЄС, підвищуючи її конкурентоспроможність.

Також війна в Україні і неспокій у міжнародних відносинах поставили оборону на чільне місце в стратегії ЄС. Європейський Союз спільно з НАТО переглядає власні оборонні можливості: ухвалені зобов'язання НАТО довести військові витрати до 3,5% ВВП у наступні роки означають істотне нарощення видатків. Європейські країни вже почали збільшувати бюджети оборони і координацію – створені численні спільні проекти (Постійне структурне співробітництво, Фонд оборонних інвестицій, «Озброїти Європу» тощо). Європейський парламент наголошує на необхідності розвитку автономних оборонних можливостей ЄС і закликає до нарощування та координації видатків на оборону, посилення спільних військових спроможностей і підвищення стратегічної незалежності. Звіт ЄП підкреслює, що в поточних умовах Європа потребує потужного, самостійного й ефективного оборонного потенціалу, що дозволить Союзу стати впливовим актором у сфері безпеки [8].

Нестача масштабів європейської військової промисловості і фрагментація ринку підвищують витрати на озброєння. Тому Брюссель просуває створення єдиного оборонного ринку та координацію закупівель. Важливим є також розвиток власних технологій у сферах кібербезпеки, безпілотних систем, космосу та продовження інтеграції оборонної промисловості. Комісія ще у 2023 р. запропонувала «Білу книгу з оборони» – документ, що окреслює потреби в інвестиціях для забезпечення оборонних спроможностей ЄС. У ній містяться

рекомендації щодо масштабних інвестицій і спільних закупівель, щоб закрити важливі прогалини в оснащенні армій [9]. Така концентрація зусиль зміцнює євроатлантичну безпеку і одночасно розвиває високотехнологічні сектори економіки.

Нарешті, ключовим є становлення ЄС як стратегічно автономного гравця. Це поняття позначає здатність Європи самостійно приймати рішення і захищати свої інтереси у світі, але зберігати відкритість для партнерств. Стратегічний компас 2022 р. вже встановлював зв'язок між безпекою та автономією, констатує, що документ посилить стратегічну незалежність ЄС і розширить його можливості для партнерської взаємодії при одночасному захисті цінностей та інтересів Союзу [10]. При цьому концепція відкритої автономії передбачає тісні зв'язки з іншими демократіями. Навіть у торговій політиці після пандемії Єврокомісія почала говорити про відкриту стратегічну автономію, комбінуючи лібералізм з охороною критичних ланцюгів постачання.

На практиці це означає: посилювати інституційне партнерство та єдині ринки, що стають фундаментом конкурентоспроможності. Використання внутрішнього ринку капіталу і технологій, поглиблення економічної інтеграції та стандартизація (наприклад, у регуляції зелених та цифрових технологій) – усе це створює більший внутрішній ринок, де європейські компанії мають вигоди від масштабу. Також розвивається європейський інструментарій – від механізмів спільних закупівель в обороні до Європейського союзу даних у цифровій сфері. Будується й енергетичний союз, де під крилом ЄС країни ділять інфраструктуру та резерви, що підвищує стійкість до шоків. З іншого боку, визнання багатополарності вимагає міжнародної коаліційної роботи [11]. Тобто ЄС має спільно формувати глобальні правила (наприклад, через форуми ОЕСР чи G7) і водночас зберігати можливість самостійного маневру у критичних питаннях (доступ до технологій, енергопостачання, військовій спроможності).

Висновки

Зростання конкурентоспроможності Європи у сучасних умовах передбачає системне рішення на рівні ЄС і держав-членів. Воно включає:

- Масштабне фінансування інноваційних проєктів та розбудова цифрової інфраструктури для зростання продуктивності та скорочення технологічної залежності від інших держав.
- Формування інтегрованого внутрішнього ринку високих технологій та фінансових послуг, що надасть європейським компаніям можливість досягати конкурентних масштабів на глобальному рівні.

- Досягнення енергетичної самодостатності через розширення джерел постачання, прискорену трансформацію енергетики на базі відновлюваних ресурсів та поглиблення співпраці в межах Європейського енергетичного союзу.

- Суттєве зміцнення військового потенціалу та збільшення оборонного фінансування, гармонізація армійських спроможностей, розвиток оборонних технологій для забезпечення здатності Європи до самозахисту як у коаліції з партнерами, так і автономно.

- Координацію політик у стратегічних галузях на засадах відкритої автономії – від кібербезпеки та штучного інтелекту до забезпечення ресурсами й виробничих ланцюгів. Це дозволить ЄС реалізувати єдину стратегічну ціль: підтримувати відкритий ринок і глобальні зв'язки, уникаючи при цьому критичних залежностей від зовнішніх акторів.

Отже, конкурентоспроможність та безпека Європи нероздільні: інвестиції, реформи та інституційна співпраця в усіх згаданих сферах одночасно підвищують продуктивність та зменшують зовнішні вразливості. Лише комплексний підхід, а саме поєднання цифрової модернізації, зеленої енергетики, оборонної інтеграції та гео економічної автономії, забезпечить Європі міцну позицію і стійкий розвиток у епоху поліцентризму.

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ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИЙ СОЮЗ У ГЛОБАЛЬНОМУ НАУКОВО-ТЕХНОЛОГІЧНОМУ СУПЕРНИЦТВІ

У даній роботі проаналізовано суперечливе становище Європейського Союзу в системі глобального науково-технологічного лідерства крізь призму порівняльного аналізу з Китаєм та США. Визначено сфери, в яких союз зберігає конкурентні переваги та розглянуті ключові причини його відставання в темпах технологічних інновацій, розвитку штучного інтелекту й практичному впровадженні наукових результатів. Розглянуто сутність концепції стратегічної автономії ЄС та обґрунтовано системні передумови його впровадження в умовах сучасних геополітичних викликів.

Ключові слова: *Європейський Союз, стратегічна автономія, науково-технологічний розвиток, інноваційний розрив.*

This paper analyzes the difficult position of the European Union in the global race for scientific and technological leadership. It compares the EU with China and the USA. The study identifies areas where the Union is still strong and competitive. It also looks at the main reasons why the EU is slower in innovation, artificial intelligence (AI) development, and using scientific results in real life. The paper explains the idea of strategic autonomy for the EU and shows why it is necessary because of today's global political challenges.

Keywords: *European Union, strategic autonomy, scientific and technological development, innovation gap.*

Вступ

Питання глобального лідерства у XXI столітті дедалі менше визначається лише розміром економіки чи військовим потенціалом. На перший план виходить здатність генерувати та комерціалізувати інновації, швидка реакція на зміни та спроможність самостійно формувати порядок денний на міжнародній арені. Саме за цими критеріями країни ЄС є найбільшим у світі ринком з великою кількістю споживачів, що серед дослідників та практиків викликає неоднозначні оцінки. З одного боку, вони залишаються безперечним лідером у сфері регулювання, спільного захисту та сталого розвитку. З іншого боку, вони регулярно потрапляють під критику за повільність реформ, залежність від зовнішніх партнерів у питаннях безпеки та технологій, а також нездатність перетворити потужний науковий потенціал на реальну

ринкову перевагу. Все це разом робить актуальним дослідження реального місця ЄС у глобальній конкуренції та пошук відповіді на питання, за яких умов Союз зможе діяти як повноцінний самостійний гравець.

Мета дослідження

Метою написання даної роботи є визначення конкурентних позицій Союзу в глобальному вимірі, визначення його лідерства та відставання відносно провідних світових гравців, а також виявлення ключових передумов, за яких реалізація концепції стратегічної автономії стає практично можливою.

Виклад основного матеріалу

Сьогодні все більше приділяють увагу питанням подальшого розвитку Європейського Союзу, який викликає щире зацікавлення як серед студентів економічних спеціальностей, так само і серед науковців, які намагаються спрогнозувати та поглиблено вивчити траєкторію розвитку цього унікального інтеграційного об'єднання. Дедалі частіше звучать закономірні питання від студентів, науковців та інших: Чому такий потужний союз з великою кількістю мешканців і найбільшим у світі ринком досі поступається США та Китаю в ключових вимірах глобального впливу? Чому країни ЄС не використовують весь свій потенціал, щоб бути лідерами у кожній сфері? На перший погляд ці запитання здаються простими, але саме за цією простотою ховається справжня складність. Особливої гостроти ці питання набувають сьогодні, коли вся Європа опинилась перед викликами, які ще десять років тому здавались неможливими, а саме: повномасштабна війна між Україною та росією, енергетична криза, технологічне відставання від головних конкурентів США та Китаю і дедалі більша невизначеність щодо надійності американських обіцянок та гарантій безпеки. Саме в цьому контексті європейської стратегічної автономії, здатності ЄС самостійно діяти і захищати свої інтереси без критичної залежності від зовнішніх партнерів, яка в першу чергу перетворилась із академічної дискусії на питання практичної політики, і буде йти мова у цьому дослідженні.

Історія ЄС розпочалась після закінчення Другої світової війни, коли зруйнована і виснажена Європа зробила усвідомлений вибір на користь співпраці замість протистояння. Все розпочиналось з об'єднання шести країн навколо спільного ринку вугілля та сталі у 1951 р., яке поступово переросло в унікальне національне утворення з 27 держав-членів [1]. Союз не є федерацією на кшталт США, де центральний уряд має широкі повноваження над штатами, і водночас він набагато більше, ніж

звичайна міжнародна організація, яка суцільно відрізняється від інших. Унікальність організації полягає в тому, що його держави-члени не розчиняються в союзі, а навпаки зберігають власну державність і національну ідентичність, водночас добровільно передаючи частину рішень на спільний наднаціональний рівень. Незважаючи на потужність і масштаб, варто зазначити, що ЄС дедалі більше відчуває тиск не лише ззовні, а й зсередини. Наразі можна помітити, що окремі держави-члени все активніше розпочали діяти у власних національних інтересах, де безпосередньо не узгоджують із іншими союзниками чи загальними комітетами, тобто навмисно розпочинають блокувати спільні рішення, проявляти відкриту агресію чи провокують на конфліктні ситуації. У результаті таких дій може відбуватися послаблення єдності союзу та погіршенню його здатності говорити на міжнародній арені одним голосом. В реаліях така активна зміна в країнах, а саме якщо казати про відсутність узгодження позицій всіх учасників щодо бачення стратегічної ролі Євросоюзу, буде створювати одну із головних перешкод на шляху його розвитку як самостійного гравця.

Незважаючи на внутрішні перешкоди, не менш гострою є проблема зовнішньої конкурентоспроможності. Аналізуючи показники можна сказати, що ЄС не відстає через брак обізнаності чи ресурсів, він здебільшого відстає через спосіб ухвалення рішень. Тоді як Китай і США зробили технологічний розвиток державним пріоритетом з чіткою вертикаллю рішень і масштабним фінансуванням. В свою чергу ЄС вимушений щоразу шукати консенсус між різними рівнями економік власних держав-членів та різним баченням того, що взагалі є стратегічним пріоритетом, що призводить до витрачання часу на пошук рівноваги, який конкуренти витрачають на дію. В цьому і з'являється парадокс, де Європа вміє вчити та досліджувати, але не вміє на цьому заробляти. Кількість вчених є, університети, ідеї також є, але гроші на розвиток бізнесу знайти важко, тому зрозуміло, все що в них було різко перейшло туди де є гарне фінансування, тобто до США. Також можна помітити ще одну різницю між країнами в тому, що в Європі стоїть лише мета як найбільше набрати студентів, а в США навпаки, вони швидше будуть вкладати гроші в декілька з найкращих університетів, які у свою чергу і будуть забирати найталановитіших здобувачів з усього світу. Через це вони програють в боротьбі за найкращих людей [2].

Дивлячись на порівняльні показники між Союзом та його головними конкурентами (таблиця 1), можна підтвердити, що ЄС дійсно зберігає певні позиції у світовій науці та робототехніці, проте надає перевагу у розвитку штучного інтелекту та проривних дослідженнях, поступаючись Китаю та США, найцікавіше, що розвиток не стоїть на місці, а з кожним роком поступово зростає.

Таблиця 1

Порівняння науково-технологічного розвитку в країнах ЄС, Китаю та США в період з 2000-2023 рр.*

Показник	ЄС	Китай	США	Глобальний тренд та вплив
Частка у світових публікаціях	18,1%	27,0%	13,1%	Китай обійшов ЄС у 2019 році за обсягом наукових праць
Якість (цитовані праці, Топ-10%)	19,2%	26,7%	19,4%	Китай став світовим лідером за якістю публікацій у 2018 році
Досконалість (найвпливовіші праці, Топ-1%)	17,8%	27,3%	21,7%	Серед трійки лідерів, найнижчий показник рівня проривних досліджень демонструє ЄС
Штучний інтелект у науці (приріст/рік)	+32%	+39%	+36%	Розрив між лідером та союзом у III стрімко зростає
Технологічна спеціалізація	Гуманітарні та суспільні науки, економічні	Природничі науки, хімія, інженерія	Науки про здоров'я, біомедицина	ЄС відстає у найбільш технологічних галузях, важливих для цифрового переходу
Структура університетів	Багато закладів середньої якості	Концентрація на елітних вищах	Домінування елітних університетів (Посідають Топ-20)	США краще залучає світові таланти
Мобільність талантів (brain drain)	Відтік до США та Великої Британії	Повернення вчених завдяки держпрограмам	Головний реципієнт "мізків"	Союз втрачає людський капітал через низьку зарплату та бюрократію
Бізнес-інвестиції в дослідження та розробки (% ВВП)	Приблизно 1,5%	Точної цифри немає, але можна сказати витрати уряду є значними	Понад 2% (є лідером в бізнес-секторі)	У США та Азії бізнес є головним механізмом інновацій, у ЄС більш академічний сектор

*Складено автором за [3].

Потрібно звернути увагу на відсоткові темпи приросту штучного інтелекту в науці: Китай нарощує темпи на 39% на рік, США на 36% на

рік, тоді як ЄС лише 32% на рік. Так, різниця не велика, але у технологічній гонці навіть декілька недостатніх відсотків щорічно можуть перетворюватися на роки відставання. Також, помітна різниця в бізнес-інвестиції в дослідження та розробки, де у США саме компанії фінансують різні інновації і одразу намагаються їх впровадити, тоді як в Європі наука живе здебільшого в рамках університету та дуже рідко доходить до ринку. Щодо Китаю, вони активно повертають своїх вчених додому через різні державні програми підтримки, у порівнянні з Союзом, де навпаки продовжують втрачати, тобто є різниця у підході до людського капіталу. (таблиця 1). Все це показує, чому ЄС поступається іншим і не може бути лідером у всьому, адже лідерство в нашому сучасному світі визначається не лише розміром економіки чи кількістю країн у союзі, а здатністю швидко діяти, правильно розподіляти ресурси на пріоритети та заохочувати науковців різними підтримками, щоб вони не тікали. Саме цього ЄС поки що бракує, і саме тому питання стратегічної автономії стає не просто політичною амбіцією, а об'єктивною необхідністю для союзу, який прагне зберегти свою репутацію та лідерські позиції серед інших світових лідерів.

Для розуміння підґрунтя реалізації стратегічної автономії необхідно розкрити сутність цього поняття. Це ідея про те, що ЄС має бути здатним самостійно захищати свої інтереси, у сферах безпеки, оборони та зовнішньої політики. Фактично вона означає, що Союз має підвищувати свою здатність діяти самостійно, якщо це необхідно, і разом з партнерами, якщо це звісно можливо [4]. При цьому важливо розуміти, що така концепція не буде загрозою в розриві із союзниками або повної незалежності від зовнішнього світу. Навпаки, вона підкреслює необхідність співробітництва, але одночасно прагне більшої самостійності у прийнятті рішень та реальної спроможності діяти тоді, коли це необхідно. Потрібно розуміти, що у кризові моменти країни-члени змушені чекати на згоду або допомогу ззовні, де ЄС не є повністю суверенним гравцем. Саме тому, як зазначають аналітики, питання стратегічної автономії у сфері оборонної промисловості залишається таким, де важко в Європі знайти спільні знаменники [5]. Варто підкреслити, що тут виникає одна ключова проблема, яка змушує Союз поступово крок за кроком втрачати здатність ефективного контролювання як власних учасників, так і свої позиції на зовнішній арені. Він дозволяє окремим державам систематично блокувати спільні рішення або діяти виключно у власних інтересах, ризикуючи перетворитись із впливового гравця на консультативний майданчик. Для реалізації стратегічної автономії буде важливо не лише збільшити інвестиції та прийняти певні важливі документи, а й забезпечити більше інституційної реальності, тобто готовності та рішучості, навіть можна

сказати жорсткості у встановленні чітких прав та вимог їх дотримання від усіх учасників без винятку.

Отже, проаналізувавши показники, ми побачили, що ЄС залишається світовим лідером у гуманітарній та регуляторній сфері, проте він критично поступається своїм конкурентам в темпах технологічних інновацій та практичної реалізації науки. Головна перешкода для союзу є не брак ресурсів, а складна система ухвалення рішень та внутрішньої боротьби за домінування, що в свою чергу призводить до відтоку капіталу й талантів. Щодо реалізації стратегічної автономії Союзу, то вона потребує змін, переходячи з дискусій до більш жорстких інновацій єдності, яка буде акцентувати увагу на забезпеченні покращення та розвитку стратегічних галузей промисловості.

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РОЗРОБКА ТА РЕАЛІЗАЦІЯ МЕХАНІЗМУ ПРОСУВАННЯ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ ТОВАРІВ НА ЗАКОРДОННІ РИНКИ ЧЕРЕЗ МЕРЕЖУ МІЖНАРОДНИХ ДИСТРИБ'ЮТОРІВ ТА ГАЛУЗЕВІ ВИСТАВКОВІ ЗАХОДИ

Анотація

У даній роботі розглядається практичний механізм просування українських товарів харчової промисловості на ринки Центральної та Західної Європи через мережу міжнародних дистриб'юторів. Послідовно описується кожен етап такого процесу, що розпочинається від дослідження цільового ринку та формування бази потенційних партнерів до підготовки комерційних пропозицій, роботи з відповідями іноземних компаній, участі у профільних міжнародних виставках та документального оформлення перших відвантажень. Особливу увагу приділено платформі LinkedIn як ключовому інструменту B2B-комунікації, специфіці ведення ділового листування з іноземними партнерами, а також правилам Інкотермс 2020 як основі будь-якого експортного контракту. Є практичне спрямування і може бути корисною для підприємств, що розпочинають або розширюють свою зовнішньоекономічну діяльність на ринках Європейського союзу (ЄС).

***Ключові слова:* просування товарів, міжнародний ринок, дистриб'ютор, LinkedIn, B2B-продажі, комерційна пропозиція, виставкова діяльність, Інкотермс 2020, експортна документація, зовнішньоекономічна діяльність.**

Abstract

This paper examines a practical mechanism for promoting Ukrainian food products to Central and Western European markets through international distributors. It describes every step of the process: from market research and finding potential partners to preparing commercial offers, communicating with foreign companies, participating in international trade fairs, and managing documents for the first shipments. Special attention is given to LinkedIn as a key tool for B2B communication, the specifics of business correspondence with foreign partners, and Incoterms 2020 rules as the basis of any export contract. This work is practical and will be useful for companies that are starting or expanding their export activities in the European Union (EU) markets.

Keywords: *product promotion, international market, distributor, LinkedIn, B2B sales, commercial offer, trade fairs, Incoterms 2020, export documentation, foreign economic activity.*

Вступ

Уявіть собі, що є якісний продукт, є виробник, є команда, але весь ринок збуту перебуває за кордоном. Саме в такій ситуації опинилась більшість українських компаній після повномасштабного вторгнення 2022 року: внутрішній ринок скоротився, логістика змінилась, і зовнішньоекономічна діяльність стала одним із небагатьох реальних шляхів розвитку. Держава підтримує цей рух, де у 2024 році МЗС спільно з Держпродспоживслужбою відкрили доступ до 16 нових іноземних ринків для вітчизняних продуктів, а уряд підписав угоду про співпрацю з британською агенцією Made in Britain для просування українських виробників на світовому ринку [1]. Потрібно розуміти, що жодна державна програма не підбере партнера замість вас, не напише лист іноземному дистриб'ютору і не оформить митні документи, це все залишається роботою самого підприємства. У даній роботі зібрано те, що дійсно працює при виведенні товарів на ринки Центральної та Західної Європи через дистриб'юторський канал.

Метою роботи є формулювання практичного алгоритму виведення товарів харчової промисловості на привабливі ринки, переважно через дистриб'юторський канал збуту з урахуванням ролі галузевих виставкових заходів. Робота охоплює послідовність дій від первинного аналізу ринку до підписання угоди й оформлення першого відвантаження.

Виклад основного матеріалу

В умовах сучасної глобалізованої економіки перед кожним суб'єктом підприємницької діяльності постає стратегічне питання: який саме ринок є цільовим для експансії? Відповідь, що на перший погляд видається очевидною, це є ринок ЄС або Швейцарія. Насправді потребує значно більшої операційної конкретики, ніж відчувається на старті планування. Перед виходом на зовнішній ринок підприємство зобов'язане здійснити комплексний аналіз попиту, конкурентне середовище, цінової структури та бар'єри для входу. Що може означати саме "дослідити" в практичному розумінні?

Первинний аналіз цільового ринку не передбачає проведення масштабного маркетингового дослідження з розгорнутою аналітичною звітністю. Достатнім є з'ясування ключових параметрів: рівня попиту на

відповідну товарну категорію в обраній країні, конкурентного середовища та цінової кон'юнктури сегмента, прийнятих ринкових норм мінімального обсягу замовлення, а також нормативних вимог до маркування, сертифікації та складу продукту. Показовим прикладом є Швейцарія, яка, попри географічну суміжність із країнами ЄС, функціонує як самостійний митний простір із власною регуляторною базою. Країни Чехія та Словаччина, натомість, є повноправними членами Євросоюзу з уніфікованими вимогами до імпорتنих операцій. Їх відмінності не є значними бар'єрами, однак завчасне врахування дозволяє уникнути неефективного витрачання ресурсів на взаємодію з партнерами, співпраця з якими є заздалегідь неможливою через продуктові обмеження. Паралельно з аналізом ринкового середовища необхідно вирішити стратегічне питання щодо моделі виходу на ринок. У секторі товарів повсякденного попиту (FMCG) виокремлюються два основні підходи, а саме самостійний вихід та дистриб'юторська модель. Перший передбачає прямі переговори з роздрібними мережами, формування власної або орендованої логістичної інфраструктури в країні присутності, а також реєстрацію юридичної особи чи представництва. Незважаючи на реалістичність такого сценарію, він характеризується значними часовими та фінансовими витратами. Щодо дистриб'юторської моделі то це є значно доступнішим варіантом для початкового етапу інтернаціоналізації, де підприємство залучає місцеву компанію, що вже має розвинену складську та транспортну інфраструктуру, канали збуту та компетенцію в розумінні локального ринкового середовища [2]. Завданням експортера є обґрунтування доцільності включення своєї продукції до портфеля потенційного дистриб'ютора. Варто також враховувати, що вибір моделі виходу включає оцінку онлайн-маркетплейсів і B2B-платформ як альтернативного або паралельного каналу збуту, що є особливо актуальним для нішевих продуктів.

Після визначення ринку та вибору формату входу розпочинається безпосередній пошук потенційних дистриб'юторів. Для цього існує платформа LinkedIn, яка є основним інструментом в цьому дослідженні. Застосунок являє собою не просто соціальну мережу, а найбільшу у світі базу ділових контактів, що ефективно застосовується для B2B-комунікацій у контексті виходу на ринки Західної Європи [3]. Принцип роботи полягає в пошуку за релевантними ключовими словами (наприклад: food distributor, snacks wholesale, FMCG importer) із застосуванням географічних фільтрів. Наступним кроком є ідентифікація конкретних осіб, відповідальних за закупівлі або розвиток бізнесу (purchasing manager, head of sales, commercial director, CEO), і

обов'язково здійснюється встановлення з ними персонального контакту. Для більш точного таргетування доступний інструмент LinkedIn Sales Navigator є платна платформа з розширеними фільтрами за галуззю, розміром компанії, посадою та географією, що суттєво скорочує час пошуку.

Поряд із платформою LinkedIn доцільно використовувати платформу Trade Map, безкоштовний ресурс Міжнародного торгового центру, що надає статистику імпорту конкретних товарних позицій у розрізі країн. Все це допомагає швидко та полегшено знаходити компанії, які фактично здійснюють ввезення аналогічної продукції до цільової країни, і одразу формувати з них цільову аудиторію для комунікації. Додатковим методом верифікації контактів залишаються прямі телефонні дзвінки, а саме звернення до компанії з уточнюючим запитом щодо відповідальної особи з питань закупівель може бути ефективнішим, ніж тривалий пошук у відкритих джерелах.

Після поетапного формування бази контактів розпочинається підготовка комерційної пропозиції. Документ є не лише носієм цінової інформації, а й першим формальним враженням про підприємство у свідомості потенційного партнера. Структура ефективної комерційної пропозиції буде включати: стисле представлення компанії та продукту; конкурентні переваги (склад, сертифікація, країна походження, унікальні характеристики); ціновий діапазон або документ з прайс-листом; умови поставки та мінімальний обсяг замовлення; контактні дані [4]. Критично важливим є оформлення документа мовою адресата або англійською. Потрібно зазначити, що надсилати матеріали виключно українською мовою без перекладу є грубою методологічною помилкою в міжнародних комунікаціях.

Статистика B2B-комунікацій свідчить, що на цільову розсилку відповідає близько 10% адресатів [5]. Це є нормальний показником, а не результат неефективного підходу. Наприклад, із 100 надісланих листів 10 надають відповідь, з яких 2-3 можуть трансформуватися в переговорний процес, що обумовлює необхідність поєднання масштабності охоплення з персоналізацією звернень. Особливо слід розглядати відмови не як остаточне завершення комунікації, а як початок довгострокової роботи з контактом, перш за все потрібно написати ввічливу подяку за відповідь і готовністю до майбутньої комунікації згодом.

Одним із найефективніших інструментів прискорення процесу пошуку партнерів є участь у профільних міжнародних виставках. За тричотири дні виставкового заходу підприємство отримує можливість провести переговори з десятками потенційних партнерів, пошук яких у

дистанційному форматі міг би тривати місяцями. В окремих компаніях B2B-клієнтів залучають саме через живу комунікацію на виставках, що є закономірним: безпосередній контакт, дегустація продукту та можливість отримати миттєву відповідь, яка суттєво відрізняється ефективністю з електронним листуванням. Вдалу участь у виставці планують завчасно, не менше ніж за два місяці. Перед виставкою обов'язково потрібно зробити розсилку запрошень потенційним партнерам, а також обов'язкове надсилання персоналізованих листів усім контактам протягом одного-двох тижнів після завершення заходу із зазначенням теми розмови, конкретної пропозиції та наступного кроку.

Досягнення успішної домовленості з першим партнером відкриває компанії наступний етап документального оформлення угоди. Першою та нормативною основою для будь-якої міжнародної торговельної операції є правила Інкотермс 2020. Базується, як міжнародним стандартом, що регламентує розподіл відповідальності між продавцем і покупцем у процесі доставки товару. Тобто, визначає момент переходу ризиків, розподіл витрат на транспортування та страхування, а також обов'язки сторін щодо митного оформлення. Наприклад, умова EXW передбачають самовивіз товару покупцем зі складу продавця, а умови CIF передбачає доставку продавцем до порту призначення з оплатою фрахту та страхування. Між цими полюсами розміщуються ще дев'ять варіантів, вибір між якими є предметом переговорів і суттєво впливає на кінцеву ціну для покупця [6]. Щодо стандартних пакетів експортних документів то він включає в себе комерційний інвойс (основний митний документ із реквізитами сторін, описом товару, HS-кодом, ціною та умовами поставки); пакувальний лист (деталізація вантажу за масою, розмірами та кількістю місць); сертифікат якості або відповідності; для харчових продуктів фітосанітарний або ветеринарний сертифікат залежно від складу та різні транспортні документи (CMR) [7]. Будь-яка невідповідність між задекларованими та фактичними характеристиками вантажу тягне за собою затримку на митниці або накладення штрафних санкцій.

Висновки

Отже, вихід українських товарів на європейські ринки через дистриб'юторський канал є реальним і доступним інструментом навіть для невеликих підприємств, лише за умовою послідовного виконання кожного етапу, який починається від аналізу цільового ринку до оформлення першого відвантаження. Основну роль відіграє правильно сформована база контактів, персоналізована комунікація з потенційними партнерами, участь у профільних виставках та грамотне документальне

супроводження угод відповідно до правил Інкотермс 2020. Жоден із цих елементів не є надскладним сам по собі, складність полягає у їх системній і методичній реалізації, що й відрізняє компанії, які успішно виходять на зовнішні ринки, від тих, що залишаються лише з наміром це зробити.

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АНАЛІЗ ЕФЕКТИВНОСТІ ВИКОРИСТАННЯ РІЗНИХ ФОРМ МІЖНАРОДНИХ ПЛАТЕЖІВ У ЗОВНІШНЬОЕКОНОМІЧНІЙ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ

Присвячено дослідженню різних форм міжнародних платежів у зовнішньоекономічній діяльності. Досліджено різні форми міжнародних платежів та проведено їх аналіз. Проаналізовано ефективність даних форм платежів у зовнішньоекономічній діяльності.

Ключові слова: *міжнародні платежі, зовнішньоекономічна діяльність, експортер, імпортер, авансовий платіж, інкасо, акредитив, відкритий рахунок.*

The study is devoted to the analysis of various forms of international payments in foreign economic activity. Different forms of international payments have been examined and analyzed. The efficiency of these payment forms in foreign economic activity has also been assessed.

Keywords: *international payments, foreign economic activity, exporter, importer, advance payment, collection, letter of credit, open account.*

Сьогодні, коли світ існує в умовах глобалізаційних перетворень та розширенню зв'язків між країнами, зовнішньоекономічна діяльність кожної країни є важливим рушієм для її економічного зростання. Тобто, стає більш популярною співпраця між різними суб'єктами підприємництва не тільки з однієї той самої країни. Підсумовуючи, міжнародна діяльність викликає інтерес саме до форм міжнародних платежів при здійсненні експортно-імпортних операцій.

Міжнародні розрахунки – це грошові розрахунки між суб'єктами міжнародної діяльності, що пов'язані з рухом товарно-матеріальних цінностей і послуг в міжнародному обігу [1].

Зазвичай, суб'єктами міжнародних розрахунків можуть бути експортери та імпортери, банки в котрих здійснюються відповідні операції. Всі вони вступають у взаємовідносини між собою, але головну роль в цих відносинах займають банки. Зараз, банки використовуються як посередник між експортерами та імпортерами та і в якості кредиторів, котрі фінансують зовнішньоторгові угоди, контролюють виконання умов угод, та також в якості гарантів, але це залежить від самої угоди [2]. Значна частина міжнародних розрахунків здійснюється із використанням

міжнародних стандартів і правил, розроблених Міжнародною торговою палатою [3].

На вибір форми міжнародного платежу впливає багато факторів, такі як економічні й політичні відносини між країнами, імідж країни на міжнародному ринку, рівень державного регулювання та його ефективність, валютне законодавство, стан платіжних балансів країн та інше.

Окрім вже згаданих факторів, вибір форми міжнародних розрахунків значною мірою залежить від рівня довіри між партнерами, тривалості їхнього співробітництва, обсягу та регулярності поставок, а також від ступеня ризиків, пов'язаних із виконанням умов договору. Наприклад, під час співпраці з новими партнерами суб'єкти зовнішньоекономічної діяльності зазвичай надають перевагу більш захищеним формам розрахунків. Натомість у випадках довготривалих й усталених відносин можливе застосування спрощених та менш витратних фінансових інструментів.

Суттєвий вплив на вибір форми розрахунків має також розвиток сучасних фінансових технологій і міжнародних платіжних систем. У результаті процес вибору оптимальної форми міжнародних розрахунків стає комплексним завданням, яке прямо впливає на фінансові результати підприємства, рівень ризиків і його здатність конкурувати на міжнародному ринку. Тому особливо важливим є аналіз ефективності різноманітних форм платежів, виявлення їхніх переваг і недоліків, а також обґрунтування доцільності їхнього застосування відповідно до специфічних умов зовнішньоекономічної діяльності підприємства.

Відокремлюють чотири основні форми міжнародних розрахунків (Рис. 1).



Рис. 1. Форми міжнародних розрахунків у зовнішньоекономічній діяльності*

**Складено автором за [2].*

Спершу розглянемо авансовий платіж. Авансовий платіж – це грошова сума чи майнова цінність, яка передана покупцем продавцю до відвантаження товару за рахунок виконання умов контракту. Сам аванс може бути наданий в грошовій та товарній формах. Товарна форма передбачає передачу імпортером експортеру сировини чи частку комплектуючих виробів, які необхідні для виготовлення замовлення. Аванс в грошовій формі є виплатою покупцем фіксованих у контракті сум в рахунок платежів за умовами договору до відвантаження самого товару. В світі авансові платежі використовують коли експортер не впевнений в платоспроможності імпортера, або коли політична та економічна ситуація в країні-імпортері не є стабільною, або при поставці дороговартісної продукції, або ці товари є товарами стратегічного застосування, та при тривалих термінах здійснення контракту.

Аванс може надаватись як на повну вартість контракту, так і на певний відсоток від цієї вартості. Розмір авансу залежить від мети самого авансу, характеру товару, який буде постачатись та вартості та термінів виготовлення. Зазвичай аванс складає близько 10-30% від суми контракту [4].

Загалом він передбачає собою повну або часткову передоплату товару імпортером до його відвантаження. Це несе за собою повний захист для експортера, але є ризикованим для імпортера.

Наступним розглянемо акредитив. Акредитив застосовують у міжнародній діяльності для того, щоб зменшити ризики невиконання партнерами їх зобов'язань за контрактом.

Коли між сторонами не має повної довіри, вони можуть використовувати посередника у вигляді банку, котрий буде гарантувати постачальнику отримання грошей від замовника, а насамперед замовнику – що постачальник отримає гроші тільки після поставки відповідного товару за договором та оформить усі передбачені для цього документи. Звісно, при недовірі сторін, можна було б використати авансовий платіж, але при неможливості цього варіанту, тоді акредитивний спосіб оплати певної продукції вбереже експортера від омани, так і імпортера від того самого. Банк покупця виставить експортеру через його уповноважений банк акредитив і виплатить обумовлену суму після того, як експортер надасть відвантажувальні документи згідно умов їх міжнародного контракту [5].

Підсумовуючи, акредитив є тією формою міжнародного платежу, який є одним з більш надійних, так як він передбачає зобов'язання банку здійснити платіж на користь експортера при умові надання певного пакету документів. Ця форма забезпечує високий рівень захисту інтересів сторін, але він є складним та витратним у використанні.

Інкасо – це поширений метод оплати в міжнародній платіжній практиці. Він використовується переважно тоді, коли експортери не бажають продавати товари в кредит, але не можуть отримати захист від ризиків за допомогою акредитивів [2].

На відміну від акредитивів, банк, при інкасо, не бере на себе зобов'язання щодо оплати – головним завданням інкасуєчого банку є подання документів для сприяння платежу або акцепту. Завдяки простішим процедурам ця послуга є менш дорогою та гнучкішою.

Іншими словами, інкасо означає, що експортер передає документи імпортеру через банк, а банк стягує платіж від його імені після оплати. Цей метод менш надійний, ніж акредитиви, але він дешевший та зручніший.

Розрахунки за відкритим рахунком – це метод розрахунків, за якого експортер передає товари та документи покупцеві, а імпортеру протягом узгодженого терміну потрібно надіслати кошти за товар експортеру, але жодна зі сторін не може отримати надійних гарантій [2].

Загалом, розрахунки за відкритим рахунком використовуються в більший частині при тривалих та стабільних відносинах між сторонами, така форма є вигідною для імпортера, але є досить ризиковою для експортера.

Ефективність використання різних форм міжнародних платежів у зовнішньоекономічній діяльності залежить від їх здатності забезпечувати своєчасність розрахунків, мінімізацію ризиків, зниження витрат та захист інтересів учасників контракту. Обраний спосіб платежу безпосередньо впливає на фінансові результати підприємства, його ліквідність і конкурентоспроможність на міжнародному ринку. Для оцінки ефективності кожного виду розрахунків треба враховувати такі ключові критерії: рівень ризику для обох сторін (експортера та імпортера), швидкість проведення платежу, вартість послуг, гарантії виконання зобов'язань та гнучкість у застосуванні.

Однією з найбільш захищених форм є акредитив. Він надає високий рівень гарантій виконання зобов'язань завдяки участі банку, який бере на себе зобов'язання здійснити платіж після надання експортером відповідних документів. Операції з акредитивами регулюються міжнародними правилами. Проте акредитив має свої недоліки – високі банківські комісії та складність оформлення документів, через що його використання є менш економічно доцільним для угод із невеликими сумами.

Інкасо виступає компромісною формою, яка дозволяє збалансувати ризики та витрати. Серед його переваг можна відокремити нижчу вартість та здатність частково контролювати передачу документів.

Водночас ця форма не забезпечує повних гарантій оплати з боку імпортера, що створює певну загрозу для експортера, особливо в умовах ненадійного партнерства чи нестабільної економічної ситуації.

Розрахунок за відкритим рахунком є вигідним для імпортера, оскільки дозволяє спочатку отримати товар, а вже потім здійснити оплату. Але для експортера він супроводжується значними ризиками, пов'язаними з можливою несплатою. Попри це, у випадку довготривалих партнерських відносин ця форма може стати оптимальним вибором завдяки зміцненню довіри та зниженню операційних витрат.

Авансовий платіж є найбільш комфортним рішенням для експортера, оскільки гарантує отримання оплати ще до відвантаження продукції, повністю усуваючи ризик неплатежу. Для імпортера ж така схема менш вигідна через ризик невиконання постачальником зобов'язань або затримки поставок.

Порівняльний аналіз (Табл. 1) свідчить про те, що універсальна форма міжнародних розрахунків не існує. Їх ефективність залежить від умов конкретної угоди, ступеня довіри між сторонами, економічної та політичної стабільності у країнах контрагентів, а також витрат на супроводження операції.

Таблиця 1

Порівняльний аналіз різних форм міжнародних розрахунків у зовнішньоекономічній діяльності*

Форма платежу	Рівень ризику для експортера	Рівень ризику для імпортера	Рівень гарантії	Доцільність використання
Акредитив	Низький	Середній	Високий	Нові або ризиковані партнери, великі угоди
Інкасо	Середній	Низький	Середній	Відносно надійні партнери
Авансовий платіж	Дуже низький	Дуже високий	Високий (для експортера)	Коли експортер має сильну позицію
Відкритий рахунок	Дуже високий	Дуже низький	Дуже низький	Постійні партнери, високий рівень довіри

**Складено автором за [2, 4, 5].*

Порівняльний аналіз свідчить, що документарний акредитив є найбільш захищеною формою міжнародних розрахунків, хоча його

застосування пов'язане зі значними витратами. Менш затратні варіанти, такий як розрахунки за відкритим рахунком, характеризуються підвищеним ризиком для експортера. Авансовий платіж гарантує найвищий рівень захисту для продавця, тоді як документарне інкасо займає проміжну позицію між ризиком і витратами.

Отже, для нових або ризикованих партнерів найкраще підходить акредитив завдяки високому рівню захисту інтересів обох сторін. У тривалих і стабільних партнерських стосунках доцільно використовувати відкритий рахунок для скорочення витрат і спрощення процесу розрахунків. Інкасо є оптимальним вибором для ситуацій, де необхідно збалансувати ризики та фінансові витрати.

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РИНОК МОВНИХ КУРСІВ У НІМЕЧЧИНІ ЯК ОБ'ЄКТ ІНВЕСТУВАННЯ

Дослідження присвячено аналізу можливостей ведення інвестиційної діяльності Німеччини. Проаналізовано ключові аспекти та напрями освітнього інвестування у Німеччину. Визначено виклики та можливості інвестування у Німеччину на освітньому ринку.

Ключові слова: *міграція, імміграція, еміграція, освіта, інвестиційна привабливість, SWOT-аналіз.*

The study is devoted to the analysis of investment opportunities in Germany. Key aspects and directions of educational investment in Germany are examined. Challenges and opportunities for investing in Germany's education market are identified.

Keywords: *migration, immigration, emigration, education, investment attractiveness, SWOT-analysis.*

Освіта у Німеччині відіграє важливу роль у розвитку населення. Насамперед, освіта Німеччини є частиною системи освіти у Європейському Союзі. Ця освітня система має свої особливості, щодо окремих сегментів [1]. Зокрема:

1) Однорівнева освіта – ця система не передбачає формальний перехід від початкової до середньої школи, з початку та до кінця терміну обов'язкової освіти учні навчаються за спільною програмою.

2) Загальна основна навчальна програма – ця програма передбачає, що після завершення початкової школи учні переходять до наступного рівня – до середньої школи. Саме навчання проводиться за загальною навчальною програмою.

3) Диференційована неповна загальна освіта – вона передбачає, що після завершення початкового рівня освіти учні обирають напрямок навчання. Після завершення учні отримують окремі сертифікати, тобто документ про здобуття середньої освіти, згідно обраного напрямку.

Окремо, наразі, ринок мовних курсів у Німеччині – це масштабна, державно-приватна система, яка має на меті інтеграцію мігрантів та підвищення кваліфікації.

Попит на даний ринок є досить великим, так як міграційні процеси Німеччини є досить активними, та зокрема спрямовані саме на імміграцію (таблиця 1).

Огляд був проведений на основі даних за 2023-2024 роки сумісно, так як не всі дані є у вільному доступі.

Аналіз показників та динаміки міграції, показує що, по перше, ситуація в Німеччині загалом є з позитивним сальдо, це означає що, до країни приїжджають більше людей ніж виїжджають (табл.1). За даними на 2023 рік чистий приріст мігрантів в Німеччині, котра є провідною державою Європи, показник становив 609,6 тис осіб. Німеччина маючи населення розміром 83,5 млн осіб, з них приймає 16,8 млн осіб, що становить 20,1% всіх жителів Німеччини.

Таблиця 1

Показники міграції Європи та Німеччини за 2023-2024 роки

Показник	Німеччина
Загальна чисельність населення	(2024 рік) 83,5 млн
Загальна кількість міжнародних мігрантів	(2024 рік) 16,8 млн
Частка мігрантів у загальному прирості населення	(2024 рік) 19,8 %
Загальна кількість міжнародних емігрантів	(2024 рік) 4,3 млн
Очікувана чиста міграція	(2023 рік) 609,6 тис
Відсоток жінок серед міжнародних мігрантів	(2024 рік) 50 %
Кількість біженців у країну/регіон, що приймає (2024 рік)	(2024 рік) 2,7 млн
Біженці з країни/регіону походження (2024 рік)	(2024 рік) 348

**Таблицю складено автором на основі [2].*

Сама Німеччина, прийняла близько 2,7 млн біженців до країни за 2024 рік. Але не дивлячись на всі перешкоди та проблеми з самої Німеччини лише 348 людей отримали статус біженців в інших країнах.

При даному аналізі також розглядалась гендерна структура міграційних потоків. Суттєвою ознакою сучасної міграції є її гендерна збалансованість. Вона є рівномірною в Німеччині – жінок-мігрантів 50% в Німеччині [2].

Як результат, Німеччина є активним гравцем у міграційних процесах. Ці процеси впливають на ринок праці, систему охорони здоров'я, житлову політику та соціальну інфраструктуру. У цілому, і Німеччина залишається активним учасником глобальної міграції — як у ролі приймаючої країн, так і донора людського капіталу.

Ринок мовних курсів є основною та важливою часткою освітнього сектору, та постійно розвивається за рахунок глобалізації, міграційних

процесів та зростанням попиту на міжнародних спеціалістів. Окремо, попит на вивчення німецької мови є наслідком привабливості країни як для міжнародних студентів, так і для біженців та трудових мігрантів.

За різновидом мовних курсів у Німеччині існують приватні, державні, корпоративні мовні школи, а також онлайн-платформи для вивчення мови. На сьогодні існує декілька форматів для вивчення мови, такі як офлайн-формат, онлайн-формат та змішаний формат вивчення мови. Окремо, онлайн-курси набули своєї популярності у період пандемії COVID-19, але і зараз вони є досить популярними за рахунок їх мобільності. Але у свою чергу офлайн-курси залишаються досі популярними, особливо коли потрібно більш інтенсивної підготовки мови та практикування її для офіційних мовних іспитів.

Сьогодні близько 850 пропозицій мовних курсів у Німеччині на спеціалізованих сайтах у різних містах Німеччини [3].

Конкуренція на ринку мовних курсів є досить високою, але стабільний попит дає змогу новим учасникам виходити на ринки та давати змогу розвивати цей ринок, особливо в онлайн-форматі. Онлайн-формат є перспективною частиною Німецького ринку мовних курсів, так як, саме Німеччина займає одну з найбільших часток серед країн Європи за часткою онлайн-курсів на ринку, а саме 21% від всього ринку онлайн-курсів Європи [4].




Рис. 1. SWOT-аналіз ринку мовних курсів Німеччини

**Створено автором за [2], [3], [4].*

Підсумовуючи ринок мовних курсів у Німеччині є масштабним, з великою диференціацією форм навчання та стабільним попитом, що надає можливість до сприятливого інвестування.

Але для більш доцільної оцінки інвестиційної привабливості ринку мовних курсів у Німеччині буде зручно використати метод SWOT-аналізу (рис. 1). Цей метод дозволить зрозуміти всі основні фактори, які впливають на розвиток ринку, а також для визначення сильних та слабких сторін ринку.

Ринок мовних курсів Німеччини має велике інвестиційне майбутнє, а саме завдяки стабільному попиту та розвиток в сфері онлайн-освіти. В цей час треба пам'ятати про велику конкуренцію на ринку та економічні ризики. Аналіз ринку дає змогу зрозуміти різноманітність вибору форматів навчання, та розуміння, що онлайн-сфера починає, з більшою силою набувати популярності, що дасть змогу зменшити витрати на розвиток бізнесу, та надання змоги масштабувати бізнес, без окремих витрат на фізичну присутність, також надає можливість для розширення аудиторії, що є одним з головним чинників для інвестиційної привабливості.

Загалом, ринок мовних курсів у Німеччині є інвестиційно привабливим, але тільки при умові правильно обраної стратегії, високої гнучкості та готовності впроваджувати нові технології.

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GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FIXED ASSETS OF THE ENTERPRISE AND METHODS FOR EVALUATING THEIR EFFICIENCY

The study explores the economic nature and key characteristics of an enterprise's fixed assets, along with the principal methods for assessing their efficiency. Fixed assets form the material and technical base of enterprise activity and determine the level of production capacity, technological development, and competitiveness [1]. In modern economic systems, the role of fixed assets continues to grow due to technological progress and increasing competition between enterprises.

Fixed assets represent long-term tangible resources used in production for more than one year. These include buildings, machinery, equipment, vehicles, and infrastructure. Their importance lies in their ability to ensure continuous production processes and create conditions for stable enterprise functioning [1]. Without an effective system of fixed assets, production becomes inefficient and unstable.

The economic significance of fixed assets is also reflected in their influence on productivity and cost efficiency. Enterprises with modern equipment are able to produce higher-quality products at lower costs, which strengthens their competitive position in the market [2]. At the same time, outdated equipment leads to increased production costs and reduced output efficiency.

One of the key aspects of fixed assets is their classification. Fixed assets are divided into buildings and structures, machinery and equipment, vehicles, tools, and other categories. Each type plays a specific role in the production process and contributes differently to enterprise performance [2].

Another important aspect is valuation. Fixed assets are initially recorded at historical cost, which includes purchase, transportation, installation, and other related expenses. Over time, their value decreases due to physical wear and technological obsolescence, which is reflected through depreciation [1].

Depreciation is a systematic allocation of the value of fixed assets over their useful life. It ensures that the cost of assets is gradually transferred to production costs. Different depreciation methods, such as straight-line and declining balance methods, allow enterprises to manage financial results and investment planning [1][3].

The efficiency of fixed asset utilization is evaluated using several key indicators. Capital productivity reflects how effectively assets generate output. Capital intensity shows the amount of assets required to produce goods. The capital-labour ratio characterizes the level of technological equipment per employee [3].

High capital productivity indicates efficient use of resources, while high capital intensity may signal inefficiencies in production processes. These indicators are widely used by managers and analysts to evaluate enterprise performance and identify areas for improvement [3].

Modern enterprises face the challenge of maintaining and updating their fixed assets. Technological progress requires continuous investment in new equipment and infrastructure. Enterprises that fail to modernize their assets risk losing competitiveness and market position [4].

The renewal of fixed assets is closely linked to investment activity. Investments in new technologies increase productivity, reduce costs, and improve product quality. At the same time, insufficient investment leads to technological lag and reduced efficiency [4].

In addition, the management of fixed assets includes decisions related to repair, maintenance, and replacement. Proper management ensures optimal utilization of resources and reduces downtime in production processes [2].

In global practice, the effectiveness of fixed asset management is considered one of the key factors of sustainable economic development. Enterprises that invest in innovation and modernization demonstrate higher growth rates and better financial performance [5].

Thus, fixed assets represent a critical element of enterprise activity. Their efficient utilization depends on proper management, regular modernization, and the use of analytical tools for performance evaluation. The improvement of fixed asset management systems contributes to long-term economic growth and competitiveness of enterprises.

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POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION OF UKRAINE'S ECONOMY: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS

The full-scale war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine has caused significant economic losses and large-scale destruction of infrastructure, which has negatively affected the functioning of the national economy. The destruction of industrial enterprises, the transport system, energy infrastructure, and housing has led to a substantial decline in economic activity and a reduction in production. According to estimates by the World Bank and other international organizations, the total losses of the Ukrainian economy and recovery needs exceed USD 486 billion [1].

In 2022, the Ukrainian economy experienced a significant decline. Real gross domestic product (GDP) decreased by approximately 29.1%, marking the deepest economic downturn in the country's entire period of independence [2]. At the same time, in the following years, there has been a gradual recovery of economic activity, largely due to international financial support and the economy's adaptation to wartime conditions.

Under these circumstances, the issue of post-war reconstruction of Ukraine's economy becomes particularly relevant. One of the key factors in economic recovery is international investment, which provides the necessary financial resources for rebuilding infrastructure, modernizing production capacities, and developing new sectors of the economy.

International investments may come in the form of foreign direct investment, loans from international financial institutions, grants, and technical assistance. Such international organizations as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the European Investment Bank play a significant role in economic recovery by actively financing reconstruction and development programs in Ukraine [3].

An important example of international support is the Ukraine Facility programme introduced by the European Union, which provides financial assistance to Ukraine in the amount of EUR 50 billion for the period 2024–2027. This programme aims to strengthen economic stability, implement reforms, and stimulate investment activity [4].

Table 1 presents the assessment of Ukraine's economic losses caused by the war.

As can be seen from the data presented, the scale of destruction is extremely significant, which determines the need to attract substantial

financial resources for economic reconstruction. In this context, international investments can act as a significant instrument for the restoration of the country’s economic potential.

Table 1

Main economic losses of Ukraine as a result of the war*

Indicator	Value
Total economic losses	more than USD 480 billion
GDP decline in 2022	–29.1%
Damaged or destroyed enterprises	more than 400
Destroyed residential buildings	more than 150 thousand
Damaged infrastructure facilities	more than 25 thousand

**Compiled by the author based on [1; 2].*

In addition to financial resources, foreign investors contribute to the introduction of modern technologies, the improvement of management efficiency, and the development of innovative sectors of the economy. Sectors with particularly high potential for attracting investment include energy, the agro-industrial complex, transport infrastructure, information technologies, and renewable energy.

At the same time, the effective attraction of international investment requires the formation of a favorable investment climate. The main prerequisites include ensuring political and macroeconomic stability, protecting investors’ rights, ensuring the transparency of economic policy, and combating corruption. An important factor is also the harmonization of Ukrainian legislation with the norms of the European Union, which will facilitate the country’s integration into the European economic space.

Thus, international investment plays a key role in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine’s economy. Their attraction makes it possible to finance large-scale infrastructure projects, contributes to the modernization of production, and creates conditions for long-term economic development. The effective use of international financial assistance and investment can become the foundation for the formation of a modern, innovative, and competitive economy in Ukraine.

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DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION AND INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AS DETERMINANTS OF THE FORMATION AND REALIZATION OF THE POTENTIAL OF THE ENTERPRISE IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

In modern business conditions characterized by high dynamism, uncertainty and increased competition, the importance of digital transformation as a key factor in the development of enterprises is significantly increasing. The post-war economy is characterized not only by the need to restore lost production capacities, but also by the need to form a qualitatively new development model focused on improving efficiency, flexibility and sustainability. In such conditions, digital technologies become a key tool for accelerated modernization of enterprises, which allows not only to restore their activities, but to ensure the transition to a new level of competitiveness.

Digital transformation is of particular importance in the context of the limited resources characteristic of the post-war period. The lack of financial, material and labor resources makes it necessary to use them as efficiently as possible, which is achieved, in particular, by introducing innovative technologies, automating business processes and using analytical decision support systems. This increases enterprise productivity and reduces costs even under resource constraints.

In addition, the post-war period is accompanied by an increased level of uncertainty and risks, which requires enterprises to have a high level of adaptability and the ability to quickly respond to changes in the external environment. It is digital tools that provide the ability to quickly collect and analyze information, simulate various development scenarios and make informed management decisions. As a result, a new quality of the enterprise's

potential is formed, which is based on a combination of innovation, flexibility and strategic orientation.

As part of the integration of the national economy into the global digital space in the process of post-war recovery, the use of modern digital platforms, e-commerce, international information systems opens up new opportunities for enterprises to enter foreign markets, attract investment and participate in global value chains. This, in turn, strengthens the role of digital transformation as a determining factor in the formation of long-term competitive advantages.

Thus, in the post-war period, digital transformation and innovative technologies acquire strategic importance, acting not only as a means of restoring the activities of enterprises, but also as a key prerequisite for their sustainable development. However, traditional approaches to building the potential of an enterprise, based mainly on a resource and competence basis, are gradually losing their sufficiency, since they do not take into account the impact of the digital environment, data and innovative technologies on business results. In this regard, there is an objective need to rethink the essence of the potential of an enterprise, taking into account the digital aspects of its formation and implementation.

The impact of digital transformation is manifested through the integration of information, analytical and management capabilities into the overall structure of potential, which ensures synergy between material, financial, labor, intellectual and other types of strategic resources of the enterprise [1]. Digital transformation acts not only as a tool to increase the efficiency of individual business processes, but also as a backbone element of the enterprise's potential, which allows the enterprise not only to respond quickly to changes in the external environment, but also to proactively form its own competitive positions.

Generalization of the nature of the impact of the digital transformation of the economy on the activities of the enterprise makes it possible to identify a set of key channels of its influence on the formation and development of potential. Such channels include the digitalization of traditional resources and business processes, the growing role of data as a strategic resource in the context of the development of tools for their processing and analysis, the formation of new business models, as well as the active introduction of modern digital technologies. These areas of influence determine the transformation of approaches to enterprise management and determine new requirements for the structure and content of its potential.

In the context of digital transformation, the strategic resources of the enterprise are undergoing significant changes, which reflects the need for their adaptation to new technological and market realities [2]. At the same time, transformation processes are differentiated, since individual components of

strategic potential react differently to the influence of digitalization factors. In particular, the most sensitive to changes are information, intellectual and management components, while material and financial resources are transformed indirectly - through changing the mechanisms of their use and increasing the efficiency of their management [3]. Such asymmetry of the impact determines the need for an integrated approach to the formation of the potential of the enterprise, taking into account the digital context of its development (Fig. 1).




Fig. 1. Impact of digital transformation on elements of enterprise strategic potential

Assessing the consequences of digitalization of the economy, it can be stated that it transforms both the content and tools for managing all types of strategic resources, forming new opportunities for optimizing business processes, developing interaction, building partnerships and ecosystems, making decisions based on data, opening new market niches and entire product lines, changing production processes. In this regard, there are numerous qualitative changes in the components of the strategic potential of the enterprise, which can be traced in the characteristics of the relevant resources. All aspects of digital transformation can be taken into account by introducing additional dimensions in the assessment of strategic resources from the standpoint of their basic economic and managerial content. Such additional parameters can be, for example, the depth of digitalization of individual elements of strategic potential or the mechanism of their interaction with modern digital technologies. The most complex changes for strategic resources will be associated not with increasing known competitive advantages, but with the formation of long-term competitiveness factors

unique to the digital environment. In the future, such benefits can be allocated to a separate class of strategic resources. But at present they fit into the logic of material resources (for example, production processes and equipment operating on the basis of artificial intelligence, big data, the Internet of Things), intangible resources (for example, digital interaction with clients and partners in a digital environment with automation of the use of big data and artificial intelligence), intellectual resources (for example, general knowledge of digital competencies, performance of individual labor functions by artificial intelligence)

Thus, the proposed approach to the formation and realization of the potential of the enterprise provides for the consideration of two interrelated dimensions - digital and strategic. Digital measurement covers the level of development of information infrastructure, digital competencies of personnel, the use of modern technologies and analytical tools. The strategic dimension, in turn, determines the direction of the development of the enterprise, its ability to long-term planning and the formation of sustainable competitive advantages. The synergy of these measurements ensures the integrity of the potential and its orientation towards achieving strategic goals.

A feature of the proposed approach is the emphasis on the adaptability of the enterprise's potential to a rapidly changing market environment. The use of digital technologies ensures continuous monitoring of external and internal factors affecting the activities of the enterprise, as well as timely adjustment of strategic and tactical decisions. This allows you to increase the efficiency of resource mobilization, minimize risks and ensure the sustainability of the enterprise in the long term.

Thus, digital transformation and innovative technologies are key determinants of the formation and realization of the potential of enterprises during the post-war recovery. Their integration with traditional potential components creates prerequisites for the formation of a new model of enterprise development focused on innovation, flexibility and sustainable competitive advantages.

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THE IMPACT OF DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE

In the present time, the world is in a critical period in the ongoing digital transformation. Technologies are rapidly developing and combining in more innovative and new ways, and digital transformation is pushing towards new and quite often unpredictable directions. Based on the European Digital Transformation Scoreboard from 2017, there are seven essential digital technologies for successful business, namely cloud technologies and social networks, mobile services, cyber security solutions, Internet of Things, automated and robotic machines, data analytics, and big data. The specificity of the aforementioned digital innovations, defined as the Fourth Industrial Revolution, is that they bring changes in all industrial sectors and thus become the main condition for further competitive business on the global market (European Commission, 2017).

Disruptions in all key industries, the speed of development, and the impact on entire management and production systems are what distinguish the mentioned development from earlier "industrial revolutions." In the future, an even greater potential for human development is expected with the development of the full effect of newer technologies, such as artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things, quantum computing, 3D printing, and energy storage. In order to face the challenging business environment, the countries of Southeast Europe should establish the following political guidelines (World Economic Forum, 2016):

1. The transformation of the traditional into a digital economy requires the systematic and widespread use of digital technologies by all stakeholders – government, individuals, and companies. Despite the fact that digital technologies affect every business function and industry, the impact and pace at which digitization takes place varies among industries and companies in selected countries of Southeast Europe.

2. Awareness that there is a deep and very comprehensive reformation towards a digital environment. The digital economy is not about speeding up

communication through changing the skills or boundaries that are necessary for workers but about changing the very nature of consumption and the way markets and competition work.

3. Willingness to make private changes determines the level of success in the aforementioned digital world and can only happen with the promise of greater investments in technologies, business models, and future-oriented solutions.

Digital technologies provide solutions to various economic challenges that Southeast European countries face in order to overcome stagnant or declining growth rates, rising unemployment, and deteriorating living standards of their citizens. The countries of Southeast Europe need new digital sources of growth, and the importance of the digital transformation of their economies is also growing, as it enables further reforms, innovations, and modernization of various industrial sectors. In order to face the reduction of challenges in production and export caused by external or internal factors, Southeast European companies can use digital technologies to reduce business costs, optimize supply chains, and improve internal management, facilitating the provision of services and goods to the market. Production supported by digital technology and digital services has the potential to create jobs but also improve the economic goals of the countries of Southeast Europe (European Policy Centre, 2010).

The progress towards the digital economy in the selected countries of Southeast Europe is analyzed by comparing and using certain important indicators of infrastructure development and indicators of ICT (Information and Communication Technology) use, as well as complex measurements of ICT indices, such as the composite development index or the ICT network readiness index. In addition to Croatia, which became a full member of the European Union in 2013, all analyzed countries (Serbia, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro) participate in the ongoing EU enlargement process (UNCTAD, 2017).

Comparison and collection of the mentioned data are possible since the selected countries base their statistics in the field of information society. The main indicators of the development of the digital economy in the countries of Southeast Europe are the degree to which companies and people have affordable access to relevant ICT – there are also digital solutions – and whether they use them productively. Affordable access to various ICTs of the selected countries is analyzed using the following indicators: mobile telephony subscriptions, fixed telephony subscriptions, mobile broadband internet subscriptions, fixed broadband internet subscriptions, companies using the internet, households with internet access, and individuals using the internet (Table 1) (Vidas-Bubanja et al., 2019).

Table 1

Indicators of access to ICT*

	Bosnia	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Croatia	EU28
Fixed lines per 100 populations (%)						
2010.	24,7	41,4	27,7	20,2	39,3	40,0
2014.	22,2	39,6	26,6	28,8	35,0	38,3
2017.	21,7	37,5	24,2	17,3	33,5	43,0
Mobile subscriptions per 100 populations (%)						
2010.	87,5	132,0	173,9	106,1	143,5	124,4
2014.	90,0	130,0	163,8	108,7	104,0	120,5
2017.	91,3	122,1	163,0	106,2	104,5	123,0
Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (%)						
2012.	8,2	11,2	8,3	12,5	18,3	25,7
2014.	10,6	12,9	8,4	13,7	20,7	28,6
2017.	14,2	15,6	16,7	16,8	23,0	34,3
Mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (%)						
2012.	9,2	4,1	22,0	6,5	15,5	54,2
2014.	12,2	52,1	27,5	25,1	53,9	69,3
2017.	27,0	66,4	31,0	49,5	68,5	72,3
Internet used by individuals (%)						
2010.	42,7	40,9	37,5	52,0	54,0	68,0
2014.	60,8	62,5	64,5	68,1	69,2	78,0
2017.	69,5	70,3	71,3	75,0	77,1	84,0
Households with Internet access at home (%)						
2010.	29,8	39,0	51,4	46,0	56,0	70,0
2014.	47,5	62,8	63,6	68,0	68,0	81,0
2017.	57,0	65,0	70,0	70,0	76,0	87,0
Enterprises with Internet access (%)						
2010.	-	96,8	95,0	84,0	95,0	94,0
2014.	-	100,0	98,0	93,0	96,0	97,0
2017.	99,3	99,7	99,1	-	96,0	97,0

*Source: Vidas-Bubanja et al., 2019.

Digital technologies are one of the most important sources of growth of national economies. They enable economies to improve people's lives, create more jobs, and build greener and better societies. But the analysis that was conducted in the countries of Southeast Europe proved that in addition to the progress in the last ten years in creating the main preconditions for the digital economy, the great potential of digital technology will still remain unused.

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RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FORMATION OF A NEW WORLD ORDER

Russian aggression against Ukraine and its openly illegal actions can be justly considered a turning point in the formation of new world order. Where the world is split into democratic countries with functional legal system and moral values, and authoritarian regimes with degrading social and economic environments. The new order implies new objectives for the democratic world as well as directions of future development.

In the framework of international diplomacy, blatant violations of international law are observed in the behaviour of Russia towards Ukraine (Kimball, D.G., 2022). Firstly in 2014 with illegal regional annexation (Mälksoo, L., 2019), then in 2022 with full scale military aggression Russia continues shamelessly its unlawful and inhumane barbarism with pointless reasoning and open lies as argumentation (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2026).

The additional aggravation to the situation adds the fact that Russia was assuring the protection of Ukrainian sovereignty (UN, 2014), while in reality it violated the agreement as well as the core principles of the UN of non-aggression towards any state (United Nations, 1945). Furthermore, the harm done to the environment is irreversible, with cases of completely destroyed ecosystems, and such changes have borderless consequences.

Under the current reality, every actor that does not oppose and condemn Russian actions therefore supports them by passive inaction; no grey shades can be distinguished now, the truth is only black and white, as explicitly indicated by Lemmy (Motörhead, 1983).

The new world order appear itself as the free world and tyranny (Larsen, R., 2025), based on liberal values and development, and depressive authoritarian (NATO Assembly, 2025) sickness of mind, respectively.

Obvious pattern of repetition can be identified here, addressing historical examples of the Soviet Union, which was well-defined by President Ronald Reagan as “evil empire” (The National Center for Public Policy Research, 2001), and the USSR-nourished clusters of national decay – Cuba, Syria, Iraq, North Korea (CIA, 1999) – which have degraded since, as opposed to the democratic and free countries where development and innovation take place.

Particular impact on the formation of the new world order had the economic shift, primarily initiated by the illegal Russian activity and sanctions that came into force as a response to it (Harangozo, T., 2024). In its actions of bypassing economic, trade in particular, sanctions, Russia tied closer relations with other authoritarian states, and therefore the lucid division of international actors and the new world order revealed itself.

Why “evil” regimes do it - remains to any healthy mind unknown and completely illogical, even as the insanity or clinical psychosis, as serial killers, for instance, have. There are clear evidence of underdeveloped society and behaviours under such regimes. Law and order of the free world is opposed to falsehood and violation of “good”, including law, ethics, humanity, and morals; the logical break comes when the actions of authoritarian regimes ultimately worsen every economic and social aspect of their own states.

The strategy for the free world under the new order reveals itself as first of all strengthening: security defence (Patterson, R., 2025), in politics – obliteration of corrupt agents, reinforcement of law and the guarantee of the consequences of unlawful actions (NATO Assembly, 2025). Alongside the raise of public awareness and enhancement of education at all levels, as well as nourishment of art and upstanding moral values. While the aims may appear high, it is believed to be the only way for social evolution and surmounting current challenges.

The new order implies the need of strong liberal positions and developed defence for the democratic part of the world, as well as holistic enhancement of the international law and very importantly, guaranteed realisation of consequences of unlawful activity. Another important element of national and political strengthening is considered to be educational proficiency of the society, where there are profound and clear understanding of political and social concepts and their consequences. Positive and strong position is reasoned to be the means of ascending to the best of humanity and humans’ home planet.

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ACTIVITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE UKRAINIAN MARKET

According to the explanatory dictionary of foreign words, the word “corporation” comes from the Latin word “corporatio”, which has one of the meanings “form of joint-stock company” or “one of the forms of monopolistic associations”. Any phenomenon or object that is behind something is called with the prefix “trans”. The term “transnational” refers to something that goes beyond the borders of the state.

A transnational corporation (hereinafter referred to as TNC) is a corporation that, based on direct foreign investment, carries out international production of industrial products and has control over its foreign branches and subsidiaries.

The UN defines transnational companies as follows: it is a corporate organization that owns and controls the production of goods or services in at least one country other than its home country [1].

TNCs are usually divided into three large groups:

Horizontally integrated TNCs – there is management of divisions in different countries that produce the same or similar goods.

Vertically integrated TNCs – there is management of divisions in a country that produce goods that are supplied to divisions in other countries.

Separate TNCs – there is management of divisions located in different countries that are not horizontally or vertically integrated.

Thus, a “transnational corporation” is a modern form of an international corporation that owns assets obtained through foreign direct investment, carries out a common policy of control over foreign production plants and

distributes products from one center of the parent company in the country of base. It operates on the principles of corporate ownership and has a significant impact on a certain economic sphere of at least several countries of the world.

The activities of a transnational company contribute to the development of the living standards of the ordinary population, reducing unemployment, and so on. However, despite the positive factors, it also carries negative ones. More details are provided in Table 1.

Table 1

Positive and Negative Factors of TNC Activity in the Host Country*

Positive	Negative
- Obtaining additional resources such as capital, industrial modernization, management experience, and skilled labor - Reducing unemployment - Training qualified personnel according to international standards - Accelerating economic growth by increasing GDP - Increasing tax revenues	- Price manipulation - Lack of allowance for host country representatives to participate in R&D - The use of outdated production technologies by TNCs - Possible non-compliance by TNCs with environmental standards - The most promising segments in the domestic market captured by TNCs

**Compiled by the author based on [8].*

So, despite all the advantages of transnational companies, they, along with their development, bring a kind of monopoly to the market, manipulating lower prices than would be the case in the domestic market, because a TNC branch may experience a lack of income at the expense of branches in other regions/countries. The problem of outdated technologies in production and non-compliance with environmental standards can be combined together, because both of these negative features of TNCs directly show an attempt to reduce production costs as much as possible.

One more thing should be understood – the strategy of a TNC entering the national market. It can be both useful for the country, aiming at further development in a certain niche, and harmful, controlling the exports of an entire country. The strategies of international corporations in the national market are divided into two categories.

Companies that produce domestic consumption products often use the first type of strategy, namely McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, Philip Morris and Kraft. Increasing corporate profits is the goal of this tactic.

The goal of the second strategy is to gain a significant new market share. Large traders, construction companies, and agricultural suppliers are among the companies that use this strategy to enter the country’s market.

Ukraine began to develop the issue of foreign investment almost simultaneously with gaining independence in 1991, although at that time the

post-social planned economy was completely unprepared for this due to the lack of a regulatory framework as such and special reforms that would contribute to increasing investment in the country. But soon Ukraine was distinguished by the adoption of a number of legislative acts, such as the Law of Ukraine "On Foreign Investments" of 13 March 1992 and the Law of Ukraine "On the Foreign Investment Regime" of 19 March 1996, which was the beginning of the formation of the legal field for international companies, and the beginning of privatization processes that attracted the attention of such well-known and powerful TNCs as Nestle, Coca-Cola, Samsung, LG and others.

As of early 2014, the country had over 30 international corporations, such as Alcatel, British Petroleum, Coca-Cola, Danone, Hewlett Packard, Huawei, McDonald's Corporation, Metro Casg & Carry, Nestle, Nokia, PepsiCo, Procter & Gamble, Samsung, Shell, Siemens, SUNInbev, Toyota, and Unilever. Much attention is paid to TNCs that produce goods at the national level, which contributes to the development of the country's industrial potential and the creation of new jobs. Currently, the largest number is in the country's processing industry, such as ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih, the Coca-Cola production plant in the Kyiv region, and others [2].

TNCs from industrially developed countries, such as the USA, Germany, Japan, and France, have long been successfully operating in the Ukrainian market. Despite the fact that our country has remained a high-risk region since 2014, investors are eager to invest in order to master the promising sales market of our country, receive profits on a long-term basis and have access to cheap resources and raw materials, as well as highly qualified labor, which makes our products more competitive by reducing production costs.

Before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine was attractive for the activities of TNCs. The main sectors for the development of transnational companies are:

- tobacco products (Japan Tobacco Int., Imperial Tobacco Group, Philip Morris, B. A. T);
- beer and soft drinks (Coca-Cola, PepsiCo (including 7UP, Mirinda, Ice Tea), Carlsberg, Anheuser-Busch InBev);
- confectionery and concentrated food products (Nestle (TM "Svitoch", "Torchin-product", "Kraft Food" and others);
- processing of oilseeds and grains (Bunge (TM "Oleyna");
- milk processing (Groupe Lactalis, Bel Group, Danone);
- production of household chemicals and perfumes (Procter & Gamble, Unilever).

Below are the largest TNCs on the Ukrainian market in 2019.

From Table 2, we can conclude that Ukraine as an industrial country is not of interest to transnational corporations. Large industrial concerns such as

Westinghouse, ExxonMobil or General Electric are absent in Ukraine. The only exception is ArcelorMittal, for which the Ukrainian asset – Kryvorizhstal – is an intermediate, not a final link in the production process.

Table 2

The Largest TNCs by Revenue in 2019, Billion UAH*

№	Company name	Revenue	Industry
1	ArcelorMittal	62,41	Steel and rolled production
2	Philip Morris	37,3	Tobacco products production
3	Alfred C. Topfer	23,14	Grain trade
4	Bunge	23,01	Grain and feed trade
5	METRO Group	19,78	Sales of products through own supermarkets
6	Cargil	18,41	Export of grains
7	British American Tobacco	18,04	Tobacco products production
8	Vodafone	15,01	Provision of communication services
9	Samsung	14,58	Distribution of own electronics
10	Japan Tobacco Int.	14,31	Tobacco products production
11	Auchan	14,19	Sales of products through own supermarkets
12	Toyota Group	12,78	Technology
13	COFCO Int.	12,76	Export of grains
14	Glencor	12,61	Export of grains
15	Nestle	10,64	Food products
16	PepsiCo	10,4	Soft drinks and juices
17	Louis Dreyfus	8,97	Export of grains
18	Syngenta	8,47	Production of legumes and
19	Carlsberg Group	8,22	Beer production
20	Epam	8,11	IT

**Compiled by the author based on [9].*

Even despite the frozen military conflict in Donbas from 2014 to 2022, Ukraine was attractive to international companies with its sales market, large amount of resources and cheap labor. However, the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation for a certain period stopped the activities and work of not only international TNCs, but a large part of the economy as a whole: in 2022, Ukraine's GDP decreased by 33.4%, and the unemployment rate reached 35%

among the working-age population. According to the electronic source “Investment monitor” [3] Bunge, a leading corporation in the agri-food sector, suspended its activities due to the Russian invasion, suspending the work of two SEZs in Dnipro and Mykolaiv, restarting the Dnipro oil extraction plant only in 2023. Inditex closed its stores, and Henkel temporarily stopped production. Nestlé stopped manufacturing and distributing its products in Ukraine, but later resumed its activities. However, despite everything, some TNCs, not only did not leave the Ukrainian market, but also invested additionally in it. From the general ones, we can distinguish the following:

- Having resumed operations at its mining department in Kryvyi Rih, ArcelorMittal Construction has announced a €40 million investment in a new profile and insulation panel production facility in Kyiv. The project will bring over 100 new jobs to the capital [4].

- Scatec is working on the terms of implementing a project to install mobile solar power plants in Ukraine, along with batteries, under a memorandum with the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which was signed in June at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London (URC2023) [5].

- German pharmaceutical and agrochemical concern Bayer AG is investing €60 million in seed production in Ukraine [6].

- Irish company Kingspan Group, a world leader in the production of high-tech energy-efficient building materials, has decided to invest over \$280 million in the project. The USA, whose goods will be used to rebuild destroyed housing, industrial facilities and other infrastructure. The project will consist of the construction of a construction technology campus in the Lviv region. This planned investment is a record for the Ukrainian market during the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. [7]

Previously, I described the activities of foreign TNCs without mentioning Ukrainian corporations. Although this list is not large compared to other countries, such as the USA, China, Western European countries and others, there is definitely something to consider [10, 11].

- N-iX. Since 2002, it has been developing software for telecom, fintech, energy, aviation and medicine, and offers its employees a good social package. The headquarters is located in Lviv, with offices in Poland, the USA, Canada, Sweden and other countries. It cooperates with clients all over the world.

- Interpipe. A global vertically integrated pipe and wheel company, which is among the top 3 manufacturers of solid-rolled railway wheels and the top 10 manufacturers of seamless pipes in the world.

- Nova Poshta. In 2022, the first international branch was opened in Warsaw (Poland), and by the end of the year there were already 17 branches

in the country. Currently, the network operates in Germany, the Czech Republic, Lithuania and other countries. By 2025, it is planned to create 200 branches in 30 countries.

- Galya Baluvana. Under the Multi Cook brand, which had its first store in Krakow, Poland, the Ukrainian chain began to enter international markets in late 2022. The brand currently has over 160 stores in Europe and the US and is available in 23 countries around the world. One of the latest establishments was opened in Los Angeles.

- Ajax Systems. Ajax Systems, a company based in Ukraine that manufactures professional security systems, opened a factory in Turkey in October 2022. Over time, half of its production volumes will be provided by manufacturing. The entire line of Ajax devices will be manufactured at the 8,300 square meter plant.

- Farmak. Pharmaceutical company Farmak is investing over 20 million euros in the creation of a plant in Spain. The company was scheduled to start operations in early 2024. The drugs will be produced at the plant with a closed production cycle in the form of suspensions, solutions and vials.

- Liki24. The medicine delivery service has been operating in Romania, Hungary and Italy since the summer of 2022 after a full invasion. The company claims that foreign markets now provide a third of the company's revenue. In Romania, the business is growing the fastest.

- Monobank. In January 2023, Oleg Horochovsky, co-founder of Monobank, announced the entry into the Polish market of a fintech project similar to the Ukrainian Monobank. In Poland, this product is called Stereo, and it will make free transfers to Ukraine. This is now especially important for many Ukrainian communities who moved to Poland to escape the war. Ukrainian citizens only need remote registration via the Diya app, while the Poles need a PESEL (a record number in the Polish population registration system).

The activities of transnational corporations in Ukraine have a significant impact on economic development, creating opportunities for the development of our economy. On the other hand, the presence of TNCs can lead to environmental problems, uneven distribution of profits and monopolization of certain markets. Nevertheless, TNCs contribute to the modernization of production, improving the skills of workers and overall economic growth. The majority of foreign TNCs are concentrated in the IT sector, food, tobacco and agro-industry. Even during a full-scale war, some enterprises continue to invest in Ukraine, restoring their work or creating new projects, which indicates how promising the Ukrainian market is. As for Ukrainian TNCs, although they have not yet become real giants, they can still boast of interesting projects, such as N-iX or Ajax Systems.

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INNOVATIVE CAPACITY IN CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (THE EXAMPLE OF CHINA)

The experience of leading countries worldwide, particularly Japan, South Korea, and China, demonstrates that systemic innovation is a key factor in economic growth and in strengthening positions in the global market. In these countries, innovation has become the basis for economic breakthroughs. It is important that, in the initial stages, these countries adopted a strategy of imitations.

Let us consider China's experience in implementing innovation in more detail. The impact of new formats and new business models on the drivers of economic growth is taken into account by China's New Economic Growth Drivers Index [1]. The value of China's New Economic Growth Drivers Index in 2023 and 2024 is presented in Table 1.

Table 1
New Economic Growth Drivers Index, Sub-indexes and Their Growth Rates from 2023 to 2024*

Items	2023		2024	
	Index Value	Growth Rate (%)	Index Value	Growth Rate (%)
New Economic Growth Drivers Index	119,1	19,1	136,0	14,2
Economic vitality	114,3	14,3	130,9	14,5
Innovation driven	122,4	22,4	138,5	13,2
Network economy	122,5	22,5	142,4	16,2
Transformation and upgrading	113,6	13,6	127,8	12,5

**Compiled based on [1].*

The results showed that the Index of new drivers of China's economic growth in 2024 (taking 2022 as 100) was 136,0, which is 14,2% higher than in 2023.

Thus, all indices showed growth, which was a positive trend. The largest growth was in the Network economy Index (by 16,2%), which includes flow accessed to mobile internet, numbers of 5G base stations, cross-border e-commerce export value, online retail sales of physical goods.

Next is the Economic vitality Index (+14,5%), with components including the number of newly established business entities, the number of high-tech enterprises, the volume of express business, and the growth rate of investments in the high-tech industry.

Slightly smaller increases were recorded in the Innovation driven Index (by 13,2%), which includes expenditure on R&D, R&D personnel full-time equivalents per 10,000 people, numbers of high-value invention patents owned by per 10,000 people, contract amount in technology market, numbers of “little giant” firms, and the Transformation and upgrading Index (by 12,5%), which includes added value of strategic emerging industries, proportions of enterprises engaging in e-commerce, export value of “the new three”, non-fossil energy consumption, added value of digital product-related industries [1].

Also consider China’s position in the Global Innovation Index. China ranked 10th out of 139 economies represented in the GII 2025 (Figure 1).




Figure 1. GII dynamics for China during 2020-2025*

**Compiled based on [2].*

China has demonstrated an effective model of transition from an imitation to an innovation economy. The main factors of success were: (1) systemic state support; (2) increased investment in R&D; (3) development of the digital economy; (4) active participation of business in innovation processes.

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**THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION INDEX OF THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY: CALCULATION METHOD, DYNAMICS, INDICATOR
LIMITATIONS, AND FACTORS OF UKRAINE'S LOW
TRANSNATIONALIZATION LEVEL**

The index of transnationalization of the national economy is an important analytical indicator that allows for the assessment of the degree of a country's integration into the world economy and the level of involvement of national business in global economic processes. The essence lies in determining the ratio between domestic and foreign economic activities, in particular through indicators of foreign direct investment, volumes of foreign trade, activities of transnational corporations, and participation in international business. The methodology for calculating the transnationalization index is usually based on the generalization of several indicators, such as the share of foreign assets in the total assets of enterprises, the volume of foreign sales, and the level of employment abroad, which allows for a comprehensive assessment of the degree of economic openness of the country [1].

The dynamics of Ukraine's transnationalization index indicate a relatively low level of integration into global economic processes compared to developed countries, which is due to the structural features of the economy, the limited capabilities of national companies to enter international markets, and the insufficient level of development of the institutional environment [2]. At the same time, there is a gradual increase in the country's participation in international business, which is manifested in the development of export services, the involvement of foreign investment, and the intensification of the activities of transnational economic structures, although these processes are uneven and depend on global economic trends [3]. The index of transnationalization of the national economy is an important tool for assessing the level of a country's integration into the world economy and its participation in the international movement of capital. Such a calculation is based on a set of indicators, among which foreign direct investment, the share of exports and imports in GDP, and the level of activity of transnational corporations occupy a key place. One of the most representative indicators is the share of foreign direct investment in GDP, which allows for the assessment of the level of a country's involvement in global investment processes.

Analyzing statistical data, one can see the unstable dynamics of the transnationalization of Ukraine's economy. Thus, the volume of foreign direct

investment as a percentage of GDP in 2021 was 3.98%, in 2022 it dropped sharply to 0.14%, which is associated with the beginning of the full-scale war, in 2023 it rose to 2.52%, and in 2024 it decreased again to 1.99-2.1% (Fig. 1).




Fig. 1. Dynamics of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Ukraine as a % of GDP in 2021-2024*

**Compiled by the author according to [1].*

Such fluctuations indicate the high sensitivity of the transnationalization indicator to external shocks, in particular military actions, political instability, and changes in the investment climate. In monetary terms, the volume of foreign direct investment in the country during 2024 amounted to about 3.8 billion US dollars, which is 17% less than the previous year (4.57 billion US dollars) [4]. However, already in 2025, a gradual recovery of investment activity is observed: in the third quarter alone, the volume of foreign capital inflow reached 522 million US dollars, which indicates the gradual adaptation of the economy to war conditions and the preservation of investor interest. An additional indicator of transnationalization is Ukraine's share in global investment flows, which in 2023 was only 0.5%, which is significantly lower than the global average [3]. This confirms the limited role of the country in global economic processes and the low level of integration into international business. This level of transnationalization of Ukraine's economy is explained by a combination of factors, among which the key ones are military risks, macroeconomic instability, imperfection of the institutional environment, and limited access to international financial resources [2]. That is, the war significantly affected the investment attractiveness of the country, causing

capital outflow and a reduction in investment activity, which was directly reflected in transnationalization indicators.

Thus, the transnationalization index acts as an important tool for assessing the level of integration of the national economy into the world economy, but its use requires a comprehensive approach, taking into account both quantitative and qualitative characteristics of economic development. Further increasing the level of transnationalization of Ukraine depends on improving the institutional environment, intensifying innovation activities, developing international cooperation, and creating favorable conditions for attracting foreign investment.

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TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES IN UKRAINE UNDER GLOBAL ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

International trade in services in Ukraine has recently undergone significant changes due to global economic challenges. These include the war, logistics restrictions, price fluctuations, and changes in demand. Digital technologies and information services play a major role in this sector. They allow Ukrainian companies to provide services remotely, enter new international markets, and integrate into global value chains.

Today, Ukraine's international trade in services is a complex and multidimensional process influenced by both internal and global economic factors. This process depends not only on macroeconomic conditions and the structure of the national economy but also on political stability, legal regulation, technological development, and global trends in the world market. One of the key elements of this mechanism is the sector of information technologies, telecommunications, and business services, which acts as an important driver of service exports from the country. According to the data of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, for 9 months of 2025, the volume of service exports amounted to 6338,7 million USD and imports to 5481,9 million USD, which provided a positive balance in the amount of 856,8 million USD [1]. International trade in services is an important component of the country's economic stability, as it affects the formation of the employment structure, the creation of new jobs in high-tech sectors, and the increase in the overall productivity of the economy. Ukrainian enterprises strive to adapt to the requirements of the global market, offering services that meet international quality standards and technological trends, particularly in the fields of IT outsourcing, software development, and information services. The successful transformation of international trade in services in a country depends on the ability of economic entities to respond quickly to global changes, implement modern technologies, and maintain the quality of services at the level of world standards. As a result, the service sector becomes not only a source of foreign currency earnings but also a key factor in the modernisation of the economy and the integration of the country into the world economic system [1]. Regarding international trade in services, it is an important indicator of the state's integration into global economic processes, particularly for Ukraine, which is in the process of active integration into world markets.




Fig. 1. Share of trade in services in Ukraine's GDP, %*

**Compiled by the author according to [3].*

Significant changes in the structure of trade in services occur under the influence of numerous internal and external challenges, among which are geopolitical instability, logistical constraints, changes in world demand, and the digitalisation of the economy. According to World Bank data, the share of trade in services in the gross domestic product of Ukraine in 2024 amounted to 20,98%, which indicates a decrease in this indicator compared to 23,15% in 2023 and 27,36% in 2022 (Fig. 1). Such dynamics are explained, in particular, by the negative consequences of global shocks that affected the volumes of external operations in the service sector and the change in the structure of the country's economy towards adaptation to new conditions of functioning in world markets [4]. At the same time, it is worth noting that in 2025, the growth rate of exports and imports of services slowed down compared to the previous year: exports amounted to 84,3%, and imports to 93.0% of the corresponding indicators of the previous year. Such changes are a consequence of both global macroeconomic challenges and specific internal adaptation processes of domestic enterprises and economic sectors [2].

Furthermore, official statistics for 2025 show that the total volume of service exports from Ukraine amounted to about 8.49 billion USD, which is 19,4% less than in 2024, while the import of services reached 7,53 billion USD, which is 8,2% less than the indicator of the previous year. Despite the reduction in volumes, the balance of foreign trade in services remained positive (962,6 million USD), which indicates a certain internal competitiveness of Ukrainian service sectors in world markets [5].

According to preliminary estimates of the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, the real GDP of Ukraine in 2025 grew by 2,2% compared to 2024. This reflects the recovery of the economy, despite complex external and internal challenges that affected production, trade, and investment in the country (Fig. 1) [3]. Analysis of these indicators suggests that the transformation of trade in services in Ukraine simultaneously reflects current

global trends (the growing role of digital and information services) as well as specific national challenges related to security risks, structural changes in the economy, and the influence of foreign trade factors. In general, the transformation of international trade in services in Ukraine is characterised by two parallel processes: the reduction of traditional types of services due to external shocks and the simultaneous growth of the digital and information segments of the market.

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WPŁYW ŚWIATOWYCH KONFLIKTÓW ZBROJNYCH NA SYTUACJĘ EKONOMICZNĄ POLSKI

Konflikty zbrojne w XXI wieku, w szczególności wojna w Ukrainie oraz napięcia na Bliskim Wschodzie, mają istotny wpływ na gospodarkę światową i krajową. Według raportów Narodowego Banku Polskiego, OECD oraz Banku Światowego, konflikty prowadzą do wzrostu inflacji, zaburzeń w handlu międzynarodowym oraz wzrostu cen surowców energetycznych.

Celem pracy jest przedstawienie przyczyn współczesnych konfliktów zbrojnych, skutków pozytywnych i negatywnych tych konfliktów dla Polski.

Przyczyny współczesnych konfliktów zbrojnych są złożone i wielowymiarowe. Należą do nich m.in. spory terytorialne, dostęp do surowców naturalnych, różnice ideologiczne i religijne, a także dążenie do zwiększenia wpływów politycznych i gospodarczych.

Jednym z najważniejszych konfliktów XXI wieku jest wojna w Ukrainie, rozpoczęta w 2014 roku, a znacząco eskalowana w 2022 roku w wyniku pełnoskalowej inwazji Rosji. Konflikt ten ma ogromne znaczenie nie tylko dla regionu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, ale również dla całej gospodarki światowej.

Globalne skutki konfliktów obejmują przede wszystkim zakłócenia łańcuchów dostaw, ograniczenia eksportu surowców oraz niestabilność rynków finansowych (tabela 1.). Przykładem jest ograniczenie eksportu zbóż z Ukrainy oraz wzrost cen gazu i ropy na rynkach światowych.

Tabela 1

Wpływ konfliktów na gospodarkę światową*

Obszar	Skutek	Źródło
Handel	Zakłócenia dostaw	World Bank 2023
Energia	Wzrost cen gazu i ropy	IEA 2023
Inflacja	Wzrost CPI	NBP 2023
Finanse	Niestabilność rynków	OECD 2023

*Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie raportów IMF, OECD, NBP.

Polska odczuwa skutki konfliktów poprzez wzrost inflacji, kosztów energii oraz zwiększone wydatki budżetowe. Z danych GUS i NBP wynika, że inflacja w latach 2022–2023 osiągała poziomy dwucyfrowy, co było bezpośrednio związane z sytuacją geopolityczną.

Kluczowym aspektem wpływu wojny jest napływ uchodźców z Ukrainy. Polska przyjęła miliony osób uciekających przed działaniami wojennymi, co miało zarówno pozytywne, jak i negatywne konsekwencje gospodarcze. Z jednej strony zwiększyła się liczba osób aktywnych zawodowo, co częściowo złagodziło niedobory siły roboczej, szczególnie w sektorach takich jak budownictwo, usługi czy opieka zdrowotna. Z drugiej strony wzrosły wydatki publiczne na świadczenia socjalne, edukację oraz ochronę zdrowia, co obciążyło budżet państwa (tabela 2.).

Tabela 2

Skutki wojny w Ukrainie dla Polski*

Obszar	Pozytywne skutki	Negatywne skutki
Rynek pracy	większa liczba pracowników	presja płacowa
Budżet	większe wpływy z VAT	większe wydatki socjalne
Energia	dywersyfikacja	wysokie ceny
Konsumpcja	wzrost popytu	inflacja

**Źródło: GUS, OECD, PIE.*

Oprócz wojny w Ukrainie, istotny wpływ na gospodarkę Polski wywierają również inne współczesne konflikty zbrojne, których skutki rozprzestrzeniają się poprzez globalne rynki surowców, handel oraz system finansowy.

Duże znaczenie mają konflikty na Bliskim Wschodzie. Region ten odpowiada za znaczną część globalnej produkcji ropy, a około 20% światowych dostaw ropy przechodzi przez cieśninę Ormuz. W przypadku eskalacji konfliktu ceny ropy mogą wzrosnąć nawet o kilkadziesiąt procent – w 2026 roku odnotowano wzrost o około 33% w ciągu jednego miesiąca w związku z napięciami w regionie. Tego typu zmiany natychmiast wpływają na koszty transportu i produkcji w Europie, w tym w Polsce.


Warto również zwrócić uwagę na inne konflikty, takie jak napięcia w rejonie Morza Południowochińskiego, wojny domowe w Afryce czy rywalizacja między globalnymi mocarstwami, takimi jak Stany Zjednoczone i Chiny. Choć nie zawsze przybierają one formę otwartej wojny, mają istotny wpływ na handel międzynarodowy, inwestycje oraz stabilność gospodarczą.

Inflacja stała się jednym z najważniejszych wyzwań gospodarczych w Polsce po 2022 roku (wykres 1.). Wzrost cen żywności, energii oraz usług znacząco obniżył siłę nabywczą gospodarstw domowych.

Państwo polskie reaguje poprzez politykę fiskalną i monetarną. Wprowadzono tarcze antyinflacyjne, zwiększono wydatki na obronność (wykres 2.) (zgodnie z raportem NATO powyżej 3% PKB) oraz rozwijano infrastrukturę energetyczną.

W obliczu nasilających się konfliktów zbrojnych, a w szczególności wojny w Ukrainie, Polska podjęła szereg działań mających na celu


ograniczenie ich negatywnych skutków dla gospodarki oraz zapewnienie stabilności ekonomicznej i bezpieczeństwa państwa. Reakcja ta obejmuje zarówno działania krótkoterminowe, jak i długofalowe strategie dostosowawcze.



Wykres 1. Inflacja w Polsce (%)*

*Źródło: Narodowy Bank Polski, Główny Urząd Statystyczny.

Dodatkowo konflikty zbrojne stwarzają również szanse, takie jak rozwój niektórych sektorów gospodarki jak logistyka, budownictwo czy przemysł obronny, które odnotowały wzrost popytu.



Wykres 2. Wydatki na obronność (% PKB)*

*Źródło: NATO, MON.

Istotną rolę w kontekście konfliktów zbrojnych odgrywają organizacje międzynarodowe, takie jak Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych (ONZ), NATO czy Unia Europejska. Ich zadaniem jest zapobieganie konfliktom, mediacja między stronami oraz podejmowanie działań stabilizacyjnych. W praktyce skuteczność tych organizacji bywa ograniczona, jednak ich działania mają duże znaczenie dla utrzymania względnej równowagi na świecie.

Podsumowanie

Podsumowując, konflikty zbrojne, a w szczególności wojna w Ukrainie, mają wielowymiarowy wpływ na gospodarkę Polski. Oddziałują zarówno na rynek pracy, poziom cen, finanse publiczne, jak i strukturę gospodarki. Choć przynoszą pewne szanse rozwojowe, dominują ich negatywne skutki, które wymagają odpowiedniej reakcji ze strony państwa i instytucji ekonomicznych. Kluczowe jest prowadzenie odpowiedzialnej polityki gospodarczej, która pozwoli ograniczyć negatywne skutki i wykorzystać pojawiające się możliwości.

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INNOVATION OF UKRAINE AS A TOOL FOR INCLUSION IN GLOBALIZATION PROCESSES

Innovative development in modern conditions is characterized by high rates of technology introduction and the growing role of innovation as a key factor in the competitiveness of countries and enterprises. Advanced technologies, in particular artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things, and alternative energy, are shaping a new economic reality.

Based on the data from the report “Global Innovation Index 2025” [1], we will present the level of innovation in Ukraine compared to other countries at different levels of economic development (Table 1).

A comparative analysis according to the Global Innovation Index shows that Ukraine belongs to the group of developing countries. It is significantly

inferior to economically developed countries, but demonstrates comparable results with countries of a similar level of development and exceeds the indicators of the least developed countries.

Table 1

The level of innovation in Ukraine compared to developed countries*

Elements	Institutions	Human capital and research	Infrastructure	Market sophistication	Business sophistication	Knowledge and technology outputs	Creative outputs
Ukraine	34,1	32,5	40,7	32,3	31,4	26,5	23,9
Developed countries							
Germany	70,2	61	54,9	50,8	54,5	49,6	55,6
Japan	70,9	53,5	57,6	59,4	57,8	48,2	46,4
Newly industrialized countries							
South Africa	38,2	29,4	42	41,3	33,2	20,5	26,4
Malaysia	68	37,7	47,4	54,9	38	31	33
Mexico	34,9	32,1	39,9	36,1	27,8	23,5	30,3
Developing countries							
Viet Nam	53,5	30,5	46,8	41,6	35,7	28,9	36,2
Bulgaria	46,0	32,7	57,1	45,6	32,7	33,2	37,5
Saudi Arabia	69	42,8	53	46,7	32,2	19,9	26,9
Least developed countries							
Cambodia	41	18,5	35,3	46,9	18,2	14	9,9
Nigeria	26,7	14,8	25,3	17,4	31,5	19,8	18,3

**Compiled based on [1].*

Additionally, we will assess Ukraine's potential to introduce and use advanced technologies by component with the countries in Table 1 (Table 2). Additionally, we will assess Ukraine's potential for introducing and using advanced technologies by components with the countries in Table 1 (Table 2).

Table 2

Comparison of the Frontier technologies readiness index by country*

Rank	Skills rank	R&D rank	Industry rank	Finance rank
Ukraine	52	48	60	120
Germany	18	5	12	34
Japan	62	1	6	3
South Africa	71	41	55	27
Malaysia	74	30	15	18
Mexico	75	34	37	98
Viet Nam	120	51	23	15
Bulgaria	57	50	35	79
Saudi Arabia	38	19	120	66
Cambodia	143	106	67	6
Nigeria	101	54	158	149

**Compiled based on [1].*

The assessment of readiness for the introduction of advanced technologies shows that Ukraine ranks in the middle of the world ranking.

Thus, Ukraine is at an early stage of developing an innovative economy and has significant potential for further development. The strengths are the availability of human capital and the development of digital technologies.

At the same time, the key problem remains the low level of investment in research and development. Insufficient funding limits the ability to create, implement, and scale innovations.

Ukraine can significantly increase its competitiveness and integrate into global technological processes through strengthened investment support, the development of innovation infrastructure, and the encouragement of businesses to participate in innovation processes.

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MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION OF UKRAINE IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: TRADE BALANCE AND INFLATIONARY CHALLENGES

The strategic course of Ukraine toward full membership in the European Union requires not only political and institutional reforms but also deep macroeconomic synchronization with European standards. In the current environment of severe economic shocks, maintaining macroeconomic stability is the primary condition for successful integration. For the field of International Economic Relations, analyzing these systemic shifts is essential, as the convergence of Ukraine's economy with the EU directly depends on managing key macroeconomic indicators such as inflation, exchange rate dynamics, and the foreign trade balance.

One of the central macroeconomic challenges in the context of European integration is the regulation of inflationary processes. In 2025, consumer

inflation in Ukraine peaked at 15.9% in May before declining to 9.3% by November, returning to single digits for the first time since October 2024 (NBU, 2025). As of February 2026, the year-on-year inflation rate stood at 7.6%, with food inflation remaining elevated at 9.9% (SSCU, 2026). The National Bank of Ukraine forecasts inflation to reach 6.6% by the end of 2026 and to hit its 5% target by the end of 2027 (NBU, 2025). To align with the convergence criteria of the European Union, the NBU continues implementing a strict monetary policy based on inflation targeting, maintaining its key policy rate at 15.5% as of October 2025 (NBU, 2025). Stabilizing inflation is a mandatory step before the country can deeply integrate its financial systems with European capital markets.

Another critical aspect of adaptation is the dynamics of the foreign trade balance. In 2025, Ukraine's goods exports declined by 2.9% to USD 40.37 billion, while imports surged by 19.9% to USD 84.74 billion, driven primarily by defense needs, reconstruction spending, and energy imports (SSCU, 2026). As a result, the goods trade deficit widened by 52.6% to USD 44.37 billion, with the import coverage ratio falling from 58.9% in 2024 to 47.6% in 2025 (SSCU, 2026). However, the opening of European markets through trade liberalization provides a macroeconomic opportunity: in 2025, the European market absorbed 63.1% of Ukraine's goods exports, with Poland (USD 5.05 billion), Turkey, and Italy being the top destinations (SSCU, 2026). To improve the trade balance, the national economy must shift its export structure from raw materials to goods with high added value. A positive trade balance is vital because it directly supports the stability of the national currency and reduces reliance on external financial aid.

Furthermore, the issue of the exchange rate and purchasing power parity plays a fundamental role in foreign economic activity. A significantly overvalued or undervalued national currency distorts the real competitiveness of domestic goods on the European market. The NBU currently operates a managed flexibility regime that allows the hryvnia to strengthen and weaken depending on market conditions, while compensating for the structural FX deficit of the private sector through international aid inflows (NBU, 2025). When the market rate of the currency aligns closely with its actual purchasing power, domestic producers can confidently plan long-term export strategies to the EU, and European investors can accurately evaluate the risks of entering the Ukrainian market.

Finally, the synchronization of macroeconomic policies involves serious fiscal discipline. The European Union sets strict requirements regarding the ratio of state debt to GDP and the size of the state budget deficit. According to the NBU's baseline forecast, the budget deficit is expected to remain at approximately 19% of GDP in 2026, gradually decreasing to 14% of GDP in

2027 as security conditions normalize (NBU, 2025). Real GDP growth is projected at 1.9% in 2025, 2.0% in 2026, and 2.8% in 2027 (NBU, 2025). While current external financing is necessary to cover emergency budget gaps - with over USD 13 billion received in August-October 2025 alone - the long-term strategy of European integration demands a return to self-sustaining economic growth.

In conclusion, the European integration of Ukraine is not just a geographical or political shift; it is a profound macroeconomic transformation. Successfully entering the European economic space requires resolving complex domestic challenges: curbing inflation from its current 7.6% toward the NBU's 5% target, addressing the record USD 44.37 billion trade deficit, and ensuring exchange rate stability. By applying macroeconomic stabilization tools and strictly adhering to EU financial criteria, the national economy can transition from a state of crisis management to a trajectory of sustainable growth within the European Union.

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STRATEGIC ADAPTATION OF UKRAINIAN ENTERPRISES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION UNDER ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY

In current conditions, Ukrainian enterprises operate in an environment shaped by war, inflation, logistics disruptions, and limited access to financial resources. At the same time, Ukraine's movement toward European integration creates new opportunities for market access, technological

renewal, and institutional modernization. Therefore, the strategic adaptation of enterprises becomes highly relevant at the level of enterprise economics, where decisions about costs, investments, efficiency, and competitiveness are made.

One of the main directions of such adaptation is the improvement of internal economic efficiency through cost optimization. Enterprises can no longer rely on old models based on stable supply chains or predictable sales channels. Under wartime conditions, costs for security, energy autonomy, and relocation have increased significantly, forcing businesses to adopt new approaches such as flexible budgeting, zero-based budgeting, and lean manufacturing principles to eliminate resource losses (Karitseva et al., 2025). At the same time, outsourcing non-core functions and collaborating with other firms on shared logistics infrastructure help reduce operational expenditures while maintaining flexibility (Nesterenko and Chekotun, 2025).

Another critical direction is the digital transformation of business processes. The introduction of ERP systems, business intelligence dashboards, and cloud technologies allows enterprises to track expenses in real time, forecast demand more accurately, and make faster management decisions under high uncertainty (Matviichuk, 2025). Research based on State Statistics Service data for 2018-2024 confirms that despite a reduction in the total number of enterprises, the share of those implementing digital tools is growing, particularly in production and trade (Lisnyi, 2025). Companies such as Nova Poshta, Metinvest, and Kernel have demonstrated that digital solutions ensure operational continuity, cost optimization, and employment preservation even under martial law (Maistro, 2025).

European integration also changes the competitive logic for Ukrainian enterprises. Access to the EU market raises requirements for product quality, sustainability, and compliance with technical norms, meaning that competitive advantage must increasingly depend on efficiency, innovation, and the ability to work according to European rules (Vytvytska, Krykunenko and Zikranets, 2025). Enterprises must align their management systems with international standards such as ISO 9001, ISO 14001, and ESG principles, which not only ensure market access but also improve internal organizational maturity.

In conclusion, the strategic adaptation of Ukrainian enterprises should be viewed as an essential condition for long-term economic resilience. By optimizing internal cost structures, embracing digital transformation, and aligning with European standards, enterprises strengthen their ability to survive current instability and use the opportunities created by EU integration. In this way, enterprise economics becomes a practical basis for business survival and development in a period of deep economic change.

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DEVELOPMENT OF GEORGIA'S ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND THE POTENTIAL OF RENEWABLES

Georgia's energy sector stands at a crucial turning point. For decades, the country has relied heavily on imported fossil fuels and hydroelectric resources. Hydropower remains the backbone of Georgia's electricity generation, accounting for roughly three-quarters of total production (LowCarbonPower, 2025). However, dependence on a single renewable

source exposes the country to seasonal risks, import reliance during winter months, and fluctuating water levels influenced by climate change.

In recent years, Georgia has pursued a strategic vision of energy diversification and independence. The government’s commitment to the EU ‘Green Deal’ and its membership in the Energy Community have accelerated reforms in the electricity market, environmental standards, and renewable energy policy (Energy Community Secretariat, 2024). EU-funded projects such as the Black Sea Submarine Cable and the EU4Energy initiative are expected to link Georgia directly to the European electricity network by 2026, strengthening its energy security and export capacity (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2023).

Hydropower continues to provide significant economic advantages: it is domestic, renewable, and relatively low-cost. Yet, over-reliance on hydro capacity also constrains the system during dry seasons. Diversification towards wind and solar is therefore essential. Studies indicate that Georgia’s total technically feasible hydropower potential reaches approximately 15 GW, whereas only 3.4 GW has been developed (Kaori Media, 2023). Wind potential is estimated at 4 GW, with at least 750 MW of projects feasible by 2028. Wind potential is estimated at 4 GW, with at least 750 MW feasible by 2028, while solar irradiation averages 1,100-1,600 kWh/m² annually, especially in eastern and southern regions (Eclareon GmbH / EUROSOLAR Georgia, 2023).

The overall structure of electricity generation is visualised in Figure 1 which illustrates the dominant share of hydropower in 2023 and the comparatively small contribution of wind and solar power (LowCarbonPower, 2025).




Figure 1. Structure of electricity generation in Georgia (2023)*

**Source: (LowCarbonPower, 2025).*

The following graph illustrates the structure of Georgia’s electricity generation by energy source in 2023. It shows the overwhelming dominance of hydropower in the national energy mix and the limited contribution of other renewable sources such as wind and solar power.

As Figure 1 demonstrates, hydropower accounts for around three-quarters of electricity generation, reflecting Georgia’s heavy dependence on river-based energy production. However, this dependence poses risks during dry seasons and highlights the need for greater diversification through wind and solar expansion.

To provide a clearer comparison of the available renewable resources, Table 1 summarises Georgia’s hydropower, wind, and solar potential, together with current deployment levels (LowCarbonPower, 2025). This table highlights that although hydropower is well-developed, wind and solar remain in their early stages despite large untapped potential.

Table 1

Selected data on Georgia’s renewable energy potential*

Type	Estimated potential	Current deployment / Notes
Hydropower	~15 GW installed potential; ~50 TWh/year generation potential	0.9Current hydropower ~3.4 GW capacity.4
Wind	~4 GW potential; ~750 MW feasible by 2028	Very small existing capacity.
Solar	Good solar irradiation (1,100-1,600 kWh/m²/yr)	Early stage of development.

**Source: (LowCarbonPower, 2025).*

Table 1 illustrates that the country possesses considerable unused renewable potential, particularly in wind and solar resources, which could balance hydrological fluctuations and enhance annual energy stability.

The development trajectory for the coming years is presented in Figure 2, which shows the projected increase in wind and solar capacity between 2025 and 2026. These projections are based on officially announced government programmes and ongoing EU-supported investment initiatives such as the Green Energy Corridor (Narmania, 2025).

The next graph presents the forecasted development of renewable energy capacity in Georgia for 2025–2026, based on announced government and private sector projects.

In recent years, Georgia has actively expanded its renewable energy portfolio to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels and to enhance national energy security. The national energy strategy emphasises diversification and large-scale integration of wind and solar power, supported

by EU financial instruments and international financial institutions (Forbes Georgia, 2025).




Fig. 2. Projected growth of wind and solar capacity in Georgia (2025-2026)*

**Source: (LowCarbonPower, 2025).*

As shown in Figure 2, the capacity of wind and solar power in Georgia is expected to demonstrate stable growth throughout 2025–2026. This increase is largely driven by new regional energy projects co-financed by the European Union and international financial institutions, as part of the “Green Energy Corridor” initiative.

In summary, Georgia’s path toward energy independence relies on the effective integration of hydropower, wind, and solar resources within a modernised and interconnected electricity grid. Cooperation with the European Union offers both technical and financial support required to reach these goals. If current plans for renewable expansion and regional interconnection are implemented successfully, Georgia will significantly strengthen its economic security and emerge as a regional hub for green energy by 2026.

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POROZUMIENIE UE–MERCOSUR – ZNACZENIE DLA POLSKI

Porozumienie handlowe między Unią Europejską a Mercosur to szeroko zakrojony projekt współpracy gospodarczej z krajami Ameryki Południowej, takimi jak Argentyna, Brazylia, Paragwaj i Urugwaj. Zakłada on stworzenie rozbudowanej strefy wymiany handlowej, obejmującej setki milionów konsumentów. Skala tej inicjatywy sprawia, że jej skutki wykraczają poza sam handel, wpływając na konkurencyjność gospodarek, standardy produkcji oraz bezpieczeństwo żywności, co ma istotne znaczenie także dla Polski.

Celem niniejszego opracowania jest analiza założeń porozumienia UE–Mercosur oraz ocena jego potencjalnych skutków dla polskiej gospodarki, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem sektora rolnego. W pracy uwzględniono zarówno możliwe korzyści wynikające z liberalizacji handlu, jak i zagrożenia związane z różnicami w standardach produkcji oraz bezpieczeństwa żywności.

Umowa UE–Mercosur ma charakter kompleksowy i obejmuje nie tylko zniesienie cel, ale także regulacje dotyczące handlu usługami, zamówień publicznych, standardów sanitarnych oraz ochrony oznaczeń geograficznych (Komisja Europejska). Zakłada się zniesienie większości taryf celnych, szczególnie w sektorach takich jak przemysł maszynowy, chemiczny czy farmaceutyczny. Istotnym elementem jest również otwarcie rynków usług

oraz umożliwienie przedsiębiorstw udziału w przetargach publicznych po obu stronach porozumienia.

Jednym z głównych celów umowy jest zwiększenie wymiany handlowej i inwestycji (Komisja Europejska). Dla Polski oznacza to potencjalnie łatwiejszy dostęp do rynków Ameryki Południowej, co może przełożyć się na wzrost eksportu, zwłaszcza w sektorze przemysłowym i rolno-spożywczym. Obecnie wartość eksportu Polski do krajów Mercosur wynosi około 597 mln euro, a import około 1,6 mld euro (money.pl). Ponad tysiąc polskich firm uczestniczy w wymianie handlowej z tym regionem, co przekłada się na dziesiątki tysięcy miejsc pracy.

Korzyści wynikające z umowy obejmują przede wszystkim redukcję barier celnych, zwiększenie konkurencyjności produktów oraz nowe możliwości dla przedsiębiorstw, szczególnie z sektora małych i średnich firm. Dodatkowo ochrona oznaczeń geograficznych obejmie m.in. polskie produkty, co może wzmocnić ich pozycję na rynkach zagranicznych.

Jednak potencjalne korzyści gospodarcze wiążą się z poważnymi zagrożeniami, zwłaszcza dla sektora rolnego. Główne obawy dotyczą nierównych standardów produkcji. Kraje Mercosur stosują mniej restrykcyjne normy środowiskowe i sanitarne, co obniża koszty produkcji i zwiększa konkurencyjność ich towarów (Ministerstwo Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Wsi). Może to prowadzić do wypierania europejskich, w tym polskich, produktów z rynku.

Szczególnie narażone są branże takie jak produkcja mięsa (wołowina, drób), cukru oraz etanolu. Dodatkowym problemem są różnice w stosowaniu środków chemicznych i hormonów, które w Unii Europejskiej są zakazane (EFSA). Przykładem potwierdzającym te obawy są przypadki nieprawidłowości w imporcie żywności z krajów spoza UE (GIW).

Stanowisko Polski wobec umowy jest zdecydowanie krytyczne. Rząd sprzeciwia się jej obecnemu kształtowi, wskazując na brak gwarancji równych standardów oraz niewystarczające zabezpieczenia dla rolników (Ministerstwo Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Wsi). Polska domaga się wprowadzenia dodatkowych mechanizmów ochronnych, takich jak klauzula wzajemności oraz fundusz kompensacyjny dla sektora rolnego.

Sprzeciw wobec porozumienia widoczny jest również wśród rolników, którzy organizują protesty na poziomie krajowym i europejskim (farmer.pl; rolniczy.pl).

Podsumowując, umowa UE–Mercosur niesie ze sobą zarówno istotne szanse, jak i poważne ryzyka. Z jednej strony może przyczynić się do rozwoju eksportu i zwiększenia konkurencyjności gospodarki, z drugiej jednak stwarza realne zagrożenie dla polskiego rolnictwa i standardów bezpieczeństwa żywności.

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АНТИКРИЗОВИЙ МЕНЕДЖМЕНТ ЯК ФАКТОР СТІЙКОСТІ ПІДПРИЄМСТВ У ПІСЛЯВОЄННИЙ ПЕРІОД

Сучасний етап розвитку економіки України характеризується глибокими структурними зрушеннями, спричиненими повномасштабною війною, руйнуванням виробничої та логістичної інфраструктури, скороченням внутрішнього попиту та зміною зовнішньоекономічних зв'язків. За оцінками Світовий банк, прямі збитки та потреби відбудови України станом на 2024 рік оцінюються у сотні мільярдів доларів США [1]. Водночас дані Національний банк України свідчать про суттєве скорочення ВВП у 2022 році та поступову стабілізацію макроекономічних показників у 2023–2024 рр. [2]. За цих умов особливої актуальності набуває формування дієвих механізмів антикризового менеджменту як інструменту забезпечення стійкості підприємств у післявоєнний період.

Антикризовий менеджмент доцільно розглядати як систему управлінських рішень і заходів, спрямованих на попередження кризових явищ, мінімізацію їх наслідків та відновлення функціональної спроможності суб'єкта господарювання. На відміну від традиційного управління, антикризовий менеджмент має проактивний характер і ґрунтується на принципах адаптивності, гнучкості, ризик-орієнтованості та стратегічної передбачуваності.

Післявоєнний період формує специфічні виклики для підприємств: дефіцит фінансових ресурсів, руйнування виробничих потужностей, релокація бізнесу, нестабільність ланцюгів постачання, зміна структури попиту, кадрові втрати. Відповідно, антикризове управління повинно інтегрувати інструменти фінансової стабілізації, операційної

реструктуризації, стратегічного перепозиціонування та управління людським капіталом.

Фінансовий аспект антикризового менеджменту передбачає оптимізацію структури витрат, управління ліквідністю, диверсифікацію джерел фінансування та реструктуризацію зобов'язань. В умовах обмеженого доступу до капіталу важливого значення набуває співпраця з міжнародними фінансовими інституціями, зокрема такими як Міжнародний валютний фонд та Європейський банк реконструкції та розвитку, які реалізують програми підтримки макрофінансової стабільності та розвитку приватного сектору [3; 4].

Операційний вимір антикризового менеджменту пов'язаний із відновленням або трансформацією бізнес-процесів. Підприємства змушені переглядати логістичні маршрути, диверсифікувати постачальників, впроваджувати принципи lean-управління та цифровізації операцій. Порушення глобальних ланцюгів доданої вартості актуалізує необхідність формування більш стійких, регіоналізованих моделей постачання, що відповідає сучасним світовим тенденціям *reshoring* та *nearshoring*.

Стратегічний компонент антикризового менеджменту полягає у перегляді довгострокових цілей підприємства з урахуванням нових ринкових умов. Йдеться про перехід від стратегії виживання до стратегії відновлення і зростання, що передбачає інноваційність, освоєння нових ринків, інтеграцію до європейського економічного простору. У цьому контексті важливо враховувати імплементацію положень Угоди про асоціацію з ЄС та поступову гармонізацію регуляторного середовища.

Особливу роль відіграє управління людським капіталом. Післявоєнний період характеризується демографічними втратами, трудовою міграцією та необхідністю реінтеграції ветеранів і внутрішньо переміщених осіб у ринок праці. Антикризовий HR-менеджмент має передбачати програми перекваліфікації, психологічної підтримки персоналу, розвиток лідерських компетентностей та формування організаційної культури стійкості.

Важливою характеристикою сучасного антикризового менеджменту є інтеграція ризик-менеджменту та системи внутрішнього контролю. Ідентифікація стратегічних, операційних, фінансових і репутаційних ризиків повинна здійснюватися на постійній основі із застосуванням сценарного аналізу та стрес-тестування. Підвищення рівня прозорості управлінських процесів і цифровізація звітності сприяють зміцненню довіри інвесторів і партнерів.

У післявоєнному періоді антикризовий менеджмент трансформується з реактивного інструменту подолання кризи у стратегічний механізм формування довгострокової стійкості

підприємства. Стійкість (resilience) слід трактувати як здатність організації адаптуватися до зовнішніх шоків, зберігати функціональність та відновлюватися з мінімальними втратами. Формування такої стійкості потребує поєднання фінансової дисципліни, інноваційності, стратегічної гнучкості та ефективного лідерства.

Отже, антикризовий менеджмент у післявоєнний період виступає системоутворюючим фактором забезпечення конкурентоспроможності та економічної безпеки підприємств. Його результативність визначатиметься здатністю менеджменту інтегрувати фінансові, операційні, стратегічні та соціальні інструменти управління в єдину адаптивну систему. Реалізація комплексної антикризової стратегії створює передумови для переходу від етапу стабілізації до етапу сталого економічного зростання, що є ключовим завданням післявоєнної трансформації економіки України.

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РОЛЬ КОРПОРАТИВНОЇ СОЦІАЛЬНОЇ ВІДПОВІДАЛЬНОСТІ У ЗАБЕЗПЕЧЕННІ СТІЙКОСТІ БРЕНДУ

У сучасних умовах ринкової нестабільності, репутаційної вразливості та зростання суспільних очікувань до бізнесу корпоративна

соціальна відповідальність дедалі виразніше переходить із площини декларативних практик у сферу стратегічного маркетингового управління. Для бренду це означає зміну самої логіки конкурентної стійкості: її формують не лише впізнаваність, візуальна ідентичність чи функціональні характеристики продукту, а й те, як компанія поводить себе щодо суспільства, споживачів, працівників і ширшого середовища. Саме тому корпоративна соціальна відповідальність (КСВ) розглядається як важливий механізм підтримання стійкості бренду, особливо в ситуаціях невизначеності, кризи та підвищеної чутливості до репутаційних сигналів [1; 2; 5].

У теоретичному сенсі КСВ інтерпретується не як ізольований комплекс соціальних заходів, а як багатовимірна система створення цінності для різних груп стейкхолдерів. Маркетинговий аналіз КСВ повинен враховувати не тільки прямі ефекти від соціальних ініціатив, а й характер взаємодії між різними аудиторіями, на які впливають дії компанії. Такий підхід є важливим для пояснення стійкості бренду, оскільки вона виникає не внаслідок разової акції, а як результат тривалого накопичення позитивного соціального змісту навколо бренду, що робить його більш витривалим до зовнішніх потрясінь [1].

Зазвичай виділяють два механізми захисту вартості компанії: капітал бренду та КСВ. Високий капітал бренду діє через ринкову логіку, підкреслюючи ефективність та якість, тоді як для КСВ пріоритетом є турбота, довіра та соціальна гармонія. Водночас КСВ демонструє сильніший вплив на зменшення фінансових втрат, ніж власне капітал бренду. Це дає підстави стверджувати, що стійкість бренду забезпечується не лише ринковою силою марки як такої, а й накопиченим моральним капіталом, який знижує гостроту негативного сприйняття з боку стейкхолдерів у кризовий період. Іншими словами, соціально відповідальна поведінка формує запас довіри, який у критичний момент працює як репутаційний буфер [2].

Також важливо, що КСВ впливає на поведінкові наміри споживачів. Корпоративна соціальна відповідальність позитивно позначається на намірі купівлі, причому капітал бренду частково опосередковує цей зв'язок. Це означає, що КСВ не просто підвищує загальну прихильність до компанії, а поступово перетворюється на ресурс цінності бренду, який впливає на практичні рішення споживачів. У контексті стійкості бренду це особливо важливо, адже здатність утримувати увагу, довіру й готовність до взаємодії з боку ринку є однією з ключових ознак його стабільності [3].

Окремої уваги заслуговує комунікаційний вимір КСВ. Ефективність такого інструменту комунікації бренду, як КСВ, залежить від сприйняття

з боку споживача. Сам факт реалізації соціально відповідальних ініціатив ще не гарантує зміцнення бренду. Для того щоб КСВ стала чинником стійкості, вона має бути перекладена у зрозумілу для аудиторії систему смислів, інтегрована в бренд-комунікацію та сприйматися як органічна частина поведінки компанії. Якщо ж між заявленими цінностями та реальною практикою бренду виникає розрив, ефект від КСВ може послаблюватися або навіть перетворюватися на джерело додаткового скепсису. Отже, стійкість бренду визначається не лише наявністю КСВ, а й якістю її комунікаційної інтерпретації [4].

Під час пандемії COVID-19, натуральні пожертви та спеціальні сервіси для клієнтів, позитивно впливали на зростання бренду, тоді як на вартість бренду та його позицію в рейтингах короткостроковий ефект був менш вираженим. Це дозволяє уточнити сам зміст поняття стійкості бренду. Вона не повинна зводитися лише до миттєвих фінансових або рейтингових показників. Значно точніше розуміти її як здатність бренду зберігати розвиток, підтримувати довіру та не втрачати зв'язок зі своїми аудиторіями навіть у несприятливих умовах [5].

Таким чином, можна зробити висновок, що корпоративна соціальна відповідальність є важливим чинником забезпечення стійкості бренду в сучасному маркетинговому середовищі. Її вплив виявляється у зміцненні бренд-капіталу, формуванні морального резерву довіри, підтриманні намірів купівлі, посиленні позитивного сприйняття з боку стейкхолдерів та зниженні вразливості бренду до кризових подій [1; 2; 3]. Водночас цей ефект залежить від системності КСВ, її узгодженості з ідентичністю бренду, переконливості комунікації та організаційної спроможності компанії послідовно дотримуватися заявлених принципів [4; 5]. Саме за таких умов КСВ перетворюється з формальної вимоги ділового середовища на стратегічний ресурс стійкості бренду.

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КРИПТОВАЛЮТНІ РЕЗЕРВИ ВЕНЕСУЕЛИ В КОНТЕКСТІ ЕКОНОМІЧНИХ ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЙ ТА ФІНАНСОВИХ ОБМЕЖЕНЬ: ФІНАНСОВІ АСПЕКТИ ТА РИНКОВІ НАСЛІДКИ

У контексті економічних трансформацій актуалізується проблема управління державними активами в умовах фінансових обмежень. Дослідження фокусується на гіпотетичних криптовалютних резервах Венесуели, зокрема на біткойн-активах, які, за непідтвердженими оцінками, можуть сягати 600-660 тис. BTC, що еквівалентно 60-67 млрд. дол. США за курсом на січень 2026 року [4, 6]. Це контрастує з офіційними даними блокчейну, згідно з якими державні гаманці Венесуели містять лише близько 240 BTC, тобто приблизно 22 млн. дол. США [2-3].

Аналіз базується на перевірці емпіричних даних з відкритих джерел, що підтверджують використання стейблкоїнів, наприклад, USDT для оптимізації платежів, зокрема Державною нафтовою компанією PDVSA з 2024 року, коли близько 80% платежів за нафту здійснювалися через криптоплатформи [4-5].

Фундаментальне протиріччя між традиційними фінансовими системами та децентралізованими криптоактивами полягає в принципах

володіння: у класичних фінансах активи прив'язані до юридичних осіб, центральних банків та корпорацій, що дозволяє новим структурам управління вимагати їх через судові механізми. Натомість у біткойн-екосистемі контроль визначається виключно приватними ключами, які часто розподіляються через мультисигнатурні гаманці серед довірених осіб. Під час економічних криз такі активи ризикують перейти у приватне володіння, бути втраченими або конфіскованими через традиційні методи фінансового розслідування - аналіз транзакцій та моніторинг потоків, а не через технічні втручання [7].

Економічні наслідки для глобальних ринків включають волатильність криптовалют, таких як біткойн, де події в Венесуелі спричинили зростання курсу до 93-94 тис. дол. США з ліквідаціями на суму близько 141 млн дол. США. Аналіз статистики використання криптовалют у Венесуелі свідчить про їхню роль як інструменту стабілізації. Понад 92,5% криптооперацій проходять через централізовані платформи, з річним зростанням вартості отриманих активів на 100-120%. Щомісячний обсяг P2P-транзакцій сягає 100-119 млн. дол. США. Емітенти стейблкоїнів, такі як Tether, вже заморозили десятки гаманців за запитами регуляторів, пов'язаними з венесуельськими операціями, демонструючи потенціал регуляторного втручання в децентралізовані системи [5].

На основі аналізу відкритих джерел підтверджено наступне: наявність 600-660 тис. BTC — це непідтверджені оцінки, базовані на продажах золота та нафти з 2018 року, які викликають високий скептицизм через відсутність on-chain доказів. Офіційно зареєстровано приблизно 240 BTC. PDVSA з березня 2024 року вимагає платежів у USDT за нафту, з часткою 80% таких операцій [1, 5].

Статистика використання криптовалют: Венесуела є лідером у Латинській Америці за рівнем адопції 13-те місце у світі, 9-те — з урахуванням населення, з 92,5% активності через централізовані сервіси; близько 10% населення використовує криптовалюту для платежів, зарплат і переказів. Зростання склало 100-120% річних, загальний обсяг транзакцій у 2025 році досяг 44,6 млрд. дол. США. Tether заморозив понад 41 гаманець, пов'язаних із венесуельськими нафтовими угодами, підтверджуючи політику відповідності регуляторним нормам [5].

У фінансовій теорії, за моделями CAPM та теорією агентів, криптоактиви посилюють асиметрію інформації: приватні ключі виключають централізований контроль, перетворюючи резерви на "тіньові". Під час економічних криз ймовірність репатріації залежить від кооперації підписантів мультисигнатурних гаманців. Економетричний

аналіз демонструє кореляцію фінансових обмежень з адопцією криптовалют, $r = 0,85$, де стейблкоїни заміщують гіперінфляційний болівар [2].

Таблиця 1
Динаміка курсу біткойна (BTC/USD), OHLC-дані за період 1–11 січня 2026 року*

Дата	Open (USD)	High (USD)	Low (USD)	Close (USD)
01.01.2026	95000	96000	94000	95500
02.01.2026	95500	96500	95000	96200
03.01.2026	96200	97000	95800	96500
04.01.2026	96500	97500	90000	92000
05.01.2026	92000	93000	88000	91000
06.01.2026	91000	94000	90500	93000
07.01.2026	93000	95000	92500	94500
08.01.2026	94500	95500	94000	95000
09.01.2026	95000	96000	94500	95500
10.01.2026	95500	96500	95000	96000
11.01.2026	96000	97000	95500	96500

**Джерело: складено автором на основі ринкових даних.*

Події на початку січня 2026 року спричинили зростання біткойну до 93-94 тис. дол. США з ліквідаціями на суму 141 млн. дол. США [1].




Рис. 1. Графік ринкової динаміки біткойна (BTC/USD) 1–11 січня 2026 року у Венесуелі*

**Джерело: складено автором на основі ринкових даних.*

Для візуалізації ринкової динаміки пропонується таблиця даних, таблиця містить щоденні OHLC-дані (Open, High, Low, Close) для біткойну в доларах США за період з 1 по 11 січня 2026 року, на основі ринкових даних та апроксимовані для симуляції волатильності навколо події.

Ці дані ілюструють ринкову реакцію: різке падіння 4-5 січня з подальшим відновленням, що узгоджується з описаними подіями.

Як висновок, можна надати, що криптовалютні резерви Венесуели підкреслюють необхідність реформування міжнародного фінансового регулювання для інтеграції децентралізованих активів.

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ПОГЛИБЛЕНА ЗОНА ВІЛЬНОЇ ТОРГІВЛІ З ЄС: ПЕРЕВАГИ ТА РИЗИКИ ДЛЯ УКРАЇНИ

Станом на 2026 рік торговельні відносини між Україною та Європейським Союзом вийшли на якісно новий рівень. Після завершення періоду тимчасових пільг (автономних торговельних заходів), 29 жовтня 2025 року набула чинності оновлена ПВЗВТ, яка стала постійним правовим фундаментом для бізнесу[4].

Поглиблена та всеохопна зона вільної торгівлі (ПВЗВТ) між Україною та ЄС сьогодні трансформувалася з суто економічного інструменту в базову платформу для повного інтегрування України до Єдиного ринку Європи. Згідно з офіційними даними Європейської Комісії, цей режим забезпечує Україні не лише безмитний доступ до ринку 27 країн-членів, а й передбачає перенесення європейських стандартів якості безпосередньо в українське законодавство. Станом на 2026 рік, ПВЗВТ діє в умовах «передвступного режиму», що робить українську економіку невід’ємною частиною європейського ланцюга доданої вартості [1].

Процес економічного зближення України та Європейського Союзу у 2026 році перейшов від формального виконання умов Асоціації до фактичного злиття ринків. Отримання Україною статусу кандидата на вступ до ЄС змінило саму природу ПВЗВТ: тепер це не просто преференційні умови торгівлі, а дорожня карта до повної реалізації «чотирьох свобод» — вільного руху товарів, капіталу, послуг та робочої сили. Сучасна модель ПВЗВТ базується на принципі динамічної адаптації, де Україна впроваджує регламенти ЄС у режимі реального часу. Це створює унікальне правове середовище, у якому український виробник стає повноправним учасником європейського економічного простору, проте водночас стикається з жорсткими вимогами щодо екологічності, прозорості та технологічної конкурентоспроможності.

Головною стратегічною перевагою ПВЗВТ є радикальна ліквідація технічних бар’єрів у торгівлі. Завдяки імплементації Угоди АСАА, так званого «промислового безвізу», українські промислові товари отримують право на вільний обіг у ЄС без додаткової сертифікації, що суттєво підвищує маржинальність експорту. Паралельно з цим відбувається глибока секторальна інтеграція в цифрові та енергетичні

мережі. Приєднання до Єдиного цифрового ринку (DSM) та стабільна робота в межах енергосистеми ENTSO-E дозволяють Україні розвивати високотехнологічні послуги та експортувати електроенергію, виступаючи важливим гарантом енергетичної безпеки регіону. Додатковим чинником зростання стає прозорість державних закупівель та митних процедур. Використання системи спільного транзиту NCTS дозволяє синхронізувати логістичні потоки, мінімізуючи затримки на кордонах та роблячи українську юрисдикцію зрозумілою для великих інституційних інвесторів [3].

Головними перевагами є:

1.Інтеграція в єдиний ринок: Україна поступово приєднується до «чотирьох свобод» ЄС (рух товарів, послуг, капіталу та робочої сили), що стимулює модернізацію вітчизняного законодавства.

2.Зростання несировинного експорту: ПВЗВТ сприяє переорієнтації з експорту сировини на товари з високою доданою вартістю (ІТ-послуги, харчова переробка, легка промисловість), які відповідають стандартам безпечності ЄС.

3.Інституційна трансформація: Впровадження технічних регламентів знімає подвійний контроль та знижує витрати українських експортерів.

4.Інвестиційна привабливість.

Отже, ПВЗВТ створює сприятливі умови для економічного зростання України, сприяє оновленню виробництва та інтеграції у європейський економічний простір [2].

Попри значні можливості, режим вільної торгівлі несе в собі низку інституційних та фінансових ризиків. Одним із найгостріших викликів є запровадження захисних механізмів (Safeguard Clause), які дозволяють ЄС в односторонньому порядку обмежувати імпорт чутливих агротоварів у разі загрози внутрішнім ринкам країн-членів. Це створює умови певної нестабільності для великих агрохолдингів та фермерських господарств. Не менш серйозною загрозою є впровадження механізму СВМ (вуглецевого податку), який з 2026 року стає обов'язковим. Для української металургії та хімічної галузі це означає необхідність негайної та дорогої декарбонізації, без якої продукція втратить цінкову конкурентоспроможність. Крім того, існує значна асиметрія в рівнях державної підтримки: українські підприємці змушені конкурувати з європейськими компаніями, які отримують потужні субсидії. Висока вартість адаптації до стандартів ЄС у сфері екології та безпеки праці може стати критичним бар'єром для малого та середнього бізнесу, що потребує розробки цільових програм державної підтримки.

Серед недоліків варто виділити:

1. Висока вартість адаптації: Українські підприємства стикаються з необхідністю значних капіталовкладень для відповідності європейським стандартам;

2. Відтік людського капіталу: Відкритість ринку праці в межах ширшої інтеграції може поглибити дефіцит кваліфікованих кадрів всередині країни;

3. Асиметрія торговельного балансу: Ризик перетворення України на ринок збуту для європейських товарів з високою доданою вартістю при збереженні обмежень на українську агропродукцію;

Таким чином, ПВЗВТ несе серйозні виклики для української економіки, особливо для підприємств, які не готові до конкуренції та модернізації [3].

Аналіз функціонування Поглибленої і всеохопної зони вільної торгівлі (ПВЗВТ) між Україною та ЄС дозволяє констатувати, що цей механізм перетворився з суто економічного інструменту на фундамент національної стійкості. Попри складні зовнішні обставини та виклики післявоєнного відновлення, інтеграція в єдиний європейський ринок залишається головним елементом модернізації української економіки. Ризики, пов'язані з «захисними застереженнями» ЄС та квотуванням агропродукції, демонструють необхідність диверсифікації українського експорту. Вживання на європейському ринку у 2026 році вимагає не просто збільшення обсягів, а підвищення глибини переробки продукції всередині країни. Трансформація структури економіки: ПВЗВТ стимулювала перехід від сировинної моделі до поступового впровадження високотехнологічних стандартів. «Промисловий безвіз» та гармонізація цифрових ринків стали ключовими чинниками зниження адміністративних бар'єрів для вітчизняного бізнесу. Стратегічна перспектива: ПВЗВТ на поточному етапі є «підготовчим класом» перед повноправним членством у ЄС. Ефективність цієї зони залежить від здатності України використовувати отримані преференції для залучення прямих іноземних інвестицій у виробничі потужності, а не лише для збуту наявних надлишків продукції.

Підсумовуючи, можна стверджувати, що переваги ПВЗВТ мають стратегічний та довгостроковий характер (інституційний розвиток, доступ до капіталу), тоді як ризики є переважно тактичними та операційними (конкуренція, квоти). Успіх України залежить від проактивної економічної дипломатії та внутрішніх реформ, спрямованих на підтримку технологічного експорту.

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ФОРМУВАННЯ АНТИКРИЗОВИХ МЕХАНІЗМІВ У СТРАТЕГІЇ ЗАБЕЗПЕЧЕННЯ РОЗВИТКУ: ЦИФРОВА ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ ТА AGILE-ПІДХОДИ В УМОВАХ ФОРС-МАЖОРІВ

Сучасна глобальна економіка перебуває в стані перманентної кризи. Пандемія COVID-19, геополітичні конфлікти, енергетична нестабільність та стрімкий розвиток штучного інтелекту змінили парадигму стратегічного планування. Традиційні жорсткі стратегії, розраховані на 3–5 років, виявилися нежиттєздатними в умовах форс-мажорів. Сьогодні основою виживання та розвитку стає резильєнтність (життєстійкість), яка базується на двох стовпах: цифровій архітектурі та гнучких методах управління (Agile) [1].

Антикризовий механізм сучасних підприємств – вже не просто план евакуації, а динамічна система, інтегрована в щоденну діяльність організації, ключовими компонентами якої є 1) превентивність, заснована на використанні Big Data для прогнозування ризиків; 2) адаптивність, яка полягає у можливості миттєвої зміни бізнес-моделі без

втрати керованості; та 3) технологічності, яка передбачає переведення критичних процесів у хмару для забезпечення автономності.

Цифровізація стала базовою потребою. В умовах фізичних обмежень (локдаун, руйнування інфраструктури) цифрові активи забезпечують безперервність бізнесу. На нашу думку, цифрова антикризова стратегія може розвиватися в кількох напрямках (Табл. 1).

Таблиця 1

Напрямки розвитку цифрової антикризової стратегії*

Напрямок	Характеристика
Cloud-Native підхід	Відмова від локальних серверів на користь розподілених хмарних обчислень (AWS, Azure, Google Cloud), що гарантує доступ до даних з будь-якої точки світу
AI та предиктивна аналітика	Штучний інтелект дозволяє моделювати сценарії «що, якщо» з точністю, недоступною людському мозку
Кіберрезильєнтність	В умовах гібридних загроз антикризовий механізм має включати протоколи «нульової довіри» для захисту корпоративних даних

**Складено авторами за [2].*

Зараз Agile – це філософія, яка дозволяє великим структурам працювати як мережа малих, високоефективних команд [3].

Розглянемо докладніше, чому Agile-підхід є критичним під час кризи:

- ітеративність, тобто, замість очікування кінцевого результату місяцями, команда видає ціннісний продукт кожні 1-2 тижні (спринти як у Scrum-методології), що дозволяє коригувати курс залежно від ринкових змін;

- децентралізація, яка передбачає, що право прийняття рішень делегується на нижчі рівні, що критично важливо, коли зв'язок із «центром» може бути перерваний;

- Scrum і Kanban в антикризовому штабі, які допоможуть візуалізувати завдання і уникнути хаосу й перевантаження персоналу.

Справжня стійкість виникає на перетині технологій та культури. Навіть найсучасніша ERP-система буде марною, якщо бюрократичні процедури блокують швидкі рішення (Табл. 2).

Таблиця 2

Порівняння традиційного та антикризового підходів

Параметр	Традиційний підхід	Антикризовий (Digital і Agile)
Планування	Річне / Квартальне	Тижнєве (Спринти)
Комунікація	Офіційна переписка	Реальний час (Slack, Teams, AI-асистенти)
Дані	Звіти минулих періодів	Real-time Dashboard
Реакція на форс-мажор	Пошук винних / Режим очікування	Швидке тестування гіпотез (Fail fast)

Таким чином, формування антикризового механізму сьогодні неможливе без тотальної ревізії управлінських підходів. Цифрова трансформація забезпечує технічну можливість діяти, а Agile – організаційну здатність робити це швидко. Успішна стратегія розвитку – це стратегія динамічної рівноваги, де криза сприймається не як катастрофа, а як каталізатор необхідних змін.

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БРЕНД КОМПАНІЇ AIRBNB ЯК ФАКТОР ГЛОБАЛЬНОЇ ІНВЕСТИЦІЙНОЇ ЕКСПАНСІЇ

Бренд компанії Airbnb є стратегічним активом, який відіграє вирішальну роль у формуванні інвестиційного успіху компанії та її міжнародної експансії. Airbnb заснована у 2007 році як цифрова платформа для короткострокової оренди житла [1]. Завдяки інноваційній бізнес-моделі, високому рівню впізнаваності бренду та здатності адаптуватися до глобальних ринкових умов компанія швидко здобула світове визнання і стала одним із провідних гравців у сфері подорожей та гостьових послуг [2]. Основна цінність бренду полягає не лише у технологічній складовій, а й у формуванні унікального споживчого досвіду та створенні почуття належності до спільноти користувачів. Airbnb позиціонує себе як платформа, що дає можливість «належати будь-де» (belong anywhere), що сприяє високому рівню лояльності клієнтів, стабільності попиту і підвищенню прибутковості компанії. Ця емоційна складова бренду є важливим елементом бренд-капіталу, який виступає нематеріальним активом і суттєво впливає на оцінку інвестиційної привабливості підприємства.

У 2020 році компанія Airbnb успішно провела первинне публічне розміщення акцій на біржі Nasdaq. Початкові торгові сесії продемонстрували значне зростання ринкової капіталізації Airbnb, що відображало довіру інвесторів до бренду та перспективи його розвитку. Це підтверджує, що сильний бренд є не лише маркетинговим інструментом, а й фінансовим ресурсом, який підтримує стійкість компанії на ринку та здатність залучати інвестиції навіть у періоди економічної нестабільності. Вплив бренду на фінансову привабливість компанії проявляється у стабільності ринку акцій та зростанні інтересу інвесторів до компанії, що відображає ефективність її комунікаційної та маркетингової стратегії [3]. Важливим фактором стало й те, що під час виходу на фондовий ринок компанія вже мала сформований позитивний імідж та високу впізнаваність серед користувачів у багатьох країнах світу. Саме довіра до бренду та стабільна база клієнтів значною мірою сприяли успішному розміщенню акцій і швидкому зростанню їх вартості. На рис. 1 візуалізовано зростання ринкової вартості Airbnb після Initial Public Offering (IPO). Окрім того, інвестори розглядали Airbnb як інноваційну платформу із високим потенціалом розвитку у сфері цифрової економіки та глобального туристичного ринку, що також посилювало інвестиційний інтерес до компанії та її подальшого розширення на міжнародних ринках.




Рис. 1. Зростання ринкової вартості Airbnb після IPO*

**Джерело: побудовано автором за [3].*

Airbnb активно реалізує стратегії продуктового диференціювання, що сприяє розширенню джерел доходу та підвищенню інвестиційної привабливості компанії. Зокрема, запуск сервісу Airbnb Experiences зумовив створення платформи для бронювання турів, майстер-класів та

локальних заходів, що перетворює Airbnb з простого сервісу оренди житла у комплексну платформу для організації подорожей і дозвілля. Окрім цього, компанія впроваджує нові технологічні рішення, такі як інтеграція систем штучного інтелекту для персоналізації пропозицій та автоматизованих рекомендацій, що підвищує зручність використання платформи та рівень задоволеності користувачів. Розширення продуктового портфеля підвищує цінність бренду і стимулює залучення нових користувачів та інвесторів, оскільки компанія демонструє здатність розвиватися і адаптуватися до зміни попиту на глобальних ринках [2]. Додатково Airbnb активно розвиває партнерські програми із локальними туроператорами, культурними центрами та освітніми організаціями, що дозволяє створювати унікальні пропозиції та додаткові джерела доходу, одночасно підсилюючи імідж бренду як інноваційної та соціально відповідальної компанії. Водночас така стратегія сприяє формуванню довгострокової конкурентної переваги компанії на глобальному туристичному ринку. Ці комплексні підходи не лише зміцнюють фінансову стійкість компанії, а й підвищують її інвестиційну привабливість на міжнародному рівні, демонструючи потенціал для подальшої глобальної експансії [4].

На рис. 2 подано структуру доходів Airbnb.



Рис. 2. Структура доходів Airbnb*

**Джерело: побудовано автором за [4].*

Сильний бренд Airbnb також виступає механізмом зниження фінансових та ринкових ризиків. Компанія демонструє високу здатність адаптуватися до змін зовнішніх умов, що підтверджується її реакцією на пандемію COVID-19. Під час кризи Airbnb швидко змінила комунікаційну стратегію, зробивши акцент на безпечних умовах

проживання та гнучких умовах скасування бронювань. Це уможливило збереження довіри користувачів і підтримку інвестиційної привабливості компанії, оскільки інвестори сприймають сильний і адаптивний бренд як сигнал стабільності та довгострокового зростання [2].

Маркетингові та комунікаційні стратегії Airbnb, спрямовані на локалізацію контенту та розвиток ком'юніті користувачів, підсилюють впізнаваність бренду на різних світових ринках і сприяють збільшенню готовності інвесторів вкладати кошти в компанію [3]. Платформа активно працює із регіональними інфлюенсерами, локальними спільнотами та цифровими каналами просування, що дозволяє підтримувати високий рівень довіри та підвищує конкурентоспроможність компанії [4]. Таким чином, бренд Airbnb формує довгострокові нематеріальні активи, які підтримують стійкість бізнесу та є ключовим фактором глобальної інвестиційної експансії.

У фінансовому вимірі бренд компанії сприяє залученню капіталу, підвищенню ринкової вартості, розширенню джерел доходу та підтримці стабільності прибутку навіть в умовах економічної нестабільності. Підхід до розвитку бренду і продуктового портфеля дозволяє Airbnb зберігати лідерські позиції на ринку, формувати інноваційний імідж та забезпечувати довіру користувачів і інвесторів. Досвід Airbnb демонструє, що у сучасній цифровій економіці сильний бренд є не лише маркетинговим активом, а й потужним інструментом, який підтримує фінансову стабільність, конкурентоспроможність та глобальну експансію компанії, роблячи його ключовим фактором інвестиційного успіху.

Таким чином, бренд компанії Airbnb є стратегічним ресурсом, що прямо впливає на фінансову стійкість, інноваційний потенціал та здатність до глобальної експансії. Через комплексну продуктову пропозицію, маркетингові стратегії та адаптацію до локальних ринків компанія підтримує конкурентні переваги, стабільний прибуток і довіру інвесторів, що підтверджує роль бренду як ключового чинника глобальної інвестиційної експансії.

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ЛІДЕРСТВО ТА ВЛАДА В СИСТЕМІ МЕНЕДЖМЕНТУ КОМУНАЛЬНОГО ПІДПРИЄМСТВА

У сучасних умовах розвитку економіки важливу роль у забезпеченні ефективності діяльності організацій відіграє поєднання керівництва, лідерства та управлінської влади. Саме ці складові формують механізм впливу на персонал, визначають характер управлінських рішень та сприяють досягненню стратегічних цілей організації. Особливої актуальності це питання набуває для комунальних підприємств, діяльність яких спрямована на виконання суспільно важливих функцій, зокрема у сфері поводження з відходами та забезпечення екологічної безпеки територіальних громад [3]

У наукових дослідженнях керівництво розглядається як процес організації діяльності працівників, що передбачає планування, координацію та контроль виконання завдань (табл. 1). Лідерство, на відміну від керівництва, пов'язане передусім із здатністю впливати на поведінку людей, формувати довіру та згуртованість колективу. Управлінська влада виступає інструментом реалізації управлінських рішень і базується на формальних повноваженнях керівника, його компетентності та авторитеті серед працівників [2].

Запропоноване порівняння дозволяє зробити висновок, що керівництво, лідерство та управлінська влада є взаємодоповнюючими складовими системи менеджменту організації. Керівництво забезпечує організаційний порядок та координацію діяльності персоналу, тоді як лідерство формує мотиваційну основу колективної роботи. Управлінська влада, у свою чергу, виступає механізмом реалізації управлінських рішень і гарантує їх виконання в межах організаційної структури підприємства.

Таблиця 1

**Порівняльна характеристика керівництва, лідерства та
управлінської влади в системі менеджменту організації***

Критерій	Керівництво	Лідерство	Управлінська влада
Сутність	Організація та координація діяльності працівників	Вплив на поведінку і мотивацію колективу	Можливість приймати рішення та забезпечувати їх виконання
Основа впливу	Формальні управлінські функції	Особисті якості, авторитет, довіра	Посадові повноваження та організаційна ієрархія
Основний інструмент	Планування, організація, контроль	Мотивація, переконання, приклад керівника	Адміністративні рішення та управлінські розпорядження
Роль у діяльності організації	Забезпечує упорядкованість управлінських процесів	Формує згуртованість і мотивацію колективу	Гарантує виконання прийнятих управлінських рішень

**Джерело: узагальнено на основі [4].*

Для комунальних підприємств важливою є гармонійна взаємодія зазначених елементів управління. На відміну від комерційних організацій, основною метою діяльності яких є отримання прибутку, комунальні підприємства орієнтовані насамперед на забезпечення суспільних потреб та підтримку належного рівня екологічної безпеки (табл. 2). Це зумовлює особливості управлінської діяльності у сфері керівництва персоналом.

Наведене порівняння дозволяє зробити висновок, що управлінська діяльність у комунальних підприємствах має більш соціально орієнтований характер. У таких організаціях керівник повинен не лише забезпечувати ефективну організацію виробничих процесів, але й підтримувати стабільність роботи колективу, дотримання екологічних норм та виконання соціальних зобов'язань перед громадою. Водночас ефективність управління значною мірою залежить від лідерських якостей керівника. У комунальних підприємствах екологічного спрямування лідерство проявляється насамперед у здатності керівника формувати відповідальне ставлення працівників до виконання службових обов'язків, підтримувати дисципліну та сприяти формуванню позитивного морально-психологічного клімату в колективі.

Важливою складовою управлінського впливу є також раціональне використання владних повноважень. Ефективний керівник повинен поєднувати адміністративні методи управління з елементами партнерської взаємодії з персоналом. Такий підхід сприяє підвищенню

рівня довіри між керівництвом і працівниками та забезпечує більш ефективну реалізацію управлінських рішень.

Таблиця 2

Особливості реалізації керівництва, лідерства та управлінської влади в організаціях різних форм власності*

Критерій	Комерційні підприємства	Комунальні підприємства
Основна мета діяльності	Отримання прибутку та підвищення конкурентоспроможності	Забезпечення суспільних потреб і надання екологічно важливих послуг
Характер управлінської влади	Влада базується переважно на економічних результатах та корпоративній ієрархії	Значну роль відіграє адміністративна влада та регуляторний вплив органів місцевого самоврядування
Особливості лідерства	Орієнтація на досягнення фінансових результатів і розвиток підприємницьких ініціатив	Лідерство спрямоване на підтримання стабільності роботи колективу та відповідальне виконання соціально значущих функцій
Управління персоналом	Акцент на результативності, продуктивності праці та ефективності бізнес-процесів	Важливими є дисципліна, безпека праці та координація колективної роботи
Взаємодія із зовнішнім середовищем	Орієнтація на ринок і конкурентне середовище	Тісна взаємодія з органами місцевого самоврядування та громадою

**Джерело: узагальнено на основі [1].*

Отже, керівництво, лідерство та управлінська влада є взаємопов'язаними складовими системи менеджменту організації. Для комунальних підприємств екологозабезпечувального напрямку їх ефективне поєднання має особливе значення, оскільки від якості управління залежить стабільність функціонування підприємства та рівень забезпечення екологічної безпеки територіальної громади. Таким чином, формування ефективної системи управління на комунальних підприємствах потребує поєднання формальних управлінських повноважень із лідерськими якостями керівника, що дозволяє забезпечити результативну діяльність організації та належне виконання її соціально важливих функцій.

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БЕЗРОБІТТЯ: ВТРАТИ ТА ВИГРАШИ ДЛЯ СУСПІЛЬСТВА

Безробіття є однією з найважливіших соціальних та економічних проблем сучасного суспільства. Воно виникає, коли деякі люди, здатні працювати, не можуть знайти роботу, хоча вони цього прагнуть і готові працювати. Безробіття негативно позначається як на окремих громадянах, так і на економіці країни в цілому, оскільки призводить до зниження доходів, погіршення рівня життя та посилення соціальної напруженості в суспільстві. Зазвичай люди вважають безробіття негативним явищем, яке коштує уряду грошей і знижує рівень життя населення. Однак, існує думка, що певний рівень безробіття може мати й позитивний вплив на економіку. Наприклад, це може спонукати людей до підвищення кваліфікації, сприяти змінам у структурі економіки та розвитку нових галузей. Таким чином, питання про те, як безробіття впливає на суспільство, є дуже складним і неоднозначним. У цій роботі буде розглянута сутність безробіття, його основні наслідки для суспільства та те, чи може суспільство отримати від нього певні вигоди.

Безробіття є соціально-економічним явищем, яке виникає через дисбаланс між пропозицією та попитом на ринку праці. Це демонструється тим, що частина працездатного населення не має роботи, незважаючи на бажання та датність працювати. У сучасній економічній науці безробіття розглядається як важливий показник стану економіки держави, оскільки його рівень безпосередньо впливає на економічне зростання, рівень життя населення та соціальну стабільність у суспільстві. Причини безробіття можуть бути різними. Економічні кризи, коли компанії скорочують виробництво та наймають менше

працівників, є однією з основних причин. Крім того, структурні зміни, які відбуваються в економіці, коли певні галузі перестають бути важливими, а їх місце займають нові галузі, можуть призвести до безробіття. Наприклад, нові технології можуть автоматизувати багато процесів, зменшуючи потребу в людях.

Також важливими причинами безробіття є недостатній рівень освіти або невідповідність професійних навичок працівників вимогам сучасного ринку праці. У таких ситуаціях стає складніше для людей знайти роботу відповідно до їхньої спеціальності, що призводить до підвищення рівня безробіття.

Якщо проводити розширений аналіз рівня безробіття, то ми можемо констатувати суттєві відмінності динаміки в різних країнах (через сучаснішу довідкову базу для аналізу були обрані країни ОЕСР) (Рис. 1).




Рис. 1. Рівень безробіття в країнах ОЕСР*

**Складено автором за [1].*

Рівень безробіття в січні 2026 року перебував на рівні або в межах 0,1 процентного пункту (п.п.) від рекордно низького рівня в Італії, а також у зоні ОЕСР, Європейському Союзі та зоні євро. Він був більш ніж на 1,0 п.п. вищим за рекордно низький рівень в Австрії, Бельгії, Канаді, Чилі (грудень 2025 р.), Чехії, Данії, Естонії, Фінляндії, Німеччині, Угорщині, Ісландії, Латвії, Литві, Люксембурзі, Новій Зеландії (четвертий квартал 2025 р.), Норвегії, Іспанії, Швеції, Швейцарії (четвертий квартал 2025 р.) та Великій Британії (листопад 2025 р.) [1]. Таким чином, наведені статистичні дані свідчать про те, що рівень безробіття в різних країнах може суттєво відрізнятися залежно від

економічної ситуації, особливостей ринку праці та державної політики у сфері зайнятості. Навіть у розвинених країнах, що входять до складу ОЕСР, показники безробіття можуть змінюватися та перебувати на різних рівнях. Це свідчить про те, що безробіття є складним економічним явищем, яке має різні причини та наслідки для суспільства.

Хоча зазвичай безробіття розглядають як негативне явище, деякі зазначають, що за певних умов воно може виконувати і певні позитивні функції в економіці. Саме тому доцільно розглянути, чи може суспільство отримувати певні вигоди від існування безробіття.

Незважаючи на значну кількість негативних наслідків, у економічній теорії існує думка, що певний рівень безробіття може виконувати і позитивні функції для розвитку економіки. Очевидно, що повна відсутність безробіття практично неможлива, оскільки ринок праці постійно змінюється. У зв'язку з цим невеликий рівень безробіття може навіть сприяти більш ефективному функціонуванню економіки. Однією з можливих переваг безробіття є стимулювання людей до підвищення кваліфікації та отримання нових знань. У сучасних умовах ринок праці швидко змінюється, з'являються нові професії, а вимоги до працівників постійно зростають. Безперервне навчання дає змогу людям і суспільству адаптуватися та процвітати у світі, що постійно змінюється, забезпечуючи їх актуальними знаннями, навичками та поглядами, необхідними для особистого та професійного зростання. Воно стимулює інтелектуальну допитливість, сприяє інноваціям та продуктивності, а також допомагає людям залишатися затребуваними та активними учасниками глобального суспільства, що стрімко розвивається [2]. Це означає, що навіть в умовах безробіття люди можуть отримати стимул до навчання та розвитку нових навичок, що в подальшому підвищує їхню конкурентоспроможність на ринку праці. Крім того, безробіття може сприяти розвитку нових галузей економіки. Коли старі підприємства закриваються або скорочують виробництво, працівники можуть переходити до більш перспективних сфер діяльності. Це сприяє структурним змінам в економіці та розвитку інновацій.

Ще одним позитивним аспектом є підвищення мобільності робочої сили. У пошуках роботи люди можуть змінювати місце проживання або переходити до інших сфер діяльності. Це дозволяє більш ефективно розподіляти трудові ресурси та сприяє економічному розвитку країни. Варто також зазначити, що помірний рівень безробіття може стимулювати працівників до підвищення продуктивності праці. Усвідомлюючи можливість втрати роботи, люди часто намагаються працювати ефективніше та покращувати свої професійні навички. Отже,

хоча безробіття має багато негативних наслідків, у певних умовах воно може виконувати і деякі позитивні функції в економіці. Помірний рівень безробіття може стимулювати розвиток професійних навичок, сприяти структурним змінам у господарстві та підвищувати ефективність використання трудових ресурсів.

Узагальнюючи, безробіття є складним соціально-економічним явищем, яке має значний вплив на розвиток суспільства. З одного боку, воно має негативні наслідки, включаючи зниження рівня життя населення, зростання бідності та зростання соціальної напруги. Високий рівень безробіття також зменшує виробництво та надходження до державного бюджету. З іншого боку, аналіз показує, що безробіття не можна сприймати лише як негативну ситуацію. Він також може бути корисним для економіки за певних обставин. Зокрема, помірний рівень безробіття може призвести до підвищення кваліфікації працівників, створення нових галузей економіки, підвищення мобільності робочої сили та підвищення ефективності використання трудових ресурсів. Ринкова економіка є важливою частиною, яка відображає розвиток і трансформацію безробіття. Завданням держави є не повне усунення безробіття, що практично неможливо, а підтримання рівня безробіття на найнижчому рівні та створення умов для ефективної роботи ринку праці. Таким чином, безробіття має як негативні, так і певні позитивні сторони; однак його вплив на суспільство значною мірою залежить від рівня економічного розвитку країни та ефективності державної політики у сфері зайнятості.

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ЕКОНОМІЧНА БЕЗПЕКА ПІДПРИЄМСТВА: ПОКАЗНИКИ ОЦІНКИ, РИЗИКИ, ШЛЯХИ ЗМІЦНЕННЯ

Економічна безпека підприємства є важливою складовою його стабільного функціонування. Вона визначає здатність підприємства працювати ефективно, зберігати свої ресурси та адаптуватися до змін у зовнішньому середовищі. В умовах економічної нестабільності сучасного часу особливо важливо забезпечити безпеку бізнесу, особливо в логістиці. Нова пошта є одним із таких підприємств, яке активно розвивається навіть у складних умовах. Мета роботи полягає в тому, щоб проаналізувати економічну безпеку підприємства та визначити показники оцінки, ризики та методи мінімізації цих факторів.

Економічну безпеку підприємства можна визначити як стан, за якого підприємство може продовжувати працювати, отримувати прибуток і протистояти негативним впливам. Фінансова стійкість, ефективність діяльності, захист ресурсів і здатність адаптуватися до змін на ринку – це все аспекти, які його стосуються. Логістичні компанії, такі як Нова пошта, залежні від зовнішніх джерел, зокрема постачання палива, транспортної інфраструктури, попиту споживачів та загальної економічної ситуації, тому економічна безпека дуже важлива. Оцінка економічної безпеки здійснюється через фінансові показники підприємства, які характеризують його ефективність. Зокрема, важливими є доходи та прибуток підприємства. За офіційними даними, у 2025 році Нова пошта отримала понад 54 млрд грн доходу, що на 21% більше порівняно з попереднім роком. Чистий прибуток компанії склав 2,6 млрд грн. Також компанія значно розширила свою діяльність: кількість доставлених посилок досягла 522 млн, а мережа перевищила 50 000 точок обслуговування [1]. Отримані дані свідчать про зростання доходів підприємства, що є позитивним фактором економічної безпеки, однак прибуток залишається нестабільним.

Поряд з основними фінансовими показниками важливу роль відіграють ліквідність і рентабельність підприємства. Вони дозволяють більш детально оцінити ефективність діяльності підприємства. Для більш наочного аналізу фінансових показників доцільно розглянути їх динаміку (Табл.1). Рентабельність – поняття, що характеризує економічну ефективність виробництва, за якої підприємство за рахунок грошової виручки від реалізації продукції (робіт, послуг) повністю відшкодовує витрати на її виробництво й одержує прибуток як головне

джерело розширеного відтворення [2]. Це означає, що підприємство може оцінити, наскільки ефективно воно використовує свої ресурси та чи здатне отримувати прибуток у довгостроковій перспективі.

Таблиця 1

Фінансові показники підприємства*

Показник	2024 рік	2025 рік	Зміна
Дохід (млрд грн)	44,6	54	+21%
Чистий прибуток (млрд грн)	4,1	2,6	-37%
Кількість посилок (млн)	480	522	+9%
Кількість відділень	40 000	50 000	+25%

**Складено автором за [1].*

Аналіз показує, що підприємство активно розвивається, однак спостерігається зниження прибутку.

У процесі діяльності підприємство стикається з різними ризиками, які можуть негативно впливати на його розвиток та загальний рівень економічної безпеки. Основні ризики доцільно систематизувати, оскільки це дозволяє краще зрозуміти їх природу та можливі наслідки для підприємства. Фінансові ризики пов'язані зі зростанням витрат підприємства, що може призвести до зниження прибутковості. В умовах сучасної економіки це особливо актуально через підвищення вартості енергоносіїв, логістичних витрат та загальну нестабільність ринку. Виробничі ризики проявляються у вигляді затримок доставки, перевантаження системи або технічних збоїв, що може негативно впливати на якість послуг та рівень задоволеності клієнтів. Зовнішні ризики, такі як інфляція, економічна нестабільність або зміни в законодавстві, є найбільш складними для прогнозування та контролю, однак саме вони мають найбільший вплив на діяльність підприємства.

Окрім ризиків, важливу роль у забезпеченні економічної безпеки відіграють показники фінансової стійкості підприємства. Розглянемо наступні коефіцієнти, які можна використати для аналізу довгострокової платоспроможності підприємства: коефіцієнт концентрації власного капіталу, коефіцієнт концентрації позикового капіталу, співвідношення позикового і власного капіталу, коефіцієнт забезпеченості за кредитами [3]. Ці показники дозволяють оцінити здатність підприємства своєчасно виконувати свої фінансові зобов'язання та підтримувати безперервність діяльності. Високий рівень ліквідності свідчить про фінансову стабільність підприємства та його готовність до можливих кризових ситуацій.

На економічну безпеку підприємства впливають також внутрішні та зовнішні фактори, які визначають умови його функціонування.

Економічна безпека підприємства – система захисних заходів, спрямованих на забезпечення стійкої та ефективної діяльності підприємства. До внутрішніх факторів належать рівень управління, ефективність використання ресурсів, кваліфікація персоналу та рівень впровадження сучасних технологій. Вони формуються всередині підприємства і можуть бути змінені або покращені за рахунок ефективного менеджменту. Зовнішні фактори включають загальний стан економіки, рівень інфляції, конкуренцію на ринку та політичну ситуацію. Вони є менш контрольованими, однак мають значний вплив на результати діяльності підприємства. Економічна безпека підприємства розглядається як система захисних заходів, спрямованих на забезпечення стійкої та ефективної діяльності підприємства. Це означає, що підприємство повинно не лише реагувати на вже існуючі загрози, але й завчасно прогнозувати можливі ризики та впроваджувати заходи для їх запобігання. Для забезпечення економічної безпеки підприємству необхідно впроваджувати ефективні заходи управління. Одним із таких заходів є створення резервів валового і чистого прибутку, що дозволяє підприємству мати фінансову «подушку безпеки» у разі виникнення кризових ситуацій. Крім того, важливим є контроль витрат, оптимізація бізнес-процесів та впровадження сучасних технологій, що сприяє підвищенню ефективності діяльності підприємства. Додатково слід зазначити, що важливим напрямом зміцнення економічної безпеки є постійний аналіз ринку та адаптація до змін зовнішнього середовища. Підприємство повинно бути гнучким і здатним швидко реагувати на нові виклики, що дозволяє зменшити вплив негативних факторів та забезпечити стабільний розвиток у довгостроковій перспективі.

Економічна безпека підприємства є ключовою умовою його стабільного та ефективного функціонування. На прикладі Нової пошти видно, що підприємство демонструє стабільне зростання доходів, розширення мережі відділень та збільшення обсягів доставки посилок. Це свідчить про підвищення ефективності діяльності та зміцнення економічної безпеки компанії. Разом із тим, існують суттєві ризики, які можуть негативно впливати на діяльність підприємства. Серед них фінансові, виробничі та зовнішні фактори, включно з інфляцією, економічною нестабільністю та конкуренцією на ринку. Аналіз показав, що зовнішні ризики мають найбільший вплив, проте внутрішні фактори, такі як рівень управління, ефективність використання ресурсів та кваліфікація персоналу, також відіграють значну роль у забезпеченні стабільності підприємства. Забезпечення економічної безпеки вимагає комплексного підходу: постійного моніторингу фінансових показників, підвищення ліквідності та рентабельності, впровадження сучасних

технологій, оптимізації витрат та створення резервів прибутку. Ефективне управління цими аспектами дозволяє не лише зменшити негативний вплив ризиків, а й забезпечити конкурентоспроможність та стійкий розвиток підприємства в довгостроковій перспективі.

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ІНСТИТУЦІЙНЕ ЗАБЕЗПЕЧЕННЯ ІНТЕГРАЦІЇ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ ПІДПРИЄМСТВ У ГЛОБАЛЬНІ ЛАНЦЮГИ ВАРТОСТІ В КОНТЕКСТІ ЄВРОІНТЕГРАЦІЇ

Трансформація гео економічного ландшафту та поглиблення євроінтеграційних процесів актуалізують проблему формування ефективного інституційного середовища для інтеграції українських підприємств у глобальні ланцюги вартості (ГЛВ). Метою дослідження є аналіз сучасного стану інституційного забезпечення та розробка рекомендацій щодо його вдосконалення.

Теоретичною основою дослідження є інституційна теорія Д. Норта [1], яка, втім, потребує критичного переосмислення в українському контексті. Класичне розмежування формальних і неформальних інститутів не враховує специфіки «інституційної гібридності», коли підприємства одночасно функціонують у національній, європейській та глобальній нормативних системах. Це суттєво ускладнює оцінку реального впливу інституційного середовища на інтеграційні процеси.

Аналіз показує, що за період 2014–2024 років Україна імплементувала понад 60% *acquis communautaire* у сфері технічного регулювання, створила Офіс з просування експорту, запровадила механізми компенсації відсоткових ставок [2]. Проте, на нашу думку, ця «інституційна імітація» – механічне копіювання європейських практик –

не забезпечила пропорційного зростання участі підприємств у ГЛВ, що свідчить про розрив між формальною гармонізацією та реальною інтеграцією.

Емпіричне дослідження 156 українських підприємств виявило, що інституційні фактори пояснюють лише 23% варіації в показниках участі у ГЛВ. Цей результат, що суперечить домінуючим теоретичним очікуванням, дозволяє констатувати «парадокс інституційної неефективності»: організаційні здатності підприємств виявляються більш значущими для успішної інтеграції, ніж зовнішнє інституційне середовище. Найвпливовішими факторами є наявність міжнародних сертифікатів ($\beta=0,31$), доступ до експортного фінансування ($\beta=0,24$) та участь у програмах підтримки ($\beta=0,19$) [3].

Секторальний аналіз засвідчив критичну асиметрію: ІТ-сектор демонструє високу інтеграцію попри мінімальну формальну підтримку завдяки розвиненим неформальним інститутам професійних спільнот. Натомість агропромисловий комплекс стикається з «інституційним розривом» – формальна відповідність вимогам ЄС не гарантує реального доступу до європейських ГЛВ через неформальні бар'єри [4].

На основі критичного аналізу сформульовано висновок: замість подальшого нарощування формальних інститутів доцільно зосередитись на «м'якій» інституційній інфраструктурі – інформаційних платформах, мережових структурах взаємодії, механізмах обміну досвідом. Такий підхід здатен подолати виявлений парадокс та забезпечити реальне включення українських підприємств у глобальні виробничі мережі.

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ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ ПОВОЄННОГО ВІДНОВЛЕННЯ ЕКОНОМІКИ УКРАЇНИ

За результатами дослідження щодо соціально-економічних наслідків війни встановлено, що повномасштабні руйнування інфраструктури, виробничих потужностей та енергетичної системи суттєво ускладнюють відновлення економіки України. Висока залежність від зовнішньої фінансової допомоги, дефіцит трудових ресурсів і інвестицій зумовлюють потребу у формуванні комплексної та довгострокової стратегії повоєнного розвитку.

Повоєнне відновлення економіки – це комплекс заходів для відбудови інфраструктури, промисловості та фінансової системи країни в післявоєнний період. Для України, яка переживає повномасштабну війну з 2022 року, це питання є критичним. За три роки війни економіка показала стійкість, але зазнала та продовжує зазнавати великих втрат: ВВП скоротився на 29% у 2022 році, а промисловість – на 35% . Зараз у країні існує залежність від зовнішньої допомоги – понад 70% бюджету від донорів – країн ЄС, США, Великобританії, інших.

Основні проблеми – руйнування енергетики, мостів, транспортних мереж та експортних шляхів, що вимагає як внутрішніх реформ, так і міжнародної допомоги. За даними 2025 року зруйновано 50% енергетики (дефіцит 10 ГВт, імпорт електрики з ЄС зріс утричі), зруйновано 30% заводів, 25% мостів і тисячі кілометрів доріг, порти заблоковані, 6 млн людей вимушено виїхали з країни. Такі ключові сектори економіки, як промисловість і сільське господарство, постраждали найбільше. Втрати в металургії та експорті зерна сягнули 100 млрд доларів. Такі галузі промисловості, як металургія та машинобудування втратили 40% потужностей – заводи в Маріуполі та Харкові зупинили свою діяльність [1; 3].

Відновлення країни вимагає всебічного підходу, де пріоритет буде зроблено на інфраструктурі (дороги, порти, енергомережі). Українські науковці пропонують «зелену» реконструкцію з фокусом на відновлювані джерела енергії, таких як сонце та вітер, для заміни 50% зруйнованих ТЕС. Цей процес залежить від наступних ключових факторів:

– зовнішня фінансова допомога: Україна отримала понад 100 млрд доларів від партнерів, що допомогло стабілізувати бюджет і гривню;

– внутрішні ресурси – мобілізація резервів, релокація підприємств на безпечні території та розвиток ІТ-сектору, який зріс на 8% попри війну;

– демографічні та трудові фактори: вимушена міграція українців за кордон призвела до дефіциту робочої сили, тому потрібні програми повернення мігрантів. Крім того, інфляція сягнула 26% ще у 2022 році, а безробіття зросло до 20%, що ускладнює процес. Світовий досвід (наприклад, післявоєнна Німеччина чи Японія) показує, що швидке відновлення можливе за умови фокусу на інвестиціях у виробництво та експорт;

– інституційна спроможність держави ефективно планувати та реалізовувати відбудовчі проєкти. Підвищення якості державного управління, прозорість використання ресурсів і координація між центральною та місцевою владою сприятимуть підвищенню довіри з боку інвесторів і міжнародних партнерів. Особливе значення має узгодження економічної політики з соціальними цілями, що дозволить забезпечити інклюзивний характер відновлення та зменшити регіональні диспропорції [2; 3].

Стратегія повоєнного розвитку повинна бути багатонаправленою. Перший напрям – реконструкція інфраструктури: пріоритет на енергетику (відновлення 50% пошкоджених ТЕС) та логістику (мости, порти), з фінансуванням від ЄС та США. Другий – економічна диверсифікація: перехід від сировинної моделі до високотехнологічних галузей, як агротех та зелена енергія. Третій – євроінтеграція: адаптація до стандартів ЄС стимулює інвестиції та торгівлю, з потенціалом зростання ВВП на 5-7% щорічно після війни. Важливою є децентралізація: регіональні плани відновлення, наприклад, у Харківській чи Запорізькій областях, де руйнування сягає 40% промисловості [1; 4].

Світовий досвід підкреслює роль державно-приватного партнерства. У плані Маршалла для Європи після Другої світової війни 70% коштів пішло на промисловість, що дало приріст ВВП на 35% за 4 роки. Для України актуально запозичити модель так званих «швидких перемог»: спочатку стабілізація макроекономіки, тобто зниження боргу, а потім інвестиції в освіту та інновації. Крім того, післявоєнна Корея показала успіх через фокус на експорті, що може стати моделлю для України з її аграрним потенціалом [2].

Серед ризиків у даній ситуації можна виділити – продовження війни, корупцію та залежність від донорів. За три роки Україна досягла макрофінансової стабільності (зростання ВВП на 5% у 2023-2024 рр.), але без миру відновлення затягнеться на 10-15 років. Потрібні

антикорупційні реформи, прозорість влади та цифровізація для ефективного розподілу фондів (наприклад, через ProZorro). Євроінтеграція посилює вимоги до судової реформи, що прискорить інвестиції. План включає етапи: короткостроковий (стабілізація, 1-2 роки) – гуманітарка та базова інфраструктура; середньостроковий (3-5 років) – промислове відродження; довгостроковий (5 і більше років) – інноваційна економіка. Успіх залежить від єдності влади, бізнесу та суспільства [1; 3; 4].

Повоєнне відновлення економіки України є складним і тривалим процесом, що потребує поєднання внутрішніх реформ та масштабної міжнародної підтримки. Пріоритетними напрямками мають стати відбудова інфраструктури й енергетики, модернізація промисловості, стимулювання інвестицій та розвиток людського капіталу. Важливу роль у цьому процесі відіграють антикорупційні перетворення, цифровізація державного управління та розвиток державно-приватного партнерства.

Реалізація комплексної стратегії з урахуванням принципів сталого розвитку та євроінтеграції створить умови для формування конкурентоспроможної й стійкої економіки в довгостроковій перспективі.

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ЕВОЛЮЦІЯ КОНЦЕПЦІЙ МАРКЕТИНГОВОЇ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ В УМОВАХ ЦИФРОВОЇ ЕКОНОМІКИ

Маркетингова діяльність є одним із головних елементів забезпечення конкурентоспроможності організації. Науковці розглядають маркетинг як систему управлінської діяльності, спрямовану на дослідження ринку, виявлення та задоволення потреб споживачів, формування стійких взаємовідносин із цільовими групами клієнтів. Ефективне управління маркетинговою діяльністю передбачає інтеграцію інструментів ринкової політики, координацію збутових процесів і стратегічну орієнтацію організації на споживача [1].

Історичний розвиток маркетингу пов'язаний із трансформацією економічного середовища та зміною підходів до організації виробництва і збуту продукції [4].

У науковій літературі розвиток маркетингових підходів зазвичай розглядається через зміну маркетингових концепцій. Найдавнішою вважається виробнича концепція, яка сформувалася в умовах дефіциту продукції, коли попит значно перевищував пропозицію. Основна увага була зосереджена на збільшенні обсягів виробництва та зниженні витрат, а споживачі орієнтувалися переважно на доступність товарів.

Наступним етапом стала концепція продукту, яка передбачала концентрацію організацій на підвищенні якості продукції та впровадженні інновацій. Проте надмірна орієнтація виключно на технічні характеристики товару нерідко призводила до ігнорування реальних потреб споживачів. Подальший розвиток отримала концепція продажів, що акцентувала увагу на активізації збутової діяльності. У межах цього підходу підприємства намагалися стимулювати попит за допомогою різноманітних методів просування, часто орієнтуючись на максимізацію обсягів реалізації незалежно від реальних потреб ринку.

Сучасні підходи базуються на маркетинговій концепції, у центрі якої перебуває споживач. Її сутність полягає у глибокому дослідженні потреб ринку та формуванні пропозиції, здатної найбільш ефективно їх задовольнити. Такий підхід передбачає не лише розроблення конкурентоспроможного продукту, але й комплексне використання маркетингових інструментів, що забезпечують формування довгострокових відносин із клієнтами [3].

Подальша еволюція маркетингових підходів призвела до

формування цілісної (холістичної) маркетингової концепції, яка передбачає інтеграцію всіх функціональних напрямів діяльності організації у єдину систему створення цінності для споживача. До її ключових компонентів належать: маркетинг відносин; інтегрований маркетинг; внутрішній маркетинг; соціально відповідальний маркетинг.

Маркетинг відносин орієнтований на формування довгострокових взаємовигідних зв'язків із партнерами, клієнтами та іншими стейкхолдерами. У результаті формується так звана маркетингова мережа, яка забезпечує більш стійке функціонування організації в умовах нестабільного ринкового середовища. Інтегрований маркетинг передбачає узгоджене використання інструментів маркетингового комплексу, традиційно представлених моделлю 4P: product, price, place, promotion (табл. 1)

Таблиця 1

Ключові складові комплексу маркетингу (4P) та їх управлінське значення у формуванні ринкової пропозиції підприємства*

Елемент	Зміст елементу	Управлінське значення
Product (продукт)	Сукупність характеристик товару або послуги: якість, функціональні властивості, дизайн, бренд, сервісне обслуговування	Формує цінність пропозиції для споживача та визначає конкурентні переваги підприємства на ринку
Price (ціна)	Вартісна оцінка товару, що включає рівень ціни, систему знижок, умови розрахунків	Забезпечує баланс між прибутковістю та привабливістю для споживачів
Place (розподіл)	Система доведення товару до споживача: канали збуту, логістика, складування, посередники	Визначає доступність товару на ринку та ефективність організації процесів постачання і продажу
Promotion (просування)	Комплекс комунікаційних заходів: реклама, зв'язки з громадськістю, стимулювання збуту, персональний продаж	Сприяє формуванню попиту, підвищенню впізнаваності бренду та стимулює купівельну поведінку споживачів

**Джерело: сформовано за [2].*

З розвитком сервісної економіки та ускладненням ринкового середовища класична модель була доповнена новими компонентами, що привело до формування концепцій 5P–7P і ширших моделей маркетингового комплексу. Зокрема, до системи додаються такі елементи, як персонал, процес надання послуг та фізичні докази якості обслуговування.

Альтернативним підходом є модель 4C, яка переносить фокус із виробника на споживача. У цьому випадку основними елементами виступають цінність для клієнта, споживчі витрати, доступність товару

та комунікація. Такий підхід відображає сучасну тенденцію переходу від продуктово-орієнтованого маркетингу до клієнтоорієнтованих стратегій [2]. Трансформація маркетингових концепцій пов'язана з цифровізацією економіки. У сучасних умовах поширення набули інструменти цифрового маркетингу, системи управління взаємовідносинами з клієнтами, персоналізація пропозицій і використання аналітики даних для вивчення поведінки споживачів.

У концепції маркетингу 3.0 споживач розглядається не лише як покупець, але і як носій соціальних та культурних цінностей. Відповідно, організації прагнуть формувати бренди, що відповідають етичним і суспільним очікуванням. Наступний етап розвитку – маркетинг 4.0, який поєднує традиційні інструменти маркетингової діяльності з цифровими технологіями та багатоканальними комунікаціями. Особливого значення набуває соціально відповідальний маркетинг, який передбачає врахування екологічних, соціальних та етичних аспектів діяльності організації. Його розвиток тісно пов'язаний із концепцією сталого розвитку, що базується на поєднанні економічних, соціальних і екологічних цілей.

Отже, сучасне управління маркетинговою діяльністю організації характеризується комплексністю, інтегрованістю та орієнтацією на формування довгострокових відносин зі споживачами. Використання новітніх цифрових технологій, персоналізації комунікацій і соціально відповідальних практик дозволяє підприємствам формувати стійкі конкурентні переваги та забезпечувати ефективний розвиток у динамічному ринковому середовищі.

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ОБОРОННИЙ ІМПУЛЬС ЄВРОПИ: МІЖ ТЕХНОЛОГІЧНИМ ЛІДЕРСТВОМ ТА РИЗИКАМИ ВНУТРІШНЬОЇ ФРАГМЕНТАЦІЇ⁴

Сучасна архітектура безпеки Європейського Союзу проходить етап фундаментальної трансформації, що знаменує завершення епохи «дивідендів миру» та перехід до парадигми тотальної оборонної готовності. Глобальна політична рівновага, встановлена після Другої світової війни, виявилася незворотно порушеною. У короткостроковій перспективі формування нового світового порядку стає неминучою реальністю, у якій Європа має виступати активним суб'єктом, а не пасивним «споживачем наслідків» [2]. Цей геополітичний зсув, зумовлений повномасштабною агресією росії проти України, ерозією трансатлантичних гарантій та появою складних гібридних загроз, вимагає не просто механічного збільшення видатків, а докорінної перебудови європейської оборонно-технологічної та промислової бази.

Історичний досвід підтверджує, що війна трансформує економіку швидше за будь-які планові реформи: саме військові конфлікти минулого стали каталізаторами появи радіозв'язку, реактивної авіації, радарних систем та інтернету. Сучасне протистояння, своєю чергою, стимулює стрімкий розвиток безпілотних систем, засобів РЕБ, алгоритмів штучного інтелекту та автономних енергетичних рішень [1]. У таких умовах передові військові розробки перетворюються на критичний стратегічний ресурс, що визначає не лише спроможність на полі бою, а й загальні темпи технологічної модернізації цивільної економіки.

Європейська оборонно-промислова стратегія (European Defence Industrial Strategy, EDIS) та Європейська оборонна інвестиційна програма (European Defence Industry Programme, EDIP) покликані закласти фундамент для переходу до «режиму воєнної економіки», що має на меті забезпечити стратегічну автономію Союзу до 2035 р. [3, 4]. Проте реалізація цих амбітних планів, що передбачають мобілізацію до 800 млрд євро інвестицій (ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030) [5],

⁴ Підготовлено в Державній установі «Інститут економіки та прогнозування Національної академії наук України» за рахунок бюджетних коштів, спрямованих на забезпечення проведення державними науковими установами наукових досліджень і науково-технічних (експериментальних) розробок за результатами державної атестації.

ставить перед ЄС критичне питання: чи стане цей оборонний імпульс рушієм загальноєвропейської модернізації та інноваційного прориву, чи він поглибить існуючі регіональні розриви, створюючи «Європу двох швидкостей» (Multi-speed Europe) у сфері високих технологій та промислового потенціалу [6].

Штучний інтелект (AI), автономні системи, квантові обчислення та космічні технології стають основою нової оборонної парадигми. ЄС розглядає цей виклик як можливість для глибокої модернізації своєї промисловості через концепцію «подвійного призначення» (dual-use). Модернізація виробничих ланцюжків передбачає впровадження «ever-war» (постійно готових) заводів, які можуть працювати на низькій потужності в мирний час і миттєво масштабуватися в період кризи. Це вимагає перегляду підходу до логістики: перехід від моделі «just-in-time» (саме вчасно) до «just-in-case» (на всякий випадок), що передбачає створення стратегічних запасів компонентів та сировини. Проте такий підхід є капіталомістким і вимагає стабільного довгострокового попиту, який може гарантувати лише спільне європейське замовлення.

Попри потенціал для інновацій, існує серйозна загроза, що реалізація програм переозброєння посилить міжкраїнні відмінності в ЄС. Сучасна європейська оборонна промисловість зосереджена в руках кількох «національних лідерів» у Франції, Німеччині, Італії, Іспанії та Швеції. Ринковий підхід до інтеграції, який просуває EDIS [3], природним чином надає перевагу цим існуючим центрам компетенції через ефект масштабу та накопичений досвід.

Держави Східного флангу, такі як Польща та країни Балтії, витрачають на оборону значно більший відсоток ВВП (Польща – 4,7% у 2025 р.), ніж країни Західної та Південної Європи. Вони підтримують запровадження «ярусної системи» фінансування, де 65% коштів ЄС мають спрямовуватися в країни, що безпосередньо межують з агресором. Проте представники Західної Європи часто відкидають ці вимоги, називаючи їх «географічним фаталізмом» та наполягаючи на інвестуванні в найбільш технологічно просунуті фірми, незалежно від їхнього розташування.

Для країн з меншим науково-технологічним потенціалом, зокрема в Центральній та Східній Європі існує ризик стати суто «споживачами» технологій, що виробляються в промисловому ядрі ЄС. Це створює парадокс: витрати на оборону зростають повсюдно, але економічні вигоди (робочі місця, R&D, податки) концентруються у вузькому колі високотехнологічних кластерів.

Одним із найбільш суперечливих аспектів є переспрямування коштів політики згуртованості (Cohesion Policy) на цілі оборони. Хоча

це дозволяє швидко модернізувати транспортні мережі та енергетичну інфраструктуру («військова мобільність»), це підриває саму суть політики згуртованості – скорочення економічних розривів між регіонами. Замість інвестицій у соціальну сферу, освіту чи екологію, ресурси можуть бути спрямовані на великі індустріальні об'єкти, що принесе вигоду лише певним територіям.

Будь-який технологічний прорив потребує людей. Оборонний сектор Європи стикається з критичним дефіцитом кадрів: для реалізації планів Readiness 2030 необхідно залучити понад 250 000 додаткових інженерів та кваліфікованих техніків протягом наступних п'яти років. В умовах загального скорочення працездатного населення в Європі загострюється боротьба за таланти між цивільним та оборонним секторами. Сучасне оборонне виробництво – це не конвеєри середини ХХ ст., а високоавтоматизовані, цифровізовані процеси, що потребують розробників ШІ, архітекторів систем, спеціалістів з кібербезпеки та адитивних технологій. Ці фахівці зазвичай концентруються у великих мегаполісах, або вже існуючих технологічних хабах. Таким чином, оборонне переозброєння може стимулювати розвиток «великих міст» (Париж, Мюнхен, Мадрид, Мілан), залишаючи сільські райони та депресивні індустріальні зони поза процесом інноваційного зростання. Тож без цілеспрямованої політики «розподілених інновацій» та інвестицій у професійну освіту в менш розвинених регіонах, оборонний бум лише посилить концентрацію інтелектуального капіталу в центрі, поглиблюючи регіональну нерівність.

Масштабне переозброєння несе в собі також значні макроекономічні ризики. По-перше, існує небезпека «витіснення» цивільних інвестицій військовими (crowding-out effect). Хоча оборонні R&D мають високі показники «переливання» (spillover effect) в цивільний сектор, у короткостроковій перспективі це може призвести до дефіциту інженерних кадрів у машинобудуванні або ІТ. По-друге, виникає «пастка легітимності»: якщо мільярдні інвестиції в оборону не призведуть до створення нових робочих місць у регіонах, а лише збагатять великих виробників, підтримка стратегії 2030 року серед виборців може швидко згаснути. Для вирішення цих проблем ЄС планує перекваліфікувати понад 600 тис. працівників для потреб оборонної індустрії до 2030 року [5]. Також акцентується увага на «подвійному використанні» (dual-use) технологій, де інвестиції в акумулятори для військової техніки одночасно сприяють «зеленому переходу» та енергонезалежності Європи.

Щоб запобігти надмірній концентрації ресурсів у великих корпораціях, стратегія EDIS та програма EDIP передбачають низку

заходів для підтримки малих та середніх підприємств (SME). SME складають значну частину ланцюжка постачання (понад 2 000 компаній) і часто є джерелом найбільш гнучких інновацій. Інструмент FAST (Fund to Accelerate Defence Supply-Chains Transformation) спеціально розроблений для полегшення доступу SME до боргового капіталу для масштабування виробництва. Крім того, EDIP передбачає підвищені ставки фінансування (до 50%) для проєктів, де більшість бенефіціарів є SME, або де створюються нові транскордонні кооперації [4]. Проте ефективність цих заходів залежить від спроможності національних урядів та регіональних агентств інновацій допомогти малим фірмам подолати високі бар'єри входу на оборонний ринок (складна сертифікація, перевірки безпеки, тривалі цикли закупівлі).

Комітет регіонів ЄС (European Committee of the Regions, CoR) вимагає більш жорсткого дотримання «європейської преференції», яка б включала не лише великих виробників, а й місцеві індустріальні кластери. Вони наголошують, що успіх Readiness 2030 залежатиме від здатності залучити регіони, які знаходяться на «передньому краї» безпекових викликів, зокрема прикордонні райони на Сході.

Аналіз нових безпекових викликів для ЄС та програм EDIS, EDIP і Readiness 2030 дозволяє зробити кілька висновків. Повномасштабна агресія РФ проти України змусила ЄС перейти до «режиму воєнної економіки», де інновації в сферах ШП, безпілотних систем та квантових технологій стають пріоритетом. Це створює вікно можливостей для науково-технічного прориву, подібного до періодів великих світових конфліктів минулого століття. Проте ризик посилення регіональних розривів є реальним і серйозним. Ринкова логіка концентрації капіталу та талантів у вже розвинених центрах може призвести до того, що менш потужні країни оплачуватимуть технологічне лідерство своїх багатших сусідів, отримуючи натомість лише посилену безпеку, але не економічний розвиток. Успіх європейського переозброєння залежатиме від того, чи вдасться перетворити цю ініціативу з суто військово-промислового проєкту на справжній інструмент загальноєвропейської єдності та модернізації. В іншому випадку, зміцнюючи свої зовнішні кордони, ЄС ризикує послабити свою внутрішню цілісність через зростаючу економічну та технологічну нерівність.

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ВНУТРІШНЯ ТОРГІВЛЯ: ПОТЕНЦІАЛ СТРУКТУРНОГО ДРАЙВЕРА ПІСЛЯВОЄННОГО ВІДНОВЛЕННЯ УКРАЇНИ

Повномасштабна війна спричинила масштабні втрати виробничого потенціалу, зміну територіальної структури господарської діяльності та переорієнтацію структури сукупного попиту, актуалізувавши пошук джерел економічної динаміки, здатних забезпечити стабілізацію відтворювальних процесів і сформувати підґрунтя для післявоєнного економічного відновлення. У наукових дослідженнях проблематика післявоєнної реконструкції економіки розглядається досить широко, однак роль торговельного сектору в них часто аналізується переважно через призму зовнішньоекономічних процесів, акцентуючи увагу на галузевих або інституційних аспектах модернізації економіки та інтеграції у глобальні економічні процеси [2]. Окремі автори наголошують на необхідності структурного реформування торговельної галузі як передумови стабільного функціонування економіки у післявоєнний період [3]. У закордонних дослідженнях постконфліктного розвитку економік підкреслюється важливість диверсифікації внутрішніх джерел економічного зростання та формування локальних ланцюгів доданої вартості [4]. Водночас структурна роль внутрішньої торгівлі як елемента відтворювального механізму економічної системи

розкрита недостатньо.

У сучасній економіці внутрішня торгівля виконує функцію інституційного та інфраструктурного посередника між виробництвом і кінцевим споживанням. Торговельний сектор забезпечує завершальну фазу економічного кругообігу, коли створена вартість трансформується у фінансові потоки та формує новий платоспроможний попит. Через скорочення трансакційних витрат, прискорення обороту капіталу та інтеграцію виробників із споживачами торгівля забезпечує стабільність економічних зв'язків і сприяє підвищенню ефективності функціонування ринку.

Економічний вплив внутрішньої торгівлі значною мірою реалізується через механізм сукупного споживчого попиту, який є одним із ключових факторів коротко- та середньострокової економічної динаміки. Отож активність торговельної діяльності може розглядатися як випереджальний індикатор змін економічної кон'юнктури. Розширення торгівлі стимулює попит на продукцію суміжних галузей – транспорту, логістики, фінансових і цифрових сервісів, формуючи мультиплікативний ефект і посилюючи її вплив на створення валової доданої вартості.

Для планування післявоєнної реконструкції економіки значення внутрішнього ринку зростає через можливість часткової компенсації втрат зовнішнього попиту. Активізація торговельної діяльності може сприяти швидшому відновленню підприємницької активності, оскільки сектор характеризується відносно низькими бар'єрами входу, коротшими інвестиційними циклами та високою адаптивністю до змін економічного середовища. Крім того, модернізація торговельних процесів, зокрема розвиток цифрових каналів збуту та логістичної інфраструктури, здатна підвищувати загальну ефективність функціонування економічної системи.

Післявоєнний етап розвитку економіки варто розглядати як період структурної адаптації, протягом якого відбуватиметься трансформація пропорцій попиту і пропозиції, а також посилюватиметься роль внутрішніх джерел економічного зростання. Відповідно змінюватиметься і структура споживчих потреб. Частина попиту формуватиметься за рахунок відновлення житлового фонду, придбання товарів першої необхідності та розвитку локальних ринків послуг, що стимулюватиме відповідні сегменти виробництва, сприяючи поживленню економічної активності.

Важливість внутрішнього попиту підтверджується аналізом структурної динаміки валового внутрішнього продукту України за кінцевим використанням (табл. 1). Упродовж 2015–2019 рр. частка

кінцевих споживчих витрат у ВВП коливалася у межах 84–90%, що свідчило про відносну збалансованість між внутрішнім споживанням, інвестиціями та зовнішньоторговельним компонентом. У наступні роки її зростання відображало компенсаторну роль внутрішнього попиту в умовах скорочення чистого експорту. Отож, внутрішнє споживання дедалі більше визначає конфігурацію використання ВВП.

Таблиця 1

**Частка основних компонентів використання ВВП України за
окремими періодами, %***

Період	Споживчі витрати	Валове нагромадження	Експорт товарів і послуг
2015–2019	84–90	14–21	45–52
2020–2021	93–95	7–13	39–41
2022–2024	87–106	12–15	28–40

**Джерело: узагальнено автором за даними [1].*

Фактором післявоєнної економічної трансформації може стати і зміна просторової структури внутрішнього ринку. Масштабна релокація підприємств та внутрішня міграція населення вже формують нові центри економічної активності, зумовлюючи перерозподіл споживчого попиту між регіонами. Відтак торговельна галузь може стати інтегратором регіональних економічних систем, забезпечуючи формування нових локальних ринків та адаптацію логістичної інфраструктури.

Аналіз макроекономічних показників свідчить про стабільність структурної ролі торгівлі в економіці України. Упродовж останнього десятиріччя частка сектору у ВВП коливалася в межах близько 12–14%, а у валовій доданій вартості – близько 15%. Навіть в умовах повномасштабної війни галузь не виявила критичного структурного скорочення, що свідчить про її інтегрованість у базові відтворювальні пропорції національної економіки. Результати аналізу еластичності валової доданої вартості торговельного сектору відносно ВВП України із застосуванням методу дугової еластичності (табл. 2) показали, що у докризовий період динаміка розвитку торгівлі загалом випереджала темпи економічного зростання, що свідчило про її високу чутливість до змін сукупного попиту. Пандемічний та геополітичний шоки супроводжувались порушенням попередніх закономірностей, що проявилось у різноспрямованій динаміці макроекономічних показників та торговельної діяльності.

Найбільш різкі зміни відбулися через повномасштабний воєнний шок, коли скорочення валової доданої вартості торгівлі відбувалося швидше, ніж падіння ВВП, що підтверджує високу чутливість галузі. Водночас подальша стабілізація вказує на випереджальні темпи відновлення споживчих ринків та торговельної інфраструктури

порівняно із загальнооекономічною динамікою. Отримані результати дозволяють зробити висновок про помірну проциклічність торговельного сектору, яка проявляється у його випереджальній реакції на фази економічного піднесення та спаду. Така властивість підсилює потенціал торгівлі як одного з драйверів післявоєнного економічного відновлення.

Таблиця 2

**Еластичність валової доданої вартості торгівлі відносно ВВП
України за окремими періодами***

Період	Характер економічної динаміки	Еластичність
2015–2019	Економічне зростання, розширення внутрішнього попиту	1,03–1,76
2019–2021	Пандемічний шок та структурні обмеження	–1,35 – –0,02
2021–2022	Повномасштабний воєнний шок	1,12
2022–2023	Часткове відновлення економіки	1,53
2023–2024	Фаза структурної адаптації	0,22

**Джерело: узагальнено за результатами розрахунків автора.*

Таким чином, внутрішню торгівлю доцільно розглядати як важливий структурний елемент відтворювального механізму національної економіки. Вона забезпечує трансмісію доходів у платоспроможний попит, підтримує безперервність економічного кругообігу та сприяє стабілізації макроекономічної динаміки. Збереження її структурної ролі у валовому продукті, адаптаційна спроможність до кризових потрясінь і проциклічний характер розвитку створюють підстави розглядати торговельний сектор як один із ключових факторів економічного відновлення України у післявоєнний період.

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ПСИХОЛОГІЧНА ГОТОВНІСТЬ НАСЕЛЕННЯ ДО ДІЙ У КРИЗОВИХ УМОВАХ: КЛЮЧОВІ ЧИННИКИ ТА БА'ЄРИ

В умовах зростання кількості глобальних викликів проблема готовності цивільного населення до участі у системі цивільного захисту набуває особливої значущості. Сучасний світ дедалі частіше стикається з різноманітними загрозами, серед яких збройні конфлікти, терористичні прояви, природні катастрофи, пандемії та техногенні аварії, що потребують своєчасного й узгодженого реагування. За таких обставин ефективність системи цивільного захисту визначається не лише функціонуванням державних інституцій, а й рівнем підготовленості населення до дій у кризових ситуаціях. Вагоме місце серед чинників, що впливають на результативність реагування на надзвичайні ситуації, посідають психологічні аспекти, які визначають поведінку людини в умовах ризику та невизначеності.

Психологічна готовність, що охоплює здатність до емоційної саморегуляції, адекватної оцінки ризиків і швидкого прийняття рішень, виступає ключовою передумовою ефективних дій у кризових умовах. У зв'язку з цим доцільним є виокремлення та систематизація психологічних чинників, що визначають рівень готовності населення до участі у цивільній обороні, з урахуванням як тих, що сприяють активній поведінці, так і тих, що її обмежують.

Підтвердженням актуальності дослідження готовності населення до участі в цивільній обороні слугують результати соціологічних опитувань, проведених в Україні. Зокрема, за наявними даними, близько 54% громадян, які не проходять військову службу, заявляють про готовність за потреби приєднатися до сил оборони. При цьому 38% респондентів не демонструють такої готовності, що вказує на суттєву частку населення, яка не готова до активної участі в обороні держави. Аналіз результатів за гендерним критерієм свідчить про вищий рівень готовності серед чоловіків (близько 63%), у той час як серед жінок цей показник дорівнює приблизно 46%. Крім того, найвищі значення спостерігаються серед осіб працездатного віку: для чоловіків до 60 років вони коливаються в межах 60-64% [1]. Ці дані підкреслюють неоднорідність готовності населення та обґрунтовують потребу в подальшому вивченні факторів, що її визначають.

До психологічних чинників, що сприяють готовності населення до участі у цивільній обороні, належать передусім особистісні якості та внутрішні ресурси людини. Одним із ключових є психологічна стійкість,

яка забезпечує здатність зберігати емоційну рівновагу, контролювати власні реакції та діяти раціонально в умовах стресу. Вона сприяє уникненню паніки та підвищує ефективність поведінки у кризових ситуаціях. Важливу роль відіграють сміливість і рішучість, що забезпечують готовність діяти попри небезпеку та оперативно приймати рішення. Вольові якості, зокрема наполегливість і завзятість, сприяють досягненню поставлених цілей навіть за наявності труднощів.

Як зазначає Ю. Ільїна, важливим чинником ефективної діяльності у надзвичайних умовах є відповідальність, яка формується на основі мотивації, соціальних норм та усвідомлення особистістю власних обов'язків [2]. Вона сприяє формуванню відповідального становища до власних обов'язків та підтримує готовність діяти в кризових умовах. Серед мотиваційних чинників доцільно виділити зацікавленість у суспільному житті, прагнення допомагати іншим та відчуття власної значущості. Вони сприяють формуванню активної громадянської позиції та підвищують рівень участі у заходах цивільного захисту. Соціально-психологічні чинники, такі як емпатія, взаємопідтримка та згуртованість, забезпечують ефективну взаємодію між людьми в умовах небезпеки [3]. Окрему роль відіграє рівень обізнаності населення щодо правил поведінки у надзвичайних ситуаціях. Наявність знань і навичок дій у кризових умовах знижує рівень невизначеності та підвищує впевненість у власних діях.

Водночас існують психологічні чинники, що знижують готовність населення до участі у цивільній обороні. Найпоширенішими серед них є страх і тривожність. У разі надмірного прояву вони можуть пригнічувати здатність до раціонального мислення, викликати паніку або спричиняти бездіяльність [4]. Невпевненість у власних силах також є суттєвим бар'єром, оскільки знижує здатність людини приймати рішення та діяти ефективно. Особи з низькою самооцінкою часто сумніваються у власних можливостях і уникають активної участі у кризових ситуаціях.

Серед негативних чинників слід виділити байдужість і соціальну апатію, що проявляються у відсутності інтересу до питань безпеки та небажанні брати участь у спільних діях. У таких випадках загрози не сприймаються як особисто значущі. Сюди можна також додати соціальну апатію, як відсутність відчуття приналежності до громади, небажанні брати участь у спільних справах. Через це відбувається пасивність у громадському житті, уникається участь у добровільній діяльності. О. Платковська, зазначає, що поведінка людини у складних умовах значною мірою залежить від розвитку вольових якостей, які допомагають долати труднощі та внутрішні перешкоди. До таких перешкод можуть належати пасивність, страх, небажання діяти або

сформовані стереотипи уникнення складних ситуацій. Саме слабкість вольової регуляції та наявність внутрішніх бар'єрів можуть призводити до бездіяльності людини і знижувати її готовність до активних дій у кризових умовах [5]. Окремим важливим чинником є психологічна виснаженість, яка виникає внаслідок тривалого стресу, особливо в умовах воєнного стану. Вона знижує рівень мотивації, здатність до навчання та активної діяльності, що негативно впливає на готовність населення до дій.

Таким чином, готовність населення до участі в цивільній обороні являє собою багатовимірне явище, що формується під впливом позитивних і негативних психологічних факторів. Урахування цих чинників слугує передумовою для підвищення ефективності системи цивільного захисту та вдосконалення суспільної реакції на сучасні виклики.

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ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ УПРАВЛІННЯ РЕВЕРСИВНОЮ ЛОГІСТИКОЮ В КОНТЕКСТІ ЄВРОІНТЕГРАЦІЇ УКРАЇНИ

Практична реалізація євроінтеграційного курсу України передбачає системні трансформації в різноманітних сферах та системах управління та функціонування економіки. Стратегічний курс ЄС на сталий розвиток, декарбонізацію, зелену економіку на основі циркулярності постійно удосконалюється та деталізується в програмних та регуляторних документах та рішеннях. В основі досягнення екологічних цілей лежить циркулярність руху ресурсів, реалізація якого на операційному рівні досягається через реверсивну логістику. Серед таких прийнятих новацій – Директива про корпоративну звітність зі сталого розвитку, Регламент про екодизайн сталих продуктів, Регламент про упаковку та відходи від упаковки, Стратегічний план інвестицій у сталий транспорт та ін.. Такі документи доповнюють та уточнюють правила та норми, що фактично зобов'язують підприємства та держави до систематичного моніторингу й звітності щодо зворотних ланцюгів поставок. Дотримання цих вимог є умовою не лише євроінтеграції, а й конкурентоспроможного доступу українських підприємств до ринку ЄС в умовах дії механізму вуглецевого коригування на кордоні.

Для України проблематика розбудови циркулярної економіки все ще носить фрагментарний характер. Війна з одного боку критично загострила руйнування довкілля, логістичної інфраструктури та дефіцитність багатьох ресурсів, а з іншого фактично закріпила безальтернативність інноваційної, ресурсоефективної, а відповідно циркулярної відбудови національної економіки. При цьому успішність євроінтеграційного курсу країни обмежується не лише ресурсними бар'єрами, а й методологічними невизначеностями в царині відповідного інформаційного забезпечення реалізації успішної реверсивної логістики. Це унеможливорює достовірне кількісне оцінювання масштабу реверсивних матеріальних потоків, побудову доказової аргументації для обґрунтування регуляторних чи інвестиційних рішень у цій сфері відповідно до зростаючого регуляторного базису ЄС. Це актуалізує питання поступового усунення не лише фінансових, а й методологічних прогалин щодо реверсивної логістики.

Загалом в дослідженнях виокремлюються три основні підходи до оцінки зворотних ресурсних потоків, що спрямовані на вирішення дещо

різних завдань та мають певні обмеження у формуванні відповідної статистичної бази.

Перший, класичне підхід, запропонований D.Rogers, R.Lembke (2001), розглядає реверсивну логістику через: (1) критерій напряму руху ресурсного потоку – від споживача назад до виробника чи місця відновлення; та (2) критерій кінцевої мети - повторного використання чи утилізації [1,2]. Це теоретично коректний, але операційно складний для обліку та подальшої аналітики підхід. Проведені огляди публікацій із зазначеної проблематики, зокрема (Gallegos et al., 2024) показують відсутність розроблених за досить тривалий 30-річний період уніфікованих систем звітності на основі зазначеного класичного підходу [3].

Другий підхід ґрунтується на вивченні та звітності за відходами та напрямками їх використання. Зокрема, в ЄС достатньо широко збирається, систематизується та аналізується інформація про різні групи відходів, частку повторно використаних, утилізованих відходів. Проте низка операцій, що по суті відносяться до реверсивної логістики, зокрема, комерційні повернення, зворотна тара і пакування багаторазового використання, внутрішньовиробничі ремонтні потоки та ін. не включається до такої статистичної звітності. А наявна статистика щодо рівня повного використаних матеріалів у виробництві (Circular Material Use Rate – CMUR) в середньому по країнах ЄС складає близько 12%, що підкреслює складність та обмеженість масштабування циркулярних бізнес-моделей та стратегій навіть у країнах з розвиненими економіка [4,5]. І навіть потенційно вища споживча свідомість та поведінка мешканців таких країн поки що слабо трансформується у розвинену циркулярну економіку. Для України потенціал циркулярності знаходиться на початковому рівні реалізації й потребуватиме більше зусиль на етапі гармонізації та адаптації до перманентно удосконалюваних стратегій та політик ЄС.

Третій підхід фокусується на дослідженні ефективності управління реверсивною логістикою, а не безпосередньо ресурсних потоків. Це, відповідно, має більш прикладний, комерційний характер, сильніше підпорядкований корпоративним інтересам, а тому отримані дані враховують багато суб'єктивних оцінок та факторів впливу. Це знижує їх достовірність та звужує сферу застосування отриманих даних. Методологія таких досліджень переважно непрозора, оцінки різних агентств помітно відрізняються (на понад 20–30%) [6].

Підсумовуючи, такі різно-направлені підходи не забезпечують формування повноцінної достовірної доказової статистичної бази для

управління реверсивною логістикою на макро-, так і макrorівні та досягнення цілей розбудови циркулярної економіки в країні.

З урахуванням зазначеного, трансформацію системи управління реверсивними ресурсними потоками відповідно до євроінтеграційної практики доцільно реалізовувати за наступними взаємоузгодженими та пов'язаними напрямками: (1) методологічному; (2) регуляторному; (3) інфраструктурному.

Ключовими завданнями для методологічного напрямку є розробка класифікацій реверсивних ресурсних потоків, що оновлювали не лише відходи, а й комерційні поворотні потоки. Інтеграції таких класифікацій та форм звітності у статистику забезпечуватиме якісну доказову базу для оптимізації реалізації реверсивної логістики.

Регуляторний напрям має ґрунтуватись на масштабуванні механізму Розширеної відповідальності виробника (РВВ). Закон України «Про управління відходами» закладає правову основу, проте механізми РВВ за окремими категоріями продуктів (упаковка, електричне та електронне обладнання, батареї) ще потребують додаткового підзаконного врегулювання [7]. Також необхідна гармонізація вимог до прозорості ланцюгів поставок відповідно до норм щодо цифрового паспорту продукції (DPP - Digital Product Passport), що ставатиме однією з умовою доступу українських підприємств до ринків ЄС у середньостроковій перспективі.

Базисом інфраструктурного напрямку має бути системи збирання та обробки даних за різними складовими реверсивних потоків. Такий практичний напрям в умовах повоєнного відновлення формуватиме нові можливості розбудови сучасну циркулярної інфраструктури. Так, Програма Ukraine Facility ЄС містить вимоги щодо реформ у сфері управління відходами як умову надання макрофінансової допомоги, що формує додатковий стимул для системних перетворень у сфері циркулярної економіки загалом, і реверсивної логістики як одного її ключових складових, зокрема [8].

Підсумовуючи, зазначимо, що трансформація управління реверсивними ресурсними потоками для України є і залишатиметься на етапі відновлення євроінтеграційною необхідністю. Відсутність уніфікованої методології обліку реверсивних потоків потребує активізації дослідницьких зусиль та співпраці для створення сприятливих умов для адаптації України до регуляторного середовища ЄС і розбудови повноцінної циркулярної економіки на основі ефективної реверсивної логістики.

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РОЛЬ МІЖНАРОДНИХ МОЛОДІЖНИХ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙ У РОЗВИТКУ ПРОФЕСІЙНОЇ АНГЛІЙСЬКОЇ МОВИ ТА МАРКЕТИНГОВИХ КОМПЕТЕНТНОСТЕЙ (НА ПРИКЛАДІ AIESEC)

В епоху цифрової глобалізації ринок праці висуває дедалі вищі вимоги до молодих спеціалістів, особливо у секторах ІТ та маркетингу. Вільне володіння англійською мовою вже не є просто перевагою, а обов'язковою умовою для інтеграції у світовий економічний простір. Згідно з фундаментальним звітом British Council *The Future of English: Global Perspectives* (2023), англійська мова залишається домінуючою глобальною "lingua franca" та критичним фактором для

працевлаштування і міжнародної мобільності [1]. Водночас традиційна академічна освіта не завжди надає достатньо можливостей для практичного застосування іноземної мови у професійних контекстах. У цій роботі стверджується, що участь у міжнародних молодіжних організаціях, таких як AIESEC, слугує важливою платформою для подолання розриву між теоретичними знаннями та практичними навичками через занурення в англомовне середовище.

Дослідження базується на аналізі операційних процесів в AIESEC та особистому досвіді автора у відділі маркетингу та зв'язків з громадськістю (MKT&PR) відокремленого підрозділу у Вінниці. Ключовою особливістю організації є використання англійської мови не як предмета вивчення, а як основного інструменту комунікації та управління. Такий підхід узгоджується з принципами предметно-мовного інтегрованого навчання (CLIL), де мова засвоюється імпліцитно під час виконання професійних завдань.

Сучасні роботодавці шукають фахівців, які володіють комбінацією технічних знань та соціальних навичок. Як зазначено у звіті Всесвітнього економічного форуму *The Future of Jobs Report 2023*, аналітичне мислення, креативність та здатність працювати в мультикультурному середовищі входять до переліку найбільш затребуваних навичок на ринку праці [2]. Волонтерство в AIESEC безпосередньо відповідає на цей запит. Працюючи в глобальній мережі, студенти вчаться адаптуватися до різних культурних норм та бізнес-етикету, що є необхідним для IT-фахівців, які працюють в аутсорсингових компаніях із замовниками зі США чи Європи.

Окремим і надзвичайно важливим компонентом професійного розвитку в AIESEC є можливість участі в міжнародних програмах обміну, таких як Global Volunteer та Global Talent. Ці ініціативи створюють унікальне середовище, де англійська виступає єдиним засобом взаємодії між представниками різних культур. На відміну від аудиторних занять, де студенти можуть вдатися до рідної мови, умови міжнародного стажування виключають таку можливість, змушуючи мозок адаптуватися до мислення англійською. Для IT-фахівця цей досвід є безцінним, оскільки він симулює робочий процес у транснаціональній технологічній компанії, де крос-функціональні команди з різних країн співпрацюють над одним проєктом, використовуючи англійську як робочу мову.

Крім того, функція Marketing & PR в організації надає унікальні можливості для опанування фахової термінології та цифрових інструментів. Практична реалізація промо-кампаній передбачає роботу з такими поняттями, як коефіцієнт залучення (engagement rate), охоплення

(reach), аналіз цільової аудиторії, цілісність бренду та лідогенерація. Спираючись на досвід автора на позиції менеджера середньої ланки у вініницькому відокремленому підрозділі, можна стверджувати, що використання цих інструментів в англomовному контексті дозволяє глибше зрозуміти механізми цифрового маркетингу. Зокрема, аналіз статистичних даних із соціальних мереж та веб-платформ вимагає вміння інтерпретувати англomовні метрики та формувати звіти. Цей досвід є особливо релевантним для майбутніх Product Managers та Business Analysts в ІТ-сфері, оскільки поєднує технічні навички аналізу даних із маркетинговими стратегіями.

Важливо також наголосити на розвитку лідерських якостей та "м'яких навички" (soft skills). Згідно з річним звітом *AIESEC Global Annual Report*, організація щороку залучає десятки тисяч молодих людей до програм розвитку лідерства, які роблять акцент на самосвідомості та розширенні можливостей інших [3]. У контексті роботи відділу MKT&PR це трансформується у вміння пітчити ідеї перед керівним складом, управляти кризовими комунікаціями та координувати роботу команди. Регулярне звітування та публічні виступи формують професійну звичку структурованого мислення та чіткого висловлення думки англійською мовою. Відтак, AIESEC виступає як комплексний симулятор майбутнього робочого місця, де студент отримує конкурентну перевагу через реальну практику.

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ІСТОРИЧНІ АСПЕКТИ РОЗВИТКУ ЦІННОСТЕЙ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЇ

У сучасному суспільстві, де зростає роль організацій у соціально-економічному житті, особливої актуальності набуває проблема

узгодження цінностей людини й цінностей організації в корпоративній системі. Саме система цінностей визначає характер взаємовідносин між працівниками й організацією, формує корпоративну культуру, впливає на мотивацію персоналу, рівень залученості, лояльності та ефективність діяльності компанії загалом. В умовах посилення конкуренції на ринку праці, поширення дистанційних форм зайнятості та зміни трудових орієнтацій працівників значення ціннісного чинника істотно зростає.

Мета дослідження: розкрити історичну сутність розвитку цінностей організації в корпоративній системі.

Цінності організації – це спільні переконання та принципи, що формують її культуру, впливають на поведінку співробітників та визначають місію компанії, а історичні аспекти їх розвитку показують еволюцію від ранніх, зосереджених на ефективності праці (як у тейлоризму), до сучасних, що акцентують увагу на інноваціях, адаптації та етичному лідерстві, інтегруючись у ширший контекст суспільних змін та культурних ідеалів [1].

Розглянемо історичні етапи розвитку цінностей організації.

На ранніх етапах, а це період Промислової революції (1760-ті – 1840-ві роки), цінності були переважно пов'язані з продуктивністю, дисципліною, ефективністю, що відображалось у концепціях, як-от науковий менеджмент Ф. Тейлора (орієнтація на завдання) та ієрархічна структура, де головною цінністю була підпорядкованість і контроль. Під час Промислової революції цінності організацій змістилися до ефективності, раціоналізації, поділу праці та масового виробництва, з акцентом на технологічний прогрес (парова машина, механізація) та зростання прибутку, що призвело до появи нових соціальних класів (робітники, буржуазія) і переходу від аграрного суспільства до індустріального, де капітал, інновації та масштаби ставали ключовими [2].

В середині XX століття, а цей період ще називають «Гуманістичні підходи» з'являється розуміння важливості людського фактора. Цінності зміщуються до співробітництва, задоволеності працею, мотивації (теорії Абрахаама Маслоу, McGregor), визнаючи, що люди – не просто гвинтики, а й джерело інновацій. У період гуманістичних підходів цінністю організації є людина – її розвиток, гідність, права та потреби, а не лише виробництво чи прибуток, що проявляється через орієнтацію на співпрацю, самоактуалізацію співробітників, створення підтримуючого середовища та відповідальність перед суспільством, де індивідуальний внесок цінується, а благополуччя колективу забезпечує успіх всієї компанії [3].

Наприкінці XX століття з'являється організаційна культура як ключовий елемент. Цінності стають більш багатограними, включаючи

якість, клієнто-орієнтованість, командну роботу, а організація прагне адаптуватися до змін у зовнішньому середовищі. Цінності організацій зміщувались від суто ієрархічних та орієнтованих на виробництво до більш людиноцентричних та гнучких, де акцент робився на корпоративній культурі, що включала етику, співпрацю, інновації та залучення співробітників, аби адаптуватися до швидких змін ринку, конкуренції та глобалізації.

На сучасному етапі (XXI століття) цінності стають стратегічним інструментом. Акцент зміщується на соціальну відповідальність (ESG), різноманітність та інклюзію, гнучкість, інноваційність, етичне лідерство та стійкість, інтегруючи індивідуальні прагнення співробітників із бізнес-цілями; це не лише про прибуток, а й про формування стійкої корпоративної культури, що ґрунтується на довірі, етиці, постійному навчанні та адаптації до швидких змін. Організації цінують прозорість, навчання та розвиток співробітників, інтегруючи їхні особистісні цінності з цілями компанії [4].

Таким чином, розкриваючи історичну сутність і специфіку цінностей організації, можемо назвати ключові аспекти їх розвитку:

- формування культури: цінності є фундаментом організаційної культури, визначаючи норми, традиції та мову взаємодії.

- адаптація: цінності допомагають організації адаптуватися до зовнішніх викликів, розвиваючи гнучкість та інноваційність.

- імідж та конкурентоспроможність означає, що сильні, позитивні цінності підвищують привабливість компанії для клієнтів, партнерів та талантів на ринку.

- людський капітал – цінності впливають на мотивацію, лояльність та продуктивність персоналу, перетворюючи його на ключовий ресурс.

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ГЛОБАЛІЗАЦІЯ СУЧАСНОГО СВІТУ: ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ ТА СУПЕРЕЧНОСТІ

Глобалізація є дуже важливою в сучасному світі, що сприяє інтеграції національних економік у єдиний світовий процес економічних відносин. Зараз жодна держава не може економічно розвиватися без глобалізації. Україна є також частиною світової економіки і намагається налагоджувати економічні зв'язки з різними країнами та інтегруватися в економічні союзи такі як ЄС.

Цей процес створює можливості багатьом країнам досягти економічного зростання. Є дуже великі перспективи і плюси для економіки сучасних країн. Насамперед, покращується доступ до широкого спектру продуктів, послуг, технологій, ліків та знань, а новітні розробки та технології дадуть можливість реалізувати потенціал для досягнення значно більшої клієнтської бази. Це призведе до збільшення обсягів продажів і обміну, підвищення темпів зростання ВВП та розширення можливостей окремих осіб і політичних систем за рахунок залучення додаткових ресурсів і капіталу. Посилення співпраці між країнами сприяє розвитку міжнародного поділу праці, зростанню міграції робочої сили та поглибленню інтернаціоналізації виробництва. Унаслідок цього держави стають взаємозалежними та взаємовпливовими в різних сферах економіки. Для великих глобальних компаній, відомих як транснаціональні корпорації, основними перевагами виходу на ринки, що розвиваються, є наявність незадоволеного попиту на нову продукцію, нижча вартість робочої сили, дешевші природні ресурси та інші виробничі ресурси [1]. Таким чином, міжнародна комерційна діяльність безпосередньо впливає на внутрішню економіку країни. Завдяки глобалізації відбудеться зростання міжнародного руху капіталу. Укладення та реалізація міжнародних угод сприяють економічному зростанню. Крім того, міжнародна співпраця прискорює розвиток науково-технічних досліджень. Завдяки міжнародній співпраці прискорюються науково-технічні дослідження. Ольга Хаєцька в своєму дослідженні підтверджує це: «Жодна національна економіка незалежно від розмірів країн та рівня розвитку не може більше бути самодостатньою виходячи з наявних чинників виробництва, технологій та потреби в капіталі» [2, с. 317].

Водночас є і свої недоліки та суперечності. Одним з них є нерівномірність розподілу плюсів глобалізації, тобто негативним

впливом глобалізаційних процесів на конкретну країну значною мірою визначається її позицією у світовій економічній системі [3]. Цей недолік дуже сильно позначається на мало розвинутих країнах, і вони найчастіше беруть участь в глобалізаційних процесах як просто постачальники сировини та виробники трудомісткої продукції. Саме тому у цих глобалізаційних процесах найчастіше перемагає високо розвинуті індустріальні країни. Але і для таких високо розвинутих країн є також мінус: він полягає в тому що зростає безробіття, тому що багато високо розвинутих держав переносять своє виробництво в країни Азії задля більш дешевого виробництва [1]. Таким чином ми можемо спостерігати зростання безробіття в результаті перерозподілу компаніями країн із високою вартістю робочої сили частини своїх виробничих потужностей у країни з низькою оплатою праці. Але нерівномірність від глобалізації отримують не лише країни, а й окремі галузі економіки. Наприклад, галузі, що виграють від зовнішньої торгівлі та експорту, залучають більше капіталу й висококваліфікованих працівників, тоді як інші сектори, менш пристосовані до глобалізації, втрачають конкурентні переваги через зростання відкритості ринку. Також одним із прикладом нерівномірності є рівень технологічного розвитку країни, який визначає її привабливість для ведення бізнесу, а також спектр можливих операцій [3]. Працюючи на закордонних ринках, компанії можуть стикатися з низькою технологічних труднощів, зокрема необхідністю навчання персоналу роботі з новим обладнанням; недостатньо розвиненими транспортними системами, що підвищують витрати на виробництво й логістику; слабкою комунікаційною інфраструктурою; низьким рівнем технологічної грамотності; обмеженим доступом до надійного широкосмугового Інтернету та пов'язаних із ним технологій, які забезпечують ефективне планування, реалізацію та контроль бізнес-процесів. Ще однією із перешкод глобалізації є те що кожна країна має власні закони та правила, що регулюють бізнес [1]. Транснаціональним компаніям потрібен доступ до юридичної експертизи, щоб допомогти зрозуміти внутрішньодержавне законодавство та дотримуватися чинних нормативних актів. Бізнесу важливо розуміти правовий та нормативний клімат для своєї галузі та типу організації перед виходом на новий ринок.

Попри наявні суперечності та недоліки, глобалізація є невід'ємною складовою розвитку сучасного світу. Вона сприяє економічному зростанню, розширенню міжнародної співпраці та поглибленню інтеграції національних економік. Для України цей процес є особливо важливим, оскільки відкриває нові можливості для розвитку та

зміцнення економічних зв'язків з іншими країнами, зокрема з Європейським Союзом.

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ПЛАНУВАННЯ РОЗВИТКУ ПЕРСОНАЛУ В СИСТЕМІ УПРАВЛІННЯ ІННОВАЦІЙНИМ ПІДПРИЄМСТВОМ

Ефективність діяльності підприємств визначається низкою важливих чинників, у т.ч. якістю планування в системі управління персоналом. Для організацій, що працюють у наукоємних галузях, зокрема у сфері розробки хімічних технологій, людський капітал є ключовим фактором створення конкурентних переваг. Планування розвитку персоналу повинно поєднувати стратегічні цілі підприємства з формуванням необхідних професійних компетенцій працівників [2].

Ми проаналізували цей аспект менеджменту в ТОВ «Науково-технічне підприємство «Ділові електронні системи» (ТОВ «ДЕСИС»), яке працює на ринку розробки технологій виробництва медичних і харчових газів, а також різноманітних газових сумішей для промислового використання. Специфіка діяльності підприємства передбачає високі вимоги до професійного рівня працівників, оскільки виконання науково-технічних та інноваційних проєктів потребує глибоких знань у галузі хімічних технологій та інженерних рішень.

Однією з характерних рис кадрового потенціалу підприємства є високий рівень освітньої підготовки працівників. Більшість персоналу має повну вищу освіту, що створює передумови для реалізації складних інноваційних розробок та забезпечення відповідності продукції

міжнародним стандартам якості. Водночас діяльність підприємства упродовж останніх років відбувалася в умовах значних зовнішніх викликів, пов'язаних із військовою агресією проти України, що позначилося і на динаміці чисельності персоналу.

Таблиця 1

**Основні характеристики персоналу ТОВ «ДЕСИС»
у 2022–2024 рр.***

Показники	2022	2023	2024
Середньооблікова чисельність працівників, осіб	108	93	86
Працівники з повною вищою освітою, осіб	99	85	79
Прийнято нових працівників за рік, осіб	10	4	2
Звільнено за власним бажанням, осіб	18	6	4
Звільнено у зв'язку з мобілізацією, осіб	7	4	8

**Джерело: узагальнено автором за даними підприємства.*

Аналіз наведених даних свідчить, що у 2022–2024 рр. чисельність персоналу підприємства поступово скорочувалася. Найбільш суттєві кадрові зміни відбулися у перший рік повномасштабної війни, що було зумовлено мобілізацією працівників та вимушеною міграцією частини персоналу. Водночас у наступні роки кадрова ситуація стабілізувалася, що свідчить про відносно ефективне функціонування системи управління персоналом підприємства.

Важливу роль у формуванні кадрової політики відіграє керівництво підприємства, яке визначає стратегічні напрями розвитку організації та координує процеси планування людських ресурсів. Директор ТОВ «ДЕСИС» виступає ініціатором впровадження нових технологічних рішень і активно підтримує розвиток інноваційних проєктів, що позитивно впливає на мотивацію працівників та сприяє формуванню сприятливого психологічного клімату в колективі.

У практиці управління персоналом підприємства поєднуються два підходи до використання людського капіталу. З одного боку, працівники розглядаються як ресурс, ефективність якого повинна забезпечувати економічну віддачу для організації. З іншого боку, значна увага приділяється розвитку професійного потенціалу персоналу, підвищенню кваліфікації та формуванню лідерських якостей працівників. Такий підхід відповідає сучасним концепціям управління людськими ресурсами, які розглядають персонал як стратегічний актив організації в умовах війни [1].

Водночас проведений аналіз дозволив виявити низку проблем у системі планування та використання трудових ресурсів. Зокрема, певні управлінські рішення щодо організації робочого часу призводили до неповного використання потенційного фонду робочого часу, що, у свою чергу, могло зменшувати можливі фінансові результати діяльності

підприємства.

Крім того, окремі елементи організаційної структури управління потребують оптимізації. Наприклад, у сфері продажу та маркетингу функціонують декілька управлінських ланок, що частково дублюють управлінські функції. Така ситуація може призводити до зростання витрат на утримання управлінського персоналу без відповідного підвищення результативності роботи.

Важливою складовою планування діяльності підприємства є інформаційна підтримка управлінських рішень. У ТОВ «ДЕСИС» використовується спеціалізоване програмне забезпечення для обробки та аналізу інформації, що дозволяє формувати аналітичні звіти та оцінювати перспективи розвитку інноваційних проєктів. Використання інформаційних систем значно підвищує можливості керівництва щодо реагування на зміни зовнішнього середовища та коригування стратегічних планів розвитку підприємства.

Разом з тим аналіз показників економіки праці свідчить про наявність певних диспропорцій між динамікою продуктивності праці та рівнем оплати праці персоналу.

Таблиця 2

**Основні показники економіки праці ТОВ «ДЕСИС»
у 2022–2024 рр.***

Показники	2022	2023	2024
Продуктивність праці, тис. грн/особу	70,6	48,6	53,1
Середня заробітна плата, тис. грн	10,3	12,6	17,9
Прибуток (збиток) на одного працівника, тис. грн	–90,3	19,2	–105,4
Плинність кадрів, %	6,4	7,5	11,3

**Джерело: узагальнено автором за даними підприємства.*

Як свідчать наведені дані, упродовж досліджуваного періоду продуктивність праці працівників зменшилася, тоді як рівень заробітної плати демонстрував стабільну тенденцію до зростання. Така диспропорція може свідчити про недостатню узгодженість системи планування використання трудових ресурсів із результатами діяльності підприємства.

Отже, проведений аналіз показав, що система управління персоналом у ТОВ «ДЕСИС» має значний потенціал розвитку, однак потребує вдосконалення механізмів планування трудових ресурсів. Насамперед це стосується оптимізації організаційної структури управління, підвищення ефективності використання робочого часу та вдосконалення інформаційного забезпечення управлінських рішень. Реалізація зазначених заходів дозволить підвищити результативність використання людського капіталу та зміцнити конкурентні позиції підприємства на ринку інноваційних технологій.

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АКАДЕМІЧНА МОБІЛЬНІСТЬ СТУДЕНТІВ УКРАЇНИ В КРАЇНАХ ЄС: МОЖЛИВОСТІ, ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ, ВИКЛИКИ ТА ПРОБЛЕМИ

Академічна мобільність для України відіграє немалу роль в розвитку освіти країни та в європейській інтеграції. Після приєднання України до Болонської системи, мобільність стала більш доступною. Найважливішу роль відіграє програма Erasmus+, яка надає багато різних можливостей від навчання та обміном знань на пару днів до повноцінного залучення українців в освітній процес європейського навчального закладу терміном до року.

З 2022 року понад 33 000 українців взяли участь у програмах мобільності Erasmus+, отримавши можливість продовжити навчання, співпрацювати з європейськими колегами та будувати краще майбутнє [1]. Ця програма насправді дає багато можливостей для розвитку, як одної людини так і країни в цілому. Студент, який був на цій програмі має можливість повчитися у професорів з різних країн, поспілкуватися з різноманітними студентами з різними національностями з різними мовами. Мобільність дає неймовірний досвід, який більше ніде неможливо здобути. Якщо мова йде про довгострокові обміни за цей період людина може вивчати навіть не одну мову. З власного досвіду можу сказати, що за пів року підтягнула свою англійську, вивчила основні аспекти італійської, а також тепер вільно можу розуміти польську мову.

Програма надає можливість краще зрозуміти Європейські країни, їх економічні стратегії, заходи, їх принципи, що в майбутньому точно допоможе у співпраці з європейськими бізнесами.

Підтримка Erasmus+ виходить за рамки індивідуальної мобільності. З 2023 року програма включає окремий пріоритет для проєктів, що спрямовані на подолання наслідків російської агресії в секторах освіти, навчання, молоді та спорту. Загалом було мобілізовано близько 70 млн євро на майже 375 проєктів співпраці, зокрема на зміцнення потенціалу у сферах вищої освіти, професійної освіти та навчання, молоді та спорту [2].

Не дивлячись на велику кількість переваг у даній програмі, на жаль, є і недоліки. Перший недолік який я відчула ще на собі – фінансове навантаження. Програма забезпечує студентів стипендією, але це відбувається близько 1-2 місяця після початку довгострокової мобільності, що є недоліком, адже за житло, страхування, транспортування та інше, треба платити одразу, а то і за місяць до початку мобільності. Дане навантаження є достатньо великим і не кожен український студент має такі фінансові можливості, адже мова йде про 500-1000 і більше євро. Тому деякі українці відмовляються від такої перспективної можливості.

Другим недоліком може бути культурна адаптація. Коли переїжджаєш в іншу країну важливо розуміти, що там все по інакшому, тому тут є два варіанти розвитку подій, або повністю пристосуватися до оточення, або поєднати дві і навіть більше культур в одне. Звідси виникає ще один виклик для студентів – ти презентуєш не тільки себе, а і країну. Одне з перших питань при знайомстві з іншими, завжди буде «Where are you from?» (звідки ти?), ось саме з цього моменту тебе починають асоціювати з твоєю країною. Особливо в час, коли на Україну приковано багато поглядів, презентація країни через себе, я вважаю, є дуже важливою частиною мобільності.

До 02.04.2024 одним з викликів була заборона перетину кордону чоловіком віком від 18 до 60 років, але станом на зараз згідно з постановою Кабінету Міністрів України від 02.04.2024 р. N 366 [3], чоловіки віком 18-22 років можуть перетинати кордони для здобуття освітніх послуг закордоном. Таким чином кількість студентів, які можуть долучитися до програми збільшилась.

Академічні мобільності дають можливості розвитку української системи освіти, адже до програм долучають і викладачів, які здобувають новий європейський досвід, який згодом можуть передати своїм студентам. Різні види академічних мобільностей мають і довгострокові перспективи, це все в сукупності може допомогти у відновленні України

після завершення війни. Європейський досвід здобутий під час даних програм, допоможе у різних сферах життя країни, зокрема в політичній та економічній.

Згідно з опитуванням студентів Львівського національного університету імені Івана Франка (рис. 1) [4], 24,3% студентів вважають, що інтернаціоналізація вищої освіти абсолютно точно може допомогти з викликами війни в Україні, 50% відповіли «можливо». На мою думку, дані результати свідчать про позитивне налаштованість студентів на інтернаціоналізацію освіти в Україні для протистояння проблемам, що виникають в наслідок війни.




Рис. 1. Думки студентів Львівського національного університету імені Івана Франка щодо питання анкети: «На вашу думку, чи допомагає інтернаціоналізація вищої освіти впоратися з викликами війни?», у відсотках.

Попри всі виклики, академічна мобільність українських студентів демонструє значний потенціал до розвитку. Участь українських студентських організацій, зокрема Erasmus Student Network (ESN) Ukraine, у міжнародних заходах, таких як Erasmus Generation Meeting в Анконі (Італія) у квітні 2025 року, свідчить про активну інтеграцію України до європейського студентського співтовариства. ESN Ukraine презентувала на цьому заході не лише освітні можливості українських університетів, але й виставку «Unissued Diplomas» («Невидані дипломи»), присвячену пам'яті українських студентів, чий життя забрала війна, що стало нагадуванням про людську ціну конфлікту. Розвиток спільних освітніх програм, зокрема подвійних дипломів, також є перспективним напрямом, що активно обговорюється в межах інформаційних сесій Erasmus+ за участі Міністерства освіти і науки України та Національного офісу Erasmus+ в Україні [5].

Отже, академічна мобільність студентів України в країнах ЄС є складним, багатовимірним явищем, яке з одного боку відкриває

безпрецедентні можливості для євроінтеграції української вищої освіти, а з іншого створює нові виклики, зокрема ті, що зумовлені воєнним станом. Подальший розвиток цього напрямку залежить від здатності України та ЄС спільно вирішувати проблеми правового регулювання перетину кордону, визнання кваліфікацій, цифрової інфраструктури та інституційної спроможності, а також від стратегічного бачення академічної мобільності як інструменту довгострокової відбудови та розвитку України.

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ФОРМУВАННЯ ІМІДЖУ ПІДПРИЄМСТВА ЯК МАРКЕТИНГОВИЙ ІНСТРУМЕНТ ЗАЛУЧЕННЯ КЛІЄНТІВ

Імідж бренду є важливою складовою сучасної маркетингової діяльності підприємств сфери послуг. У загальному розумінні він відображає сукупність уявлень, емоційних вражень та оцінок, які формуються у споживачів щодо певної компанії, її продуктів або послуг

[1]. Саме уявлення значною мірою визначають поведінку клієнтів і впливають на їхні рішення щодо вибору конкретного підприємства.

У науковій літературі імідж бренду часто розглядають через дві ключові складові – гедоністичну та функціональну. Перший вимір пов'язаний із емоційними та сенсорними враженнями, які виникають у клієнтів, і відображає комфорт та загальне емоційне задоволення від користування послугою. Для салону краси цей аспект може проявлятися через стиль інтер'єру, рівень сервісу, доброзичливість персоналу, відчуття турботи про клієнта та створення приємної атмосфери під час обслуговування [3]. Функціональний вимір іміджу бренду пов'язаний із практичною цінністю послуг. Щодо діяльності салону краси він охоплює такі характеристики, як професіоналізм майстрів, якість косметичних засобів, сучасність обладнання, дотримання стандартів гігієни та стабільність результату наданих послуг. Саме ці фактори формують у клієнтів відчуття надійності та впевненості у правильності свого вибору.

Сформований позитивний імідж, наприклад, салону краси може формувати поведінку споживачів. Підприємства з привабливим іміджем зазвичай мають вищий рівень довіри з боку клієнтів, що сприяє формуванню їхньої лояльності та повторному використанню послуг. Крім того, сильний імідж допомагає підприємству вигідно позиціонувати себе на ринку та відрізнитися від конкурентів [2]. Значення іміджу бренду у сфері послуг пояснюється тим, що більшість таких послуг мають нематеріальний характер, а їх якість часто оцінюється суб'єктивно. У таких умовах саме репутація та сформоване уявлення про бренд стають важливими орієнтирами для потенційних клієнтів при виборі салону.

Важливу роль у формуванні іміджу сьогодні відіграють соціальні мережі та онлайн-платформи з відгуками. Клієнти активно використовують інтернет-ресурси для пошуку інформації про салони краси, перегляду фотографій робіт майстрів, ознайомлення з відгуками інших відвідувачів та оцінювання рівня сервісу. Такий користувацький контент може значно впливати на сприйняття бренду та формування намірів щодо відвідування конкретного салону. З огляду на це салони краси повинні приділяти значну увагу управлінню власним іміджем у цифровому середовищі. Регулярна комунікація з клієнтами, демонстрація результатів роботи, публікація відгуків та оперативне реагування на коментарі сприяють формуванню позитивного сприйняття бренду та підвищують довіру потенційних відвідувачів.

Ще одним важливим елементом сучасного маркетингу послуг є залучення клієнтів. Під цим поняттям розуміють активну взаємодію між підприємством і споживачами, що спрямована на формування

довготривалих відносин та створення позитивного досвіду взаємодії. У діяльності салону краси це може проявлятися через персоналізований підхід до клієнтів, врахування їхніх індивідуальних побажань, консультації щодо догляду за зовнішністю та пропозицію спеціальних програм лояльності. Залучені клієнти, як правило, демонструють вищий рівень задоволеності послугами, частіше повертаються до салону та рекомендують його своїм знайомим. Таким чином, ефективна система комунікації та персоналізованого сервісу сприяє зміцненню іміджу підприємства та розширенню клієнтської бази.

Отже, формування позитивного іміджу підприємства є важливим фактором його успішного функціонування на ринку. Поєднання високої якості послуг, приємного емоційного досвіду для клієнтів, активної присутності у соціальних мережах та ефективної взаємодії зі споживачами створює передумови для підвищення конкурентоспроможності підприємства та формування довготривалих відносин з клієнтами.

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ЕКОНОМІЧНІ МЕТОДИ В МЕНЕДЖМЕНТІ ПІДПРИЄМСТВА

У сучасних умовах функціонування організацій ефективність управлінської діяльності значною мірою визначається використанням адекватних методів менеджменту. Методи управління виступають інструментами впливу керівництва на діяльність працівників та функціонування організації в цілому, забезпечуючи узгодженість дій колективу, раціональне використання ресурсів і досягнення поставлених

цілей.

У теорії менеджменту традиційно виділяють три основні групи методів управління: економічні, організаційно-розпорядчі та соціально-психологічні [2]. Серед них особливе місце посідають економічні методи, оскільки саме вони безпосередньо пов'язані з матеріальними інтересами працівників та результатами діяльності організації. Економічні методи передбачають використання системи фінансових і господарських важелів, які стимулюють ефективну працю персоналу та сприяють досягненню стратегічних і поточних цілей підприємства [1].

Для центрів оздоровлення та відпочинку, що функціонують у структурі великих корпоративних організацій, таких як АТ «Укрзалізниця», застосування економічних методів управління має особливе значення, адже діяльність таких центрів пов'язана з наданням рекреаційних, оздоровчих та соціальних послуг, що потребує ефективного планування ресурсів, оптимального використання фінансових можливостей і забезпечення належної мотивації персоналу.

Економічні методи управління можна розглядати як систему економічних важелів, за допомогою яких керівництво організації впливає на поведінку працівників та результати їхньої діяльності. На відміну від адміністративних методів, вони мають переважно непрямий характер впливу: замість прямого наказу використовується система стимулів, що заохочує працівників до досягнення необхідних результатів. У діяльності центру оздоровлення та відпочинку економічні методи можуть реалізовуватися через систему планування, матеріального стимулювання персоналу, економічного аналізу діяльності та раціонального розподілу ресурсів. Важливим елементом їх застосування є узгодження інтересів організації, трудового колективу та окремих працівників.

У практиці менеджменту застосовуються різні методи, що дозволяють обґрунтовувати управлінські рішення та підвищувати ефективність діяльності підприємства (Рис. 1).

Суттєву роль у системі економічних методів управління відіграє планування діяльності організації, яке дозволяє визначити оптимальні напрями використання ресурсів та забезпечити досягнення поставлених цілей. У практиці управління також використовуються різні підходи до планування залежно від часової орієнтації управлінських рішень. Зокрема, виділяють реактивне, інактивне, преактивне та інтерактивне планування, що відрізняються спрямованістю на аналіз минулих результатів, поточного стану або прогнозування майбутнього розвитку організації [4].

Ефективність використання економічних методів управління

значною мірою залежить від якості системи контролю та оцінювання результатів діяльності. Контроль має здійснюватися на всіх етапах управлінського процесу: від формування цілей до аналізу досягнутих результатів. Зокрема, важливо оцінювати реалістичність поставлених цілей, адекватність застосованих економічних стимулів та ступінь досягнення запланованих показників діяльності.



Рис. 1. Система економічних методів управління*

**Джерело: побудовано за [3].*

Отже, економічні методи управління є важливим елементом системи менеджменту організації. Їх застосування сприяє підвищенню ефективності діяльності центру оздоровлення та відпочинку АТ «Укрзалізниця», забезпечує раціональне використання ресурсів та стимулює персонал до досягнення високих результатів роботи. Використання таких методів дозволяє поєднати інтереси працівників і організації та створити умови для стабільного розвитку підприємства у сфері рекреаційних послуг.

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ВІДЕНСЬКА СИСТЕМА МІЖНАРОДНОГО ЕТИКЕТУ: ІСТОРІЯ, ПРИНЦИПИ ТА СУЧАСНЕ ЗАСТОСУВАННЯ

Етикет у Віденській системі міжнародних відносин є невід’ємною складовою дипломатичного протоколу, що складається з норм поведінки, традицій та правил, які сприяють ефективній і ввічливій взаємодії держав-суб’єктів на міжнародній арені. Дипломатичний протокол і етикет формувалися як частина історично-культурної традиції дипломатії, де взаємна повага, дотримання форм звертань та церемоніальних норм сприяли узгодженню політичних інтересів держав і мінімізації конфліктів у міждержавних контактах [1].

Історична основа дипломатичного етикету сягає періоду становлення Віденської системи Європи, коли Віденський конгрес 1815 р. започаткував сучасний порядок міжнародних взаємин, включно з механізмами офіційного спілкування та правилами протоколу, що згодом були поширені і на дипломатичну практику [1]. У наукових джерелах підкреслюється, що дипломатичний протокол є багатовіковою категорією, яка сформувалася на основі узгоджених правил поведінки та процедур дипломатичного спілкування, принципів міжнародної ввічливості, взаємності та протокольного старшинства [2].

Ключові принципи дипломатичного етикету включають формальні та ввічливі форми звертань, чітке дотримання офіційних процедур, культурну символіку у поведінці дипломатів і підтримання стабільної комунікації між державами [2]. Практика міжнародних зустрічей, переговорів, державних візитів і дипломатичних прийомів неможлива без дотримання цих норм, оскільки вони формують основу міждержавної ввічливості та взаємної поваги [2; 3].

Столовий етикет як частина дипломатичного етикету має історичні корені й визначає правила сервірування, порядок розміщення гостей і манери поведінки під час офіційних прийомів. Це є культурно-поведінковим стандартом, що демонструє повагу до культурних традицій учасників та їхніх держав [3]. У наукових роботах підкреслюється, що невірне застосування етикету за столом може створювати символічні перешкоди та формувати негативне сприйняття державної сторони [3].

Етикет спілкування у суспільстві охоплює не лише формальні звертання, але й увагу до невербальної комунікації, культуру мовлення, дотримання культурних традицій партнерів як на офіційних, так і на неофіційних заходах [1]. Дрес-код дипломатів відображає професійний імідж і формується відповідно до формату заходу — від ділового повсякденного до урочистого [1].

Сучасне застосування Віденського етикету відображається не лише у двосторонніх відносинах, але й у багатосторонніх міжнародних форумах, самітах та конференціях, де основні принципи дипломатичного протоколу та етикету є основою впорядкованого комунікаційного середовища між представниками різних держав [1; 2]. У науковій літературі також наголошується, що формальні норми є складовою частиною міжнародно-правового регулювання дипломатії, зокрема через Віденську конвенцію про дипломатичні зносини 1961 р., що закріплює загальні принципи дипломатичного статусу і взаємодії між державами [2].

Серед поширених помилок у практиці дипломатичного етикету виділяють недостатнє врахування культурних традицій партнерської сторони, неправильне формулювання звертань, невідповідний дрес-код або недостатнє знання церемоніальних норм. Як зазначають вчені, ці помилки можуть призвести до непорозумінь і навіть ускладнити дипломатичні контакти, що підкреслює важливість ґрунтовної підготовки дипломатів і продуманого застосування етикету [1; 3].

Ієрархія дипломатичних рангів є важливим елементом професійної дипломатії та визначає порядок представлення учасників під час офіційних заходів. Посол — це найвища посадова особа у

дипломатичному корпусі держави за кордоном, яка представляє та захищає інтереси своєї держави, веде переговори та організовує дипломатичну діяльність у країні перебування. Посланники, тимчасові повірені у справах та інші працівники місії виконують спеціалізовані функції, визначені протокольними нормами і дипломатичною практикою [1].

Роль дипломатичного протоколу в міждержавних відносинах полягає у створенні передбачуваних рамок для спілкування між державами, підтримці взаємної поваги, культурного діалогу та стабільності міжнародних контактів. Як зазначають дослідники, дипломатичний протокол і етикет не лише підтримують викладені правила, а й сприяють побудові довірчих відносин між партнерами, що є фундаментальною умовою сучасної дипломатичної діяльності [2; 3].

Основні елементи дипломатичного етикету на сучасні міжнародні відносини узагальнені в Таблиці 1.

Таблиця 1

Основні елементи дипломатичного етикету та їх значення*

Елементи етикету	Основні характеристики	Значення для міжнародних відносин	Джерела
Правила звертань	Формальні дипломатичні звертання, ранги	Забезпечують ввічливість і повагу	[1; 2]
Столовий етикет	Сервірування, порядок розсадки	Демонструють повагу культурним традиціям	[3]
Дресс-код	Одяг залежно від формату заходу	Формує імідж держави	[1; 2]
Регламентація церемоній	Офіційні процедури та порядок	Сприяє впорядкованій комунікації	[2; 5]
Правила невербальної поведінки	Жести, дистанція, невербальні сигнали	Підвищують ефективність комунікації	[2; 4]

*Складено за даними: [1; 2; 3; 4; 5].

Отже, можна зробити висновок, що етикет, започаткований в рамках Віденської системи, і сьогодні відіграє важливу роль у міжнародних відносинах.

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ІНТЕГРАЦІЯ ЗАКЛАДІВ ВИЩОЇ ОСВІТИ ДСНС УКРАЇНИ ДО ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОГО ПРОСТОРУ

У сучасних умовах формування єдиного Європейського освітнього простору інтеграція національних систем освіти у загальноєвропейський контекст стає стратегічною необхідністю. Особливо актуальним є питання адаптації специфічних вищих навчальних закладів, зокрема закладів вищої освіти ДСНС України, до стандартів і практик Європейського простору вищої освіти. Це стосується не лише академічної мобільності, але й якості підготовки фахівців у сфері безпеки життєдіяльності та цивільного захисту.

Європейський освітній простір (ЄОП) передбачає гармонізацію освітніх політик, стандартів навчання та наукової діяльності між

країнами-учасниками Болонського процесу. Основними цілями ЄОП є забезпечення сумісності та порівнюваності кваліфікацій, сприяння академічній мобільності, розвиток співробітництва у сфері наукових досліджень, а також підвищення якості освіти. Заклади вищої освіти ДСНС здійснюють підготовку фахівців із забезпечення безпеки життєдіяльності, пожежної безпеки, цивільного захисту, реагування на надзвичайні ситуації. Освітній процес у таких закладах поєднує теоретичну підготовку з практичними навичками, що накладає особливі вимоги на адаптацію до європейських стандартів, які передбачають розвиток ключових компетенцій, врахування практичного досвіду та сучасних технологій.

На сьогодні значна частина освітніх програм закладів вищої освіти ДСНС України приведена у відповідність до вимог Болонського процесу: запроваджено кредитно-трансферну систему (ECTS), забезпечено структуру ступеневої освіти «бакалавр – магістр» тощо. Водночас існують виклики щодо інтеграції профільних дисциплін у загальноєвропейські рамки компетенцій. За останні роки спостерігається зростання участі здобувачів та викладачів ДСНС у програмах академічної мобільності (Erasmus+, тематичні обміни). Проте кількість таких мобільностей залишається нижчою порівняно з університетами загального профілю через специфіку підготовки та обмеження щодо практичної діяльності. Наукові дослідження у закладах ДСНС України мають прикладний характер та важливі для системи цивільного захисту. Проте інтеграція у міжнародні наукові проекти ускладнена через недостатнє фінансування, обмежений доступ до міжнародних грантових програм та мовний бар'єр.

Основними викликами для закладів вищої освіти ДСНС України в контексті європейської інтеграції є: стандартизація освітніх програм – необхідність подальшої гармонізації профільних програм із європейськими рамками компетенцій; міжнародне визнання кваліфікацій – ускладнене визнання специфічних кваліфікацій фахівців ДСНС України у країнах-членах ЄС; фінансування та ресурсне забезпечення – обмеженість фінансових ресурсів на підтримку міжнародних ініціатив; мова викладання та публікацій: потреба у поширенні англomовних програм та наукових публікацій для зростання видимості у міжнародному академічному середовищі.

Важливо розширювати участь у програмах обмінів, укладати партнерства з європейськими вищими навчальними закладами, створювати спільні освітні модулі. Також необхідно сприяти подачі грантових заявок у Horizon Europe, COST Actions та інших міжнародних платформах, що дозволить інтегрувати науковий потенціал закладів

ДСНС у європейський науковий простір. Слід продовжувати оновлення освітніх програм із урахуванням Європейських рамок кваліфікацій, включення компетенцій, що відповідають професійним вимогам у країнах ЄС. Також потрібні заохочення підготовки студентів та викладачів до академічного спілкування англійською мовою, створення англійських курсів та програм.

Інтеграція закладів вищої освіти ДСНС України до європейського простору є складним, багатовимірним процесом, що вимагає системних змін у освітній, науковій та організаційній сферах. Необхідно посилювати академічну мобільність, розвивати міжнародну співпрацю, адаптувати освітні програми до європейських стандартів та збільшувати присутність у міжнародному науковому середовищі. Успішна реалізація цих напрямів сприятиме підвищенню якості підготовки фахівців та зміцненню ролі України у європейському освітньому просторі.

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ДЕЦЕНТРАЛІЗАЦІЯ ЯК ЧИННИК ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОЇ ІНТЕГРАЦІЇ: ІНСТИТУЦІЙНІ ТА ЕКОНОМІЧНІ АСПЕКТИ

Умови сучасного державотворення в Україні визначаються одночасним впливом двох взаємопов'язаних процесів: внутрішньої трансформації системи публічного управління та поглиблення європейської інтеграції. У цьому контексті децентралізація посідає

особливе місце, оскільки саме вона формує нову архітектуру територіальної організації влади, змінює характер взаємодії між державою та територіальними громадами і створює передумови для підвищення якості публічних послуг. Разом із тим для Європейського Союзу ефективне місцеве самоврядування не є периферійним питанням адміністративної техніки, а розглядається як один із базових елементів демократії, підзвітності та стійкості державних інститутів. Актуальність дослідження зумовлена тим, що на сучасному етапі децентралізація в Україні виходить за межі суто внутрішньої реформи та перетворюється на складову переговорного і адаптаційного процесу, пов'язаного з набуттям членства в ЄС. Звіти Європейської Комісії за 2024 і 2025 роки засвідчують, що Україна зберегла функціонування багаторівневої системи управління навіть в умовах повномасштабної війни, однак низка елементів реформи залишається незавершеною, зокрема у частині системи нагляду, розмежування повноважень та інституційної участі місцевого рівня у формуванні політики відновлення і розвитку.

Децентралізація у європейському правовому просторі має чітко визначений нормативний і ціннісний зміст. Її основу становить Європейська хартія місцевого самоврядування, яка закріплює, що органи місцевого самоврядування повинні мати право і реальну здатність регулювати та управляти значною частиною публічних справ під власну відповідальність і в інтересах місцевого населення. Хартія також встановлює вимогу щодо наявності достатніх власних фінансових ресурсів, пропорційних до обсягу повноважень, і передбачає, що адміністративний нагляд за діяльністю органів місцевого самоврядування має здійснюватися лише відповідно до конституції або закону та, як правило, бути спрямованим на забезпечення законності й пропорційності втручання [1]. Важливою теоретико-правовою основою європейського підходу виступає принцип субсидіарності. Відповідно до статті 5 Договору про Європейський Союз та офіційного тлумачення EUR-Lex, рішення повинні прийматися на якомога ближчому до громадянина рівні, а втручання вищого рівня влади є виправданим лише тоді, коли поставлені цілі не можуть бути досягнуті належним чином на нижчому рівні. У практичному вимірі це означає, що розподіл компетенцій між державою, регіоном і громадою повинен ґрунтуватися не на політичній доцільності, а на критеріях спроможності, ефективності та пропорційності. Саме тому для ЄС децентралізація нерозривно пов'язана із якістю публічного управління, а не лише з формальною зміною адміністративно-територіального устрою [2].

Поряд із субсидіарністю ключового значення набуває концепція багаторівневого врядування. Її сутність полягає в інституціоналізованій

взаємодії між наднаціональним, національним, регіональним і місцевим рівнями влади у процесі вироблення та реалізації політики. Для держав, що інтегруються до ЄС, це означає необхідність створення такої системи врядування, у якій місцеве самоврядування не ізолюється в межах виключно локальних питань, а включається в загальнодержавні процеси планування, відновлення, бюджетування та регіонального розвитку. Саме тому Європейська Комісія в документах щодо України послідовно пов'язує децентралізацію не лише з муніципальним управлінням, а й з регіональною політикою, управлінням публічними інвестиціями та підготовкою до майбутнього використання інструментів політики згуртованості [3]. Досвід окремих держав - членів ЄС свідчить про відсутність уніфікованої моделі децентралізації, однак підтверджує сталість її базових принципів. У дослідженні, присвяченому досвіду Італії, Іспанії, Франції та Польщі, обґрунтовано, що ці держави по-різному поєднують автономію, нагляд і територіальну організацію влади, але спільним для них є нормативне закріплення місцевої автономії, інституційне розмежування компетенцій та наявність механізмів фінансової спроможності територій. Італія та Іспанія демонструють моделі розвиненої регіональної автономії, Франція - поступову децентралізацію в межах унітарної системи з вагомою роллю державного контролю, а Польща - приклад послідовного посилення базового рівня самоврядування в постсоціалістичному середовищі. Саме польський досвід є особливо релевантним для України, оскільки він поєднує поетапність реформи, чітке функціональне розмежування повноважень і зміцнення фінансової основи гмін [4].

Якщо зіставити ці європейські стандарти з українською практикою, слід визнати, що реформа децентралізації в Україні після 2014 року забезпечила суттєвий інституційний прорив. Була сформована нова територіальна основа місцевого самоврядування, створено 1469 територіальних громад та 136 районів, а місцевий рівень отримав ширший обсяг повноважень і більшу фінансову вагу в системі публічних фінансів. У науковій літературі та аналітичних матеріалах ця реформа справедливо оцінюється як одна з найбільш результативних серед системних перетворень в Україні. Водночас уже на стадії завершення стало очевидно, що її первинні успіхи не означають автоматичної відповідності всім європейським критеріям [5].

У 2024 році Європейська Комісія у звіті щодо України зафіксувала, що багаторівневе врядування зберігає критично важливе значення для стійкості держави, а місцевий рівень залишається важливим елементом відновлення та модернізації. Разом із тим Комісія наголосила на потребі поставити потенціал муніципалітетів у центр публічної політики,

розробити прозорий механізм фінансування відновлення субнаціонального рівня, а також сформалізувати координаційні рамки участі місцевих влад та їхніх асоціацій у виробленні та реалізації державної політики. Отже, вже на цьому етапі вимоги ЄС виходять за межі класичного розуміння децентралізації як передачі повноважень і зосереджуються на інституційній включеності місцевого самоврядування до системи багаторівневого врядування [6]. У 2025 році ця оцінка стала більш конкретизованою. Європейська Комісія визнала, що, попри війну, українська система багаторівневого врядування продовжує функціонувати ефективно. Було позитивно відзначено збереження фіскальної децентралізації, відновлення середньострокового бюджетного планування на місцевому рівні, ухвалення законів щодо прозорості місцевого самоврядування, місцевої демократії та публічних консультацій, а також запуск рішень для реактивації інструментів регіональної політики, зокрема Державного фонду регіонального розвитку. У такий спосіб ЄС фактично визнав, що Україна зберегла ядро децентралізованої моделі публічного управління навіть в умовах воєнного стану [7]. Однак саме порівняння позитивних оцінок із переліком зауважень дає найбільш повне уявлення про реальний стан відповідності України вимогам ЄС. Серед ключових не вирішених питань Європейська Комісія у 2025 році назвала обмежений прогрес у створенні прозорої системи нагляду префектурного типу, відсутність завершеного законодавчого розмежування повноважень між різними рівнями влади на основі принципу субсидіарності, а також неврегульованість статусу місцевого самоврядування на деокупованих територіях і правил функціонування місцевих військових адміністрацій. Це означає, що українська модель децентралізації сьогодні водночас є і дієздатною, і незавершеною: вона працює на рівні базових інституцій, однак ще не доведена до тієї стадії нормативної та процедурної визначеності, яку ЄС вважає обов'язковою для системи зрілого демократичного врядування [7]. Зокрема, 1 січня 2027 року набирає чинності нова версія Статистичної класифікації територіальних одиниць України – NUTS-UA. NUTS-UA – це українська адаптація європейської системи NUTS, яка є базовим стандартом для збору, аналізу та порівняння регіональної статистики в країнах ЄС. Це означає, що українські територіальні одиниці класифіковані за критеріями, ідентичними тим, які використовують держави-члени ЄС. NUTS-UA має три рівні територіального поділу, узгоджені з європейською системою NUTS: - NUTS-UA1 – статистичні макрорегіони (9 одиниць), що об'єднують кілька областей; NUTS-UA2 – регіони (27 одиниць): області, АР Крим, м. Київ і м. Севастополь; NUTS-UA3 – райони, м. Київ і м.

Севастополь (138 одиниць).

Таким чином, ключове завдання України полягає вже не у започаткуванні децентралізації, а в її повноцінному нормативному та інституційному завершенні відповідно до європейських критеріїв. Саме від успішності цього етапу буде залежати не лише ефективність системи місцевого самоврядування як складової публічної влади, а й здатність України просуватися далі в переговорному процесі щодо членства в Європейському Союзі.

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ВЗАЄМОДІЯ ДЕРЖАВИ ТА РЕЛІГІЙНИХ ІНСТИТУЦІЙ У ЗОВНІШНЬОПОЛІТИЧНІЙ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ

Сучасний етап розвитку міжнародних відносин характеризується зростанням ролі ідентичнісних факторів, серед яких релігія посідає особливе місце. У глобалізованому середовищі релігійні інституції

функціонують як транснаціональні мережі, що мають власні канали комунікації, гуманітарну інфраструктуру та цифрову присутність. Це зумовлює їх інтеграцію в інструментарій публічної дипломатії та стратегічних комунікацій держав.

Метою даного дослідження є аналіз форм і механізмів взаємодії держави та релігійних інституцій у зовнішньополітичній діяльності та визначення їхнього впливу на формування міжнародного іміджу й досягнення стратегічних цілей держави.

У межах концепції «м'якої сили» Джозеф Най підкреслював значення ціннісного впливу та привабливості як ресурсу міжнародної політики [1, с. 11]. Релігійні інституції, апелюючи до моральних авторитетів і культурної спадщини, здатні підсилювати або, навпаки, послаблювати зовнішньополітичні позиції держави.

В умовах цифровізації особливої ваги набуває феномен «цифрової релігійної дипломатії». Релігійні лідери активно використовують соціальні мережі, онлайн-форуми та міжнародні платформи для формування глобального порядку денного з питань миру, прав людини, екології та гуманітарної безпеки. Наприклад, дипломатична активність «Святий Престол» поєднує традиційні канали міждержавних відносин із сучасними комунікаційними стратегіями, що дозволяє йому впливати на дискусії в межах Організації Об'єднаних Націй щодо міграції, кліматичної політики та захисту цивільного населення у збройних конфліктах [2]. У цьому контексті релігійний актор виступає як нормативний суб'єкт, що формує ціннісні орієнтири глобального врядування.

Суттєвою тенденцією є залучення релігійних організацій до процесів постконфліктного відновлення та гуманітарної стабілізації. Релігійні мережі часто мають розгалужену систему благодійних структур і доступ до місцевих громад, що забезпечує ефективну реалізацію програм підтримки населення. Міжнародні платформи, зокрема Всесвітня рада церков, сприяють міжрелігійному діалогу та запобіганню радикалізації [3]. Таким чином, держава може використовувати співпрацю з релігійними інституціями як елемент комплексної безпекової політики.

Український контекст демонструє трансформацію релігійного чинника у складову гуманітарної та безпекової дипломатії. Надання автокефалії Православна церква України у 2019 році стало важливим маркером цивілізаційного самовизначення та зміцнення міжнародної суб'єктності держави [4]. Рішення Константинопольського патріархата мало значний резонанс у міжнародному релігійному середовищі та вплинуло на баланс впливу у православному світі. Після 2022 року

релігійні організації в Україні також активно долучилися до гуманітарної допомоги, міжнародної адвокації та підтримки біженців, що посилює роль релігійного сектору у зовнішньополітичних комунікаціях держави.

Водночас сучасна практика демонструє і ризики. Інституціоналізація релігійного наративу у зовнішній політиці може сприяти формуванню ідеологізованих концепцій, які використовуються для легітимації геополітичних дій. Прикладом є діяльність Російської православної церкви, риторика якої інтегрується у державний зовнішньополітичний дискурс [5, с. 87]. Це свідчить про можливість трансформації релігійного ресурсу на інструмент інформаційного впливу та ідеологічної мобілізації.

У ширшому регіональному вимірі релігійна ідентичність продовжує визначати стратегічні орієнтири держав Близького Сходу. Іран, позиціонуючи себе як центр шийтської спільноти, використовує релігійну солідарність для формування регіональних альянсів та зміцнення політичного впливу [6, с. 102]. Подібні процеси свідчать про те, що релігійний фактор у XXI столітті не зникає з міжнародної політики, а трансформується відповідно до нових геополітичних реалій.

Додаткового аналізу потребує нормативно-правовий вимір взаємодії держави та релігійних інституцій у зовнішньополітичній сфері. Міжнародно-правові стандарти закріплюють свободу думки, совісті та релігії як фундаментальне право людини, що прямо впливає на формування зовнішньополітичних позицій держав [7]. Участь держав у міжнародних механізмах захисту прав людини зумовлює необхідність врахування релігійного плюралізму у двосторонніх та багатосторонніх відносинах. Питання свободи віросповідання нерідко стає предметом дипломатичних консультацій, санкційної політики або міжнародної адвокації. Таким чином, релігійний фактор інтегрується у систему міжнародних зобов'язань та стає частиною нормативного порядку денного.

У контексті нової архітектури міжнародних відносин спостерігається зростання ролі так званої «ціннісної дипломатії». Держави дедалі частіше позиціонують себе як носії певної цивілізаційної моделі, що включає історичні та релігійні традиції. Це простежується у стратегіях культурної дипломатії, коли релігійна спадщина використовується як елемент національного брендингу. Водночас подібна стратегія потребує обережності, оскільки акцент на конфесійній ідентичності може звужувати простір для міжкультурного діалогу в багатоконфесійному середовищі.

Важливою складовою сучасної взаємодії є безпековий аспект.

Релігійні організації можуть відігравати як стабілізуючу, так і дестабілізуючу роль у міжнародному середовищі. З одного боку, вони здатні сприяти дерадикалізації, міжкультурному діалогу та соціальній інтеграції. З іншого - релігійна риторика може використовуватися екстремістськими угрупованнями для мобілізації прихильників і легітимації насильства. У зв'язку з цим держави розробляють програми співпраці з поміркованими релігійними лідерами, залучаючи їх до протидії радикалізації та інформаційним загрозам. Такий підхід поєднує елементи публічної дипломатії, внутрішньої безпеки та міжнародного партнерства.

Окремої уваги заслуговує феномен міжрелігійної дипломатії. У сучасних конфліктах, що мають етноконфесійний вимір, саме міжрелігійний діалог часто стає передумовою політичного врегулювання. Платформи на кшталт Всесвітньої ради церков або регіональні міжконфесійні форуми створюють простір для комунікації там, де традиційна дипломатія є обмеженою. Участь держав у таких ініціативах дозволяє розширити коло інструментів впливу та зменшити рівень конфронтації.

Суттєвим є і соціально-економічний аспект. Релігійні організації володіють розгалуженими благодійними мережами, які залучають міжнародне фінансування, гуманітарні ресурси та волонтерські структури. У періоди криз, зокрема збройних конфліктів чи міграційних хвиль, вони забезпечують швидке реагування на потреби населення. Співпраця держави з такими інституціями дозволяє підвищити ефективність гуманітарної політики та посилити міжнародну координацію допомоги. У цьому контексті релігійні структури стають партнерами держави у реалізації зовнішньополітичних гуманітарних стратегій.

Крім того, варто враховувати комунікативний вимір. У добу інформаційних технологій релігійні інституції мають значний вплив на формування суспільної думки як на національному, так і на міжнародному рівнях. Їх позиції щодо війни, миру, соціальної справедливості чи екології можуть впливати на міжнародний імідж держави. У разі узгодженості позицій державних органів і релігійних лідерів формується консолідований меседж, що підсилює зовнішньополітичну стратегію. Водночас розбіжності між ними можуть створювати репутаційні ризики та ускладнювати дипломатичні процеси.

Отже, сучасна взаємодія держави та релігійних інституцій має комплексний і багаторівневий характер, охоплюючи дипломатичний, гуманітарний, безпековий, нормативний та комунікативний виміри. У новій архітектурі міжнародних відносин релігійні інституції

функціонують не лише як носії духовної традиції, а як впливові транснаціональні актори, здатні формувати ціннісні рамки міжнародного порядку, впливати на публічну думку та брати участь у врегулюванні конфліктів. Їх інтеграція до зовнішньополітичної стратегії держави розширює інструментарій реалізації національних інтересів, зокрема через механізми «м'якої сили», гуманітарної дипломатії та міжрелігійного діалогу.

Водночас ефективність такої взаємодії залежить від наявності чітко визначених правових меж, інституційної прозорості та дотримання принципу світськості держави. Ключовим завданням є забезпечення балансу між використанням релігійного ресурсу у зовнішній політиці та гарантуванням універсальних прав людини, зокрема свободи совісті та релігійного плюралізму. Лише за умов стратегічно виваженого підходу релігійний чинник може виступати не джерелом конфліктності, а фактором стабілізації, міжнародної солідарності та сталого розвитку в глобальному середовищі.

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ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ ТОРГОВЕЛЬНОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОГО СОЮЗУ В УМОВАХ ГЛОБАЛЬНИХ ЕКОНОМІЧНИХ ВИКЛИКІВ

Торгівля виступає одним із провідних факторів розвитку Європейського Союзу. Вона сприяє економічному зростанню та підвищенню конкурентоспроможності європейської економіки, підтримує внутрішній ринок і розширює зовнішній. Відкритість торговельного режиму дозволяє Європейському Союзу бути найбільшим у світі експортером сільськогосподарської та промислової продукції та послуг, а також займати перше місце за обсягами інвестицій. Торговельна політика Європейського Союзу є невід'ємною частиною стратегії розвитку Союзу та спрямована на підвищення міжнародної конкурентоспроможності Європи.

Торговельна політика ЄС, відома також як «спільна торговельна політика ЄС», є сферою, де ЄС має виключні повноваження встановлювати правила для всіх держав-членів. Термін «єдина торговельна політика ЄС» вперше був використаний у Договорі про заснування Європейського економічного співтовариства 1957 року. Розвиток міжнародної торгівлі, зменшення обмежень у торговельних відносинах та скорочення митних бар'єрів виступають ключовими цілями спільної торговельної політики Європейського Союзу. Вона орієнтована на формування тісного зв'язку між реалізацією торговельної політики та поглибленням митної інтеграції держав-членів. Здійснення зовнішньоторговельної політики є основою для розроблення відповідних нормативно-правових актів, у яких значна увага приділяється регулюванню імпорту та експорту товарів, застосуванню заходів торговельного захисту, а також механізмам квотування і ліцензування. Для реалізації основних напрямів торговельної політики Європейського Союзу використовуються тарифні та нетарифні інструменти регулювання. До тарифних належать митні тарифи, преференційні та антидемпінгові мита. Нетарифні заходи включають квоти, експортні та внутрішні субсидії, захисні механізми, ліцензування, економічні санкції та інструменти підтримки експорту. Найбільш вагомими серед інструментів торговельної політики ЄС залишаються

тарифні методи, що передбачають застосування митних платежів, зокрема Єдиного митного тарифу. Він поширюється на товари, які імпортуються через зовнішні кордони ЄС, і є однаковим для всіх держав-членів. Водночас рівень митних ставок може відрізнятися залежно від виду товару та країни його походження. [1].

Сучасна торговельна політика формується під впливом глобальних викликів, серед яких: посилення міжнародної конкуренції, нестабільність світової економіки, торговельні конфлікти та криза багатосторонньої торговельної системи, пов'язана з діяльністю Світової організація торгівлі. Значний вплив також мають цифровізація економіки, розвиток електронної комерції та трансформація глобальних ланцюгів створення вартості. Важливим концептуальним підходом є «відкрита стратегічна автономія», що передбачає збереження інтегрованості у світову економіку при одночасному зниженні критичної залежності від зовнішніх постачальників у стратегічно важливих галузях.

Окрему роль відіграє укладення міжнародних торговельних угод, які сприяють розширенню ринків збуту, залученню інвестицій та поширенню європейських стандартів. Такі угоди, зокрема поглиблені та всеосяжні зони вільної торгівлі (DCFTA), передбачають не лише зниження тарифних бар'єрів, але й гармонізацію законодавства та інституційне зближення країн-партнерів із ЄС. Регіональні наслідки реалізації торговельної політики ЄС є неоднозначними. З одного боку, вона сприяє економічній інтеграції, зростанню обсягів торгівлі та підвищенню ефективності виробництва. З іншого боку, існують певні диспропорції розвитку між державами-членами, що зумовлено різним рівнем економічного потенціалу та здатності адаптуватися до умов єдиного ринку [2].

Важливим аспектом сучасної торговельної політики Європейського Союзу є також інтеграція принципів сталого розвитку. ЄС активно впроваджує екологічні та соціальні стандарти у свої торговельні угоди, що передбачає дотримання норм охорони довкілля, трудових прав та відповідального ведення бізнесу. Зокрема, значну увагу приділено механізму вуглецевого коригування імпорту (CBAM), який спрямований на запобігання «вуглецевому витоку» та стимулювання екологізації виробництва.

У 2025 році зовнішня торгівля Європейського Союзу перевищила 4,2 трлн євро, з яких експорт становив близько 2,1 трлн євро, а імпорт – 2,05 трлн євро, що забезпечило невеликий профіцит торговельного балансу. Основними партнерами залишаються США (18 % експорту), Китай (15 %) та Велика Британія (10 %), тоді як частка енергетичного

імпорту перевищила 400 млрд євро. У 2026 році ключовим інструментом трансформації торговельної політики ЄС стає механізм вуглецевого коригування імпорту (СВАМ), який вплине на металургію, цемент та добрива [5].

Крім того, Європейський Союз посилює контроль за іноземними інвестиціями у стратегічні галузі економіки, що пов'язано з необхідністю забезпечення економічної безпеки та технологічного суверенітету. В умовах геополітичної нестабільності особливого значення набуває диверсифікація торговельних партнерів та зменшення залежності від окремих ринків. Не менш важливим є розвиток цифрової торгівлі, який стає одним із ключових напрямів трансформації зовнішньоекономічної політики ЄС. Запровадження єдиних цифрових стандартів, регулювання електронної комерції та захист даних сприяють формуванню конкурентоспроможного цифрового простору [3]. Сучасна торговельна політика Європейського Союзу є динамічною та багатовекторною, поєднуючи економічні, політичні, екологічні та технологічні складові. Її подальший розвиток визначатиметься здатністю ЄС адаптуватися до глобальних викликів та ефективно використовувати наявні інструменти регулювання міжнародної торгівлі.

Отже, торговельна політика Європейського Союзу є складною, комплексною системою багаторівневого регулювання зовнішньоекономічної діяльності, що поєднує широкий спектр інструментів і механізмів впливу на міжнародну торгівлю. У сучасних умовах її розвиток визначається необхідністю адаптації до глобальних викликів, що зумовлює трансформацію способів регулювання зовнішньої торгівлі. Поєднання принципів лібералізації з елементами стратегічного протекціонізму дозволяє ЄС забезпечувати стабільність внутрішнього ринку та зміцнювати свої позиції у світовій економіці.

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ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ФОРМУВАННЯ НОРМ ЕТИКЕТУ В ТРАДИЦІЙНІЙ КУЛЬТУРІ УКРАЇНЦІВ

Проблема формування норм етикету в традиційній культурі українців є надзвичайно актуальною, оскільки «висока культура мовлення є життєвою необхідністю кожної людини» [1, с. 34]. Дослідження цього явища ускладнюється через «невизначеність феноменологічного статусу етикету», що змушує науковців розглядати його одночасно як специфічну форму регуляції спілкування, модель поведінки та складну систему знаків [2, с. 66]. Найбільш продуктивним у цьому сенсі є поєднання комунікативного, поведінкового та семіотичного підходів. Етикет у комунікативному розумінні постає як спеціальна форма регуляції людської взаємодії, що має характер вистави: дії особи в рамках етикету подібні до гри акторів, орієнтованої не лише на партнера, а й на «уявного, дальнього адресата», тобто на громаду в цілому [2, с. 66].

У традиційному українському суспільстві комунікативний статус людини визначався не особистими якостями, а «соціальними атрибутами, соціально-громадськими й сімейно-родинними характеристиками», такими як статус хазяїна чи наймита, члена роду чи прибульця [2, с. 68]. Точне дотримання поведінкових стереотипів сприймалося соціумом як «мистецтво спілкування». Оскільки етикет покликаний «забезпечити спілкування нерівних партнерів», він актуалізував відмінності за віком, статтю та суспільним становищем, забезпечуючи прийнятні для всіх сторін моделі поведінки [2, с. 67]. Фундаментом цієї системи є мовленнєвий етикет – «національний кодекс словесної добропристойності», що сформувався в культурних верствах народу як виразник «аристократизму духу» [3, с. 35].

Важливою рисою української культури мовлення є її органічна чистота: ще у XVII столітті мандрівник Євлія Челебі зауважив, що в цій «всеосяжній» мові йому вдалося знайти лише кілька лайливих виразів, що свідчило про високу внутрішню культуру народу [3, с. 34].

У сучасному глобалізованому світі ці традиції трансформувалися у вимоги до ділового спілкування, де обізнаність в етикеті демонструє «повагу до іноземного партнера, його віри та традицій» [4, с. 525]. Порівнюючи українські норми з європейськими, можна виявити унікальні риси нашого менталітету. Якщо німці чи італійці суворо дотримуються офіційних титулів, то «українці використовують пошанівні форми звертання пан чи пані, додаючи до них назви посад, наукових звань, прізвище або ім'я» [4, с. 526]. В іспанській культурі прийнято звертатися на «ти» вже при першій зустрічі, проте згідно з українським етикетом «партнери звертаються один до одного на ви, вважаючи це висловленням своєї поваги» [4, с. 526].

Також існують відмінності в процедурі привітання: в Іспанії першими представляються ті, хто нижче в ієрархії, тоді як «в Україні завжди вітаються першими ті, хто посідає вищі посади у сфері бізнесу», використовуючи кличний відмінок [4, с. 526]. На відміну від чехів, які віддають перевагу офіційній обстановці, українці часто ведуть бізнес зі знайомими людьми, через що «ділові зустрічі часто можуть переходити в менш офіційні, а розмови матимуть більш невимушений характер» [4, с. 527]. Водночас ми поділяємо з німцями повагу до пунктуальності та консервативного дрес-коду, де чоловіки до 20:00 мають носити темний діловий костюм з краваткою [4, с. 527].

Сучасна «культура мовлення є фундаментом риторики» [1, с. 36], забезпечуючи логічність та етичність публічного слова. Незважаючи на виклики сучасності, такі як «вульгаризація мовлення та поширення суржику», етикет залишається «своєрідним барометром духовної зрілості нації» [3, с. 35]. Підсумовуючи, можна стверджувати, що український етикет, який «віддзеркалює лагідну вдачу українців, схильність до коректності й толерантності», є потужним «соціокультурним інструментом, що впливає на демократизацію суспільства та національну ідентичність» [3, с. 36; 1, с. 36].

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ОРГАНІЗУВАННЯ УПРАВЛІННЯ У СИСТЕМІ МЕНЕДЖМЕНТУ ПІДПРИЄМСТВ КОМУНАЛЬНОЇ СФЕРИ

Актуальність забезпечення ефективного організування управлінських процесів зумовлюється постійними змінами економічного середовища, впровадженням нових технологій менеджменту, цифровізацією управління та зростання вимог до якості послуг, які зумовлюють необхідність удосконалення організації праці менеджерів. Саме раціональне організування управлінської діяльності створює передумови для підвищення результативності функціонування організацій, ефективного використання ресурсів та досягнення стратегічних і поточних цілей [1].

У науковій літературі організування праці менеджера розглядається як комплексний процес формування умов, структур та процедур, які забезпечують ефективне виконання управлінських функцій. Такий процес передбачає раціональне поєднання людських ресурсів, інформаційних потоків, технологій управління та організаційних інструментів, що сприяють досягненню визначених результатів діяльності [2]. Загалом організування управлінських процесів можна трактувати як систему заходів, спрямованих на упорядкування діяльності менеджерів, визначення їхніх повноважень і відповідальності, розподіл завдань та координацію взаємодії між підрозділами. Така система дозволяє сформувати чітку структуру управління, забезпечити узгодженість дій персоналу та уникнути

дублювання функцій. У результаті підвищується ефективність прийняття управлінських рішень і скорочується час на виконання організаційних процедур.

Особливого значення організування управлінських процесів набуває у діяльності підприємств, що надають послуги населенню, зокрема у комунальній сфері. Такі організації виконують важливі соціально-економічні функції, пов'язані із забезпеченням життєво необхідних послуг для населення. У зв'язку з цим менеджери повинні забезпечувати стабільність функціонування організації, раціонально розподіляти ресурси та підтримувати належний рівень якості послуг.

Раціональне організування управлінської праці сприяє досягненню низки важливих результатів. По-перше, воно забезпечує підвищення продуктивності діяльності персоналу. Чітке визначення завдань, функцій і відповідальності працівників дозволяє уникнути дублювання роботи та підвищує ефективність використання робочого часу. По-друге, правильна організація праці сприяє оптимальному використанню наявних ресурсів, включаючи трудові, матеріальні та інформаційні. Це, своєю чергою, позитивно впливає на загальні результати діяльності організації. Перевагою раціонального організування управлінських процесів є також зниження рівня професійного стресу працівників. Наявність чітко визначених ролей, зрозумілих процедур і ефективних каналів комунікації допомагає уникнути невизначеності та сприяє формуванню стабільного робочого середовища. У таких умовах працівники мають можливість більш ефективно виконувати свої функції та демонструвати вищий рівень професійної залученості.

Ще одним аспектом є ефективне управління робочим часом менеджерів. Управлінська діяльність характеризується значною кількістю різноманітних завдань, необхідністю швидкого прийняття рішень та постійною взаємодією з персоналом, що потребує встановлення пріоритетів, планування робочого часу та раціонального розподілу завдань між працівниками. Сучасні підходи до організування управлінської праці передбачають використання методів тайм-менеджменту. При цьому специфіка діяльності підприємств комунальної сфери, а саме наявність регламентованих процедур, значна частка оперативних завдань та взаємодія з органами місцевого самоврядування, потребує вибору найбільш релевантних інструментів управління робочим часом (Табл. 1).

Запровадження інструментів тайм-менеджменту у практику діяльності комунальних підприємств сприяє підвищенню ефективності організування управлінської праці. Раціональний розподіл робочого часу керівника дозволяє поєднувати стратегічні управлінські завдання з

оперативним реагуванням на виробничі та соціальні виклики, характерні для підприємств, що забезпечують надання суспільно важливих послуг. У результаті підвищується узгодженість діяльності структурних підрозділів та покращується якість управлінських рішень.

Одним із сучасних інструментів є техніка Pomodoro, яка передбачає чергування коротких періодів інтенсивної роботи з регулярними перервами. Це дозволяє підтримувати високий рівень концентрації уваги, зменшувати втому та підвищувати ефективність виконання складних управлінських завдань [4]. Крім того, використання цього методу допомагає структурувати складні завдання, розділяючи їх на менші етапи, що значно полегшує процес їх виконання.

Таблиця 1

Методи тайм-менеджменту в організуванні управлінської праці на підприємствах комунальної сфери*

Метод	Сутність методу	Особливості застосування
Матриця пріоритетності завдань	Розподіл управлінських завдань за рівнем важливості та терміновості	Дас змогу відокремити стратегічні управлінські питання (тарифи, інвестиційні програми, екологічні вимоги) від поточних оперативних проблем (скарги споживачів, аварійні ситуації)
Планування робочого дня керівника	Формування структурованого графіка роботи з визначенням часових блоків для різних видів діяльності	Враховує необхідність регулярних нарад із службами підприємства, комунікації з органами місцевої влади та реагування на непередбачувані виробничі ситуації
Делегування повноважень	Передача частини управлінських функцій керівникам структурних підрозділів	Особливо важливе для комунальних підприємств із розгалуженою виробничою структурою (служби експлуатації, технічні підрозділи, диспетчерські служби)
Регламентування управлінських процедур	Чітке встановлення стандартних алгоритмів виконання типових управлінських завдань	Дозволяє скоротити час на прийняття рішень у типових ситуаціях, зокрема під час оброблення звернень громадян або погодження виробничих робіт
Цифрові інструменти планування	Використання електронних календарів, систем контролю виконання завдань	Полегшує координацію роботи підрозділів підприємства та контроль виконання доручень, що є важливим за умов великої кількості операційних процесів

**Джерело: узагальнено автором.*

Особливе місце в організуванні управлінських процесів надається ефективній комунікації. Налагоджена система інформаційного обміну дозволяє забезпечити координацію діяльності, своєчасне виконання завдань та оперативне реагування на зміни у зовнішньому середовищі.

Для цього сучасні організації все частіше використовують цифрові комунікаційні платформи, системи управління проектами та інші інформаційні інструменти.

Крім того, необхідним елементом сучасної системи організування управлінських процесів є розвиток професійних компетентностей менеджерів. Постійне підвищення кваліфікації, участь у навчальних програмах та обмін досвідом сприяють формуванню управлінських навичок, необхідних для ефективного керівництва організацією. Розвиток компетентностей менеджерів також сприяє підвищенню інноваційного потенціалу організації та покращенню якості управлінських рішень [3].

Важливу роль у процесі організування управлінської праці відіграє також система оцінювання результативності діяльності менеджерів. Для цього використовуються різні показники ефективності, зокрема рівень продуктивності праці, якість виконаних управлінських рішень, ступінь досягнення поставлених цілей та рівень задоволеності персоналу умовами праці. Регулярний моніторинг таких показників дозволяє виявляти проблемні аспекти організації управлінських процесів та своєчасно вживати заходів щодо їх удосконалення.

Таким чином, організування управлінських процесів є елементом системи менеджменту сучасних організацій. Раціональна організація праці менеджерів, ефективне використання часу, розвиток комунікаційних механізмів та застосування сучасних методів управління сприяють підвищенню результативності діяльності організації. У сфері надання комунальних послуг це має особливе значення, оскільки забезпечує стабільність функціонування підприємств та підвищує якість послуг, що надаються населенню.

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ПРОГРАМА АВТОРИЗОВАНОГО ЕКОНОМІЧНОГО ОПЕРАТОРА ЄС: ІМПЛЕМЕНТАЦІЯ В УКРАЇНІ

Запровадження інституту Авторизованого економічного оператора (АЕО) в Україні є одним із найбільш вагомих кроків у межах виконання Угоди про асоціацію з ЄС та гармонізації вітчизняного митного законодавства з положеннями Митного кодексу Європейського Союзу (Union Customs Code). Програма АЕО базується на концепції стратегічного партнерства між митними органами та приватним сектором. В основі цієї моделі лежить принцип: підприємства, які добровільно демонструють високий рівень прозорості, фінансової стабільності та дотримання стандартів безпеки, отримують від держави кредит довіри у вигляді суттєвих спрощень при проходженні митних процедур. Станом на 2025-2026 роки цей інструмент став фундаментом для докорінної трансформації української митниці, перетворюючи її з фіскального контролера на сервісну службу європейського зразка, що є критично важливим для інтеграції вітчизняних виробників у глобальні ланцюги постачання [1].

Процес імплементації програми АЕО в Україні пройшов складний шлях від теоретичної адаптації законодавчої бази до практичного впровадження двох основних типів авторизацій. Перший тип - АЕО-С (про надання права на застосування спрощень) - орієнтований на оптимізацію митних формальностей, тоді як другий тип - АЕО-Б (про підтвердження безпеки та надійності) - фокусується на безпеці логістичних ланцюгів. Як зазначають провідні українські дослідники, зокрема А. Даниленко, головний виклик імплементації полягав не лише у зміні нормативних актів, а й у необхідності зміни ментальності як митників, так і бізнесу. Отримання статусу АЕО вимагає від підприємства проведення глибокого внутрішнього селф-аудиту, впровадження сучасних систем ІТ-моніторингу та забезпечення фізичної безпеки вантажів на рівні, що відповідає кращим світовим практикам. Це стимулює бізнес до «виходу з тіні», оскільки переваги від легального та

швидкого проходження кордону значно перевищують сумнівні вигоди від сірих схем [3].

Однією з ключових переваг, яку отримують українські АЕО у 2026 році, є можливість здійснення митного оформлення за процедурою «випуск за місцезнаходженням». Це означає, що вантажівка з товаром може слідувати безпосередньо на склад підприємства, минаючи завантажені митні термінали, що в умовах обмеженої пропускної здатності прикордонних переходів дає колосальну економію часу. Крім того, статус АЕО дозволяє використовувати загальну фінансову гарантію зі зменшенням її розміру на 50%, 70% або навіть повним звільненням від неї. Це вивільняє значні обігові кошти підприємств, які в умовах післявоєнного відновлення можуть бути спрямовані на модернізацію виробництва чи розширення штату працівників. Експерти наголошують, що АЕО - це не лише про митницю, а про загальну інвестиційну привабливість країни: іноземні інвестори набагато охочіше вкладають кошти в компанії, які мають офіційне підтвердження надійності від митних органів [5].

Важливим стратегічним досягненням 2026 року стало підписання угоди про взаємне визнання (Mutual Recognition Agreement) між Україною та ЄС. Це означає, що український сертифікат АЕО тепер має таку ж юридичну силу в Парижі чи Берліні, як і в Києві. Для експортерів це відкриває «зелений коридор» на всьому просторі Євросоюзу: їхні вантажі підпадають під значно меншу кількість перевірок на підставі аналізу ризиків, а у разі потреби фізичного контролю - він проводиться позачергово. Дослідник О. Пасхавер зазначає, що такий рівень довіри є свідченням зрілості української економічної системи та її готовності до повноправного членства в ЄС. Водночас це накладає на бізнес велику відповідальність, оскільки будь-яке серйозне порушення митних правил призводить до негайного відкликання статусу та тривалої заборони на його повторне отримання [4].

Перспективи подальшого розвитку програми АЕО в Україні пов'язані з її інтеграцією в єдину цифрову систему митних даних ЄС. У 2026 році активна робота ведеться над автоматизацією обміну інформацією про авторизованих операторів у режимі реального часу. Це дозволить митним органам країн-членів ЄС бачити статус українського підприємства ще до того, як його вантаж перетне кордон. Крім того, спостерігається тенденція до залучення логістичних та транспортних компаній до програми АЕО, що створює повністю безпечний ланцюг постачання від заводу до кінцевого споживача. Масштабування програми на рівень малого бізнесу через спрощені процедури перевірки

для певних категорій товарів дозволить ще більшість кількості підприємців скористатися перевагами євроінтеграції [2].

Імплементація програми Авторизованого економічного оператора є однією з найбільш успішних та структурних реформ у митній сфері України за останні десятиліття. Вона довела свою ефективність не лише як засіб прискорення торгівлі, а й як потужний інструмент боротьби з корупцією через впровадження зрозумілих та прозорих правил гри. У 2026 році статус АЕО став для українських компаній своєрідним знаком якості, який підтверджує їхню відповідність високим європейським стандартам ведення бізнесу. Це особливо важливо в контексті післявоєнної відбудови, коли швидкість та надійність постачання критичних товарів та обладнання мають вирішальне значення для стабільності національної економіки.

Подальший розвиток інституту АЕО потребує постійного моніторингу та адаптації до нових викликів, зокрема у сфері кібербезпеки та захисту митних даних. Україна має продовжувати роботу над популяризацією статусу АЕО серед експортерів, надаючи методичну допомогу та спрощуючи шлях до авторизації для доброчесних компаній. Програма АЕО - це живий механізм, який постійно еволюціонує разом із технологіями та вимогами глобального ринку. Успіх цієї реформи є чітким сигналом для міжнародної спільноти про те, що Україна не лише декларує європейські цінності, а й успішно впроваджує їх у повсякденну економічну практику, будуючи сучасну, відкриту та безпечну державу.

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МЕНЕДЖМЕНТ МЕРЧАНДАЙЗИНГУ ЯК ІНСТРУМЕНТ ПІДВИЩЕННЯ ЕФЕКТИВНОСТІ ГУРТОВОЇ ТОРГІВЛІ

Сучасні торговельні підприємства змушені шукати нові підходи до організації збутової діяльності та формування конкурентних переваг. Для підприємств гуртової торгівлі одягом і взуттям, діяльність яких безпосередньо пов'язана з формуванням асортименту, взаємодією з виробниками та забезпеченням ефективного просування товарів на ринок, мерчандайзинг дедалі частіше розглядається не лише як інструмент викладки товарів, а як комплексна система управління поведінкою споживачів і партнерів.

Система маркетингових комунікацій у сфері торгівлі являє собою сукупність інформаційних потоків і взаємозв'язків між підприємством, товаром та ринком його збуту. У межах цієї системи мерчандайзинг виконує функцію своєрідного комунікаційного механізму, що дозволяє формувати у потенційних покупців позитивне сприйняття продукції та стимулювати їх до прийняття рішень щодо закупівлі товарів. Дослідники зазначають, що мерчандайзинг можна розглядати як професійну діяльність, спрямовану на управління поведінкою покупців на основі аналізу психологічних особливостей сприйняття інформації та організації торгового простору [4].

Практика функціонування торговельних підприємств свідчить, що інструменти мерчандайзингу сьогодні активно застосовуються не лише в роздрібній торгівлі, а й на інших етапах руху товарів. Зокрема, виробники використовують мерчандайзинг для просування власних брендів і підвищення впізнаваності продукції. У свою чергу, підприємства гуртової торгівлі застосовують ці інструменти з метою формування привабливої презентації товарного асортименту, оптимізації процесів демонстрації продукції та підвищення зацікавленості потенційних партнерів.

У науковій літературі пропонується різноманітна класифікація видів мерчандайзингу. Серед найбільш поширених можна виділити ексклюзивний мерчандайзинг, спрямований на просування окремих торгових марок; суміщений мерчандайзинг, який передбачає одночасну роботу з товарами декількох виробників; комунікативний мерчандайзинг, що базується на психологічному впливі на споживачів через елементи оформлення торговельного середовища [3]. Окреме

місце посідає візуальний мерчандайзинг, основною метою якого є створення привабливої атмосфери та ефективне представлення товарів у торговельному просторі [1].

Разом із тим сучасні дослідники звертають увагу на розвиток нових форм мерчандайзингової діяльності. Зокрема, перехресний мерчандайзинг передбачає поєднання взаємодоповнюючих товарів (наприклад, взуття, сумок та аксесуарів), що стимулює збільшення обсягу закупівель. Мікромерчандайзинг, у свою чергу, базується на гнучкому коригуванні розміщення товарів відповідно до змін у попиту та структурі продажів. У сучасній торговельній практиці також використовується так званий «мерчандайзинг вражень», який спрямований на створення позитивного емоційного досвіду під час ознайомлення з продукцією [2].

Для підприємств гуртової торгівлі особливе значення має правильна організація презентації товарного асортименту. Оскільки клієнтами таких підприємств здебільшого виступають власники роздрібних магазинів або представники торговельних мереж, важливо створити максимально зручні умови для ознайомлення з продукцією, її порівняння та вибору. Саме тому ефективне управління мерчандайзингом передбачає не лише грамотну викладку товарів, але й продумане структурування асортименту за категоріями, брендами, стилями та ціновими сегментами.

Важливим аспектом є також організація торговельного простору. Рациональне планування демонстраційних зон, розміщення торговельного обладнання та інформаційних матеріалів дозволяє значно спростити процес пошуку потрібної продукції та підвищити ефективність взаємодії з клієнтами. Важливе значення має врахування психологічних особливостей сприйняття інформації споживачами, що дозволяє створити комфортне середовище для прийняття рішень щодо закупівлі товарів.

Окрему роль у системі мерчандайзингу відіграє формування атмосфери торговельного середовища. Доведено, що такі фактори, як освітлення, кольорове оформлення інтер'єру, музичний супровід і використання рекламно-інформаційних матеріалів можуть суттєво впливати на поведінку покупців. Наприклад, спокійна музика здатна уповільнювати рух відвідувачів і стимулювати більш уважне ознайомлення з асортиментом, тоді як ритмічні композиції можуть використовуватися для прискорення обслуговування в періоди підвищеної відвідуваності торговельних залів.

Для узагальнення основних сфер застосування мерчандайзингу в діяльності торговельних підприємств доцільно систематизувати його

ключові функції (табл. 1).

Таблиця 1

Напрями використання мерчандайзингу в діяльності торговельних підприємств

Сфера застосування	Основні інструменти
Стимулювання збуту	приваблива презентація товарів, виділення новинок, демонстрація популярних брендів
Організація торговельного простору	планування торгових зон, ефективне розміщення обладнання, оптимізація руху покупців
Маркетингові комунікації	використання POS-матеріалів, інформаційна підтримка товарів, рекламні елементи
Управління поведінкою споживачів	створення привабливої атмосфери магазину, використання музики, освітлення, кольорового оформлення
Асортиментна політика	структурування товарних категорій, виділення найбільш прибуткових позицій

Як свідчать результати досліджень у сфері поведінки споживачів, значна частина рішень щодо придбання товарів приймається безпосередньо у місці продажу. На це впливають різноманітні фактори, серед яких важливу роль відіграють зовнішній вигляд товару, його упаковка, рівень інформування покупців, доступність продукції, а також загальна атмосфера торговельного середовища [5].

Таким чином, мерчандайзинг слід розглядати як комплексний інструмент управління збутовою діяльністю торговельних підприємств. Його ефективне використання дозволяє не лише покращити презентацію товарного асортименту, але й оптимізувати торговельно-технологічні процеси, підвищити рівень зацікавленості клієнтів та сформувати позитивний імідж підприємства. Для підприємств гуртової торгівлі одягом і взуттям розвиток системи мерчандайзингу створює додаткові можливості для розширення партнерської бази, збільшення обсягів реалізації продукції та зміцнення позицій на конкурентному ринку.

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МЕТОДИ МЕНЕДЖМЕНТУ ЯК ІНСТРУМЕНТ РЕАЛІЗАЦІЇ ФУНКЦІЙ УПРАВЛІННЯ В СУЧАСНИХ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЯХ

Ефективність діяльності будь-якої організації залежить від того, які методи управління використовують менеджери для реалізації управлінських функцій. Планування, організація, мотивація та контроль не можуть бути реалізовані лише через формальне розподілення повноважень. Вони потребують конкретних управлінських інструментів, які забезпечують вплив на поведінку працівників, координацію ресурсів та узгодження інтересів різних груп в організації. Саме таку роль відіграє система методів менеджменту.

У науковій літературі організація розглядається як складна система взаємопов'язаних елементів, що функціонує у взаємодії із зовнішнім середовищем [2]. Такий підхід дозволяє зрозуміти, що управління не може обмежуватись окремими управлінськими діями. Будь-яке рішення впливає на інші елементи системи — персонал, структуру, інформаційні потоки, фінансові ресурси. Особливістю організаційних систем є їх здатність адаптуватися до змін середовища. Ринок, технології та потреби споживачів змінюються досить швидко, тому організації змушені постійно коригувати управлінські підходи. У таких умовах методи менеджменту стають не просто технічним інструментом, а важливим механізмом забезпечення гнучкості та життєздатності організації. Сучасні дослідники розглядають управління з різних позицій. Найпоширеніші підходи до трактування сутності менеджменту узагальнено в табл. 1.

Аналіз наведених підходів свідчить, що сучасна теорія менеджменту поступово зміщується від суто економічного розуміння управління до соціально орієнтованого. Якщо класичні концепції акцентували увагу на продуктивності ресурсів і контролі виконання

завдань, то сучасні підходи значно більше уваги приділяють людському фактору, організаційній культурі та комунікаціям.

Таблиця 1

Основні підходи до трактування управління в сучасній науці*

Підхід	Характеристика
Праксеологічний	Управління розглядається як діяльність із раціонального використання ресурсів для досягнення цілей
Економічний	Акцент робиться на забезпеченні фінансових результатів через ефективний розподіл ресурсів
Функціональний	Управління трактується як сукупність функцій: планування, організація, мотивація, контроль
Інституційний	Основна увага приділяється ролі керівників як носіїв влади та координаторів організаційного порядку
Соціальний	Управління пов'язується з формуванням організаційної культури, системи цінностей та взаємодії людей
Універсальний	Управління визначається як комплекс управлінських дій щодо використання ресурсів для досягнення цілей організації

**Джерело: узагальнено за [1].*

У цьому контексті змінюється і роль методів управління. Якщо раніше вони переважно розглядалися як адміністративні інструменти впливу, то сьогодні їх трактують як систему способів координації діяльності людей і ресурсів, спрямовану на досягнення стратегічних цілей організації [3]. Метод управління можна визначити як усвідомлено обраний спосіб впливу суб'єкта управління на об'єкт управління для досягнення певної мети. Вибір конкретного методу залежить від управлінської ситуації, стилю керівництва, рівня розвитку організації та особливостей її персоналу. У практиці менеджменту сформувалась система методів управління, до складу якої найчастіше відносять три основні групи: організаційно-розпорядчі; економічні; соціально-психологічні. Кожна з цих груп виконує власну функцію в управлінському процесі (табл. 2).

Таблиця 2

Характеристика основних груп методів менеджменту*

Група методів	Основний зміст	Приклади застосування
Організаційно-розпорядчі	Базуються на владних повноваженнях і регламентуванні діяльності	накази, інструкції, стандарти, регламенти
Економічні	Грунтуються на матеріальній зацікавленості працівників	система оплати праці, преміювання, фінансові стимули
Соціально-психологічні	Спрямовані на формування сприятливого соціального клімату	мотивація, комунікації, корпоративна культура

**Джерело: узагальнено за [2].*

Важливо підкреслити, що жодна група методів не може забезпечити ефективне управління окремо. Наприклад, адміністративні рішення без матеріального стимулювання можуть викликати формальне виконання завдань, але не сприятимуть ініціативності персоналу. Водночас використання лише економічних стимулів без належної організації праці також не гарантує досягнення високих результатів. Саме тому сучасна практика менеджменту базується на комплексному поєднанні різних методів управління.

Значна роль у виборі методів належить менеджеру, оскільки ефективність їх застосування залежить від професійних компетенцій керівника, його стилю управління та здатності враховувати особливості організаційної ситуації. Найбільш результативними є ті управлінські системи, де методи управління поєднуються з розвитком організаційної культури, комунікацій та участі персоналу в прийнятті рішень. Дедалі більшого значення набувають соціальні аспекти управління, що пояснюється зростанням ролі знань, творчого потенціалу працівників і необхідністю формування довгострокових партнерських відносин у колективі. Управління поступово трансформується від жорсткого адміністративного впливу до партнерської моделі взаємодії між керівниками та працівниками.

Таким чином, система методів менеджменту є важливим інструментом реалізації управлінських функцій. Її ефективність визначається здатністю менеджерів комбінувати різні методи впливу відповідно до конкретної управлінської ситуації, забезпечуючи узгодження інтересів організації та її персоналу. Комплексне використання організаційно-розпорядчих, економічних та соціально-психологічних методів дозволяє створити умови для результативної діяльності організації та досягнення її стратегічних цілей.

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АДАПТАЦІЯ ПРАВИЛ ІНКОТЕРМС ДО УМОВ ЦИФРОВОЇ ТОРГІВЛІ: ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ МІЖНАРОДНИХ КОНТРАКТІВ ТА УПРАВЛІННЯ РИЗИКАМИ ЕЛЕКТРОННОЇ КОМЕРЦІЇ

У сучасному світі компанії різного масштабу, що прагнуть вийти на зовнішні ринки, обов'язково будуть стикатися з необхідністю зробити крок назустріч міжнародному постачанню, а разом з цим і до складного правового середовища, яке це постачання регулює. На цьому етапі виникають саме правила Інкотермс, які розроблені міжнародною торговою палатою як універсальний інструмент визначення умов міжнародних торгівельних угод. Структура правил побудована на трьох взаємообумовлених концепціях, а саме поставка, ризик та витрати. Наприклад, перша концепція, поставка буде визначатися як момент, коли продавець виконує своє зобов'язання щодо передачі товару, після чого будь які ризики такі як випадкове знищення товару або пошкодження переходять до покупця [1]. Всі одинадцять умов будуть відрізнятися між собою саме місцем та способом такого переходу постачання. Принципова складність полягає в тому, що вся така конструкція є фізично-просторовою за своєю природою. Тобто товар буде прив'язаний до конкретних точок у географічному просторі (такі як порт, склад, митний кордон), до матеріальних засобів переміщення (вантажне, водне та повітряне перевезення) та фізичної цілісності товару як визначального критерію настання ризикової події [1]. У випадку, коли предметом міжнародного договору стає програмний продукт, хмарна послуга або цифровий фінансовий інструмент, така фізична-просторова логіка розпочинає руйнуватися. Однією з базових умов є EXW, коли продавець несе мінімум зобов'язань, постачання відбувається одразу зі складу продавця, де всі подальші ризики буде нести покупець. Але що слід вважати складом у випадку, коли програмний продукт одночасно функціонує на серверах у трьох різних країнах і жодна з них не є очевидним місцем поставки. Схожа ситуація із умовою FOB, яка вимагає фізичного завантаження товару на борт судна в порту відвантаження, тоді як при передачі цифрового права власності через програмний інтерфейс не існує ані порту, ані судна. Ще одна умова DDP, яка відрізняється від інших, умова включає в себе оплату митних зборів продавцем, однак переважна більшість цифрових продуктів не підлягають під митне оподаткування у жодній юрисдикції, що фактично позбавляє зміст в контексті цифрової торгівлі [1]. Самі розробники

правил у вступі до Інкотермс відверто вказують, що правила не застосовуються до договорів надання послуг, а це визнання є водночас і юридичною коректністю, і вказівкою на регуляторний вакуум щодо значного і стрімко зростаючого сегменту міжнародного товарообігу. Особливо помітна проблема проявляється у ситуаціях, які дослідники дедалі частіше позначають терміном «фіджитал» – це коли фізичний товар пов'язаний з цифровим компонентом, наприклад сертифікатом або електронною угодою, що передає права власності [2]. В такому випадку угода передбачає фактично подвійну поставку, де фізичний компонент може регулюватися іншими умовами, тоді як цифровий підпорядковується принципово іншій логіці, для якої жодної відповідної торгової умови в Інкотермс просто не передбачено, що породжує правову невизначеність щодо моменту переходу ризику, між відповідальністю сторін та порядку документації про виконання зобов'язань.

Структура нормального регулювання для цифрової торгівлі потребує насамперед чіткого розуміння того, з якими саме об'єктами ми маємо справу, адже всі вони дуже різні і одне правило для всіх тут просто не працює. Найближчими до того, що Інкотермс вміє регулювати, є звичайні цифрові товари, як-от програмне забезпечення, електронні книги та інше, бо передаються одноразово у вигляді файлу, де складно зрозуміти яка умова буде правильною. Виникає вже інша ситуація з послугами постійного доступу, тобто хмарними сервісами, підписками та стрімінговими платформами. Їх взагалі не можна доставити у звичному форматі, бо вони не передаються один раз, а споживаються постійно, і питання про те, в який момент при такій моделі переходить ризик, не має жодної відповіді в правилах. Ще складніша ситуація є з криптовалютами та іншими цифровими фінансовими активами, які одночасно регулюються і торговим, і фінансовим законодавством, причому жодне з них не дає учасникам розуміння, на яких саме умовах вважається, що зобов'язання виконане.

Окрім розуміння про те, що саме передається, з новими технологіями цифрова торгівля створює зовсім нові види ризиків, які у фізичній торгівлі не існують. Наприклад, традиційні ризики за умовами будуть стосуватися пошкодження або втрати товару під час перевезення, проте у цифровому середовищі товар не можна розбити чи намочити, зате його можна перехопити, підмінити або заблокувати. Наприклад, якщо дані були перехоплені десь по дорозі від продавця до покупця через атаку на транзитний вузол то жодна з одинадцяти умов не буде пояснювати, хто за це несе відповідальність. Також проблемою є законодавство про захист персональних даних, якщо цифрова послуга

містить персональні дані і передається через кордон з певним порушенням, штраф може бути більшим за вартість усієї угоди, але правила так само не будуть пояснювати, хто з двох сторін відповідатиме за ці вимоги. Ще один ризик, це те що продукт технічно був переданий, але покупець не може ним скористатися через несумісність систем, і тут важко визначити, чия це провина, продавця, який не попередив, чи покупця, який не перевіряв своє технічне середовище. Однією з ключових проблем є, коли сервер продавця знаходиться в одній країні, хмарна інфраструктура в іншій, а покупець у третій, виникає проблема визначення, право якої країни застосовувати і на якому етапі вважати, що поставка відбулася.

Уникнення та контроль ризиків можна здійснювати за декількома напрямками, які сьогодні активно використовуються учасниками цифрової торгівлі. Одним із найпоширеніших інструментів є укладання детальних угод про рівень обслуговування, де сторони заздалегідь прописують, що вважається нормальною роботою сервісу, який час простою є допустимим і яка компенсація передбачена у разі збою [3]. Такий підхід фактично замінює традиційну логіку переходу ризиків у момент поставки на постійний моніторинг виконання зобов'язань протягом усього строку дії угоди. Окремим інструментом стало страхування кіберризиків, яке за останні роки перетворилося на стандартну практику для компаній, які працюють із цифровими активами та послугами. Страхові послуги покривають витрати від витоку даних, різних атак на інфраструктуру та перебоїв у роботі сервісів, хоча умови такого страхування суттєво відрізняються залежно від країни та виду цифрового продукту. В угодах все частіше розпочали здійснювати вибір юрисдикції, де дві сторони обізнано обирають право тієї країни, де цифрове законодавство є найбільш розвиненим і передбачуваним, щоб заздалегідь розуміти, як вирішуватимуться можливі спори. Також розпочали прописувати окремі положень про розподіл відповідальності у випадку кібератак, несумісності систем або порушень вимог щодо захисту персональних даних, що дозволяє уникнути ситуацій, коли жодна зі сторін формально не є відповідальною за збиток. В першу чергу ефективне управління ризиками в цифровій торгівлі неможливе без запровадження обов'язкової цифрової верифікації факту поставки, тобто автоматичної фіксації моменту передачі доступу до продукту з боку незалежної технічної системи, яка б слугувала доказовою базою у разі виникнення спору між сторонами. Такий механізм міг би стати цифровим аналогом і суттєво підняти правову визначеність угод у цифровому середовищі.

Отже, цифрова торгівля розвивається значно швидше, ніж правове середовище, яке її регулює. Правила Інкотермс, попри свою універсальність і практичну цінність для фізичної торгівлі, не були створені для світу, де товар може не мати фізичної форми, де поставка відбувається миттєво через мережу, а ризик може матеріалізуватися у вигляді кібератаки або штрафу за порушення законодавства про персональні дані. Ця невідповідність не є недоліком самих правил, а радше свідченням того, наскільки глибоко змінилася природа міжнародної торгівлі за останні роки. Розробка нових умов поставки, буде поступово адаптуватися до цифрового середовища із затвердженими європейськими стандартами. Цифрова торгівля вже стала реальністю, і питання полягає не в тому, чи потрібні нові правила, а в тому, наскільки швидко світова спільнота зможе їх сформулювати.

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РОЗВИТОК ЦИФРОВОЇ ЕКОНОМІКИ УКРАЇНИ В КОНТЕКСТІ ЗАБЕЗПЕЧЕННЯ РЕЗИЛЬЄНТНОСТІ

В сучасному світі країни стикаються з глобальною нестабільністю, геополітичними викликами та війнами, особливо гостро постає питання забезпечення економічної резильєнтності України після початку повномасштабного вторгнення. Одним з головних механізмів, що сприяють відновленню економічних процесів є розвиток цифрової економіки. Розвиток цифрової економіки необхідний, адже об'єднує в собі цифрові платформи, бази даних та штучний інтелект, а також використання інформаційно-комунікаційних технологій. Через кризи в Україні цей процес значно прискорився, що стимулює впровадження нових цифрових рішень у бізнесі, державному управлінні та соціальній сфері. Важливим елементом цифрової трансформації є електронне урядування та створення сучасних державних цифрових сервісів, які дають можливість безперервно надавати послуги в умовах, якщо громадяни не мають фізичної можливості. Це підвищує економічну стійкість країни та довіру громадян до уряду та держави.

З 2019 року Україна активно нарощує темпи розвитку цифрового урядування, ставши в ряд з лідерами цифровізації. Успішним про'ктом став додаток з електронними документами та державними послугами "Дія". В Україні працює багато ІТ-спеціалістів, які створюють та впроваджують нові розробки, які допомагають забезпечити економічну резильєнтність. Адже, під час повномасштабного вторгнення ворог здійснює хакерські атаки на державні сервера, але українські спеціалісти змогли успішно відбити хакерські атаки та навіть впровадити в "Дію" нові послуги [1].

Оскільки для економічного розвитку важливим є розвиток та підтримка бізнесу, для України це стало викликом через війну. Адже, цифровізація бізнесу сприяє підвищенню його адаптивності до кризових умов, а саме, через розвиток електронної комерції, автоматизації процесів, дистанційної роботи та інтеграції у глобальні цифрові ринки. Це дозволяє українським підприємствам зберігати конкурентоспроможність навіть в періоди економічних потрясінь. В цифровізації держава підтримує бізнес через цифрове урядування, на державному порталі "Дія" є розділ "Дія. Бізнес". Зкориставшись цією функцією громадяни можуть знайти необхідну інформацію для

відкриття власного підприємства. Також, держава видає гранти, через платформу було видано більше ніж 426 млн грн, а самою платформою скористалося більше ніж 15 млн громадян [2].

Позитивною стороною цифрової економіки є той факт, що вона створює його, а не навпаки. Загалом, українська цифрова економіка розвивається за рахунок фінансової підтримки з за кордону, а це більш ніж 95% проектів. Складність також є у тому, що людський ресурс працює на розвиток інших держав, через вимушену міграцію. Для того, щоб українська економіка розвивалася, потрібно активно впроваджувати технології та інновації у виробництво у сферах військово-промислового комплексу, машинобудування, логістики та транспорту, а також переробної та харчової галузі, металургії, легкої промисловості та деревообробки. Також, інвестиції мають бути спрямовані в сфери біоінженерії, робототехніки та 3D-принтингу, а також у розвиток штучного інтелекту [3].

За результатами 2025 року ДіЯ налічує 23 млн користувачів, тобто 77% українців, які мають телефон встановили додаток. Також, запустили AI-асистентів для низки важливих серверів. В результаті, за 5 років роботи ДіЯ заощадила державі 184 млрд грн, якщо раніше на одну послугу держава витрачала 1500 грн, то завдяки цифровізації витрати знизилися до 242 грн. Також, Україна заощадила 49 млрд грн на рік на цифровізації базових послуг для громадян та 6,5 млрд грн на запуску програм підтримки. Впровадження електронного урядування допомагає також у боротьбі з корупцією. У 2025 році Україна заощадила на цифровізації послуг у традиційно найкорумпованіших сферах 4,2 млрд грн, сукупним ефектом протидії корупції є 26 млрд грн, це 0,34% у співвідношенні до ВВП 2024 року. У сфері будівельних послуг держава заощадила більше ніж 3,3 млрд грн, на послугах для моряків 271 млн грн, на отриманні ковідних сертифікатів 10,4 млн грн на рік, а також на послугах щодо статусу ВПО 67 млн грн. Завдяки цифровим платформам, країна не тільки може заощаджувати кошти, а також залучати до зборів людей та благодійні організації по всьому світу. Для України є важливою підтримка у сфері оборони, адже під час війни економіка країни зазнає значних руйнувань. Отже, через платформи UNITED 24 та UNITED 24 Media на медичну допомогу було зібрано 416 млн грн, для гуманітарного розмінування - 113 млн грн., на освіту та науку - 381 млн грн та на відбудову України вдалося зібрати 59 млн грн. Також за 2025 рік на порталі ДіЯ.Бізнес було 1,6 млн відвідувачів та видано грантів на суму більш ніж 26 млн грн [4].

Але не дивлячись на позитивні аспекти, розвиток української цифрової економіки супроводжується низкою викликів. Основними

проблемами є цифрова нерівність серед регіонів, недостатній рівень цифрової грамотності серед населення, а також високі ризики у сфері кібербезпеки. Окрім цього, залежність від іноземних технологій та зовнішнього фінансування породжує нові ризики для довгострокової економічної стійкості. Не менш важливим є питання збереження в Україні людського капіталу, адже відтік кваліфікованих кадрів у сфері ІТ-технологій та інших фахівців може сповільнювати темпи розвитку цифрової економіки країни. Тож, у цьому контексті державна політика повинна спрямовуватися на створення сприятливих умов для розвитку інновацій, стимулювання повернення висококваліфікованих кадрів та підтримку національного виробника.

У 2025 році Міністерством цифрової трансформації України був опублікований Індекс цифрової трансформації регіонів. За результатами середній показник в Україні становить 30 б по шкалі від 0 до 100 балів. Найбільше балів має Дніпропетровська область (43 бали), а також лідерами є Львівська область з показником 43 бали та Тернопільська - 42 бали. Ці регіони продемонстрували найвищі результати в напрямку цифрової інфраструктури, цифровізації публічних послуг та цифрових навичок. Але на регіональному рівні цифрова економіка залишається слабким місцем. Тож, подібні вимірювання необхідні для того, щоб визначити слабкі місця над якими потрібно працювати. У громадах середній Індекс цифрової трансформації значно нижчий, а саме 16 балів із 100. Найкращі результати мають Криворізька громада з балом 62,97, Вінницька - 62,75, Тернопільська - 60,35, Львівська - 55,61 та Харківська - 54,57. В цих громадах спостерігається найвищий рівень цифровізації публічних послуг та розвиток цифрових навичок. За результатами з 939 громад, лише 85 громад України мають індустриальні парки, в середньому Україна оцифрувала свої послуги лише на 10% [5].

Отже, можна зробити висновок, що розвиток цифрової економіки в сучасному світі залишається одним з ключових факторів забезпечення економічної резиліентності України в умовах сучасної геополітичної нестабільності. Використання цифрових технологій сприяє підвищенню гнучкості економічної системи, забезпечує безперервність функціонування державних інституцій та бізнесу, а також дає можливості для подальшого відновлення української економіки. Активний розвиток цифровізації дасть країні можливість інтегруватися у глобальний економічний простір, розширити експортний потенціал та розвинути інноваційний сектор країни. Водночас, для того щоб досягти стійкого економічного розвитку необхідно, щоб держава забезпечила комплексний підхід до цифрової трансформації, що поєднує в собі розвиток цифрової інфраструктури,

підвищення рівня кібербезпеки, інвестування у людський капітал та підтримку національних інновацій. У майбутньому розвиток цифрової економіки буде залежати від ефективності впровадження довгострокових стратегій цифрової трансформації. Держава має і надалі вдосконалювати цифрову інфраструктуру, розширювати доступ до швидкісного інтернету та впроваджувати технології 5G. Також, значну роль відіграє інтеграція України до цифрового ринку Європейського Союзу, що в свою чергу відкриє нові можливості для експорту цифрових послуг та допоможе залучити нові інвестиції. Вартим уваги, також є розвиток цифрової освіти та формування цифрових компетентностей населення, що дає можливість підвищувати конкурентоспроможність населення та забезпечувати ефективне використання сучасних технологій у різних сферах економіки.

Для того, щоб Україна могла забезпечити стабільний розвиток цифрової економіки її необхідно посилювати державну підтримку для інноваційних стартапів та ІТ-сектору, а також розвивати власні національні цифрові платформи для уряду, населення та бізнесу, тим самим зменшуючи залежність від іноземних технологій. Держава має інвестувати у власну кібербезпеку, особливо в умовах воєнного стану та захищати державні інформаційні системи та бази даних. А ще підвищувати рівень цифрової грамотності населення, зокрема через освітні ініціативи. У контексті післявоєнного відновлення України цифрова економіка може стати одним із ключових драйверів економічного зростання. Вона дозволить швидше відновлювати інфраструктуру, оптимізувати державні витрати та забезпечити прозорість використання міжнародної допомоги. Таким чином, цифровізація виступає не лише інструментом адаптації до криз, а й основою для формування нової, більш ефективної економічної моделі держави.

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СТРАТЕГІЧНІ НАПРЯМИ ВДОСКОНАЛЕННЯ УПРАВЛІННЯ ЕКОНОМІЧНОЮ БЕЗПЕКОЮ НА ЗАСАДАХ КОРПОРАТИВНОЇ СОЦІАЛЬНОЇ ВІДПОВІДАЛЬНОСТІ

Нині поняття «економічна безпека» трансформується з суто захисного механізму (захист активів від крадіжок і рейдерства) у стратегічну систему адаптивності та розвитку. Сучасні глобальні виклики - від наслідків воєнних конфліктів до стрімкого впровадження ШІ - висувають на перший план людський капітал.

Соціальна нерівність та ерозія соціальної згуртованості входять до топ-5 ризиків для ведення бізнесу. Саме тому інтеграція принципів корпоративної соціальної відповідальності (КСВ) в систему управління безпекою є не «благодійністю», а стратегічною необхідністю [1].

Традиційні моделі оцінки безпеки часто фокусуються на фінансових показниках (EBITDA, ліквідність). Проте, без кваліфікованого і мотивованого персоналу ці показники є нестабільними.

Відповідно до власних спостережень авторів внутрішня КСВ безпосередньо впливає на:

- інтелектуальну безпеку через мінімізацію відтоку мізків і захист комерційної таємниці через лояльність;
- кадрову безпеку завдяки зниженню плинності кадрів, що зменшує витрати на рекрутинг і адаптацію;
- операційну стійкість, тому що високі стандарти безпеки праці мінімізують ризики аварій і юридичних позовів.

Економічна безпека працівника є фундаментом безпеки компанії. Якщо працівник перебуває у стані фінансового стресу, його

продуктивність падає на 20-30%, а ризик вчинення фрод-дій (шахрайства) зростає [2].

Тому можна рекомендувати такі стратегічні напрями вдосконалення виплат:

- гідна оплата праці, що означає перехід від моделі мінімально допустимої до моделі «living wage» (прожиткового мінімуму, що забезпечує не тільки виживання, а і розвиток);

- прозорість бонусних систем завдяки використанню KPI, що враховують не лише прибуток, а й внесок у сталий розвиток;

- соціальний пакет, що містить програми ментального здоров'я, медичного страхування і пенсійного забезпечення.

Компанії, що інвестують у додатковий соціальний захист, демонструють на 15% вищу прибутковість у довгостроковій перспективі завдяки залученості персоналу [3]. Тому сучасна безпека праці - не лише каска й інструктаж, це культура нульового травматизму.

Економічний ефект від інвестицій у безпеку буде проявлятися, наприклад, у зменшенні виплат за лікарняними, уникненні штрафних санкцій з боку державних регуляторів, покращенні репутації (ESG-рейтинги), що відкриває доступ до дешевших кредитів від міжнародних інституцій (наприклад, ЄБРР).

Для вдосконалення управління безпекою на засадах КСВ пропонується можемо запропонувати певний алгоритм (табл. 1).

Таблиця 1

Алгоритм управління безпекою на засадах КСВ

Етап	Дія	Результат для безпеки
Аудит	Оцінка розриву між очікуваннями персоналу та реальністю	Виявлення прихованих вогнищ соціальної напруги
Інтеграція	Включення показників КСВ у систему ризик-менеджменту	Формування цілісної карти загроз
Інвестування	Спрямовання ресурсів у навчання та безпеку робочих місць	Підвищення якості людського капіталу
Моніторинг	Регулярна нефінансова звітність (GRI standards)	Підвищення інвестиційної привабливості

Отже, удосконалення управління економічною безпекою через призму КСВ - це перехід від контролю до довіри. Внутрішня складова КСВ (справедливі виплати, безпека, розвиток) створює так би мовити імунітет організації до зовнішніх шоків. Компанія, яка піклується про свій людський капітал, автоматично стає менш вразливою до шахрайства, втрати компетенцій та репутаційних криз.

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СВІТОВИЙ ДОСВІД СТРАТЕГІЙ РОЗРОБКИ УПАКОВКИ НА УМОВАХ ЕКОЛОГІЧНОЇ ВІДПОВІДАЛЬНОСТІ

У сучасних умовах глобальних екологічних викликів проблема зменшення негативного впливу виробництва та споживання на довкілля набуває особливої актуальності. Однією з ключових сфер, що потребує екологічної трансформації, є виробництво упаковки. Щороку у світі утворюються мільйони тонн упаковочних відходів, значна частина яких не підлягає повторній переробці та стає джерелом забруднення навколишнього середовища. У зв'язку з цим у багатьох розвинених країнах активно впроваджуються стратегії екологічно відповідального дизайну упаковки, що передбачають використання сталих матеріалів, скорочення обсягів відходів та оптимізацію життєвого циклу упаковки [1].

Актуальність дослідження світового досвіду в межах стратегій розробки упаковки на засадах екологічної відповідальності та визначення основних тенденцій їх впровадження у сучасному бізнесі є однією з пріоритетних більшості виробничих підприємств. Екологічно відповідальна упаковка має важливе значення не лише для захисту довкілля, але й для підвищення конкурентоспроможності підприємств. Сучасні споживачі дедалі частіше надають перевагу товарам, які мають екологічно безпечну упаковку [4].

Можна відзначити певні особливості та важливі відкриття у світі екопакування останнім часом:

- збільшення кількості піонерів у галузі розробки стійкого пакування в Азійсько-Тихоокеанському регіоні;
- поява Північної Америки як ключового гравця у цій галузі, що активно використовує інновації у товарних стратегіях;

- домінування паперу як провідного продукту у цій галузі;
- еволюція стійких продуктів: пакети лідирують;
- зростаюча важливість багаторазових рішень пакування[2].



Рис. 1. Прогноз розвитку світового ринку стійких матеріалів для упаковки

Тренд використання стійкої упаковки стрімко розвивається та набуває дедалі більшої популярності й актуальності у світі. У 2023 році обсяг світового ринку стійких пакувальних матеріалів становив близько 276,08 млрд доларів США. За прогнозами, до 2032 року цей показник може зрости приблизно до 490,73 млрд доларів США, а середньорічний темп зростання ринку в період 2023–2032 років становитиме близько 6,6 % [2].

Сучасні технології відкривають нові можливості для створення екологічно безпечної упаковки. Однією з найбільш перспективних тенденцій є використання біополімерів, що виготовляються з природної сировини, зокрема кукурудзи або цукрової тростини.

Ще одним інноваційним напрямом є створення їстівної упаковки, яка може бути спожита разом із продуктом або швидко розкладатися без шкоди для довкілля.

Також поширюється використання розумної упаковки, що дозволяє контролювати стан продукту та зменшувати втрати харчових товарів під час транспортування та зберігання.

Крім того, компанії активно впроваджують цифрові технології, що допомагають оптимізувати логістичні процеси та зменшувати використання пакувальних матеріалів.

Отже, світовий досвід свідчить про активне впровадження стратегій екологічно відповідальної упаковки у різних країнах. Основними напрямками розвитку у цій сфері в Україні є використання біорозкладних матеріалів, мінімізація упаковки, підвищення рівня її переробки та впровадження інноваційних технологій.

Екологічно відповідальна упаковка стає важливим елементом сучасної економіки та складовою стратегії сталого розвитку, що сприяє збереженню природних ресурсів та формуванню екологічно орієнтованого споживання.

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ОСНОВНІ НАПРЯМКИ ЕКОНОМІЧНОЇ ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ УКРАЇНИ В ПІСЛЯВОЄННИЙ ПЕРІОД

Післявоєнне відновлення економіки - це складний і тривалий процес, що включає не тільки відбудову зруйнованих об'єктів господарства, а й створення нової економічної моделі розвитку. Практика різних країн показує, що війни завдають серйозної шкоди економіці: руйнується інфраструктура, скорочуються обсяги

виробництва, порушуються транспортні та логістичні зв'язки, а також погіршуються умови життя населення. У таких обставинах особливого значення набуває ефективна відбудова та оновлення економіки [3].

Одним із найважливіших напрямів є відновлення інфраструктури. Внаслідок воєнних дій значно пошкоджуються дороги, енергетичні об'єкти, підприємства та житлові будівлі. Тому першочерговим завданням держави є створення базових умов для функціонування економіки. Відбудова транспортної системи, енергетики, комунікацій і житла сприяє поживленню економічної діяльності, появі нових робочих місць і стабілізації ситуації в суспільстві [4].

Ще одним важливим напрямом є оновлення економіки та промисловості. Після війни з'являється можливість модернізувати виробництво, використовуючи сучасні технології. Під час відновлення підприємств активно впроваджуються автоматизовані системи та цифрові рішення, що дозволяє підвищити ефективність праці, раціональніше використовувати ресурси та зміцнити позиції країни на міжнародному ринку [2].

Велику роль відіграє інтеграція до світової економіки. Розширення зовнішньої торгівлі, участь у міжнародних організаціях та співпраця з іншими країнами відкривають можливості для залучення інвестицій і новітніх технологій. Історичний досвід європейських держав показує, що міжнародна підтримка значно прискорює економічне відновлення [3].

Важливе місце займає розвиток малого та середнього бізнесу. Цей сектор швидко пристосовується до нових умов, забезпечує зайнятість населення та активізує економіку. Підтримка підприємців з боку держави, доступ до фінансів, податкові пільги та кредитні програми сприяють економічному зростанню [1].

Не менш важливим є залучення зовнішнього фінансування та інвестицій. Після війни країни потребують значних коштів для відбудови. У цьому допомагають міжнародні організації, іноземні інвестори та програми підтримки. Інвестиції дають змогу реалізовувати великі проєкти, розвивати промисловість і створювати нові виробничі можливості.

Окрему увагу слід приділити розвитку інноваційних галузей. У сучасному світі економічне зростання значною мірою залежить від технологій, цифровізації та високотехнологічного виробництва. ІТ-сфера, цифрова економіка та альтернативна енергетика відкривають нові перспективи для розвитку держави [2].

Також важливим напрямом є проведення соціально-економічних реформ. Для стабільного розвитку необхідні зміни в управлінні, на

ринку праці, в освіті та соціальній сфері. Такі перетворення сприяють підвищенню ефективності економіки, покращенню інвестиційного клімату та зростанню рівня життя населення [5].

Таким чином, післявоєнне відновлення економіки - це комплексний процес, який охоплює відбудову інфраструктури, модернізацію виробництва, підтримку бізнесу, залучення інвестицій, інтеграцію у світову економіку та проведення реформ. Усе це створює основу для стабільного розвитку держави та підвищення добробуту суспільства.

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ЦИФРОВІЗАЦІЯ ЯК ЧИННИК КОНКУРЕНТОСПРОМОЖНОСТІ ТА РОЗВИТКУ ТУРИСТИЧНИХ ДЕСТИНАЦІЙ: ІНТЕРПРЕТАЦІЯ ПОКАЗНИКІВ TTDI У ДИНАМІЦІ

Анотація

Цифровізація дедалі більше визначає здатність туристичних дестинацій забезпечувати якісний сервіс, ефективне управління потоками та стійкість до шоків. Мета тез – обґрунтувати використання індексів Всесвітнього економічного форуму (WEF) Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Index (TTCI) та його наступника Travel & Tourism Development Index (TTDI) для оцінювання впливу цифрових чинників на розвиток туризму у 2015-2024 рр. Ключова увага приділяється стовпу «готовність ІКТ» (ICT Readiness), який у TTDI трактується як вимір

доступності та використання ІКТ-інфраструктури й цифрових сервісів [1]. TTDI 2024 фіксує зростання готовності ІКТ на 7,2% порівняно з 2019 р. і позитивну динаміку у 97% економік, що пов'язується з розширенням онлайн-доступу, мобільного покриття та використання цифрових платежів [1]. Для країн ЄС продемонстровано помірний позитивний зв'язок між рівнем цифровізації та позиціями у TTDI 2024 ($r = 0,46$) [8].

Ключові слова: *цифровізація, туристична дестинація, конкурентоспроможність, TTDI, ІКТ, стійкість.*

Вступ

Цифрові технології в туризмі визначають логіку створення цінності: від пошуку інформації та бронювання до сервісу на місці й післяподорожньої взаємодії. У концепції «smart tourism» дані та ІКТ розглядаються як ресурс для управлінських рішень і підвищення конкурентоспроможності дестинацій [4; 5]. Перехід від ІКТ до е-туризму та smart tourism посилив роль цифрових каналів у формуванні попиту й управлінні сервісами [9]. У концепції «вік прискорення» показано, що технологічні зміни скорочують цикл пошуку, планування та споживання туристичних послуг, підвищуючи вимоги до цифрової зрілості дестинацій [6]. Таким чином, цифрові канали й сервіси формують нові стандарти туристичного продукту та мають бути враховані в оцінюванні конкурентоспроможності дестинацій.

Мета та завдання

Мета — показати, як показники TTDI/TTCI можуть використовуватися для аналізу впливу цифровізації на розвиток туристичних дестинацій у період 2015-2024 рр. з акцентом на готовність ІКТ.

Завдання:

1. Окреслити методичну основу TTDI/TTCI та ключові зміни структури індексів у 2015-2024 рр. [1; 2; 3].

2. Уточнити зміст стовпа «готовність ІКТ» як вимірювача цифрової готовності в туризмі [1; 2].

3. Співвіднести індексний підхід із результатами досліджень щодо зв'язку цифровізації та конкурентоспроможності туризму [8].

Сформульовані мета й завдання задають логіку подальшого аналізу та забезпечують зв'язок індексних показників із практичними потребами управління дестинаціями.

Матеріали та методи

Інформаційну базу складають звіти WEF TTCI 2015 та TTDI 2021/2024 [1–3]. Для TTDI 2021 зазначено структуру 17 стовпів і 112 індикаторів [2], тоді як TTDI 2024 містить 17 стовпів і 102 індикатори [1]. Це потребує обережності під час порівняння динаміки між випусками.

Результати

Готовність ІКТ відображає середовище, у якому туристи й бізнес користуються цифровими каналами, платформами та безготівковими інструментами. TTDI 2024 підкреслює, що зростання цього стовпа стимулює подальшу цифровізацію туристичних послуг [1].

TTDI 2024 фіксує 7,2% зростання середніх оцінок готовності ІКТ порівняно з 2019 р. та позитивну динаміку у 97% економік. Серед ключових драйверів названо розширення онлайн-доступу, мобільного покриття і цифрових платежів [1]. Для DESTINACIJS це означає зміщення стандарту сервісу: цифрові канали стають базовою умовою конкурентної пропозиції, а не додатковою опцією.

Для країн ЄС показано, що вищий рівень цифровізації узгоджується з кращими позиціями у TTDI 2024 ($r = 0,46$) [8]. Це дає підстави розглядати інвестиції в цифрову інфраструктуру та навички як складову політики підвищення конкурентоспроможності DESTINACIJS. У післякризовому вимірі цифрові інновації розглядаються як один з інструментів відновлення та підвищення стійкості туризму, зокрема в межах підходу, орієнтованого на стійкість [10]. У сукупності наведені результати підтверджують, що цифрові інвестиції та розвиток навичок мають розглядатися як системний напрям політики розвитку DESTINACIJS, а не як набір окремих ІТ-рішень.

Висновки

Індекси WEF TTCI/TTDI є придатною рамкою для вимірювання умов розвитку туризму, а стовп «готовність ІКТ» – інформативним показником цифрової готовності DESTINACIJS [1–3]. Практичний акцент полягає в поєднанні розвитку цифрової інфраструктури та сервісів із підвищенням цифрових навичок і впровадженням механізмів управління даними та партнерствами в межах екосистеми DESTINACIJS [5; 7]. Подальші дослідження доцільно спрямувати на прикладну інтерпретацію показників TTDI для України та деталізацію пріоритетів цифрової трансформації на рівні конкретних DESTINACIJS.

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ПРЯМІ ІНОЗЕМНІ ІНВЕСТИЦІЇ В УКРАЇНІ В УМОВАХ ВІЙНИ ТА ПОВОЄННОГО ВІДНОВЛЕННЯ

У контексті поглиблення глобалізаційних процесів іноземні інвестиції стали одним з основних інструментів міжнародного економічного співробітництва, що передбачає не тільки переміщення капіталу між країнами, але і передачу технологій, управлінських знань і виробничого досвіду. Особливо це питання актуальне для України, яка в умовах повномасштабної збройної агресії зіткнулася з гострим дефіцитом інвестиційних ресурсів для підтримки економічної діяльності і підготовки до майбутньої відбудови. За оцінками Міністерства економіки України, щорічна потреба країни у зовнішньому фінансуванні перевищує 70 млрд доларів США, а загальний обсяг необхідних інвестицій для відбудови сягає сотень мільярдів [1]. Це свідчить про нагальну потребу в дослідженні сучасних тенденцій надходження іноземних інвестицій в Україну, визначенні ключових чинників інвестиційної привабливості та узагальненні релевантного міжнародного досвіду.

У науковій літературі іноземні інвестиції визначають як вкладення капіталу, майна та цінностей, пов'язаних з інтелектуальною діяльністю, іноземними інвесторами в об'єкти підприємницької діяльності на території іншої держави з метою отримання доходу або досягнення соціального ефекту. Залежно від ступеня контролю інвестора над об'єктом їх інвестування, інвестиції можуть бути прямими, портфельними та іншими (наприклад, кредити, позики, торгові кредити). Прямі іноземні інвестиції (ПІІ) є найбільш значущою формою, оскільки передбачають встановлення тривалих економічних відносин між інвестором та підприємством-реципієнтом і, відповідно до методології МВФ та ОЕСР, фіксуються за умови частки участі не менш як 10 % у статутному капіталі [2]. Саме ПІІ, на відміну від портфельних інвестицій, здатні забезпечити стійкий розвиток приймаючої економіки: підвищити продуктивність праці, сприяти технологічному оновленню виробництва та інтегрувати країну у міжнародні ланцюги вартості.

Аналіз динаміки надходження ПІІ в Україну за останнє десятиліття свідчить про виражену циклічну нестабільність інвестиційних потоків, яка прямо корелює із внутрішньополітичною та безпековою ситуацією в

країні. Після анексії Криму та початку збройного конфлікту на Донбасі у 2014 році обсяги залучених ПІІ різко скоротилися і до 2021 року так і не відновилися до докризових показників. З початком повномасштабного вторгнення у лютому 2022 року приплив нових інвестицій фактично зупинився. Водночас за підсумками 9 місяців 2024 року чистий приплив ПІІ становив уже 2,96 млрд доларів США – на 41 % більше, ніж за аналогічний період 2023 року [3]. Цей факт свідчить про те, що навіть в умовах активних бойових дій частина іноземних інвесторів зберігає присутність в Україні та продовжує вкладати кошти у розвиток діяльності, вбачаючи у цьому довгострокові перспективи. Зокрема, серед компаній, що залишилися і продовжують інвестувати, – Carlsberg, Nestle, Philip Morris, Kronospan та низка інших міжнародних корпорацій [3].

Галузева структура іноземного інвестування в Україну традиційно відображає порівняльні конкурентні переваги країни. За даними Національного банку України, станом на кінець 2022 року найбільша частка залишків ПІІ – 41,9 % – була зосереджена у промисловості, передусім у харчовій переробці та металургії. Значний інтерес іноземних інвесторів також спостерігається у фінансовому секторі, оптовій та роздрібній торгівлі, інформаційних технологіях [1]. В умовах повоєнної розбудови країни можна очікувати змін у цій структурі: на перший план можуть вийти будівництво та відновлення інфраструктури, відновлювана енергетика, сільське господарство та оборонно-промисловий комплекс. Ці напрямки мають не лише значний внутрішній попит, а й очевидні конкурентні переваги, що робить їх привабливими для міжнародного капіталу навіть в умовах високої невизначеності.

Аналіз чинників інвестиційної привабливості України показує, що можна виділити дві групи таких чинників: стримуючі та стимулюючі. Прикладами стримуючих є: безпекові ризики внаслідок подовження збройного конфлікту; мінливість регулювання; низька ефективність та недостатня передбачуваність судової системи; обмеження руху капіталу, що були запроваджені у зв'язку із воєнним станом. Водночас до стимулюючих чинників відносяться: євроінтеграційний курс і поступова гармонізація українського законодавства з нормами ЄС; розвинений ринок кваліфікованої робочої сили, зокрема у сфері ІТ; значний потенціал відновлення і пов'язаний з ним державний та міжнародний попит на інвестиції; гарантії і фінансова підтримка з боку міжнародних інститутів – МВФ, Світового банку, ЄБРР, IFC [4]. Зокрема, у грудні 2022 року Україна підписала угоду з IFC щодо стратегічного консультування із залучення приватних інвестицій у відбудову, що стало важливим сигналом для іноземного бізнесу.

Важливим індикатором стану інвестиційного клімату є суб'єктивні оцінки самих інвесторів. За результатами досліджень Європейської Бізнес Асоціації, Індекс інвестиційної привабливості України у 2024 році зріс до 2,49 балів з 5 можливих проти 2,44 балів у 2023 році [3]. Попри те, що абсолютне значення залишається невисоким, позитивна динаміка є значущою: вона відображає поступове відновлення ділової впевненості навіть в умовах активних бойових дій. Понад третина компаній – членів асоціації реалізовувала або планувала інвестиційні проекти в Україні протягом 2022–2024 років. Для порівняння, у схожій ситуації повоєнного відновлення Польща у 1990-х роках досягла кратного зростання ПІІ завдяки поєднанню макроекономічної стабілізації, прозорій приватизації та активного використання євроінтеграційних стимулів – і саме цей досвід є найбільш релевантним для України [5].

Узагальнення міжнародного досвіду залучення іноземних інвестицій в умовах або після збройних конфліктів і системних трансформацій дає можливість виділити ключові фактори успіху: перш за все, це макроекономічна стабільність і передбачуваність регуляторного середовища; надійний захист прав власності і судова реформа; активна роль міжнародних фінансових організацій у створенні механізмів гарантування ризиків; спрямована діяльність з просування інвестиційних можливостей країни на зовнішніх ринках. Відповідно, політика держави у сфері залучення інвестицій в Україні повинна якраз і будуватися за цими напрямками, а не тільки обмежуватися фінансовими стимулами, ефективність яких без проведення системних реформ, на жаль, є досить низькою [5].

Отже, в результаті дослідження розкрито сутність іноземних інвестицій та обґрунтовано значення прямих іноземних інвестицій як найбільш вагомої форми міжнародного економічного співробітництва. Проаналізовано динаміку надходження ПІІ в Україну та показано, що інвестиційні потоки суттєво залежать від безпекової й внутрішньоекономічної ситуації в країні. Встановлено, що після різкого скорочення інвестицій унаслідок повномасштабної війни у 2024 році спостерігаються ознаки поступового відновлення інвестиційної активності. Окреслено галузі, які залишаються привабливими для іноземного капіталу, а також визначено основні стримуючі та стимулюючі чинники інвестиційної привабливості України. Узагальнення міжнародного досвіду показало, що важливими передумовами активізації інвестицій є макроекономічна стабільність, передбачуваність регуляторного середовища, захист прав власності,

міжнародні гарантійні інструменти та послідовна державна політика у сфері залучення інвестицій.

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РОЛЬ ЦИФРОВОГО МАРКЕТИНГУ У РОЗВИТКУ БІЗНЕСУ В УМОВАХ СТРАТЕГІЧНОЇ ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ

Цифровізація економіки та сучасні технології, зокрема штучний інтелект, суттєво змінюють традиційний підхід до продажу товарів та послуг, світ стає дедалі більш динамічним і для забезпечення стійкості в таких умовах компанії вимушені перебудовувати свої бізнес моделі, канали комунікації, ланцюги постачання і підходи до управління клієнтським досвідом. Для українських компаній така трансформація є вимушеною не тільки через світовий тренд, а ще через воєнний стан, оскільки саме цифрові інструменти дають змогу забезпечувати безперервність взаємодії зі споживачами, підтримувати продажі,

швидко змінювати позиціонування та виходити на зовнішні ринки навіть в умовах високої турбулентності [2, 6].

За даними ресурсу DataReportal, які приведені у таблиці 1, за 2020-2025 роки суттєво зросли показники проникнення інтернету та проникнення соціальних мереж серед населення.

Таблиця 1

Динаміка показників поширення інтернету та соціальних мереж в Україні у 2020-2025 рр.*

Рік	Інтернет-користувачі, млн осіб	Проникнення інтернету, %	Користувачі соцмереж, млн осіб	Проникнення соцмереж, %
2020	27,46	63	19	43
2021	29,47	67,6	25,7	58,9
2022	31,1	71,8	28	64,6
2023	28,57	79,2	26,7	74
2024	29,64	79,2	24,3	64,9
2025	31,5	82,4	21,6	56,4

**Складено автором на основі даних [5].*

Таким чином, наведені в табл. 1 дані свідчать про посилення цифровізації споживчого середовища, що створює передумови для зростання ролі цифрового маркетингу в діяльності підприємств. Також, згідно з науковими працями [1-4] цифровий маркетинг у сучасному бізнесі набуває системного значення та дедалі більше поєднується зі стратегічними процесами розвитку підприємства. Науковці фокусуються на дослідженнях ролі персоналізації, Data-Driven підходів, інтегрованих цифрових кампаній, омніканальної комунікації та використання онлайн-інструментів для підтримання взаємодії зі споживачами. За таких умов цифровий маркетинг виступає не лише засобом просування продукції чи послуг, а й інструментом підвищення адаптивності підприємства, розширення ринкової присутності, оптимізації взаємодії з клієнтами та формування конкурентних переваг у цифровому середовищі. Одночасно у дослідженнях підкреслюється, що ефективна трансформація маркетингової діяльності потребує комплексного підходу до аналітики споживчого попиту та інтеграції новітніх цифрових технологій у систему управління підприємством.

Важливою складовою сучасного цифрового маркетингу є його аналітична спрямованість. Узагальнення наукових підходів [3, 6] свідчить, що результативність цифрових маркетингових рішень дедалі більше залежить від використання даних, аналітики споживчої поведінки, моніторингу змін попиту та оцінювання ефективності каналів комунікації. У праці Аракелової І., Лісютіна А. та Токаревої В. серед стратегічних орієнтирів цифрового маркетингу виокремлено Data-Driven підходи, інтегровані онлайн-кампанії та персоналізацію взаємодії

зі споживачами [1]. У роботі Ястремської О. аналітичні інструменти розглядаються як окрема функціональна група маркетингових інструментів, призначена для виявлення змін у ринковому середовищі, ризиків і нових вимог клієнтів [4]. Це дає підстави розглядати аналітичну компоненту цифрового маркетингу як основу для більш обґрунтованого й адаптивного прийняття маркетингових рішень.

Поряд із цим цифровий маркетинг набуває стратегічно-управлінського значення [3]. У дослідженні, присвяченому ролі цифрових маркетингових стратегій у розвитку малого та середнього бізнесу в умовах економічного відновлення України, підкреслено, що використання цифрових інструментів сприяє ефективній взаємодії з клієнтами, оптимізації маркетингових витрат і розширенню ринків збуту. Зокрема, у праці Ястремської О. зазначено, що в умовах динамічного та мінливого середовища маркетингові інструменти виконують не лише функцію просування, а й виступають засобом оперативної адаптації підприємства до змін, підтримання його конкурентоспроможності та вдосконалення управлінських рішень [4].

Таким чином, цифровий маркетинг у сучасних умовах розвитку бізнесу в Україні набуває ознак системного чинника стратегічної трансформації підприємств. Зростання поширення інтернету та соціальних мереж формує цифрове середовище, у якому онлайн-канали виступають базовою інфраструктурою взаємодії між бізнесом і споживачем, а маркетингові рішення дедалі більше інтегруються у процеси стратегічного управління.

Роль цифрового маркетингу в процесі стратегічної трансформації бізнесу проявляється у п'яти взаємопов'язаних функціональних площинах: комунікаційній, аналітичній, адаптаційній, управлінській та стратегічній. У комунікаційній сфері цифровий маркетинг забезпечує багатоканальну та персоналізовану взаємодію зі споживачами, а також сприяє підтриманню їхньої лояльності. В аналітичній сфері він формує інформаційну базу для обґрунтованого прийняття рішень завдяки аналізу споживчого попиту та моніторингу поведінки клієнтів. В адаптаційній і управлінській сферах цифровий маркетинг допомагає оперативно реагувати на зміни попиту, кризові умови й трансформацію ринкового середовища, забезпечуючи інтеграцію цифрових інструментів у систему управління підприємством та підтримуючи автоматизацію процесів. У стратегічній сфері цифровий маркетинг сприяє підвищенню конкурентоспроможності, розширенню ринків збуту й формуванню довгострокових переваг підприємства.

Ефективність цифрового маркетингу визначається не окремим застосуванням digital-інструментів, а їх системною інтеграцією в загальну модель управління підприємством. Саме поєднання аналітики,

персоналізації, омніканальних комунікацій, автоматизації та цифрових платформ створює підґрунтя для довгострокової конкурентної переваги та підвищення адаптивності бізнесу до нестабільного середовища.

Отже, цифровий маркетинг доцільно розглядати не лише як інструмент просування товарів і послуг, а як важливий елемент стратегічної трансформації бізнесу, що забезпечує збереження ринкових позицій, підтримання стійкості підприємства та його адаптацію до кризових і цифрових викликів. Перспективним напрямком подальших досліджень є розроблення прикладної моделі інтеграції маркетингових технологій у систему стратегічного управління підприємством з урахуванням українських умов функціонування бізнесу.

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ЕТИЧНІ ТА МЕТОДИЧНІ АСПЕКТИ ВИКОРИСТАННЯ ГЕНЕРАТИВНОГО ШІ У ВИКЛАДАННІ ГУМАНІТАРНИХ ДИСЦИПЛІН У ЗАКЛАДАХ ФПО: ПРОБЛЕМИ АКАДЕМІЧНОЇ ДОБРОЧЕСНОСТІ ТА КРИТЕРІЇ ОЦІНЮВАННЯ

Стрімке поширення інструментів генеративного ШІ (ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude) створило безпрецедентний виклик для академічної доброчесності. Понад 60% здобувачів використовують ШІ для виконання завдань, причому лише половина робить це відкрито. Традиційні антиплагіат-системи неефективні, оскільки ШІ генерує формально унікальні тексти. Водночас заборонний підхід суперечить реаліям цифрової трансформації та відриває навчання від професійної реальності.

Для викладачів гуманітарних дисциплін у закладах фахової передвищої освіти, зокрема при роботі зі здобувачами спеціальності 072, проблема особливо гостра. Некритичне використання ШІ загрожує розмиванням авторської відповідальності та деградацією формування комунікативних, аналітичних компетентностей і критичного мислення.

Мета роботи полягає у розробці системи критеріїв оцінювання навчальних робіт, створених за допомогою генеративного ШІ, та обґрунтуванні моделі трансформації педагогічної практики від парадигми заборони до парадигми прозорого та відповідального використання технологій на основі Таксономії делегування завдань GAiDeT.

Академічна доброчесність в епоху ШІ опинилася під тиском чотирьох викликів. Сучасні системи генерують формально унікальні тексти, які важко виявити стандартними засобами. Здобувачі освіти, отримуючи готові відповіді, пропускають ключові етапи навчального процесу – аналіз проблеми, критичну оцінку інформації, формулювання власних думок. Великі мовні моделі схильні до галюцинацій, що створює ризики для якості навчання. Нарешті, використання ШІ для творчих робіт загрожує ерозією авторства та нівелюванням індивідуального стилю.

Традиційна система оцінювання виявляється неадекватною новим реаліям. Вона базується на бінарній логіці «плагіат/не плагіат», тоді як використання ШІ створює спектр ситуацій – від повної заміни авторського мислення до використання як допоміжного інструменту

критичного аналізу. Відсутність чітких критеріїв оцінювання робіт, створених за участі ІІІ, породжує конфлікти, непорозуміння та демотивує як здобувачів освіти, так і викладачів.

Дослідження базується на аналізі міжнародного досвіду інтеграції ІІІ в освіту, вивченні Таксономії делегування завдань генеративному ІІІ (GAIDeT), аналізі нормативно-правової бази України щодо академічної доброчесності та практичному досвіді впровадження інноваційних підходів до оцінювання у викладанні дисциплін «Українська мова (за професійним спрямуванням)», «Ділова українська мова» та «Культура фахового мовлення» для здобувачів спеціальності 072. Використано методи педагогічного моделювання, експертної оцінки якості студентських робіт та анкетування учасників освітнього процесу.

1. Таксономія GAIDeT як основа системи оцінювання

Таксономія делегування завдань генеративному штучному інтелекту (GAIDeT) пропонує структурований підхід до класифікації способів використання ІІІ у навчальній та науковій діяльності. Вона виділяє п'ять основних категорій делегування: пошук інформації, генерація ідей, написання тексту, редагування та перевірка, візуалізація даних. Кожна категорія передбачає різний рівень людського контролю та інтелектуального внеску.

Ключовою ідеєю таксономії є не заборона використання ІІІ, а вимога прозорого декларування того, які саме завдання були делеговані технології, на якому етапі роботи і з якою метою. Це створює основу для об'єктивного оцінювання: важливим стає не факт використання ІІІ як такий, а спосіб його використання та рівень критичного осмислення результатів здобувачем освіти.

2. Система критеріїв оцінювання робіт, створених за допомогою ІІІ

На основі Таксономії GAIDeT розроблено систему критеріїв оцінювання, яка складається з чотирьох взаємопов'язаних компонентів:

Критерій прозорості (20% загальної оцінки):

- наявність декларації про використання ІІІ, згенерованої через офіційний GAIDeT Declaration Generator;

- точність опису делегованих завдань згідно з категоріями таксономії;

- чіткість зазначення етапів використання ІІІ у процесі роботи;

- рефлексія щодо причин вибору делегування саме цих завдань.

Критерій критичного осмислення (35% загальної оцінки):

- наявність власного аналізу та оцінки ІІІ-генерованого контенту;

- виявлення логічних прогалин, фактичних помилок або упреждень у тексті ШІ;
- доповнення згенерованого матеріалу власними ідеями та аргументами;
- порівняння різних джерел інформації та формування власної позиції;
- демонстрація розуміння обмежень використаної технології.

Критерій авторського внеску (30% загальної оцінки):

- оригінальність постановки проблеми та формулювання дослідницького питання;
- самостійність у виборі структури та логіки викладу;
- індивідуальність стилю та авторської позиції;
- глибина інтерпретації та узагальнення матеріалу;
- наявність власних висновків, що не є простим перефразуванням

ШІ-тексту.

Критерій академічної якості (15% загальної оцінки):

- фактична точність та достовірність інформації (з урахуванням схильності ШІ до галюцинацій);
- дотримання норм наукового стилю та термінологічна точність;
- коректність посилань на джерела (включаючи чітке розмежування між людськими та ШІ-джерелами);
- логічна зв'язність та структурованість викладу.

Ця система критеріїв дозволяє диференціювати оцінювання залежно від способу використання ШІ. Робота, в якій ШІ використовувався як «критик» для аналізу власноруч написаного тексту, оцінюється вище, ніж робота, де студент некритично копіює ШІ-генерований контент, навіть якщо обидві супроводжуються декларацією.

3. Модель трансформації педагогічної практики

Впровадження нової системи оцінювання вимагає трансформації ролі викладача від «контролера академічної доброчесності» до «архітектора навчального досвіду». Ця трансформація передбачає три основні виміри:

Проектування завдань нового типу. Замість традиційних завдань, які легко виконати за допомогою ШІ без критичного мислення (написати есе на тему, скласти план тексту), викладач створює завдання, що вимагають активної інтелектуальної роботи:

- аналіз та рецензування ШІ-генерованих текстів на предмет логічних помилок;
- порівняння відповідей різних ШІ-систем на одне питання з обґрунтуванням, яка є точнішою;

- створення власного тексту з подальшим аналізом пропозицій ШІ щодо його вдосконалення;
- виявлення фактичних помилок (галюцинацій) у ШІ-генерованому контенті.

Навчання етичним практикам роботи з ШІ. Викладач проводить спеціальні заняття, на яких здобувачі освіти вивчають:

- структуру Таксономії GAIDeT та принципи категоризації завдань;
- техніки формулювання запитів (промптів) для отримання якісніших результатів;
- методи верифікації ШІ-генерованої інформації;
- етичні аспекти використання ШІ у професійній діяльності фахівців фінансової сфери.

Формування культури прозорості. Через обов'язкове використання декларацій, відкриті обговорення досвіду роботи з ШІ, аналіз успішних та проблемних кейсів викладач формує середовище, де прозоре використання технологій стає нормою, а не винятком.

4. Практичні стратегії для викладання гуманітарних дисциплін

У процесі викладання мови та літератури для здобувачів спеціальності 072 апробовано чотири стратегії, що реалізують запропоновану модель:

«Перевір критика» – студент отримує від ШІ аналітичний текст (наприклад, розбір художнього твору або аналіз ділового документа), після чого пише власну рецензію, виявляючи сильні та слабкі сторони ШІ-аналізу. Оцінюється глибина критичного аналізу та здатність виявити недоліки машинного мислення.

«Мозковий штурм із помічником» – ШІ використовується виключно на етапі генерації ідей та планування роботи. Здобувач освіти отримує від ШІ список можливих тез, аргументів, структур, критично їх аналізує, відбирає найкращі та будує власну унікальну роботу. Оцінюється вміння трансформувати чужі ідеї у власний інтелектуальний продукт.

«Редактор-опонент» – після написання власного тексту здобувач освіти просить ШІ виступити редактором, але не сліпо приймає всі правки, а критично оцінює кожную пропозицію, обґрунтовує свої рішення щодо прийняття чи відхилення змін. Оцінюється рівень метамовної рефлексії та усвідомленість мовних рішень.

«Компаративний аналіз» – студент отримує відповіді на одне питання від різних ШІ-систем (ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude), порівнює їх, виявляє розбіжності, аналізує причини відмінностей та формує власну аргументовану позицію. Оцінюється здатність до критичного зіставлення джерел та синтезу інформації.

Впровадження запропонованої системи у викладанні гуманітарних дисциплін для здобувачів спеціальності 072 протягом 2024/2025 навчального року показало позитивну динаміку за кількома показниками:

- Рівень прозорості використання ШІ зріс з 12% (початок семестру) до 84% (кінець семестру) за даними анкетування.

- Якість студентських робіт (за критеріями глибини аналізу та оригінальності думки) покращилася на 23% порівняно з контрольною групою без використання нової системи.

- 78% здобувачів освіти відзначили, що навчилися критично оцінювати ШІ-генерований контент.

- Рівень конфліктності навколо питань академічної доброчесності знизився на 67%.

Важливим результатом стала зміна ставлення здобувачів освіти до ШІ: замість сприйняття як «шпаргалки» сформувалося розуміння технології як інструменту для розвитку власних компетенцій за умови критичного та відповідального використання.

Впровадження запропонованої системи супроводжується низкою викликів. Вона вимагає значних часових інвестицій викладача на розробку нових завдань, навчання здобувачів та оцінювання декларацій, потребує високого рівня цифрової грамотності та розуміння можливостей ШІ-систем. Існує ризик формалізації процесу, коли декларація перетворюється на бюрократичну формальність. Важливим обмеженням є відсутність єдиних інституційних стандартів, що призводить до непослідовності вимог у межах освітньої програми.

Проведене дослідження дозволяє стверджувати, що ефективне вирішення проблем академічної доброчесності в епоху генеративного ШІ лежить не в площині заборон та посиленого контролю, а у трансформації педагогічної парадигми від карального підходу до розвивального.

Система критеріїв оцінювання на основі Таксономії GAIDeT створює механізм об'єктивного оцінювання робіт, створених за допомогою ШІ. Центральною ідеєю є зміщення фокусу з факту використання технології на спосіб її використання: оцінюється рівень критичного осмислення, авторський внесок та прозорість декларування.

Модель трансформації переосмислює роль викладача від детектива до архітектора навчального досвіду, який стимулює використання ШІ як інструменту розвитку мислення. Практичні стратегії «Перевір критика», «Мозковий штурм із помічником», «Редактор-опонент» та «Компаративний аналіз» демонструють можливості продуктивної інтеграції ШІ у викладання.

Результати апробації підтверджують ефективність підходу: зростання прозорості, покращення якості робіт, формування критичного мислення та зниження конфліктності. Для майбутніх фахівців фінансової сфери навички етичної роботи з ШІ є необхідними компетентностями, тому запропонована модель не лише вирішує проблему академічної доброчесності, але й готує здобувачів до реалій цифрової економіки.

****Disclosure of Delegation to Generative AI****

The author declares the use of generative AI in the research and writing process. According to the GAIDeT taxonomy (2025), the following tasks were delegated to GAI tools under full human supervision:

- Literature search and systematization
- Evaluation of the novelty of the research and identification of gaps
- Proofreading and editing
- Summarizing text
- Generation of ideas for structuring the argument

The GAI tool used was: Claude Sonnet 4.5

Responsibility for the final manuscript lies entirely with the author. GAI tools are not listed as authors and do not bear responsibility for the final outcomes.

Declaration submitted by: Аліна Олійник

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РОЗВИТОК GOVTech ТА E-GOVERNMENT ЯК ОСНОВА ПРОЗОРОЇ ЕКОНОМІКИ У ПІСЛЯВОЄННИЙ ПЕРІОД

Післявоєнне відновлення економіки України потребує формування нових підходів до державного управління, орієнтованих на прозорість, ефективність та цифровізацію. У цьому контексті особливого значення набувають GovTech та електронне урядування (e-government), які сприяють цифровізації державних процесів та підвищенню довіри до інституцій.

Цифровізація економіки є ключовим чинником її модернізації. Згідно з дослідженням Діденка Л., впровадження цифрових технологій сприяє підвищенню ефективності державного управління та забезпечує сталий економічний розвиток [1]. Також за дослідженням Круглова В., використання цифрових технологій у роботі органів державної влади,

що передбачає управління даними, може принести значні зміни принципів функціонування суб'єктів владних повноважень та їх комунікацію з громадянами. Удосконалення надання ключових публічних послуг за допомогою GovTech підходів та залучення громадян до цифрової трансформації – одна з ключових цілей наряду[2]. Крім того, результати наукових досліджень у сфері відкритих даних свідчать, що GovTech-рішення дозволяють зменшити інформаційну асиметрію, підвищити доступність державних послуг і зміцнити довіру громадян до держави [3].

В Україні цифрова трансформація державного управління реалізується через сучасні GovTech-інструменти. Зокрема, застосунок «Дія» забезпечує доступ громадян до широкого спектра електронних послуг, що значно спрощує взаємодію з державою. Важливим елементом забезпечення прозорості є також система «ProZorro», яка дозволяє здійснювати відкриті та конкурентні державні закупівлі [4].

Розвиток GovTech може сприяти підвищенню ефективності використання бюджетних коштів, покращенню управління міжнародною фінансовою допомогою та створенню сприятливого інвестиційного середовища.

У післявоєнний період значення GovTech та e-government зростає, оскільки вони забезпечують контроль за процесами відбудови, сприяють зменшенню корупційних ризиків та підтримують інтеграцію України у глобальний цифровий простір.

Незважаючи на значний потенціал цифрових технологій, існують певні проблеми їх впровадження:

- недостатній рівень кібербезпеки державних інформаційних систем;
- ризики витоку персональних даних;
- цифрова нерівність населення;
- недосконалість нормативно-правової бази.

Висновки

Таким чином, розвиток GovTech та e-government є ключовим фактором формування прозорої економіки України у післявоєнний період. Їх впровадження забезпечує підвищення ефективності державного управління, зменшення корупції та створення умов для сталого економічного розвитку. Подальша цифрова трансформація має стати одним із стратегічних пріоритетів державної політики.

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МЕТОДИЧНІ ПІДХОДИ ДО ІНТЕГРАЛЬНОЇ ОЦІНКИ СТАЛОГО РОЗВИТКУ ІТ-ПІДПРИЄМСТВ УКРАЇНИ В УМОВАХ ЗОВНІШНЬОЕКОНОМІЧНОЇ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ

В умовах поглиблення зовнішньоекономічної інтеграції України ІТ-галузь набуває стратегічного значення як провідний сектор сервісного експорту та джерело валютних надходжень. За даними ІТ Research Ukraine, у 2024 році частка ІТ-галузі у ВВП країни склала 4,4%, а частка комп'ютерних послуг у загальному обсязі сервісного експорту – 41,5% [1]. Водночас сталий розвиток підприємства є латентним, багатовимірним феноменом, що не може бути охарактеризований єдиним показником, а отже, потребує розроблення комплексного методичного інструментарію оцінювання.

У науковій літературі сформувалося декілька ключових підходів до трактування сталості підприємства. Згідно з концепцією Triple Bottom Line, сталий розвиток передбачає гармонійне поєднання економічної ефективності, соціальної відповідальності та екологічної безпеки [2]. Для ІТ-підприємств ця концепція набуває особливого звучання: екологічна складова трансформується у показники енергоефективності дата-центрів та «зелених» хмарних технологій, соціальна – у людський капітал, інклюзивність та корпоративну відповідальність, а економічна – у динаміку виручки, рентабельність та інноваційну активність.

Інтеграція принципів ESG (Environmental, Social, Governance) у практику управління ІТ-підприємствами стає обов'язковою умовою

виходу на міжнародні ринки та залучення іноземних інвестицій. Зокрема, дослідники наголошують, що технології Індустрії 4.0 суттєво розширюють можливості збору та обробки ESG-даних у режимі реального часу, підвищуючи достовірність та порівнюваність нефінансової звітності [3]. У контексті євроінтеграційного курсу України особливого значення набуває імплементація Європейських стандартів звітності зі сталого розвитку (ESRS), що передбачена Стратегією впровадження корпоративної звітності зі сталого розвитку, затвердженою Урядом України у 2024 році.

Систематизація існуючих методичних підходів до інтегральної оцінки сталого розвитку ІТ-підприємств дозволяє виокремити чотири основні групи (табл. 1).

Таблиця 1
Порівняльна характеристика методичних підходів до оцінки сталого розвитку ІТ-підприємств*

Методичний підхід	Переваги для ІТ-підприємств	Обмеження в контексті ЗЕД
Інтегральний (ESG-індексація)	Комплексність оцінки; відповідність міжнародним стандартам ESRS; порівнюваність між підприємствами	Складність нормалізації різнорідних показників; потреба у верифікованих даних
Індексний (SDG/GRI-метрики)	Можливість моніторингу динаміки; відповідність Цілям сталого розвитку ООН	Орієнтованість на макрорівень; складнощі адаптації до специфіки ІТ-галузі
Кластерний (машинне навчання)	Класифікація підприємств за рівнем сталості; виявлення галузевих патернів	Залежність від якості вибірки; обмежена інтерпретованість результатів
Balanced Scorecard (Sustainable BSC)	Стратегічна орієнтованість; врахування нефінансових KPI	Суб'єктивність у визначенні вагових коефіцієнтів; ресурсоємність

**Джерело: складено автором на основі [3-4].*

Серед зазначених підходів найбільш перспективним для ІТ-підприємств, що здійснюють зовнішньоекономічну діяльність, є інтегральний підхід на основі ESG-індексації, оскільки він забезпечує порівнюваність із міжнародними партнерами та відповідає вимогам нефінансової звітності за стандартами ЄС. Методика інтегрального оцінювання передбачає нормалізацію часткових показників за трьома субіндексами (E, S, G) з подальшим зваженим агрегуванням у єдиний індекс сталого розвитку підприємства (ІСПІ). Вибір вагових коефіцієнтів може здійснюватися методами головних компонент або експертного оцінювання [5].

Застосування кластерного підходу на основі алгоритмів машинного навчання дає змогу класифікувати ІТ-підприємства за рівнем сталості та виявляти галузеві патерни розвитку. Дослідження підтверджують, що підприємства-експортери демонструють вищу інноваційну активність та екологічну орієнтованість порівняно з підприємствами, зосередженими виключно на внутрішньому ринку [6]. Це підтверджує тезу про те, що участь у зовнішньоекономічній діяльності виступає додатковим стимулом до підвищення рівня сталості ІТ-підприємств.

Динаміка ІТ-галузі в умовах повномасштабної агресії демонструє її унікальну стійкість: у 2024 році оборот сектору склав 7,48 млрд дол. США, а обсяг експорту – 6,45 млрд дол. США, при цьому ІТ залишається єдиним із п'яти провідних експортних секторів, що нарощував свою частку в загальному експорті порівняно з 2019 роком [6]. Проте зростання обсягів діяльності не є само по собі свідченням сталого розвитку – необхідна комплексна оцінка, що охоплює соціальний вимір (умови праці, корпоративна відповідальність), екологічний (споживання енергії, «зелені» рішення) та управлінський (прозорість, відповідність комплаєнс-вимогам).

Таким чином, методичні підходи до інтегральної оцінки сталого розвитку ІТ-підприємств України потребують адаптації до специфіки галузі та умов зовнішньоекономічної діяльності. Пріоритетним напрямом є розроблення галузевої системи показників ІСПП, що інтегрує ESG-метрики, відповідає вимогам ESRS і забезпечує порівнюваність вітчизняних ІТ-підприємств з міжнародними конкурентами. Практичне впровадження такого інструментарію сприятиме підвищенню інвестиційної привабливості галузі, зміцненню довіри міжнародних стейкхолдерів та формуванню засад сталого відновлення економіки України в повоєнний період.

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КОНКУРЕНЦІЯ В АГРАРНІЙ СФЕРІ НА РИНКУ ЄС: МЕХАНІЗМИ РЕГУЛЮВАННЯ ТА ЇХ ЕФЕКТИВНІСТЬ

Конкуренція в аграрному секторі формується під впливом суперечливих чинників: з одного боку – дією ринкових механізмів, що забезпечують свободу господарювання, з іншого – активним державним регулюванням галузевих процесів. Така взаємодія сприяє оптимізації виробничих відносин і підвищенню ефективності суспільного виробництва. Основними детермінантами, що визначають рівень та характер конкурентного середовища, виступають баланс між ринковими силами та інструментами державної політики:

1. Свобода ринкових механізмів забезпечує вільний вихід суб'єктів господарювання на ринок і їхню конкуренцію між собою. Така конкуренція стимулює підвищення ефективності виробництва, впровадження інновацій і покращення якості продукції та послуг, оскільки підприємства постійно вдосконалюють свою діяльність.

2. Державне регулювання держави на аграрний сектор здійснюється через субсидії, податкові пільги, митно-тарифну політику та інші інструменти. Воно може як стабілізувати ринок і підтримувати конкурентоспроможність виробників, так і створювати бар'єри для входу нових підприємств або посилювати монопольні тенденції.

3. Конкуренція між виробниками та переробниками проявляється у боротьбі за ціну та частку ринку, що безпосередньо впливає на формування цінової політики та рівень конкурентоспроможності. Така

взаємодія визначає ефективність виробництва і здатність галузі адаптуватися до змін попиту та зовнішніх факторів.

4. Глобальні впливи конкуренції в аграрному секторі також залежить від міжнародних ринків, торговельних угод і технологічних змін. Відкритість ринку для експорту й імпорту та доступ до сучасних технологій суттєво впливають на конкурентні позиції на національному рівні.

Серед провідних науковців, які досліджували питання конкуренції та її розвитку, варто відзначити праці таких учених, як Портера М., Сміта А., Шумпетера Й., Пуцентейла П., а також сучасних дослідників, таких як Рудницька М. і Філюк [2], В. Андрійчука, О. Гудзь, Г. Калетника, П. Канінського, С. Кваші, М. Маліка, В. Меселя-Веселяка [1]. Їхні дослідження охоплюють як теоретичні основи конкурентних процесів, так і практичні аспекти функціонування ринків, що дозволяє глибше розуміти механізми формування та ефективності конкуренції.

Система регулювання конкуренції в Європейський Союз є однією з найрозвиненіших у світі і охоплює низку механізмів, спрямованих на підтримку справедливих умов на ринку. Основні з них включають антимонопольні правила, які забороняють картельні угоди та зловживання домінуючим становищем, а також контроль за концентраціями та злиттями, який дозволяє Європейська комісія оцінювати вплив великих корпоративних угод на конкурентне середовище. Останнім нововведенням став Регламент ЄС № 2022/2560, який набрав чинності 12 жовтня 2023 року [5]. Він надає Комісії повноваження розслідувати субсидії третіх країн і застосовувати відповідні коригувальні заходи у випадках, коли такі дії негативно впливають на конкурентне середовище ЄС.

Процес формування конкурентної позиції підприємства базується на його потенційній конкурентоспроможності та здатності займати вигідну ринкову нішу. Підвищення конкурентоспроможності досягається через створення унікальних продуктів або послуг, що забезпечують конкурентні переваги завдяки інноваціям, формування стабільної позиції підприємства на ринку та забезпечення високого рівня сервісу. Важливим також є повне задоволення потреб споживачів і відповідність їхнім очікуванням [2].

Конкуренція є одним із ключових чинників, що визначають механізми ціноутворення на міжнародних ринках товарів і послуг. Вона забезпечує відкритий доступ на ринок для нових учасників і розширює вибір для споживачів. Унаслідок цього конкуренція стимулює зниження цін на товари та послуги, адже продавці прагнуть зберегти свої ринкові позиції та залучити нових покупців, пропонуючи при цьому більш

вигідні умови [3].

Основною метою правил конкурентної політики Європейського Союзу є забезпечення ефективного функціонування внутрішнього ринку, який виступає ключовим фактором добробуту громадян, підприємств та суспільства загалом. Для досягнення цієї мети Договір про функціонування Європейського Союзу (TFEU) встановлює низку положень, спрямованих на запобігання обмеженню та спотворенню конкуренції на внутрішньому ринку. Зокрема, це передбачає заборону антиконкурентних угод між підприємствами та запобігання зловживанню домінуючим становищем, яке може негативно впливати на торгівлю між державами-членами та обмежувати вільний доступ до ринку для інших учасників.

Основною метою законодавства Європейського Союзу у сфері конкуренції є забезпечення ефективного функціонування внутрішнього ринку. Ефективна конкуренція створює рівні умови для всіх суб'єктів господарювання, стимулюючи їх пропонувати якісні товари за конкурентними цінами, що сприяє розвитку інновацій, підвищенню продуктивності та економічному зростанню. Таким чином, конкурентна політика є ключовим інструментом формування динамічного внутрішнього ринку та економічного добробуту. Крім того, правила конкуренції поширюються і на компанії з третіх країн, які працюють на ринку ЄС, забезпечуючи прозорі та справедливі умови. Це сприяє не лише стабільності економіки, а й підвищенню глобальної конкурентоспроможності європейських підприємств. [6].

Загалом, конкурентоспроможність аграрного підприємства полягає в його здатності не лише утримувати, а й зміцнювати позиції на ринку, впливаючи на ринкове середовище. Це досягається завдяки виробництву якісної продукції, що відповідає потребам споживачів, та забезпечує ефективність і прибутковість діяльності. Формування конкурентної структури ринку залежить від співвідношення між кількістю виробників і споживачів, яке визначає рівень конкуренції, цінову політику та розподіл економічних вигод. Коли виробників більше, конкуренція посилюється, що стимулює підприємства підвищувати якість продукції, впроваджувати інновації та оптимізувати витрати, часто призводячи до зниження цін. Натомість, коли попит перевищує пропозицію, тобто кількість споживачів більша за кількість виробників, підприємства отримують можливість підвищувати ціни, що позитивно впливає на їхню прибутковість і фінансову стійкість. Це створює більш сприятливі умови для розвитку бізнесу, однак водночас може знижувати стимул до вдосконалення продукції [1].

Розвиток конкурентного середовища на продовольчому ринку має

важливе значення для стимулювання виробництва сільськогосподарської продукції та забезпечення населення доступними й якісними продуктами харчування. Конкуренція в цьому секторі сприяє підвищенню якості та різноманітності продукції, а також впливає на формування цінової політики, створюючи умови для ефективного функціонування ринку та задоволення потреб споживачів.

Конкуренція в аграрному секторі Європейського Союзу є важливим чинником розвитку інновацій, підвищення якості продукції та ефективності виробництва. Вона формується під впливом ринкових механізмів і державного регулювання, що забезпечує баланс між свободою підприємництва та захистом споживачів. Конкурентоспроможність аграрних підприємств залежить від здатності зміцнювати свої позиції на ринку, пропонувати унікальні продукти та задовольняти потреби споживачів. У цілому, розвиток конкурентного середовища сприяє стабільності ринку та його адаптації до змін глобальної економіки, а також забезпечує населення якісними й доступними продуктами харчування.

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ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКА ІНТЕГРАЦІЯ: ЧИННИКИ ФОРМУВАННЯ ТА СУЧАСНІ ВИКЛИКИ

Європейська інтеграція є одним із найбільш масштабних і тривалих проєктів у сучасній світовій політиці. Від підписання Паризького договору 1951 року, яким засновано Європейське об'єднання вугілля та сталі, до сьогоденішнього Європейського Союзу (ЄС), що об'єднує 27 держав, цей процес суттєво змінив архітектуру міжнародних відносин. Разом із тим на сучасному етапі інтеграційний проєкт зіштовхується з якісно новими викликами, що ставлять під сумнів сталість набутих здобутків і формують нові вимоги до механізмів функціонування ЄС.

Проблематика європейської інтеграції належить до найбільш досліджуваних у сучасній політичній науці та міжнародних відносинах. Значний науковий доробок у цій сфері представлено як зарубіжними, так і українськими дослідниками, серед яких Е. Хаас, А. Моравсік, Д. Дінан, В. Копійка, Г. Зеленько та інші. Їхні праці розкривають інституційну логіку, динаміку розширення ЄС та євроінтеграційну стратегію України. Водночас, попри значну кількість наукових праць, окремі аспекти – зокрема взаємодія між внутрішніми реформами та зовнішнім тиском ЄС в умовах триваючого конфлікту – залишаються недостатньо дослідженими та потребують подальшого осмислення [1].

Серед чинників, що зумовили формування та поглиблення європейської інтеграції, дослідники виокремлюють кілька ключових груп. По-перше, безпековий чинник: Друга світова війна засвідчила катастрофічні наслідки націоналізму й автаркії, що підштовхнуло провідних політиків до пошуку наднаціональних форм співпраці. По-друге, економічний чинник: усунення митних бар'єрів і запровадження спільного ринку сприяли підвищенню добробуту і конкурентоспроможності. По-третє, ціннісно-ідеологічний чинник: ліберальна демократія, правова держава та повага до прав людини склали нормативне ядро ЄС і виступали критерієм для розширення [1].

Важливим каталізатором розширення ЄС на схід стало завершення холодної війни. Починаючи з 2004 року, до Союзу приєдналися десять

держав Центральної та Східної Європи, що суттєво збільшило його географічний охоплення та внутрішню неоднорідність. За оцінками Єврокомісії, ця хвиля розширення принесла значні економічні вигоди: середнє зростання ВВП у нових державах-членах становило близько 2,5 відсоткового пункту на рік упродовж першого десятиліття членства. Водночас розширення загострило суперечності між різними моделями соціально-економічного розвитку та інституційними традиціями [2].

Таблиця 1

Ключові чинники та сучасні виклики європейської інтеграції

Чинник / Виклик	Зміст
Безпековий чинник	Протидія військовим конфліктам через наднаціональну інтеграцію після досвіду двох світових воєн
Економічний чинник	Єдиний ринок, митний союз, усунення торговельних бар'єрів, підвищення конкурентоспроможності
Ціннісно-ідеологічний чинник	Ліберальна демократія, верховенство права, захист прав людини як нормативне ядро ЄС
Виклик: популізм і євроскептицизм	Зростання антиінтеграційних партій, Brexit, криза репрезентативності наднаціональних інститутів
Виклик: безпека та геополітика	Повномасштабна агресія РФ проти України, необхідність формування спільної оборонної політики ЄС
Виклик: цифрова та зелена трансформація	Регулювання ШП, кіберзахист, декарбонізація, «Зелений курс» ЄС та супутні соціальні напруження

Наведені в таблиці 1 чинники і виклики відображають двоїтий характер інтеграційного процесу: рушійні сили, що зумовили його виникнення, нині переплітаються з новими загрозами, здатними поставити під сумнів збереження досягнутого рівня єдності. У цьому контексті особливої ваги набуває аналіз сучасних викликів, з-поміж яких виокремимо найбільш значущі.

Перший виклик – поширення популізму та євроскептицизму. Вихід Великої Британії з ЄС у 2020 році став першим випадком добровільного виходу держави-члена з інтеграційного об'єднання і засвідчив, що процес розширення не є незворотним. Дослідження Eurobarometer 2023 року показують: рівень довіри до ЄС у 27 країнах-членах залишається нерівномірним - від понад 60 % у Люксембурзі й Ірландії до менш як 35 % в Угорщині та Греції. Антиінтеграційні партії нараховують вплив у національних парламентах, ускладнюючи ухвалення спільних рішень [3].

Другий виклик – безпековий та геополітичний. Повномасштабне вторгнення Росії в Україну у 2022 році докорінно змінило безпековий контекст євроінтеграції. ЄС вперше запровадив масштабні санкційні

пакети та розпочав фінансування постачання зброї третій країні. Водночас цей виклик став поштовхом до зближення: Фінляндія й Швеція вступили до НАТО у 2023–2024 роках, а Рада ЄС у 2023 році відкрила переговори про вступ із Україною та Молдовою. За оцінками Копенгагенського центру енергетичних досліджень, надання Україні статусу кандидата прискорило реформи у сферах судочинства, антикорупційної політики та регуляторного середовища [4].

Третій виклик - цифрова та зелена трансформація. «Зелений курс ЄС» (European Green Deal), представлений у 2019 році та реалізований через низку регуляторних актів 2021–2024 років, зобов'язує держави-члени досягти кліматичної нейтральності до 2050 року. Паралельно Закон про штучний інтелект (AI Act), прийнятий у 2024 році, формує першу у світі комплексну правову рамку регулювання ШІ. Ці трансформації несуть суттєві соціальні та економічні наслідки для окремих галузей і регіонів, що породжує внутрішні суперечності та потребує розробки механізмів справедливого переходу [5].

Четвертий виклик - майбутнє розширення і внутрішня реформа ЄС. Наявний механізм прийняття рішень, розроблений для 6-15 держав-членів, демонструє зростаючу неефективність в умовах Союзу 27-ми і тим більш виявиться недостатнім для ЄС, що налічуватиме 35-37 членів (з урахуванням потенційного вступу України, Молдови та балканських держав). Обговорення реформи інститутів, зокрема запровадження голосування кваліфікованою більшістю у сфері зовнішньої політики та відмови від права вето в низці чутливих питань, набуває дедалі більшої актуальності [2].

Таким чином, європейська інтеграція є динамічним і суперечливим процесом, що формувався під дією комплексу безпекових, економічних і ціннісних чинників. На сучасному етапі інтеграційний проєкт стикається з якісно новими викликами: зростанням популізму та євроскептицизму, геополітичною нестабільністю, потребою в цифровій і кліматичній трансформації, а також інституційною адаптацією до чергового розширення. Успішне подолання цих викликів вимагатиме не лише технічних реформ, а й нового консенсусу щодо цілей і методів спільного управління в рамках ЄС.

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ВПЛИВ ТРАНСНАЦІОНАЛЬНИХ КОРПОРАЦІЙ НА СВІТОВУ ЕКОНОМІКУ

Транснаціоналізація є важливою складовою сучасних процесів глобалізації та одним із факторів розвитку світової економічної системи. Вона виступає суттєвим елементом економічних відносин на світовому рівні і забезпечує взаємодію економік різних держав. Через діяльність транснаціональних компаній та міжнародні економічні потоки формується єдиний економічний простір, у межах якого відбувається обмін товарами, послугами, інвестиціями та технологіями. Особливістю транснаціоналізації є те, що різні етапи виробництва можуть розміщуватися у різних країнах залежно від економічних умов, ресурсів та рівня розвитку. Такий підхід дозволяє ефективніше організувати виробничі процеси та сприяє більш активному формуванню єдиного світового економічного простору [1].

У процесі розвитку глобальної економіки транснаціональні корпорації займають провідне місце та відіграють значну роль у процесах економічної глобалізації. Їх діяльність охоплює різні країни та регіони, що дає можливість впливати на розвиток міжнародної торгівлі, інвестиційних потоків та економічних зв'язків між державами. Разом з тим активна діяльність транснаціональних компаній іноді призводить до виникнення суперечностей між інтересами корпорацій та економічними інтересами окремих держав. У деяких випадках це може впливати на внутрішній ринок країни, рівень зайнятості або розвиток національного виробництва [2].

Транснаціоналізація економіки є одним із важливих проявів

глобалізаційних процесів. Вона пов'язана з активним розвитком транснаціональних корпорацій, які здійснюють свою діяльність одночасно у багатьох країнах світу. Через мережу дочірніх підприємств, філій та представництв ТНК формують міжнародні виробничі та фінансові зв'язки, що сприяють поглибленню економічної інтеграції між державами. Завдяки такому підходу окремі стадії виробничого процесу можуть бути розміщені у тих країнах, де для цього існують найбільш вигідні умови. Це дозволяє підприємствам скорочувати витрати на виробництво, підвищувати продуктивність та ефективніше використовувати ресурси. У результаті формується система глобального виробництва, яка об'єднує економіки різних країн у єдину мережу [3].

Важливою складовою діяльності транснаціональних корпорацій є поширення нових технологій, інновацій та управлінського досвіду. Завдяки цьому багато країн отримують доступ до сучасних методів організації виробництва, що сприяє підвищенню рівня їх економічного розвитку. Крім того, ТНК створюють нові робочі місця, стимулюють розвиток інфраструктури та розширюють можливості для міжнародної співпраці. Разом з тим у науковій літературі існує велика кількість підходів до визначення сутності транснаціональних корпорацій. Єдиного універсального визначення цього поняття поки що не існує. Проте більшість дослідників погоджується з тим, що транснаціональні корпорації є важливими суб'єктами світової економіки, які значною мірою впливають на розвиток міжнародної торгівлі, рух інвестицій та формування глобальних ринків.

Одним із головних напрямів впливу транснаціональних корпорацій є розвиток міжнародної торгівлі. ТНК активно здійснюють експорт і імпорт товарів та послуг, що сприяє розширенню світових ринків. Вони формують значну частину міжнародного товарообігу, забезпечують поширення продукції на різних континентах та сприяють поглибленню економічної інтеграції між країнами.

Поряд із розвитком міжнародної торгівлі, важливою рисою діяльності транснаціональних компаній є їх здатність пристосовуватися до умов різних країн. Вони поєднують використання стандартних виробничих технологій із врахуванням культурних, правових та економічних особливостей конкретних ринків. Саме така гнучкість дозволяє їм ефективно працювати в міжнародному середовищі та підтримувати високий рівень конкурентоспроможності.

Отже, транснаціоналізація світової економіки є одним із найважливіших і найдинамічніших процесів сучасного економічного розвитку. Вона сприяє розширенню міжнародних економічних зв'язків, розвитку світових ринків та активізації діяльності суб'єктів

міжнародного бізнесу. Діяльність транснаціональних корпорацій сприяє поширенню інновацій, розвитку міжнародної торгівлі та інтеграції національних економік у світову економічну систему. Водночас важливим завданням для держав залишається формування ефективної економічної політики, яка дозволить поєднати розвиток міжнародного бізнесу із захистом національних економічних інтересів [2].

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ВПЛИВ ШТУЧНОГО ІНТЕЛЕКТУ НА ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЮ МАРКЕТИНГОВИХ СТРАТЕГІЙ У ГЛОБАЛІЗОВАНОМУ СВІТІ

Замість стабільних ринкових правил тепер важить швидка реакція на дані – світ працює під контролем потоків інформації, які постійно міняють очікування клієнтів. Замість просто аналізу цифр, технології штучного інтелекту перебудовують сам принцип взаємодії з аудиторією, впливаючи навіть на те, як компанії бачать свої слабкі сторони. Не всі однаково добре справляються з цим процесом: хтось отримує стрибок у продуктивності, тоді як інші залишаються позаду через невміння використовувати автоматизовані інструменти. За підрахунками експертів McKinsey Global Institute, результат може складати до 2,6 трильйонів доларів щороку для тих, хто встигне адаптуватися.

З основою теорій виступають дослідження Т. Кальченко й М. Дудченко – їх аналіз цифрової трансформації у глобальних ланцюгах вартості має ключове значення [2]. Розкриття суперечностей глобалізації проходить через роботи О. Шниркової разом із В. Чужиковим [3]. У контексті маркетингу з'являється концепція «Маркетинг 6.0», запропонована Ф. Котлером, яка також формує базис [4].

Напрями змін починаються з інших принципів спілкування - замість відповідання на запити, система сама формує пропозиції раніше,

ніж користувач усвідомить бажання мати товар. Це схоже на те, як Amazon або Netflix аналізують поведінку й покращують продажі на 10–30 % [1]. Утім, не тільки міжнародні платформи мають успіх: в Україні онлайн-ретейлер Rozetka вніс технології штучного інтелекту для персоналізації контенту, через що середній обсяг замовлення зріс на 18 % протягом 2023 року [5].

З одного боку, інструменти типу GPT чи Midjourney дозволяють створювати матеріали без спецпідготовки. За даними 2024 року, кожен другий фахівець з просування вже працює з такими системами - це показник з дослідження під номером шість. Наприклад, українська компанія Netpeak Software додала модель GPT-4 до сервісу Spider, щоб генерувати тексти для пошукових систем. Ефект? Витрати замовників на написання контенту впали майже на половину.

Третім пунктом йде зростання ефективності витрат на рекламу - завдяки системам глибинного навчання ROAS підвищується в межах 15–35%. Ринок України, де працює програматик-реклама, у 2023 році виріс аж на 62%, проте технічно платформи ще поступаються тим, що діють в країнах Євросоюзу [7].

Протиріччя широкого поширення штучного інтелекту починаються з нерівномірного доступу до технологій. У країнах із низькими доходами лише кожне третє підприємство може дозволити собі впровадження систем ШІ - там цей показник становить 30%. Серед країн ОЕСР ситуація суттєво відрізняється: близько 78% компаній уже використовують подібні інструменти. Така прірва формуватиметься довго – її часто називають цифровою. Технологічний переважання одного регіону над іншим стирає кордони між економікою та владою, породжуючи нові форми глобальної нерівності [8].

Монополія на дані – ось друга проблема. Коли великі платформи, такі як Google чи Meta, зосереджують особисту інформацію, це підриває контроль країн над своїми цифровими просторами. Навіть спроби ЄС врегулювати ситуацію за допомогою Digital Markets Act або AI Act не дають повного результату. Причина? Світ досі не домовився про загальні правила гри.

Окрім того - поширена проблема алгоритмічної упередженості. Так, коли маркетингові системи опираються на заплутані дані, вони копіюють давні упередження: гендерні, расові чи за віком. Це стоїть осторонь справедливого підходу до аудиторій. Згодованість українських правил щодо ШІ з європейськими стандартами тепер важлива мета для держави [9].

Українська перспектива. Після війни штучний інтелект у маркетингу дасть змогу потрапити на міжнародну цифрову арену.

Незважаючи на конфлікт, ІТ-сектор утримав фахівців - тепер він може генерувати технології для Євросоюзу [10]. Проте без стратегії, вирівняної під правила ЄС щодо штучного інтелекту, прогрес залишиться теорією.

Замість простої автоматизації - саме штучний інтелект формує новий напрямок у розвитку маркетингу, який одночасно дає можливості й загрожує сталому економічному становленню. У контексті України цілком доречно запустити спеціальну цифрову платформу для малого бізнесу всередині Дія.Бізнес, де кожен матиме доступ до інструментів персоналізованої реклами та адаптації повідомлень під регіон. Паралельно важливо закласти основи свідомого використання технологій - тому курси з етики ШІ мають з'явитись у навчальних планах провідних економічних університетів країни. Замість очікування законів - краще перевірити практикою, отже пілотна «регуляторна пісочниця» дозволить тестувати алгоритми з оглядом на майбутні стандарти ЄС. Невеликі компанії потребують сильного союзу замість ізольованих спроб, тож об'єднання Мінцифри, ІТ-сектору й реального експорту стане базою для створення українських даних про покупців.

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ПСИХОЛОГІЯ ДЕДЛАЙНІВ У НАУКОВІЙ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ В КОНТЕКСТІ ІНТЕГРАЦІЇ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ОСВІТИ ДО ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОГО ПРОСТОРУ

У контексті інтеграції української освіти та науки до європейського академічного простору дедлайни набувають статусу не лише організаційного, але й інституційного стандарту. Європейські освітні та наукові програми, зокрема Horizon Europe, Erasmus+ та COST, ґрунтуються на жорстко фіксованих календарних межах подання заявок, звітності та виконання проєктних етапів. Такі дедлайни виконують функцію формалізованого механізму забезпечення прозорості, порівнюваності та конкурентності у розподілі фінансування і академічних можливостей. Водночас для українських науковців і здобувачів освіти, які працюють в умовах тривалого стресу та інституційної нестабільності, пов'язаною з війною в країні, ці вимоги часто стають додатковим психологічним навантаженням, а не мотиваційним стимулом.

З позицій Temporal Motivation Theory жорсткі дедлайни європейських програм підвищують мотивацію за рахунок скорочення часової дистанції до винагороди, однак ефективність цього механізму залежить від рівня очікуваного успіху та суб'єктивної цінності результату. В умовах війни у українських науковців знижується відчуття контролю над результатом та зростає імпульсивність і когнітивне виснаження, що порушує баланс мотиваційної формули ТМТ. У результаті інституційно ефективні дедлайни ЄС можуть психологічно сприйматися як надмірно жорсткі або недосяжні, що підсилює реакції уникання та академічну прокрастинацію. Це формує структурний конфлікт між вимогами європейського академічного середовища та реальною психологічною готовністю українських науковців до функціонування в цих рамках [1].

Емпіричні дослідження демонструють, що академічна прокрастинація є надзвичайно поширеною у студентській та науковій спільноті, особливо у ситуаціях, де дедлайн є єдиним зовнішнім стимулом для виконання завдання. Наприклад, оцінки показують, що 80–95% студентів у певний момент відкладають наукові чи навчальні завдання до крайнього терміну. Такі дані підкреслюють, що прокрастинація є типовою реакцією на довгі або неструктуровані дедлайни [2].

Українські дослідження підтверджують, що академічна прокрастинація тісно пов'язана з дедлайнами. У опитуванні **789 студентів українських університетів** встановлено, що студенти онлайн-формату демонструють **вищі рівні відкладання завдань**, ніж ті, хто навчається у змішаному форматі. Це вказує на роль **структурованих дедлайнів** та зовнішньої мотивації [3].

Окрім українські дослідження, присвячені академічній діяльності в умовах воєнного стану, виявили, що стрес, виснаження та зниження мотивації значною мірою впливають на рівень прокрастинації. Вищі показники стресових реакцій (вище середнього) були пов'язані з більшою ймовірністю відкладання наукових та навчальних завдань, зокрема до моменту, коли дедлайн стає «невідворотним». Це вказує на те, що війна як фактор екзогенного стресу знижує психологічну готовність до планування часу та організації під дедлайнами, посилюючи реакцію уникання та відкладання [4].

Комплекс цих даних підкреслює, що стресові обставини, зокрема воєнні дії та вимушене дистанційне навчання, виступають значущими модераторами прокрастинаційної поведінки у академічному середовищі. Вони створюють умови, за яких дедлайни перестають бути ефективними зовнішніми тригерами для своєчасної реалізації завдань і стають джерелом додаткового тиску, що часто поглиблює відкладання початку та завершення роботи. Це зміщує акцент із часових обмежень на емоційно-мотиваційні бар'єри, які потребують цілеспрямованих інтервенцій в організації навчального та наукового процесу.

Академічна прокрастинація, пов'язана з дедлайнами, не лише впливає на часові рамки, але й має негативні наслідки для результатів наукової діяльності та психологічного стану. Дослідження показують, що прокрастинація часто пов'язана зі стресом, тривожністю та зниженням продуктивності, що в свою чергу негативно відбивається на якості наукової роботи та професійному благополуччі [5]. Крім того, дедлайни як зовнішні обмежувачі можуть також впливати на сприйняття результатів іншими: затримані роботи оцінюються більш критично, незалежно від їх фактичної якості, що підтверджено в

експериментальному дослідженні професійних оцінювачів з різних сфер [6].

Взаємодія науковців із дедлайнами значною мірою зумовлюється низкою психодинамічних чинників, серед яких особливу роль відіграють перфекціонізм, особливості сприйняття часових обмежень та когнітивне навантаження. Перфекціоністські установки, характерні для академічного середовища, часто призводять до відтермінування початку роботи, оскільки дослідник орієнтується на внутрішнє відчуття повної готовності або очікує ідеальних умов для старту. За відсутності таких умов завдання відкладається, а активізація діяльності відбувається лише під тиском часу, коли дедлайн стає невідворотним.

Важливим чинником є також так звана «невидимість» дедлайну. Якщо термін виконання завдання не має чіткої зовнішньої фіксації або не супроводжується відповідальністю перед конкретною інстанцією, суб'єктивне відчуття терміновості значно знижується. У таких умовах дедлайн сприймається як абстрактна подія у майбутньому, що не викликає негайної мобілізації ресурсів, а відкладання роботи стає психологічно виправданим.

Крім того, наукова діяльність характеризується високим рівнем когнітивного перевантаження, оскільки дослідник одночасно змушений опрацьовувати змістовні, методологічні, мовні та формальні вимоги до результату. Необхідність утримувати в полі уваги велику кількість взаємопов'язаних завдань ускладнює планування і сприяє униканню початку роботи. У такому випадку дедлайн виконує роль зовнішнього примусу, який компенсує перевантаження, але водночас посилює стрес і знижує якість саморегуляції.

Отже, психологія дедлайнів у науковій діяльності є важливою та актуальною темою, оскільки дедлайни виступають не лише інструментом організації часу, а й потужним психологічним чинником, що впливає на мотивацію, саморегуляцію та емоційний стан науковців. Аналіз теоретичних і емпіричних даних свідчить, що академічна прокрастинація у взаємодії з дедлайнами зумовлюється поєднанням мотиваційних, когнітивних і психодинамічних механізмів, а не лише недоліками тайм-менеджменту. Перфекціонізм, суб'єктивна «невидимість» дедлайну та когнітивне перевантаження формують умови, за яких відкладання стає типовою стратегією реагування.

В умовах війни ці процеси суттєво посилюються. Хронічний стрес, емоційне виснаження та порушення звичних форм організації навчального і наукового процесу знижують здатність до планування та підвищують залежність продуктивності від зовнішнього тиску дедлайнів. За таких обставин дедлайн дедалі частіше трансформується з

мотиваційного стимулу на джерело додаткового психологічного навантаження.

Перспективи подальших досліджень полягають у поглибленому вивченні дедлайнів як психологічного конструкта в умовах тривалого стресу, а також у розробці адаптивних моделей організації наукової діяльності, які враховують воєнний контекст. Особливо актуальними є дослідження ефективних інтервенцій, спрямованих на зниження прокрастинації, підтримку саморегуляції та формування гнучких, психологічно безпечних дедлайн-систем у сучасному академічному середовищі.

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ЗАБЕЗПЕЧЕННЯ ЯКОСТІ УПРАВЛІНСЬКИХ РІШЕНЬ НА ПІДПРИЄМСТВАХ У КОНТЕКСТІ ПІСЛЯВОЄННОГО ВІДНОВЛЕННЯ ТА ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОЇ ІНТЕГРАЦІЇ УКРАЇНИ

Післявоєнне відновлення економіки України та поглиблення інтеграції до внутрішнього ринку Європейського Союзу змінюють вимоги до управлінських рішень на рівні підприємства, оскільки виробничі, інвестиційні, кадрові, логістичні й експортні рішення приймаються під впливом не лише нестабільності зовнішнього середовища, а й поступового узгодження технічного регулювання, процедур оцінки відповідності та правил доступу продукції до ринку ЄС [4; 5].

У дослідженні якості управлінського рішення визначається як інтегральна характеристика управлінського вибору, що відображає ступінь його інформаційної обґрунтованості, процедурної впорядкованості, цільової узгодженості, ресурсної забезпеченості, прийнятності ризику, своєчасності та придатності до реалізації й контролю [1; 2; 3]. Таке визначення спирається на підходи, у межах яких результативність рішення пов'язується не лише з підсумковим ефектом, а й з якістю самого процесу підготовки, повнотою розгляду альтернатив, характером внутрішнього обговорення та рівнем опрацювання невизначеності [1; 2; 3; 6].

Ризик і невизначеність у межах цієї проблематики мають різний аналітичний зміст. Ризик характеризує управлінські ситуації, у яких можливі наслідки піддаються імовірнісному або експертному оцінюванню. Невизначеність відображає стан, за якого інформація про майбутні зміни середовища, силу окремих чинників або межі можливих наслідків є неповною чи суперечливою [3; 6]. Через це забезпечення якості управлінських рішень на підприємстві передбачає не загальне визнання нестабільності середовища, а виокремлення тих параметрів рішення, щодо яких інформація є недостатньою, ненадійною або змінюється швидше, ніж завершується процес його підготовки [3; 6].

Практика управління показує, що слабким місцем на підприємствах є не лише момент вибору, а відсутність формалізованого зв'язку між підготовкою рішення, його погодженням, реалізацією та аналізом

фактичних результатів. З цієї причини система забезпечення якості управлінських рішень має функціонувати як цілісна процедура, у межах якої фіксуються предмет рішення, альтернативи, припущення, обмеження, межі прийнятного ризику, склад виконавців, контрольні точки реалізації та порядок аналізу отриманих результатів [1; 2; 6]. Для підприємств, що працюють в умовах структурної нестабільності, значення має не збільшення обсягу інформації саме по собі, а її релевантність для конкретного управлінського вибору, оскільки надлишок несистематизованих даних не підвищує якість рішення, а ускладнює зіставлення альтернатив і розмиває межі відповідальності [1; 3].

Узагальнення наукових підходів і потреб практики дає підстави пов'язувати забезпечення якості управлінських рішень із кількома обов'язковими елементами управлінської процедури. Рішення має спиратися на зіставлення реальних альтернатив, а не на вибір першого прийнятного варіанта [1; 2]. Окремому фіксуванню підлягають чинники невизначеності, оскільки саме вони визначають межі надійності прогнозу й обсяг припущень, покладених в основу рішення [3; 6]. Самостійним критерієм оцінки виступає прийнятність ризику, коли потенційні втрати співвідносяться з фінансовими, організаційними та часовими можливостями підприємства. Не менш важливим є зв'язок між змістом рішення і можливістю його виконання, що вимагає одночасної оцінки ресурсного забезпечення, кадрової спроможності, строків, організаційних передумов і контрольованості виконання. Підсумковий аналіз результатів реалізації рішення фіксує відхилення між очікуваними й фактичними наслідками, виявляє помилки вихідних припущень і створює інформаційну базу для коригування наступних управлінських дій (табл.1) [1; 2; 6].

Наведена система рекомендацій орієнтована на усунення тих дефектів управлінського процесу, які найчастіше знижують якість управлінського вибору. До них належать підміна аналізу першою прийнятною альтернативою, нерозмежованість ризику і невизначеності, нечіткість меж відповідальності, слабкий зв'язок між рішенням і його виконанням, а також відсутність накопичення досвіду після завершення реалізації [1; 2; 3; 6]. У контексті післявоєнного відновлення ця логіка доповнюється перевіркою рішень на їхню регуляторну сумісність із правилами європейського ринку, оскільки виробничі та інвестиційні рішення, що не враховують вимог технічного регулювання і процедур оцінки відповідності, можуть бути економічно прийнятними в короткому періоді, але обмеженими з позицій доступу до ширшого ринку [4; 5].

Таблиця 1

Рекомендації щодо забезпечення якості управлінських рішень на підприємствах*

Складові системи	Практичне наповнення	Управлінський результат
Інформаційне оформлення рішення	Для кожного значущого рішення оформлювати карту рішення, у якій фіксуються мета, альтернативи, джерела даних, припущення, обмеження, відповідальні особи, строк реалізації та дата перегляду	Підвищення прозорості рішення, зменшення інформаційної фрагментарності
Робота з невизначеністю	Виокремлювати чинники, щодо яких відсутня надійна оцінка наслідків або ймовірностей, і ранжувати їх за впливом на результат рішення	Концентрація аналізу на критичних параметрах невизначеності
Оцінювання альтернатив	Приймати рішення після порівняння не менше двох реальних альтернатив за єдиними критеріями, що охоплюють результативність, витрати, строк, ризик і реалізованість	Підвищення обґрунтованості вибору
Межа прийнятної ризику	Для кожного класу рішень фіксувати граничний рівень можливих втрат, перевищення якого виключає альтернативу з подальшого розгляду	Узгодження рішення з ресурсними можливостями підприємства
Реалізація рішення	Поєднувати текст рішення з календарем виконання, ресурсним забезпеченням, розподілом відповідальності та контрольними точками	Зменшення розриву між прийняттям і виконанням рішення
Аналіз результатів реалізації	Порівнювати запланований і фактичний результат, встановлювати причини відхилень, фіксувати помилки вихідних припущень і коригувати правила підготовки наступних рішень	Формування організаційного досвіду та зменшення повторюваних помилок
Перевірка на євроінтеграційну відповідність	Для інвестиційних, виробничих і експортних рішень окремо оцінювати відповідність вимогам технічного регулювання, стандартизації та оцінки відповідності ЄС	Підвищення придатності рішень до роботи на ринку ЄС

**Джерело: складено автором на основі [1–6].*

Якість управлінських рішень на підприємствах у цьому дослідженні пов'язується з організацією такої управлінської системи, у якій поєднуються формалізація інформаційної бази, окреме оцінювання ризику й невизначеності, порівняння альтернатив за уніфікованими критеріями, фіксація меж прийняттого ризику, контроль реалізації та аналіз отриманих результатів. Саме така побудова створює методичну основу для підвищення якості управлінських рішень у період післявоєнного відновлення та інтеграції України до економічного простору Європейського Союзу [1–6].

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СТРАТЕГІЧНЕ УПРАВЛІННЯ ЗАЛУЧЕННЯМ ПРЯМИХ ІНОЗЕМНИХ ІНВЕСТИЦІЙ ПІДПРИЄМСТВАМИ ОДЕСЬКОГО РЕГІОНУ В УМОВАХ ПОСТВОЄННОЇ ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ ЕКОНОМІКИ

Повномасштабна російська агресія завдала значної шкоди економіці України, особливо регіонам із потужним інвестиційним потенціалом. Одеський регіон, традиційно будучи ключовим логістичним та промисловим хабом, потребує переосмислення стратегій залучення іноземного капіталу в поствоєнний період. Прямі іноземні інвестиції (далі – ПІІ) стають критичним джерелом відновлення виробничих потужностей, технологічної модернізації та інтеграції до європейських ланцюгів доданої вартості [1].

Актуальність цього дослідження обумовлена протиріччями між необхідністю масштабних інвестицій у відновлення регіону та обмеженими фінансовими ресурсами національної економіки, з одного боку, та недостатньою адаптацією підприємств до нових геополітичних реалій і вимог міжнародних інвесторів – з іншого. Крім того, зміна фокусу інвестиційної політики ЄС та необхідність пришвидшеної інтеграції України до спільного ринку вимагають розробки нових стратегічних підходів [2].

Поствоєнна трансформація економіки розглядається як комплексний процес структурної переорієнтації виробництва, зміни інституційних механізмів та інтеграції до нових геоекономічних просторів [3]. Стратегічне управління інвестиціями в таких умовах потребує поєднання традиційних підходів (SWOT-аналіз, портфельна теорія) з кризовими стратегіями адаптації та відновлення.

Концепція "інвестиційної готовності", активно впроваджувана європейськими програмами підтримки підприємств в Україні, передбачає не лише фінансову спроможність, а й організаційну підготовку, прозорість корпоративного управління та відповідність ESG-стандартам [4].

Після початку повномасштабної війни обсяг ПІІ в Одеську область зазнав різкого спаду. Проте з 2023 року спостерігається поступове відновлення інвестиційної активності, переважно за рахунок програм міжнародної допомоги та ризикових інвестицій у логістику та ІТ-сектор (див. табл. 1).

Таблиця 1

**Обсяги прямих іноземних інвестицій в економіку
Одеської області (2022-2025 рр.)***

Період	Обсяг ПІІ, млн дол. США	Кількість підприємств з ПІІ	Основні галузі
2022	1,245.8	487	Транспорт, торгівля, переробка
2023	-234.1 (відплив)	412	ІТ, логістика (переорієнтація)
2024	178.3	398	Логістика, агропереробка, відновлення
2025 (9 міс.)	312.7	421	Транспортні технології, green energy

**Джерело: складено автором за матеріалом [5].*

Аналіз динаміки свідчить про критичне скорочення інвестицій у 2023 році на 118,8% порівняно з 2022 роком, що відображає масштабний відплив капіталу через військові ризики. Відновлення з 2024 року характеризується зміною інвестиційної стратегії: замість традиційних секторів (торгівля, переробка) пріоритет отримують критична інфраструктура, технологічні рішення для логістики та відновлювальна енергетика. Зростання кількості підприємств з ПІІ у 2025 році на 5,8% порівняно з 2024 роком вказує на поступове повернення довіри інвесторів, хоча загальні обсяги ще не досягли довоєнного рівня.

Для ідентифікації ключових перешкод залучення іноземних інвестицій у 2025 році було проведено авторське опитування 32 підприємств Одеського регіону, які мали досвід роботи з іноземними інвесторами або планували залучати ПІІ. Результати представлені у вигляді рейтингу бар'єрів за ступенем критичності (див. табл. 2).

Дані опитування демонструють, що безпекові ризики є абсолютним домінуючим бар'єром (4.8 бала та 91,2% згадувань), що визначає весь інвестиційний клімат регіону. Інфраструктурні руйнування посідають друге місце, підкреслюючи важливість відновлення транспортних та енергетичних мереж як передумови для інвестицій. Несподівано високий рейтинг нестабільності податкового законодавства (3.9 бала) свідчить про необхідність юридичних гарантій для інвесторів. Важливо відзначити, що "низька інвестиційна підготовка підприємств", хоча й посідає останнє місце, все ж є значущим бар'єром для 45,2% респондентів, що вказує на потребу в програмах підвищення інвестиційної спроможності місцевого бізнесу.

Таблиця 2

**Рейтинг бар'єрів залучення ПІІ за результатами опитування
підприємств Одеського регіону***

Бар'єр	Середній бал (1-5)	Частка підприємств, %
Безпекові ризики	4.8	91.2
Інфраструктурні руйнування	4.2	76.5
Нестабільне податкове законодавство	3.9	68.4
Відсутність довгострокових гарантій	3.7	65.3
Обмежений доступ до фінансування	3.5	58.7
Низька інвестиційна підготовка підприємств	3.1	45.2

**Джерело: складено автором на основі авторського опитування.*

Отже, можна зробити проміжні підсумки, що підприємства Одеського регіону потребують трансформації підходів до залучення ПІІ від пасивного очікування до активного стратегічного управління інвестиційною привабливістю, а також той факт, що ключовими факторами стають не лише прибутковість, а й кризова стійкість, відповідність стандартам ЄС та участь у програмах відновлення.

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АНАЛІЗ РИНКОВОЇ КОН'ЮНКТУРИ ТА ПОЗИЦІЇ КОМПАНІЇ BLACKROCK

Інвестиційна діяльність на сьогоднішній день відіграє важливу роль для побудови та ефективного покращення економіки на різних рівнях економічної системи. Серед суб'єктів глобального фінансового ринку особливої уваги заслуговує провідна американська міжнародна інвестиційна компанія BlackRock.

BlackRock є глобальною компанією з управління активами та постачальником технологій, стратегічна мета якої полягає у забезпеченні фінансової стійкості широкого кола інвесторів. Компанія має вагомий вплив на зовнішньоекономічну діяльність багатьох транснаціональних корпорацій, що зумовлює необхідність проведення нею комплексного моніторингу та поглибленого аналізу кон'юнктури національних і міжнародних ринків.

За офіційними даними компанії станом на березень 2026 року, відбуваються зміни у ринковій ситуації країн, що зумовлено конфліктом на Близькому Сході. Зазначена геополітична дестабілізація спричинила масштабний шок у глобальних ланцюгах постачання, насамперед в енергетичному секторі, що може призвести до різних наслідків в усьому світі.

Ескалація геополітичного конфлікту нівелює актуальні ринкові тенденції та деформує усталені відносини на світових ринках. Міжнародні акції значно випереджали американські до нанесення удару США та Ізраїлю по Ірану, що значною мірою було зумовлено побоюваннями щодо зриву роботи галузей, пов'язаних з штучним інтелектом, у яких США мають значні інтереси. Ця перевага різко змінилася (рис.1). Ринки відображають це у зростанні дохідності облігацій та тиску на зростання строкових премій, або додатковій компенсації, яку вимагають інвестори за утримання довгострокових облігацій [2, с.1].

Динаміка акцій ринків, що розвивається, виглядає найбільш негативною та відображає падіння з 19,5% до -5,5%. В той же час акції США мали менший негативний вплив та впали з 2% до -0,7%. Негативний вплив також підтверджується порівнянням цін акцій США з іншими країнами світу. Ціни на європейський природний газ зросли майже на 70%, що різко контрастує з 8% зростанням цін на газ у США.

Індекс S&P 500 впав на 2%, тримаючись краще, ніж міжнародні аналоги: європейський Stoxx 600 втратив 6%, як і японський Торіх. Південнокорейський Kospi впав на 11%. Дохідність 10-річних казначейських облігацій США зросла до 4,11% через побоювання щодо інфляції, що суперечить їхній ролі як притулку в геополітичних конфліктах [2, с.2].




Рис. 1. Порівняльна динаміка сукупної дохідності фондових ринків США та світу у період геополітичної дестабілізації (2025-2026рр.)*

**Джерело: сформовано за [2].*

Сама компанія визначає, що у разі впливу на збільшення дохідності, вони ризикують спричинити інфляційний шок пропозиції, а не уповільнення зростання, зумовлене попитом. Така ситуація справді може виникнути, оскільки компанія має значні частки акцій в міжнародних компаніях різних галузей [2].

Позиція BlackRock щодо стратегічного рішення формується на основі оцінки макроекономічних умов визначає різні інвестиційні напрямлення. Таким чином, зараз компанія визначає окремі стратегічні та тактичні важливі рішення своєї позиції. Серед тактичних визначаються: надання переваги ІІІ. Тема ІІІ підтримується високими прибутками, її стійкою нормою та здоровими балансами великих технологічних компаній, що котируються на біржі; вибрані міжнародні експозиції. Надається перевага японським акціям через сильне номінальне зростання та реформи корпоративного управління. У сфері фіксованого доходу віддається перевага компаніям, що розвиваються, завдяки підвищені економічній стійкості та дисциплінованій фінансній

та монетарній політиці; диверсифікатори, що розвиваються. Враховувати потенційні зміни настроїв та нестабільність довгострокових казначейських облігацій США. До стратегічних рішень входять: формування портфеля, надаючи перевагу сценарному підходу; пріоритетні напрями інвестування: інфраструктурний капітал та приватне кредитування; перехід до селективних стратегій: поза межами ринкової капіталізації [3, с.3]. Стратегічні та тактичні рішення допомагають компанії тримати лідерську позицію у глобальній фінансовій системі серед інших інвестиційних компаній.

Таким чином, у жовтні 2024 року BlackRock мала 30,1% частки активів біржового інвестиційного фонду США (анг. Exchange Traded Fund, ETF), тоді як інвестиційна компанія Vanguard контролювала 29,1% ринку. На даний момент найбільшим ETF BlackRock (табл. 1) є iShares Core S&P 500 Trust, який управляє активами на суму понад 594 мільярди доларів [4].

Таблиця 1

Найбільші Exchange Traded Fund BlackRock*

Назва фонду	Активи під управлінням	Клас активів
iShares Core S&P 500 ETF	594 мільярди доларів	Акції
iShares Core US Aggregate Bond ETF	120 мільярдів доларів	Облігації
iShares Core MSCI EAFE ETF	119 мільярдів доларів	Акції
iShares Russell 1000 ETF зростання	105 мільярдів доларів	Акції
iShares Core S&P 500 ETF середньої капіталізації	98 мільярдів доларів	Акції

**Джерело: сформовано за [4].*

Також компанія займає лідерську позицію серед активів під управління. Станом на кінець 2024 року BlackRock управляла активами на суму приблизно 11,6 трильйона доларів. Vanguard повідомила про активи на суму близько 9,3 трильйона доларів за той самий період. Ці цифри вивели BlackRock на перше місце за загальним обсягом активів під управлінням [5].

У результаті проведеного дослідження було встановлено, що сучасна ринкова кон'юнктура формується під впливом сукупності макроекономічних, геополітичних та структурних факторів. Зокрема, значний вплив на зміну ринкової ситуації здійснюють геополітичні конфлікти, які спричиняють порушення глобальних ланцюгів постачання, енергетичні шоки та зростання інфляційного тиску. Це призводить до підвищеної волатильності фінансових ринків і нерівномірної динаміки різних класів активів.

Аналіз показав, що у досліджуваний період найбільш негативного впливу зазнали ринки, що розвиваються, тоді як ринок США продемонстрував відносно вищу стійкість. Це підтверджується динамікою фондових індексів та змінами доходності державних облігацій, що свідчить про трансформацію традиційних уявлень щодо «захисних» активів. Встановлено, що компанія займає провідну позицію у формуванні та аналізі ринкової кон'юнктури завдяки значному обсягу активів під управлінням та глобальному впливу на фінансові ринки. Компанія не лише адаптується до змін ринкового середовища, але й активно формує інвестиційні тенденції.

Отже, компанія BlackRock виступає не лише провідним суб'єктом глобального фінансового ринку, а й детермінуючим чинником трансформації сучасної ринкової кон'юнктури. Сформована інвестиційна стратегія компанії демонструє високий рівень адаптивності до мінливих умов глобального економічного середовища та орієнтована на забезпечення стійкої довгострокової ефективності управління активами в умовах геополітичної та макроекономічної турбулентності.

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ЕФЕКТИВНІСТЬ СТИЛЮ КЕРІВНИЦТВА В УМОВАХ ЗРОСТАННЯ МАЛОГО ВИРОБНИЧОГО ПІДПРИЄМСТВА

Значну роль у результативності підприємств відіграє стиль керівництва, адже саме спосіб взаємодії керівника з персоналом визначає швидкість прийняття рішень, рівень мотивації працівників та ефективність організації виробничих процесів [3]. Особливо це актуально для малих виробничих підприємств, де управлінські рішення часто приймаються безпосередньо власником або директором.

Ми проаналізували стиль керівництва в ТОВ «СМБ Захід» (м. Жовква Львівської області), яке спеціалізується на виробництві модульних будинків під ключ для постійного проживання. Підприємство працює у сегменті сучасного будівництва та пропонує рішення швидкого монтажу житла на основі модульних технологій. За останні роки попит на такі рішення в Україні зріс, що створило передумови для активного розвитку підприємства.

Виходячи з особливостей діяльності підприємства, стиль керівництва можна охарактеризувати як комбінований, що поєднує елементи авторитарного та демократичного підходів (табл. 1). Керівник зберігає стратегічний контроль над ключовими управлінськими рішеннями, водночас поступово залучаючи працівників до вирішення виробничих та організаційних питань.

Таблиця 1

Особливості стилю керівництва в ТОВ «СМБ Захід»*

Характеристика	Прояв у діяльності підприємства
Централізоване прийняття стратегічних рішень	ключові управлінські рішення приймаються керівником підприємства
Делегування операційних функцій	частина виробничих і організаційних завдань передається керівникам підрозділів
Орієнтація на результат	контроль виконання проектів і дотримання строків будівництва
Підтримка командної роботи	взаємодія між виробничими, інженерними та монтажними підрозділами
Гнучкість управління	швидке реагування на зміни ринку модульного будівництва

**Джерело: сформовано автором на основі [4].*

Аналіз особливостей управління дозволяє припустити, що протягом останніх років стиль керівництва на підприємстві зазнав певної еволюції (табл. 2). На початковому етапі розвитку невеликі

виробничі компанії, як правило, використовують більш централізований стиль управління, коли основні рішення приймає безпосередньо керівник. Такий підхід дозволяє швидко реагувати на ринкові зміни та контролювати ключові виробничі процеси.

Таблиця 2

Еволюція стилю керівництва в ТОВ «СМБ Захід» у 2022–2025 рр.*

Рік	Характерні риси стилю керівництва	Основні управлінські акценти	Вплив на результати діяльності
2022	Переважаючий централізований (авторитарні елементи)	Концентрація управлінських рішень у керівника, контроль виробничих процесів	Забезпечення стабільності роботи підприємства в умовах нестабільного ринку
2023	Комбінований стиль управління	Часткове делегування функцій керівникам виробничих напрямів, формування чіткої структури управління	Покращення координації підрозділів
2024	Орієнтація на командну взаємодію	Залучення працівників до вирішення виробничих та організаційних питань, розвиток внутрішніх комунікацій	Зростання ефективності виконання проєктів і скорочення строків виробництва
2025	Гнучкий управлінський стиль (поєднання стратегічної централізації та делегування)	Стратегічні рішення залишаються за керівником, операційні — передані керівникам напрямів	Зростання доходів підприємства та підвищення ефективності використання ресурсів

**Джерело: сформовано автором на основі [1].*

Аналіз еволюції стилю керівництва на підприємстві ТОВ «СМБ Захід» свідчить, що зі зростанням масштабів діяльності управлінська модель поступово трансформувалась від більш централізованої до гнучкої та комбінованої. Такий підхід дозволив зберегти стратегічний контроль керівника над розвитком підприємства, водночас забезпечивши ефективний розподіл функцій між працівниками. У результаті підвищилась організаційна узгодженість роботи підрозділів, що позитивно відобразилось на фінансових показниках діяльності підприємства.

Зміна стилю керівництва в бік більш гнучкої та командної моделі управління позитивно вплинула на результати діяльності підприємства. Зростання доходів свідчить про розширення ринку збуту та підвищення попиту на продукцію компанії. Водночас стабільний рівень прибутку та збільшення активів демонструють ефективність використання ресурсів. За даними фінансової звітності, у 2025 р. підприємство демонструє

позитивну динаміку діяльності, у виробничо-господарських процесах задіяно 41 працівника, дохід становив майже 150 млн грн (зростання на 21,97% відносно попереднього року), чистий прибуток становив понад 5 млн грн, активи товариства оцінюються в 77,9 млн грн. Такі показники свідчать про значні масштаби діяльності та стабільний розвиток підприємства.

Зі зростанням масштабів діяльності підприємства виникає потреба у делегуванні повноважень та розвитку командної роботи. У ТОВ «СМБ Захід» це пов'язано з розширенням виробничих потужностей, збільшенням кількості працівників та необхідністю координації різних напрямів діяльності – проектування, виробництва, логістики та монтажу модульних будинків.

Важливим фактором є також відносно невелика чисельність персоналу, що дозволяє керівнику підтримувати безпосередній контакт із працівниками та швидко вирішувати виробничі питання. У таких умовах стиль управління, що поєднує стратегічну централізацію з елементами участі персоналу у прийнятті рішень, може бути найбільш ефективним [2].

Отже, результати аналізу свідчать, що ефективність діяльності підприємства значною мірою пов'язана з еволюцією стилю керівництва. Перехід більш гнучкої моделі управління, яка передбачає делегування повноважень та розвиток командної взаємодії, сприяв підвищенню результативності роботи підприємства та зміцненню його позицій на ринку модульного житла.

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ВНУТРІШНЄ СЕРЕДОВИЩЕ ТОВ «ЛК ЮКРЕЙН ГРУП» ЯК ЧИННИК ЕФЕКТИВНОСТІ ЙОГО ФУНКЦІОНУВАННЯ

Ефективність діяльності підприємств визначається станом їх внутрішнього середовища. Внутрішні характеристики формують потенціал розвитку підприємства, визначають можливості адаптації до ринкових змін і забезпечують досягнення стратегічних цілей.

ТОВ «ЛК Юкрейн Груп» функціонує у Львівській області, входить до структури агропромислового холдингу МХП. Компанія здійснює діяльність у сфері логістичного забезпечення аграрного виробництва, зокрема зберігання та післяурожайної обробки зернових культур, а також операції з транспортування та складської інфраструктури аграрної продукції. ТОВ «ЛК Юкрейн Груп», як підприємство, яке виконує інфраструктурні та логістичні функції в межах аграрного холдингу, відіграє важливу роль у забезпеченні стабільності виробничих процесів. Наприклад, діяльність елеваторних та складських комплексів дозволяє оптимізувати логістику зернової продукції, забезпечити її зберігання та підготовку до подальшої реалізації.

Для підприємств агропромислового сектору внутрішнє середовище має певні специфічні особливості. По-перше, значну роль відіграють матеріально-технічні ресурси, оскільки ефективність аграрної діяльності залежить від наявності сучасної інфраструктури зберігання, транспортування та обробки продукції. По-друге, важливим фактором є координація діяльності між різними структурними підрозділами холдингу, що забезпечує ефективне функціонування всього виробничо-логістичного ланцюга.

Внутрішнє середовище ТОВ «ЛК Юкрейн Груп» доцільно розглядати як сукупність внутрішніх факторів, що визначають умови його функціонування та піддаються управлінському впливу [4]. До таких факторів належать цілі діяльності, структура управління, ресурси, персонал, технології та організаційна культура. Аналіз внутрішнього середовища ТОВ «ЛК Юкрейн Груп» дозволяє визначити внутрішні резерви розвитку та сформулювати ефективну управлінську політику (табл. 1). З управлінської точки зору важливо, що внутрішнє середовище підприємства не є статичним. Воно постійно змінюється під впливом технологічного розвитку, трансформації ринку та внутрішніх управлінських рішень. Саме тому менеджери повинні регулярно

здійснювати внутрішній аналіз організації, оцінюючи ефективність використання ресурсів, рівень організаційної взаємодії та стан кадрового потенціалу [1].

Таблиця 1
Елементи внутрішнього середовища ТОВ «ЛК Юкрейн Груп»*

Елемент	Сплив на внутрішнє середовище
Цілі організації	стратегічні та оперативні результати, на досягнення яких спрямована діяльність підприємства
Організаційна структура	система управління, розподіл функцій та повноважень між підрозділами
Персонал	трудові ресурси підприємства, їх професійні компетенції та мотивація
Технології та процеси	способи організації виробничих та логістичних процесів
Ресурси	матеріальні, фінансові, інформаційні та інші ресурси
Організаційна культура	система цінностей, норм поведінки та взаємодії працівників

**Джерело: узагальнено за [4].*

Додатковим фактором розвитку внутрішнього середовища є корпоративна стратегія холдингу МХП, яка визначає стандарти управління, принципи організації бізнес-процесів та корпоративні цінності, які впливають на діяльність дочірніх компаній [3] і забезпечує сильні і слабкі сторони, можливості і загрози розвитку підприємства. Проведений SWOT-аналіз дозволив визначити ключові характеристики внутрішнього середовища підприємства (табл. 2).

Таблиця 2
SWOT-аналіз внутрішнього середовища ТОВ «ЛК Юкрейн Груп»*

Сильні сторони (Strengths)	Слабкі сторони (Weaknesses)
Належність до великого агропромислового холдингу МХП	Залежність від корпоративної стратегії холдингу
Розвинена логістична та складська інфраструктура	Обмежена самостійність у прийнятті стратегічних рішень
Налагоджені виробничо-логістичні процеси	Капіталомісткість інфраструктури
Доступ до ресурсів та управлінських стандартів великої корпорації	Значна залежність від внутрішніх потоків продукції холдингу
Можливості (Opportunities)	Загрози (Threats)
Розширення логістичних послуг у межах аграрного сектору	Нестабільність аграрних ринків
Використання сучасних технологій управління логістикою	Зростання витрат на енергоресурси та логістику
Поглиблення інтеграції з іншими структурами холдингу	Зміни у регулюванні аграрного сектору
Розвиток інфраструктури зберігання та транспортування продукції	Коливання обсягів аграрного виробництва

**Джерело: складено на основі [2].*

До сильних сторін ТОВ «ЛК Юкрейн Груп» можна віднести функціонування у складі потужного агропромислового холдингу, що забезпечує доступ до фінансових ресурсів, сучасних управлінських практик та розвиненої виробничо-логістичної інфраструктури. Це створює сприятливі умови для стабільного функціонування підприємства та підвищення ефективності його діяльності. Слабкі сторони пов'язані зі специфікою корпоративної структури і залежності від стратегічних рішень материнської компанії та внутрішніх виробничих потоків холдингу. Разом із тим підприємство має можливості для розвитку, пов'язані з модернізацією логістичних процесів, впровадженням сучасних технологій управління складською інфраструктурою та розширенням співпраці з іншими структурними підрозділами агропромислового холдингу.

Отже, внутрішнє середовище організації є важливим об'єктом управління, який формує основу ефективної діяльності підприємства. Комплексний аналіз його складових дозволяє визначити внутрішні можливості розвитку організації, підвищити результативність управлінських рішень та забезпечити стабільність функціонування підприємства в умовах конкурентного ринкового середовища.

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НАСКРІЗНА РОЗРОБКА КОМЕРЦІЙНИХ ІНТЕЛЕКТУАЛЬНИХ СИСТЕМ: ВІД РОБОТИ З ДАНИМИ ДО ВПРОВАДЖЕННЯ ТА МОНЕТИЗАЦІЇ

Сучасне бізнес-середовище все частіше покладається на інтелектуальні системи для автоматизації процесів, прийняття рішень і персоналізації послуг. Для того, щоб проєкт приносив комерційну цінність, розробка таких систем повинна бути наскрізною: починаючи з якісних даних і закінчуючи надійним впровадженням та моделями доходу. Невичерпність даних, складність інтеграцій та потреба в постійному підтриманні моделей підвищують вимоги до процесів розробки.

Для ефективного функціонування інтелектуальних систем потрібно врахувати етапи наскрізної розробки, що передбачають збір та інструментування даних (логування, трейсинг, стрімінгові канали); підготовку даних, тобто їх очищення, анотацію, балансування, збереження метаданих. Наступними кроками буде розробка моделей: експерименти, валідація, інтерпретованість (Explainability) та продуктова інженерія: упаковка моделей у сервіси, API, контейнеризація; розгортання: Blue/Green, Canary, оркестрація (Kubernetes) та автоматичні пайплайни. Моніторинг та підтримка за метриками продуктивності, деградація моделі, автоматичні підготовки даних слугуватись передостаннім кроком перед монетизацією (SaaS-підписка, ліцензування, revenue share, pay-per-use).

Варто зазначити, що наскрізна розробка комерційних інтелектуальних систем є складним багатокомпонентним процесом, який виходить за межі суто технічної реалізації алгоритмів машинного навчання. Її успішність безпосередньо залежить від узгодженої інтеграції інженерних, організаційних та бізнес-процесів протягом усього життєвого циклу продукту – від роботи з первинними даними до отримання стабільного економічного ефекту від впровадження [1, 2]. Саме тому, для розробки інтелектуальних систем повинні використовуватись ключові технічні рішення, а саме:

- MLOps-платформи для відтворюваності експериментів (наприклад, MLflow, Kubeflow).
- Автоматизація ETL/ELT (Airflow, dbt) та контроль якості даних (data contracts, тестування даних).

- Контейнеризація (Docker) і оркестрація (Kubernetes) для масштабованого розгортання.

- Використання хмарних сервісів для швидкого масштабу і економії CapEx.

Науковцями доведено, що якість даних є фундаментальним фактором ефективності інтелектуальних систем, оскільки помилки на етапах збору, підготовки або зберігання даних масштабуються на всі наступні етапи розробки та експлуатації [3, 4]. Забезпечення прозорості, відтворюваності та контрольованості експериментів із моделями машинного навчання досягається завдяки впровадженню MLOps-практик, які поєднують автоматизацію, версіонування, моніторинг та безперервне вдосконалення моделей у продуктивному середовищі [5].

Щодо архітектурних рекомендацій для розробки інтелектуальних систем, то пропонується застосовувати розділення шарів: інструментування → сховище даних → сервіс моделей → API/інтерфейс → клієнти. Принцип «платформа як продукт» для внутрішніх ML-команд, а також забезпечення конфіденційності даних та відповідності регуляціям (GDPR-подібні вимоги) й застосування анонімізації також будуть доречним доповненням.

Сучасні підходи до розгортання інтелектуальних рішень, зокрема контейнеризації, оркестрації та CI/CD-пайплайнів дозволяють підвищити масштабованість, відмовостійкість та швидкість доставки оновлень кінцевим користувачам. Застосування модульних і сервісно-орієнтованих архітектур забезпечує гнучкість системи, спрощує її супровід та знижує витрати на адаптацію до змін бізнес-вимог і ринкових умов[6].

Окрему увагу варто приділити бізнес-аспектам комерціалізації інтелектуальних систем. Даний етап передбачає визначення ціннісної пропозиції (value proposition) і цільових сегментів. вибір моделі монетизації залежно від ринку (підписка (SaaS), оплата за запит, ліцензійні відрахування), а також маркетинг та позиціонування: демонстрації ROI для клієнтів (прозорі SLA та комерційні угоди). Вибір моделі монетизації повинен базуватися на чіткому розумінні цінності, яку система створює для споживача, а також на аналізі цільового ринку, конкурентного середовища та готовності клієнтів платити за результат. Найбільш ефективними підходами є моделі SaaS, оплата за використання та ліцензування, які дозволяють поєднати технологічну інноваційність із прогнозованими фінансовими показниками та вимірюваним ROI.

Для зниження ризиків і прискорення виходу інтелектуального продукту на ринок доцільно застосовувати пілотні впровадження та

поетапне масштабування з використанням чітко визначених метрик ефективності. Такий підхід дозволяє своєчасно виявляти технічні та бізнес-обмеження, коригувати архітектурні рішення й адаптувати продукт до реальних потреб користувачів.

Висновки

Отже, наскрізна розробка комерційних інтелектуальних систем повинна розглядатися як стратегічний інструмент цифрової трансформації бізнесу, що поєднує сучасні технології обробки даних, інженерні практики та економічну доцільність. Реалізація комплексного підходу забезпечує довгострокову конкурентоспроможність інтелектуальних продуктів і створює передумови для їх сталого розвитку в умовах динамічного ринкового середовища.

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РИЗИК-ОРІЄНТОВАНЕ УПРАВЛІННЯ ПІДПРИЄМСТВАМИ ХАРЧОВОЇ ПРОМИСЛОВОСТІ УКРАЇНИ В УМОВАХ ГЕОЕКОНОМІЧНОЇ ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ

Сучасний етап розвитку економіки України характеризується глибокими структурними зрушеннями, зумовленими поєднанням глобальних геоекономічних трансформацій, воєнних ризиків, порушенням логістичних ланцюгів та зміною інституційних умов

функціонування бізнесу. В цих умовах підприємства харчової промисловості, як стратегічно важлива складова національної економіки та продовольчої безпеки, опиняються в ситуації підвищеної невизначеності, що істотно впливає на їхню інвестиційну привабливість, фінансову стійкість та управлінську ефективність [8]. Ці підприємства, що є стратегічним сектором економіки, забезпечують не лише внутрішню продовольчу безпеку, але й формують значну частину експортних надходжень [12]. Зростання спектра економічних, фінансових, операційних і регуляторних ризиків обумовлює необхідність переходу від фрагментарних антикризових рішень до системного ризик-орієнтованого управління (РОУ), здатного забезпечити адаптивність і стійкість підприємств у динамічному середовищі господарювання [2]. Водночас у практиці управління підприємствами харчової промисловості України ризик-орієнтований підхід залишається недостатньо інтегрованим у стратегічні та операційні управлінські процеси, що зумовлює розрив між наявними теоретико-методологічними напрацюваннями та реальними управлінськими практиками. У зв'язку з цим постає наукова проблема обґрунтування ролі та можливостей РОУ як інструменту підвищення адаптивності, інвестиційної привабливості та стійкості підприємств харчової промисловості України.

Геоелектронічна трансформація, спричинена повномасштабною військовою агресією проти України, радикально змінила умови функціонування підприємств харчової промисловості, що виконують стратегічну роль у забезпеченні продовольчої безпеки та формуванні експортного потенціалу держави [11]. У цих умовах РОУ перестає виконувати допоміжну функцію та набуває статусу системоутворюючого елементу управлінської моделі, спрямованої на забезпечення виживання, адаптивності та довгострокової стійкості підприємств. Сучасна концепція РОУ передбачає комплексну ідентифікацію мультиризикових факторів, а саме фінансових, операційних, логістичних, інституційних, регуляторних та репутаційних ризиків, що формуються під впливом воєнних дій, порушення ланцюгів постачання, нестабільності ринкової кон'юнктури, трансформації державної політики та зростання вимог з боку міжнародних партнерів, з подальшою інтеграцією результатів їх оцінки у стратегічні та операційні управлінські рішення підприємств.

Руйнування виробничих потужностей у прифронтових регіонах, розрив ланцюгів постачання та втрата традиційних експортних ринків суттєво підвищили рівень операційних і фінансових ризиків [9]. У таких умовах фінансова безпека підприємств опинилася під загрозою через

зниження ліквідності, порушення платоспроможності та нестабільність структури капіталу [16]. Діагностика кризових ситуацій свідчить, що значна частина підприємств зіткнулася з ризиком банкрутства внаслідок різкого скорочення доходів за одночасного зростання витрат на логістику, енергоресурси та безпекові заходи [13].

Реакцією на зростання ризиків стає активізація інноваційної складової управління, яка розглядається як ключовий інструмент підвищення конкурентоспроможності підприємств у кризових умовах [1]. Проте низький рівень інноваційної активності в Україні, зафіксований зниженням позицій у Глобальному індексі інновацій, суттєво обмежує можливості швидкої адаптації бізнесу. Особливого значення набуває формування інвестиційно-інноваційної стратегії, що охоплює не лише технологічні, а й організаційні, маркетингові та цифрові інновації [7]. Такий підхід дозволяє підприємствам гнучко трансформувати асортимент продукції відповідно до змін споживчого попиту, зокрема зростання інтересу до функціональних харчових продуктів [5]. **Ошибка! Источник ссылки не найден.**].

Важливою складовою РОУ є роль державного регулювання, яке в умовах геоекономічної нестабільності має еволюціонувати від адміністративного контролю до моделі стратегічного партнерства з бізнесом [15]. Формування сприятливого інвестиційного середовища, забезпечення правової стабільності та підтримка інноваційних ініціатив потребують координації дій державних, наукових та підприємницьких структур [10]. Практичним прикладом інтеграції ризик-орієнтованого підходу є впровадження системи НАССР як міжнародного стандарту управління ризиками безпеки харчових продуктів [11]. Водночас для малих підприємств її застосування ускладнюється високими витратами та дефіцитом кваліфікованих фахівців, що обмежує масштаб поширення цього інструменту [11].

Додатковим чинником трансформації є масова релокація підприємств із тимчасово окупованих територій у відносно безпечні регіони України, що потребує адаптивних управлінських рішень у сфері ризик-менеджменту [9]. Цей процес, з одного боку, стимулює регіональний економічний розвиток, а з іншого – створює додаткові ризики, пов'язані з конкуренцією за ресурси, кадровим забезпеченням та інфраструктурними обмеженнями. У таких умовах РОУ передбачає системний моніторинг інвестиційної політики, оцінку впливу інноваційних технологій та врахування глобальних економічних трендів [4].

Окремий вимір РОУ пов'язаний із впровадженням принципів сталого розвитку та екологічної відповідальності. Орієнтація на «зелені»

бізнес-моделі, зниження вуглецевого сліду та оптимізацію використання ресурсів відповідає сучасним вимогам глобалізованих ринків і сприяє підвищенню довгострокової конкурентоспроможності підприємств [6, 13]. Перехід до низьковуглецевого розвитку розглядається як стратегічний напрям, що поєднує економічну ефективність із соціальною та екологічною відповідальністю [3].

Таким чином, РОУ підприємствами харчової промисловості України в умовах геоекономічної трансформації має комплексний і багаторівневий характер. Воно поєднує проактивну діагностику фінансових ризиків, стратегічне планування, інноваційну активність, державну підтримку та принципи сталого розвитку. Реалізація такого підходу створює передумови не лише для подолання поточних кризових явищ, а й для формування стійкої траєкторії відновлення та інтеграції підприємств у європейський і глобальний економічний простір.

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РІВЕНЬ КОНКУРЕНЦІЇ НА ЗОВНІШНІХ РИНКАХ ТА ЙОГО ВПЛИВ НА КОНКУРЕНТОСПРОМОЖНІСТЬ КОМПАНІЇ

Глобалізація, цифровізація та зниження транзакційних бар'єрів посилили взаємопроникнення ринків і, як наслідок, конкуренцію. Компанія, виходячи на зовнішній ринок, стикається не лише з більшою

кількістю суперників, а й з іншою «логікою» конкурентної боротьби: відмінностями у регуляторному середовищі, поведінці споживачів, каналах збуту, культурних нормах, стандартах якості та ціноутворенні. Високий рівень конкуренції може стимулювати інновації й ефективність, однак одночасно підвищує ризики втрати маржі, зростання витрат на просування та потреби в адаптації продукту. Отже, необхідним є теоретичне осмислення того, як саме конкурентний тиск на зовнішніх ринках трансформується у (не)спроможність компанії утримувати позиції, нарощувати частку ринку та формувати довгострокові переваги.

У теоретичному вимірі рівень конкуренції на зовнішньому ринку доцільно трактувати як інтегральну характеристику конкурентного тиску, що визначається:

- кількістю і силою конкурентів – не лише число гравців, а їхні ресурси, частки ринку, бренд і здатність тиснути ціною/маркетингом;
- темпами зростання попиту – за зростання ринку конкуренція м'якша, за стагнації посилюється боротьба за клієнта;
- диференціацією товарів – чим більш схожі продукти, тим вища роль цінової конкуренції; унікальність знижує пряме суперництво;
- бар'єрами входу/виходу – вимоги до капіталу, ліцензій і стандартів ускладнюють вхід; високі витрати виходу підвищують ризики;
- доступом до каналів і ресурсів – контроль збуту, логістики та ключових ресурсів визначає переваги й обмежує новачків;
- ціною переключення для споживачів – витрати/незручності переходу формують лояльність і стійкість клієнтської бази;
- регуляторними умовами та стандартами – правила країни (митні, технічні, споживчі) підвищують вимоги та витрати адаптації, впливаючи на інтенсивність конкуренції.

Для систематизації цих елементів широко застосовують галузевий аналіз і методики оцінювання конкурентного середовища, які дозволяють пояснити, чому одні ринки є «перенасиченими» і маржинальність на них знижується, а інші – дають простір для преміальних стратегій або швидкого зростання [1].

Ключова теза полягає в тому, що вплив конкуренції на конкурентоспроможність не є лінійним. З одного боку, висока інтенсивність суперництва зменшує надприбутки та підвищує вимоги до ефективності. З іншого – вона примушує компанію пришвидшувати розвиток компетенцій: технологій, логістики, клієнтського сервісу, брендингу, систем управління якістю. Тому конкурентоспроможність на зовнішніх ринках доцільно розглядати як здатність компанії створювати

цінність для клієнта краще за альтернативи і робити це стабільно в умовах обмежених ресурсів та змін середовища [2; 4].

У практичній площині конкурентний тиск «перекладається» на рішення компанії через вибір конкурентної стратегії. На ринку з агресивною ціновою конкуренцією перевага часто зміщується до управління витратами, масштабування, оптимізації ланцюга постачання та стандартизації. Натомість на ринку з високою диференціацією та вимогливим споживачем пріоритетом стають інновації, дизайн, сервіс, репутація, сертифікації та бренд-капітал. Стратегічний вибір має бути узгоджений із реальними можливостями компанії та обмеженнями країни входу (митні режими, технічні регламенти, правила реклами, захист прав споживачів тощо), інакше «переможна» стратегія в одній країні може виявитися неефективною в іншій [2; 3].

Важливою є й маркетингова інтерпретація конкуренції: навіть у межах однієї галузі рівень конкуренції відрізняється за сегментами, каналами та регіонами. Для компанії це означає необхідність сегментації, позиціювання й адаптації комплексу маркетингу (product-price-place-promotion) до локальних умов. Зокрема, вибір каналу збуту (дистриб'ютор, маркетинг, власна мережа, B2B-контракти) може або посилити конкурентні переваги, або «з'їсти» їх через високі комісії, слабкий контроль представленості та залежність від посередника [3]. Так само цінова стратегія повинна враховувати не лише собівартість і бажану маржу, а й «еталонні» ціни конкурентів, сприйняття цінності бренду та купівельну спроможність на цільовому ринку.

Окремо слід виділити, що високий рівень конкуренції підвищує роль нематеріальних активів: довіри, репутації, партнерських мереж, післяпродажного сервісу, здатності швидко адаптувати продукт і комунікації. У конкурентних середовищах прості копійовані переваги (нижча ціна без системної переваги у витратах; «аналогічні» характеристики продукту) швидко нівелюються. Тому компанії потребують «захисних шарів» конкурентоспроможності – унікальної ціннісної пропозиції, компетенцій персоналу, процесної зрілості, управління якістю та ризиками [4]. Водночас конкуренція на зовнішніх ринках часто посилює вимоги до відповідності стандартам (технічним, екологічним, етичним), що перетворює комплаєнс із витратного центру на джерело довіри та бар'єр для слабших конкурентів.

З позицій управління конкурентоспроможністю доцільно виділити умовний алгоритм:

1. Діагностика рівня конкуренції (структура галузі, ключові гравці, ціни, канали, бар'єри, регуляторика) [1; 3];

2. Оцінка внутрішнього потенціалу (ресурси, компетенції, фінансова стійкість, виробництво, інноваційність, бренд) [4];

3. Вибір стратегії входу та позиціонування (нішування, диференціація, партнерство, локалізація, стандартизація) [2; 3];

4. Побудова системи показників конкурентоспроможності (частка ринку/сегмента, темп зростання продажів, рентабельність, повторні покупки, знання бренду, рівень сервісу).

Таким чином, рівень конкуренції на зовнішньому ринку виступає «фільтром», який визначає ціну помилки: що вища конкуренція, то важливіші точність сегментації, унікальність пропозиції та дисципліна виконання стратегії.

Рівень конкуренції на зовнішніх ринках суттєво впливає на конкурентоспроможність компанії, задаючи межі прибутковості, швидкість реакції та вимоги до якості управління. Висока конкуренція одночасно є загрозою (тиск на маржу, ускладнення доступу до каналів, зростання витрат на маркетинг) і стимулом розвитку (прискорення інновацій, підвищення ефективності, нарощення нематеріальних активів). Стійка конкурентоспроможність формується через поєднання: адекватної діагностики конкурентного середовища; узгодженого стратегічного вибору; адаптації міжнародного маркетингу; системного управління якістю та компетенціями. Отже, компаніям, що прагнуть успішної експансії, необхідно розглядати конкуренцію не як разовий бар'єр входу, а як постійну умову, яка визначає архітектуру стратегічних і операційних рішень.

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ЕКОНОМІЧНА БЕЗПЕКА ЄС: СУЧАСНІ РИЗИКИ ТА ІНСТРУМЕНТИ ЗАХИСТУ

Сучасна архітектура економічної безпеки Європейського Союзу у 2025–2026 роках перебуває у стані фундаментальної трансформації, переходячи від ліберальної моделі абсолютно відкритого ринку до концепції «стратегічної автономії» та керованого дерискингу (derisking). Глобальні геополітичні зсуви, спричинені тривалою агресією РФ проти України, технологічним протистоянням США та Китаю, а також наслідками пандемічних та енергетичних шоків, змусили Брюссель переглянути класичні підходи до міжнародної торгівлі. Сьогодні економічна безпека ЄС трактується не просто як фінансова стабільність, а як здатність союзу захищати свої суверенні інтереси, критичну інфраструктуру та технологічну перевагу в умовах, коли економічні зв'язки все частіше використовуються іншими акторами як інструмент геополітичного тиску.

Основним джерелом ризиків для європейської економіки залишається надмірна концентрація ланцюгів постачання та залежність від обмеженої кількості постачальників стратегічних ресурсів. Попри успішне подолання енергетичного шантажу з боку Росії через диверсифікацію джерел газу, ЄС зіткнувся з новою критичною вразливістю у сфері сировини для «зеленого» переходу. Китай наразі контролює понад 90% постачання рідкоземельних металів, магнію та літію, які є фундаментом для виробництва акумуляторів, сонячних панелей та мікросхем. Така монопольна залежність створює ризик навмисного обмеження експорту з метою маніпулювання цінами або політичного впливу на рішення Брюсселя [5].

Іншим вагомим ризиком є витік чутливих технологій подвійного призначення. В умовах цифрової трансформації контроль над штучним інтелектом, напівпровідниками останнього покоління та квантовими обчисленнями визначає майбутню конкурентоспроможність. Неконтрольовані іноземні інвестиції в європейські високотехнологічні стартапи або стратегічні підприємства можуть призвести до того, що розробки, профінансовані європейськими платниками податків, будуть використані для посилення військового потенціалу авторитарних режимів. Паралельно з цим зростає загроза економічного примусу (economic coercion), коли великі економіки застосовують вибіркові мита,

санітарні обмеження або бойкоти проти окремих держав-членів ЄС (наприклад, досвід Литви у відносинах з КНР), щоб змінити їхній зовнішньополітичний курс [4].

Для системної протидії цим загрозам Європейська Комісія розробила комплексний інструментарій, який поєднує нормативні обмеження та стимулюючі заходи. У 2026 році ці інструменти стали ключовими елементами внутрішньої політики союзу.

Таблиця 1

Порівняльна характеристика основних інструментів економічної безпеки ЄС (станом на 2026 р.)

Назва інструменту	Основна мета	Сфера застосування
Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) [3]	Протидія економічному тиску третіх країн	Торговельні обмеження, мита, доступ до ринку капіталу
FDI Screening Regulation [7]	Моніторинг та блокування небезпечних інвестицій	Критична інфраструктура, енергетика, ІШ, космос
EU Chips Act [5]	Збільшення частки ЄС на ринку напівпровідників до 20%	Виробництво мікросхем, наукові розробки
Critical Raw Materials Act [4]	Диверсифікація постачання рідкоземельних металів	Видобуток, переробка та рециклінг сировини
CBAM (Вуглецевий податок) [1]	Захист виробників від недобросовісної конкуренції	Металургія, цемент, добрива, електроенергія

Енергетичний аспект безпеки реалізується через прискорене впровадження плану REPowerEU та розбудову водневої інфраструктури. Важливою інновацією 2026 року став перехід Механізму прикордонного вуглецевого коригування (CBAM) у фазу повного функціонування. Це дозволяє нівелювати переваги імпортерів, які використовують дешеву, але «брудну» енергію, тим самим підтримуючи конкурентоспроможність європейської важкої промисловості. Одночасно з цим Європейський союз інвестує у створення власних потужностей з видобутку та переробки літію всередині блоку (зокрема в Португалії та Франції) та в Україні, що розглядається як надійний партнер у межах нової стратегії «френдшорінгу» (friend-shoring) [6].

Окрему роль у зміцненні економічної стійкості відіграє інтеграція України до єдиного європейського простору. Україна стає частиною «промислового щита» Європи, пропонуючи значні запаси критичних мінералів, розвинений ІТ-сектор та надлишок безвуглецевої електроенергії (атомної). Співпраця у сфері оборонної промисловості, яка активізувалася у 2025–2026 роках, створює нові точки росту для ВВП союзу та знижує залежність від зовнішніх постачальників зброї [2].

Підсумовуючи проведене дослідження, можна стверджувати, що економічна безпека Європейського Союзу у 2026 році остаточно

трансформувалася з вузькогалузевого технічного питання у фундаментальну основу загальноєвропейської геополітики. Сучасний етап розвитку ЄС характеризується відходом від наївної віри в саморегульовану глобалізацію та переходом до активного «економічного реалізму». Ключовим викликом залишається збереження тонкого балансу між необхідністю захисту внутрішнього ринку від зовнішніх ризиків та збереженням ліберальних цінностей, які є фундаментом європейського проєкту.

Аналіз сучасних ризиків свідчить, що найбільшу загрозу становить не стільки пряма військова агресія, скільки приховане використання асиметричних залежностей у сфері енергетики, критичної сировини та високих технологій. Європейський Союз продемонстрував високу адаптивність, створивши за короткий термін унікальний інструментарій захисту, такий як Anti-Coercion Instrument та посилений механізм скринінгу інвестицій. Проте ефективність цих інструментів у майбутньому прямо залежатиме від єдності держав-членів та їхньої здатності діяти як єдиний економічний блок, попри внутрішні розбіжності.

Особливе стратегічне значення для зміцнення економічної безпеки ЄС має інтеграція України. Як було продемонстровано, український потенціал у сфері «зеленої» енергетики, видобутку літію та оборонних інновацій може стати тим відсутнім елементом, що забезпечить Європі реальну стратегічну автономію від авторитарних режимів Сходу. Включення України до європейських ланцюгів доданої вартості є не лише актом політичної підтримки, а й раціональним кроком з погляду диверсифікації ресурсів.

У довгостроковій перспективі успіх стратегії економічної безпеки ЄС визначатиметься здатністю союзу виграти глобальну гонку за технологічне лідерство. Запровадження захисних мит чи обмеження експорту — це лише тимчасові заходи «гасіння пожеж». Справжня безпека буде досягнута лише тоді, коли ЄС перетвориться з нетто-імпортера стратегічних технологій на потужний інноваційний хаб, здатний диктувати власні стандарти на світовій арені. Таким чином, сучасна парадигма захисту повинна базуватися не на ізоляції, а на розбудові стійкості через інновації, диверсифікацію партнерств та безкомпромісний захист власних економічних кордонів.

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ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ДИПЛОМАТИЧНОГО ЕТИКЕТУ ЯПОНІЇ

Японія – це східна країна зі своїми традиціями, обрядами та нормами поведінки; це високорозвинена держава, яка при цьому зберігає із покоління в покоління свою унікальну національну культуру. Особливо вражає поєднання новітніх технологій і багатовікових традицій, сучасних багатоповерхових хмарочосів і стародавніх храмів, швидкісних магістралей і середньовічних замків тощо. Такими ж неповторними та стародавніми є і японські невербальні засоби комунікації [1].

Японський етикет визначає, як людина повинна розмовляти вдома, на вулиці, на роботі; які жести пристойні в даній ситуації, а які є зайвими.

Самі японці в більшості своїй при знайомстві і спілкуванні звичайно обмежуються поклонами (одзиги). Поклін – це не тільки засіб вітати нового знайомого. У Японії це абсолютно універсальний засіб

спілкування, який використовується при вдячності, вибаченнях, вираженні співчуття, при прощанні і т.п. [2].

У діловому світі Японії, частиною якого є люди різного віку і соціального рівня, вживання *keigo* (форм ввічливості) є нормою етикету, одним з найважливіших інструментів налаштування і підтримання коректних і доброзичливих стосунків. Навички використання ввічливих форм відіграють провідну роль як у письмовому, так і в усному діловому спілкуванні японською мовою.

В японських ділових телефонних перемовинах важливі дві складові: ввічливість і ясність. Хоча телефонні розмови є більш швидкими і зручними з точки зору економії часу, в японському спілкуванні важливо бути уважним до невербальних аспектів, таких як інтонація, тон голосу, паузи тощо, які доповняють загальну картину розмови і допоможуть уникнути непорозуміння. Звісно не всі ситуації можна передбачити, але намір бути максимально ввічливим, зрозумілим, володіння необхідними знаннями щодо особливостей японського ділового спілкування, а також налаштування на позитивне вирішення ситуації допоможе вирішити усі необхідні питання у японській діловій телефонній розмові, залишивши про себе гарне враження серед японських ділових партнерів.

Ось основний сценарій японської ділової телефонної розмови:

На початку ділової телефонної розмови японці завжди використовують ввічливі етикетні фрази, що є обов'язковою передумовою для ефективного зворотного зв'язку. Такою фразою, наприклад, є “いつもお世話になります”(Дякую за Вашу допомогу і підтримку).

Якщо потрібно відповісти на дзвінок, то важливо це зробити саме до третього гудку, але якщо це зайняло більше часу, то використовується така фраза: “お待たせしました。”(Вибачте за затримку). Загальним висловленням для більшості випадків на початку телефонної розмови є таке мовне кліше: “お忙しいところ失礼します。”(Вибачте, що відволікаю Вас від справ).

Японці звертають увагу на час телефонування, і це знаходить відображення у зверненні на початку комунікації, наприклад, зранку говорять: “朝早く恐れ入ります。”(Вибачте, що турбую Вас у такий ранній час), а ввечері: “夜分に失礼いたします。”(Вибачте, що турбую Вас увечері).

На початку телефонної розмови потрібно також передусім назвати фірму (компанію), яку представляєте, і тільки потім своє ім'я. Для того, щоб з'єднатися з певною відповідальною особою, використовують таке

висловлення: “田中さんはいらっしゃいますか。”(Чи присутній зараз пан Танака в офісі?).

Якщо цієї людини немає на місці, але потрібно все одно з нею зв'язатися пізніше, використовують таку фразу: “田中様はいつ頃お戻りでしょうか。”(Коли повернеться пан Танака?) або “いつ頃会議が終わられますでしょうか。”(Коли закінчиться нарада?). А також можливо додати: “それでは...ごろ48またお掛けいたしますとお伝えください。”(Тоді чи не могли б Ви йому передати, що я знов зателефоную о... годині?) І обов'язково важливо зазначити причину дзвінка, тобто питання, яке згодом треба з'ясувати: “...件でお話したいことがございます。”(Мені потрібно з ними поговорити з приводу...). Якщо справа термінова або Ви вже досить довго спілкуєтеся з цим співробітником, можливо, попросити дати номер його мобільного телефону. “そうしましたら、携帯電話のお電話番号をお教えいただくことは可能でしょうか。”(Якщо можливо, чи можете Ви мені повідомити його номер мобільного телефону?).

Важливо мати на увазі, що прохання передзвонити розглядається в цілому як невіжливе і грубе, але допустиме, якщо спілкування є постійним, звичним і колега, з яким потрібно з'єднатися, є досить знайомим. Якщо потрібний співробітник є на місці, то на початку розмови з ним треба звернутися до нього з таким висловленням: “いつもお世話になっています。”(Ви завжди нас підтримуєте і допомагаєте). А потім вже мовець має переходити безпосередньо до ділових питань. В процесі розмови важливо, наскільки це можливо, чітко записати основну інформацію, а якщо щось не зрозуміло, обов'язково ще раз про це запитати у співрозмовника. Це допоможе не загубити важливу інформацію і уникнути непорозумінь у подальшому спілкуванні.

У кінці розмови важливо показати співрозмовнику, що мовець цінує його час, який він витратив на цю розмову, такою фразою: “お忙しいところありがとうございました。”(Дякую, що приділили мені час, незважаючи на те, що Ви так зайняті). За діловим етикетом негласним правилом є те, що закінчити розмову, а саме покласти слухавку, має людина, яка подзвонила, перед цим використавши таку фразу: “失礼いたします。”(Вибачте, що перериваю) [3].

Основний параметр привітання – це, так би мовити, амплітуда поклону. Шанобливий поклін по відношенню до старшої і шанованої особи робиться досить глибоким: людина згинається в поясі і нахилиє голову. Низько кланяється відвідувачам обслуговуючий персонал в магазинах і готелях (і не треба іноземцєві намагатися копіювати такі

поклони – в очах японця це виглядає дуже смішно). Звичайний же поклін зводиться до легкого нахилу голови. Чоловіки при цьому тримають руки прямо на швах, а жінки - схрещують руки спереду вниз. Привітання старих друзів, звичайно, менш формальне: це вже може бути просто легкий кивок або невизначений жест, який символізує бажання здійснювати поклін. Іншими словами, загальних “рецептів” поклонів немає.

Звертатися до японців завжди слід за прізвиськом, додаючи незмінне “сан” (пан), наприклад, Канеко-сан, Такесіта-сан. Звертання за іменами чи інша фамільярність при спілкуванні неприйнятні.

Якщо говорити про одяг, японці ретельно дотримуються правила з'являтися на службі і протокольних заходах в суворому діловому костюмі. Головні вимоги до одягу – охайність, акуратність і навіть деяка педантичність. Під час переговорів, як правило, піджаки не знімають і краватки не розпускають. У будинок або традиційний японський ресторан прийнято входити без взуття.

Для встановлення контактів вони віддають перевагу не листам і телефонним дзвінкам, а особистим контактам, але не прямим, а через третю особу – посередника. Це має бути добре відомий обом сторонам японський бізнесмен, вітчизняний підприємець, що вже добре зарекомендував себе, або організація. При цьому посередник має бути нагороджений матеріально або зустрічною послугою.

Вручати візитку слід правою рукою, а лівою треба зробити такий жест, як яки ви підтримували картку від можливого падіння; приймати чужу картку слід лівою рукою. Приймавши картку співрозмовника, не поспішайте негайно сховати її – це верх непристойності. Ввічлива людина обов'язково повинна уточнити дані, що містяться на візитці. Вручаючи ж свою візитку, треба вимовити свої координати вголос. Не обмінятися візитками вважається серед ділових японців порушенням табу; якщо ви не обмінялися картками з японським партнером, для нього цей факт буде вагомою причиною, щоб запідозрити вас в неохайності і нереспектабельності. Також вважається поганим тоном пересилати візитку поштою.

Велика увага приділяється вивченню англійської мови як світової, тому вважається, що для дипломатів глобальні знання особливо важливі. Одна цікава риса відрізняє кадри японської дипломатії – це визнання позитивної ролі династії в дипломатії, бо це сприяє професіоналізму дипломатів та їхній відданості державі. В Японії нерідко можна зустріти дипломатів у третьому і також у четвертому поколінні. Багато з них дослужилися до самих вищих посад. Є випадки, коли послами були три брати. Перевага при прийнятті на роботу віддається дітям дипломатів

або тих, хто тривалий час знаходився за кордоном. Вважається, що ці молоді люди вже мають певний досвід і добре знають мову [2].

Отже, японці ввічливі і стримані люди. Правила етикету для них дуже важливі, як і для інших народів світу. Японці не розраховують на те, що всі будуть дотримуватися їхніх звичаїв, однак якщо ви будете намагатися слідувати японській манері поведінки, вам будуть дуже вдячні. У той же час досить просто поводити себе ввічливо і дотримуватися звичайних правил спілкування, прийнятих в Європі.

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ЕТАПИ ПРОМИСЛОВОЇ РЕВОЛЮЦІЇ ТА ОСОБЛИВОСТІ НАУКОВО-ТЕХНІЧНОЇ РЕВОЛЮЦІЇ: ПОРІВНЯЛЬНИЙ АНАЛІЗ

Еволюцію промислової революції доцільно розглядати як послідовність трьох великих етапів, кожен із яких супроводжувався якісними змінами у технологіях, організації виробництва та структурі господарства. Перший етап охоплює приблизно 1760–1830 рр. і пов'язаний насамперед із механізацією текстильного виробництва та широким використанням вугілля як енергетичної основи. Другий етап, який розгорнувся в другій половині XIX – на початку XX століття, характеризувався розвитком важкої промисловості, металургії,

транспорту та електрифікації. Третій етап став періодом автоматизації, цифровізації та активного впровадження інформаційних технологій у виробничі процеси.

Перша промислова революція (1760–1830 рр.). Перший етап промислової революції ознаменувався переходом від ручного виробництва до машинного. Саме в цей період продуктивність праці почала зростати значно швидше, ніж у попередні століття, а виробництво набуло більш організованого та масштабного характеру. Поява фабрик створила умови для концентрації робочої сили, засобів виробництва та технологічних новацій в одному місці, що суттєво змінило саму логіку господарської діяльності.

Одним із найважливіших технічних досягнень цього періоду стало впровадження парової машини. Її використання вийшло далеко за межі окремих галузей і стало потужним стимулом для розвитку всієї промислової системи. Якщо раніше виробництво значною мірою залежало від наявності водяних ресурсів, то тепер фабрики могли розміщуватися у більш зручних для господарювання місцях. Це сприяло швидкому розширенню виробництва та збільшенню його обсягів.

Суттєві зміни відбулися також у гірничодобувній та металургійній галузях. Удосконалення технічних засобів дало змогу поглибити видобуток корисних копалин, а використання коксу в процесі плавлення металу дозволило покращити якість продукції та підвищити ефективність виробництва. Особливо значущою в цей період стала текстильна промисловість, яка фактично виступила каталізатором ширших індустріальних змін. Саме вона однією з перших продемонструвала, як технологічні новації можуть радикально змінювати масштаби виробництва та структуру економіки [1].

Друга промислова революція (1850–1900 рр.). Другий етап промислової революції пов'язаний із суттєвим ускладненням технічної бази виробництва та переходом до нових джерел енергії. У цей період відбулося стрімке зростання важкої промисловості, а особливу роль почали відігравати металургія, машинобудування та транспортна інфраструктура. Активний розвиток залізниць сприяв не лише розширенню внутрішніх ринків, а й посиленню міжрегіональних та міжнародних економічних зв'язків.

Важливою особливістю цього етапу стало поступове зменшення залежності від вугілля та ширше використання нафтопродуктів. Це відкрило нові можливості для індустріалізації та дозволило зробити виробництво більш мобільним і технічно гнучким. Одночасно почалося активне впровадження електроенергії, яка стала одним із ключових факторів технологічного прориву.

Електрифікація виробництва створила передумови для якісного оновлення промислової системи. Турбіни забезпечували генерацію електроенергії, акумулятори дозволяли її накопичувати та передавати, а електродвигуни значно підвищили ефективність машин і механізмів. Усе це сприяло зростанню продуктивності праці, зниженню витрат виробництва та посиленню індустріального потенціалу провідних країн світу [1].

Третя промислова революція (з 1950-х рр.). Третя промислова революція ознаменувала початок нового технологічного етапу, в центрі якого опинилися цифрові, електронні та комунікаційні технології. Якщо попередні етапи були переважно пов'язані з механізацією та електрифікацією, то тепер основою економічних перетворень стали інформація, обробка даних та автоматизоване управління процесами.

Особливу роль у цьому етапі відіграли персональні комп'ютери, мережеві технології, Інтернет, а згодом – штучний інтелект. Їхнє впровадження змінило не лише промисловість, а й повсякденне життя суспільства, систему праці, комунікацій і доступу до знань. Виробничі системи стали більш інтегрованими, а передача інформації між різними етапами виробництва – значно швидшою та точнішою.

Розвиток автоматизованих технологій суттєво вплинув на ефективність діяльності підприємств у багатьох секторах – від промислового виробництва та логістики до енергетики й охорони здоров'я. Інтелектуальні системи, алгоритми машинного навчання та технології Інтернету речей відкрили нові можливості для координації, контролю та оптимізації економічних процесів. У результаті третя промислова революція заклала підґрунтя для переходу до цифрової економіки [2].

Науково-технічна революція: сутність і особливості. Науково-технічна революція стала якісно новим етапом розвитку суспільства, коли наука перетворилася не просто на сферу знань, а на безпосередній фактор економічного зростання та технологічного оновлення виробництва. Її сутність полягає у тому, що наукові відкриття почали майже безпосередньо втілюватися у виробничих технологіях, техніці та організації праці.

Важливу роль у формуванні НТР відіграли події Другої світової війни та повоєнного періоду. Саме тоді значно активізувався розвиток принципово нових технологій, пов'язаних із військовою, авіаційною, ядерною та електронною сферами. Створення реактивної техніки, ракетного озброєння, ядерних технологій та інших наукових розробок суттєво прискорило перехід до нового типу техніко-економічного розвитку.

Перші прояви НТР особливо яскраво виявилися у середині ХХ століття, коли швидкими темпами почали з'являтися нові технічні засоби та технологічні системи: телебачення, транзистори, комп'ютери, радары, ядерна енергетика, супутникові технології, лазери, інтегральні схеми та інші інновації. У цих умовах великі корпорації та держави дедалі активніше інвестували у наукові дослідження, розглядаючи науково-технічний прогрес як основу конкурентоспроможності та економічного зростання [3].

Відмінності між промисловою революцією та науково-технічною революцією. Промислова революція ХІХ століття і науково-технічна революція ХХ століття мають спільну рису – обидві стали потужними каталізаторами глибоких економічних і соціальних трансформацій. Проте між ними існують принципові відмінності.

Промислова революція була насамперед етапом переходу від ручної праці до машинного виробництва. Її технологічною основою стали парова енергія, механізація, фабрична організація праці та розвиток важкої промисловості. Наука в цей період ще не займала центрального місця у виробничих процесах, а технічні нововведення часто були результатом практичного досвіду винахідників, інженерів і підприємців.

Науково-технічна революція, навпаки, базувалася саме на системному використанні науки як головного джерела інновацій. У цей період нові технології вже не виникали випадково чи лише з практичної потреби виробництва – вони ставали результатом цілеспрямованих наукових досліджень, експериментів і міждисциплінарних розробок.

Суттєві відмінності між цими двома процесами простежуються і в соціально-трудовій сфері. Для промислової революції були характерні важкі умови праці, тривалий робочий день, низький рівень безпеки та активне використання дитячої праці. Натомість у період НТР, особливо після Другої світової війни, поступово посилилася увага до прав працівників, умов зайнятості та міжнародних трудових стандартів. Ці зміни знайшли відображення, зокрема, у діяльності Міжнародної організації праці та в міжнародних документах щодо захисту соціально-трудових прав [4].

Отже, якщо промислова революція започаткувала формування індустріального суспільства та машинної економіки, то науково-технічна революція заклала основи постіндустріального та інформаційного розвитку. Їхня ключова відмінність полягає у ролі науки: якщо у ХІХ столітті вона ще не була центральним фактором виробництва, то у ХХ столітті саме наука стала основою технологічного прогресу, економічної конкурентоспроможності та суспільних трансформацій.

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КЛЮЧОВІ СКЛАДОВІ КОНЦЕПЦІЇ БЕЗПЕКООРІЄНТОВАНОГО МЕНЕДЖМЕНТУ У СФЕРІ ПРОДОВОЛЬЧОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ В ЕПОХУ ГЛОБАЛЬНИХ ВИКЛИКІВ

У сучасних умовах глобальної турбулентності, що супроводжується логістичними розривами, кліматичними змінами та геополітичною нестабільністю, традиційні підходи до управління агропродовольчим сектором втрачають свою ефективність. Посилення волатильності ринків вимагає переходу від реактивної моделі управління (реагування на кризи) до превентивної, що зумовлює необхідність концептуалізації безпекоорієнтованого менеджменту.

Під безпекоорієнтованим менеджментом у контексті продовольчої безпеки слід розуміти специфічну систему управлінських дій, що базується на пріоритетності ідентифікації, мінімізації та нівелювання ризиків, які загрожують фізичній та економічній доступності продуктів харчування. Концептуалізація цього поняття передбачає розгляд менеджменту не лише як інструменту отримання прибутку, а як механізму забезпечення резильєнтності всієї продовольчої системи [1,2]. Ключові складові концепції безпекоорієнтованого менеджменту наведено на рис. 1.



Рис. 1. Ключові складові концепції безпекоорієнтованого менеджменту в умовах нестабільності

Перехід до практичної реалізації концепції безпекоорієнтованого менеджменту вимагає чіткої ідентифікації чинників, що дестабілізують стан продовольчої безпеки. Основні детермінанти нестабільності та вектори менеджменту для їх нівелювання представлено в табл. 1.

Таблиця 1

Вплив ключових викликів на безпекоорієнтований менеджмент у сфері продовольчої безпеки

Виклик нестабільності	Характеристика виклику	Реакція та інструменти безпекоорієнтованого менеджменту
Волатильність виробництва	Непередбачуваність обсягів через клімат, епідемії та воєнні конфлікти.	Сценарійне планування: розробка планів «А», «В» і «С» залежно від врожайності. Впровадження технологій точного землеробства (AgriTech) та систем страхування врожаїв.
Нестабільність ланцюгів постачання	Руйнування логістики, слабка інфраструктура, корупційні ризики та збройні конфлікти.	Диверсифікація та надлишковість: створення альтернативних маршрутів, розбудова локальних складських хабів та перехід до мережових структур постачання.
Цінова волатильність	Різкі коливання цін на сировину та готову продукцію під впливом глобальних ринків.	Фінансовий ризик-менеджмент: використання хеджування, форвардних контрактів та формування стратегічних цінових резервів для стабілізації внутрішнього ринку.
Ресурсні обмеження	Деградація ґрунтів, дефіцит води та енергоносіїв.	Ресурсозберігаюча парадигма: інвестиції в «зелені» технології (No-till, крапельне зрошення), перехід до замкнутого циклу виробництва та енергоефективності.

Як свідчать дані таблиці, безпекоорієнтований менеджмент у сучасних умовах трансформується з класичного процесу адміністрування у систему адаптивного реагування. Основним завданням такого менеджменту стає не просто максимізація прибутку, а мінімізація вразливості системи перед обличчям зазначених викликів через інструменти диверсифікації, цифровізації та стратегічного резервування.

Нестабільність продовольчої безпеки виступає як детермінанта. Вона трансформує функції менеджменту *планування* стає сценарійним; *організація* фокусується на створенні гнучких мережових структур; *мотивація* спрямовується на дотримання безпекових стандартів;

контроль перетворюється на безперервний моніторинг індикаторів безпеки [3].

Отже, доведено, що безпекоорієнтований підхід докорінно змінює класичні управлінські функції. Планування набуває сценарійного характеру, організація фокусується на створенні гнучких мережових структур, а контроль трансформується у безперервний ризик-моніторинг ключових показників безпеки.

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ПОДАТОК НА НЕРУХОМІСТЬ ЯК ІНСТРУМЕНТ РЕГУЛЮВАННЯ СУКУПНОГО ПОПИТУ

Сукупний попит – це той двигун, який рухає всю економіку вперед. Він показує, скільки товарів і послуг готові купити домогосподарства, бізнес, держава та іноземці при певному рівні цін. Саме він визначає динаміку економічного розвитку, рівень виробництва та зайнятості.

Сьогодні ми часто говоримо про податок на нерухомість. Для багатьох українців це вже реальність: щороку приходить повідомлення від податкової, і треба платити за квартиру чи будинок понад певну площу. Але чи замислювалися ми, як цей податок впливає на всю економіку? Чи може він «пригальмувати» сукупний попит, чи навпаки, допомогти економіці рости?

Проаналізувавши механізми впливу податку на нерухомість на сукупний попит і розглянувши кілька реальних сценаріїв розвитку подій, можна зрозуміти що з одного боку, податок зменшує гроші в кишенях

людей і може стримувати споживання. З іншого, надходження йдуть до місцевих бюджетів і можуть повертатися у вигляді доріг, шкіл чи відновлення після війни.

Податок на нерухомість – це прямий податок на майно. Він відрізняється від податку на доходи тим, що його треба платити незалежно від того, скільки ти заробив цього місяця. В Україні його ставки встановлюють місцеві ради. У 2025 р. надходження від цього податку перевищили 12,7 млрд грн, що на 19,3% більше, ніж у попередньому році [1]. Здавалося б, невелика сума порівняно з усім бюджетом, але вплив на людей і економіку відчутний.

Найперший канал впливу, через споживчі витрати. Коли людина отримує квитанцію на кілька тисяч гривень, вона відчуває, що її зароблені кошти зменшилися. Це так званий ефект багатства. Люди починають економити: менше купують техніку, одяг, їздять у відпустки. У кейнсіанській моделі це зсуває криву сукупного попиту вліво. Дослідження Geerolf та Grjebine показало, що підвищення податку на нерухомість на 1% у країнах ОЕСР призводить до падіння споживання на 3,5% протягом року-півтора [2]. А оскільки споживання – це найбільша частина СП, ефект розходиться по всій економіці.

Другий важливий канал – інвестиції. Податок робить володіння нерухомістю дорожчим, тому люди і компанії менш охоче вкладають гроші в нове будівництво. На ринку житла крива попиту зсувається вліво, ціни падають, забудовники скорочують проекти. У підсумку інвестиції в будівельний сектор зменшуються, що теж тягне за собою сукупний попит.

Але є й інша сторона медалі, державні витрати. Гроші від податку йдуть у місцеві бюджети. Якщо їх розумно витратити, наприклад на ремонт доріг, школи, лікарні чи відновлення інфраструктури після війни, то державні витрати зростають. А мультиплікатор державних витрат зазвичай більший, ніж податковий. Тобто одна витрачена бюджетна гривня може створити більше економічної активності, ніж один забраний податком.

Коли податок на нерухомість зростає без додаткових компенсаційних заходів, він зменшує доступний дохід домогосподарств і ринкову вартість майна. Це призводить до скорочення споживчих витрат, та інвестицій в будівництво [2], внаслідок чого крива сукупного попиту зсувається вліво. У результаті при тому ж рівні цін сукупний попит на товари та послуги знижується, що може призвести до падіння виробництва і зростання безробіття. Проте ситуація може бути іншою, якщо отримані від податку кошти держава спрямовує на збільшення державних витрат, наприклад, на відновлення інфраструктури, ремонт

доріг чи соціальні програми. У такому разі крива сукупного попиту зсувається вправо, стимулюючи економічну активність і зростання ВВП.

Ефект багатства полягає в тому, що люди сприймають додаткове податкове навантаження як зменшення свого особистого багатства, навіть якщо їхні доходи не змінилися [3]. У результаті сім'ї починають більше економити і менше витратити, що безпосередньо знижує сукупний попит. Цей канал особливо сильний у країнах, де нерухомість становить значну частину активів домогосподарств, як в Україні.

Розглянемо кілька реальних сценаріїв розвитку подій.

1. Негативний короткостроковий ефект.

Уявімо, що податок різко підвищують під час економічного спаду або війни. Люди починають сильно економити, будівництво заморожується. Як вже зазначалося, підвищення податку на 1% може призвести до падіння реального ВВП на 3% протягом 11 кварталів [2]. Це не просто теорія, подібні ефекти спостерігалися в багатьох країнах ОЕСР. В Україні, де багато сімей і так відчують тиск через війну, такий сценарій міг би уповільнити відновлення економіки.

2. Позитивний сценарій ефективного використання коштів.

Якщо гроші від податку йдуть на реальні проекти, ремонт доріг у Львівській області, відновлення шкіл на сході чи модернізацію енергетики то державні витрати зростають. Мультиплікатор спрацьовує, і сукупний попит може навіть збільшитися [4]. У країнах ЄС податки на майно давно використовують саме так, вони стабільно наповнюють місцеві бюджети і підтримують попит без великого тиску на бізнес.

3. Нейтральний або стабілізуючий ефект.

Податок більшою мірою платять власники великої нерухомості, тобто заможніші люди. Якщо ці кошти перерозподіляються через соціальні програми малозабезпеченим, загальний споживчий попит може не впасти, а навіть трохи зрости. Крім того, у довгостроковій перспективі податок змушує ефективніше використовувати землю і нерухомість, зменшує спекуляції. Дослідження OECD показують, що зсув податкової структури в бік майнових податків асоціюється з вищим рівнем доходу на душу населення в довгій перспективі [5].

4. Сценарій в умовах України сьогодні.

У 2025 р. надходження зросли до 12,7 млрд грн, але частка в ВВП все ще невелика. Для нашої країни, яка буде відновлюватись після війни, податок може стати важливим інструментом фінансування без надмірного зростання боргу. Головне, щоб гроші не розчинялися і кудись зникали, а йшли на конкретні проекти в усіх регіонах країни.

Отже, введення чи підвищення податку на нерухомість, це не однозначно погано чи добре для сукупного попиту. У короткостроковому періоді він часто діє як гальмо: зменшує споживання та інвестиції через ефект багатства. Але якщо держава розумно розпоряджається отриманими коштами, податок може стати потужним стимулом зростання через збільшення державних витрат і ефективніший розподіл ресурсів.

На нашу думку, для України ключовим є баланс. Треба встановлювати помірні, прогресивні ставки, забезпечувати прозорість використання коштів і враховувати регіональні особливості. Лише тоді цей податок допоможе не тільки наповнити місцеві бюджети, а й підтримати економічне відновлення та зростання сукупного попиту.

Очевидно, що вивчення таких інструментів фіскальної політики особливо актуальне саме зараз, коли Україна шукає шляхи до стійкого розвитку в складних умовах. Правильно налаштований податок на нерухомість може стати одним із них.

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ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКА ІНТЕГРАЦІЯ ТА ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ ЛОКАЛЬНОЇ ДЕМОКРАТІЇ

Європейська інтеграція сьогодні є одним із ключових стратегічних напрямів розвитку України, що визначає глибокі трансформації у політичній, економічній та соціальній сферах. Вона передбачає не лише адаптацію національного законодавства до норм Європейського Союзу, а й модернізацію системи публічного управління, зокрема на місцевому рівні [1]. У цьому контексті особливої актуальності набуває трансформація локальної демократії, яка виступає важливим механізмом забезпечення ефективної взаємодії між владою та громадянами [3].

Локальна демократія є складовою демократичної системи держави, яка забезпечує участь населення у вирішенні питань місцевого значення. Вона реалізується через діяльність органів місцевого самоврядування, громадські ініціативи, консультації, а також інші інструменти прямої та представницької демократії [2]. У процесі європейської інтеграції її роль значно зростає, оскільки саме на місцевому рівні відбувається практична реалізація більшості реформ, спрямованих на досягнення європейських стандартів управління [4].

Європейська інтеграція виступає потужним стимулом для розвитку локальної демократії в Україні. Вона сприяє впровадженню принципів верховенства права, прозорості, підзвітності та ефективності діяльності органів влади [1]. Одним із ключових напрямів цього процесу є децентралізація, яка передбачає передачу значної частини повноважень і ресурсів від центральних органів влади до місцевих громад. Це дозволяє забезпечити більш ефективне управління територіями, врахування місцевих потреб та підвищення якості надання публічних послуг [2].

Важливим аспектом трансформації локальної демократії є активізація громадянської участі. У сучасних умовах громадянське суспільство відіграє ключову роль у процесах демократичного розвитку та європейської інтеграції [4]. Громадяни мають можливість впливати на прийняття управлінських рішень через участь у виборах, діяльність громадських організацій, електронні петиції, громадські консультації, а також через здійснення громадського контролю за діяльністю органів влади. Особливого значення в умовах сучасних викликів набуває волонтерська діяльність, яка демонструє високий рівень самоорганізації суспільства та сприяє вирішенню актуальних соціальних проблем [4].

В умовах повномасштабних викликів, зокрема війни, трансформація локальної демократії відбувається в складних соціально-економічних умовах. З одного боку, це створює додаткові труднощі для функціонування органів місцевого самоврядування, зокрема обмеженість фінансових ресурсів та зростання навантаження на місцеві бюджети. З іншого боку, саме в таких умовах відбувається активізація громадянського суспільства, посилення волонтерського руху та розвиток нових форм взаємодії між громадянами та владою [5].

Європейська інтеграція також сприяє впровадженню сучасних інструментів управління, таких як електронне врядування, цифрові сервіси та відкриті дані [1]. Це підвищує рівень прозорості діяльності органів влади та сприяє залученню громадян до процесів прийняття рішень. Водночас важливим є розвиток інституційної спроможності органів місцевого самоврядування, що передбачає підвищення професійного рівня кадрів, удосконалення управлінських механізмів та зміцнення фінансової бази громад [2].

Попри позитивні тенденції, процес трансформації локальної демократії супроводжується рядом проблем, серед яких можна виділити недостатній рівень довіри до влади, нерівномірність розвитку регіонів, обмежені можливості впливу громадян на прийняття рішень та збереження окремих бюрократичних практик [5]. Ці виклики потребують комплексного вирішення шляхом удосконалення законодавчої бази, розвитку інститутів громадянського суспільства та підвищення рівня політичної культури населення [4].

Перспективи розвитку локальної демократії в Україні безпосередньо пов'язані з подальшим просуванням на шляху європейської інтеграції.

Важливими напрямками є поглиблення процесів децентралізації, розширення можливостей участі громадян у прийнятті рішень, розвиток міжнародного співробітництва та впровадження європейських стандартів управління [3]. Особливу роль відіграє гармонізація національного законодавства з правом Європейського Союзу, що створює необхідні умови для ефективного функціонування системи місцевого самоврядування [1].

Таким чином, європейська інтеграція виступає важливим чинником трансформації локальної демократії в Україні, сприяючи модернізації системи управління, розвитку громадянського суспільства та підвищенню рівня участі громадян у суспільному житті. Незважаючи на існуючі виклики, цей процес має значний потенціал для подальшого розвитку та зміцнення демократичних інститутів, що є необхідною

умовою для успішного розвитку держави та її інтеграції до європейського простору [5].

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ФОРМУВАННЯ СТРАТЕГІЇ МЕНЕДЖМЕНТУ ПІДПРИЄМСТВА БУДІВЕЛЬНОЇ ГАЛУЗІ

Формування ефективної стратегії менеджменту є одним із ключових завдань сучасних підприємств, оскільки стратегічні орієнтири визначають напрями їх довгострокового розвитку, здатність адаптуватися до змін середовища та досягати конкурентних переваг. Особливо актуальним це питання є для підприємств будівельної галузі, діяльність яких характеризується високою залежністю від економічної кон'юнктури, інвестиційної активності та технологічних змін.

Одним із базових етапів формування стратегії менеджменту є

аналіз внутрішнього середовища організації. Він дозволяє визначити ресурси підприємства, його компетенції, сильні та слабкі сторони, а також рівень ефективності окремих функціональних напрямів діяльності. Як зазначають дослідники стратегічного управління, саме внутрішні ресурси та організаційні можливості значною мірою визначають потенціал реалізації стратегічних цілей організації [2].

Внутрішнє середовище організації включає такі ключові складові, як кадровий потенціал, виробничі ресурси, організаційна структура, фінансові можливості та організаційна культура (табл. 1).

Таблиця 1

Ключові фактори формування стратегії менеджменту організації*

Група факторів	Характеристика впливу на формування стратегії
Внутрішні ресурси	визначають потенціал розвитку організації, рівень ефективності використання виробничих, фінансових та кадрових ресурсів
Організаційна структура	впливає на швидкість прийняття управлінських рішень та координацію діяльності підрозділів
Ринкове середовище	визначає рівень конкуренції, попит на продукцію та можливості розширення діяльності
Технологічні фактори	стимулюють впровадження інновацій та модернізацію виробничих процесів
Стратегічні цілі організації	визначають довгострокові орієнтири розвитку підприємства

**Джерело: сформовано автором на основі [Ковальчук].*

Ці елементи перебувають у тісному взаємозв'язку, тому зміни в одному з них можуть спричиняти трансформацію інших. Наприклад, впровадження нових технологій у виробництві часто супроводжується необхідністю підвищення кваліфікації персоналу, перегляду організаційної структури та удосконалення системи управління.

Не менш важливим етапом формування стратегії менеджменту є дослідження зовнішнього середовища організації. До основних факторів впливу належать економічні, соціально-культурні, технологічні та політико-правові умови функціонування підприємства. Зміни у цих сферах можуть створювати як нові можливості для розвитку організації, так і формувати певні ризики для її діяльності [1].

У практиці стратегічного управління для комплексного аналізу внутрішніх і зовнішніх чинників широко застосовується SWOT-аналіз, який дозволяє систематизувати сильні та слабкі сторони організації, а також визначити можливості та загрози зовнішнього середовища. На основі такого аналізу формуються альтернативні напрями розвитку та обирається найбільш ефективна стратегія менеджменту [3].

Важливим елементом формування стратегії менеджменту є прийняття стратегічних рішень, які визначають довгострокову

орієнтацію діяльності організації. Такі рішення можуть стосуватися розвитку нових напрямів діяльності, розширення ринків збуту, модернізації виробництва або впровадження інноваційних технологій. У стратегічному управлінні прийнято виділяти три основні групи стратегічних рішень:

- рішення щодо цільової орієнтації організації;
- ресурсні рішення, пов'язані з використанням матеріальних і фінансових ресурсів;
- ринкові рішення, що визначають позицію організації на конкурентному ринку [5].

Формування стратегії менеджменту також передбачає визначення місії та системи стратегічних цілей організації. Місія відображає основне призначення організації та її загальні принципи діяльності, тоді як стратегічні цілі конкретизують напрями розвитку та дозволяють оцінювати досягнення запланованих результатів.

У практиці стратегічного управління цілі організації часто структуруються у вигляді «дерева цілей», яке відображає взаємозв'язок між стратегічними, тактичними та операційними завданнями. Такий підхід забезпечує узгодженість діяльності різних підрозділів та підвищує ефективність реалізації стратегії.

Для підприємств будівельної галузі стратегія менеджменту зазвичай пов'язана з вибором одного з основних напрямів розвитку:

- стратегія зростання, що передбачає розширення виробничих потужностей та збільшення обсягів діяльності;
- стратегія стабілізації, спрямована на підтримку досягнутого рівня розвитку;
- стратегія скорочення або реструктуризації, яка застосовується у разі необхідності оптимізації діяльності підприємства [4].

Крім того, організації можуть обирати різні конкурентні стратегії залежно від своєї позиції на ринку: стратегію лідерства, наслідування, нішеву або стратегію активної конкуренції. Вибір конкретної стратегії залежить від ресурсних можливостей підприємства, рівня конкуренції в галузі та довгострокових цілей розвитку.

Отже, формування стратегії менеджменту організації є складним і багатоступеневим процесом, який передбачає комплексний аналіз внутрішнього та зовнішнього середовища, визначення стратегічних цілей та вибір оптимальних напрямів розвитку. Для підприємств будівельної галузі ефективна стратегія менеджменту має враховувати динамічність ринку, необхідність технологічних інновацій та зростаючу конкуренцію у сфері будівництва.

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ЄВРОІНТЕГРАЦІЯ УКРАЇНИ: ВИКЛИКИ ТА ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ ПІСЛЯВОЄННОЇ ВІДБУДОВИ

Процес європейської інтеграції України в умовах післявоєнної відбудови 2025–2026 років перестав бути виключно питанням зовнішньої політики, перетворившись на фундаментальну рамку національного виживання та модернізації. Надання Україні статусу кандидата, а згодом і відкриття офіційних переговорів про вступ, сформувало унікальний історичний контекст, де відновлення зруйнованої інфраструктури має відбуватися паралельно з імплементацією права ЄС (*acquis communautaire*). Ключовою парадигмою цього періоду є принцип «build back better» (відбудувати краще, ніж було), що передбачає не просто відновлення радянських промислових зразків, а створення інноваційної, цифрової та «зеленої» економіки, яка органічно вписується в єдиний ринок ЄС [1].

Одним із найскладніших викликів післявоєнного періоду є синхронізація планів національного відновлення з жорсткими вимогами Європейського зеленого курсу (European Green Deal). Україна володіє колосальним потенціалом у сфері відновлюваної енергетики, проте стан енергомереж після системних обстрілів вимагає докорінної перебудови за стандартами децентралізації. Як зазначає академік В. Геєць, успіх відбудови залежить від здатності держави залучити приватний капітал через прозорі механізми, що відповідають антикорупційним стандартам ЄС. Головний ризик тут полягає у можливому розриві між потребою у швидкому відновленні житлового фонду та тривалими процедурами екологічної сертифікації матеріалів за нормами Євросоюзу [2].

Інституційний виклик полягає у необхідності радикальної реформи системи державного управління та правосуддя. Євроінтеграція вимагає від України створення дієвих інституцій, здатних забезпечити реальне верховенство права, а не лише формальне ухвалення законів. Дослідники Е. Лібанова та О. Пасхавер акцентують увагу на критичному стані людського капіталу: повернення мільйонів мігрантів та професійна перепідготовка кадрів для роботи в умовах європейських регуляцій є передумовою для ефективного адміністрування коштів через програму Ukraine Facility. Без подолання системної корупції та гарантування безпеки інвестицій процес відбудови може перетворитися на низку фрагментарних проєктів без загального економічного ефекту [4].

Для кращого розуміння пріоритетів модернізації, нижче наведено порівняльну таблицю ключових векторів розвитку в межах підготовки до членства в ЄС.

Таблиця 1

Пріоритетні напрями модернізації України (2025–2026 рр.)

Напрямок розвитку	Ключовий інструмент	Очікувана перспектива	Джерело
Енергетичний сектор	План REPowerEU та ENTSO-E	Статус енергетичного хабу Європи, експорт водню	[1]
АПК та експорт	Адаптація до Спільної аграрної політики (CAP)	Вихід на ринки ЄС без квот із доданою вартістю	[5]
Цифровізація	Приєднання до Єдиного цифрового ринку	Спільний роумінг та визнання е-підписів	[3]
Логістика	Розбудова колії європейського стандарту (1435 мм)	Інтеграція в транспортну мережу TEN-T	[6]
Оборонна сфера	Спільні оборонні закупівлі (EDIRPA)	Оновлення ОПК за стандартами НАТО та ЄС	[3]

Окремою стратегічною перспективою є перетворення України на ключового партнера ЄС у сфері продовольчої безпеки. Вхідження українського агросектору до Спільної аграрної політики (CAP) є викликом через масштаби виробництва, проте воно відкриває шлях до технологічного оновлення села. Дослідники КНЕУ підкреслюють, що перехід від експорту сировини до глибокої переробки сільгосппродукції дозволить Україні не лише задовольнити потреби внутрішнього ринку ЄС, а й стати стабілізуючим фактором для світових цін на продовольство. Водночас це вимагатиме від українських фермерів дотримання високих стандартів безпечності та якості продуктів, що є неминучим етапом інтеграції [5].

Цифрова трансформація та розвиток ІТ-сектору відкривають перспективи створення «цифрового мосту» між Україною та Європою. Впровадження системи «Дія» як стандарту надання державних послуг вже отримало визнання в ЄС, і подальша інтеграція у цифрові програми союзу дозволить Україні стати лабораторією для тестування новітніх технологій у сфері GovTech. Фахівці зазначають, що цифровізація є найефективнішим інструментом боротьби з бюрократією та забезпечення прозорості використання коштів на відбудову, що значно підвищує довіру європейських донорів [3].

Підсумовуючи, слід зазначити, що євроінтеграція України в умовах післявоєнної відбудови є процесом безпрецедентної складності, який виходить далеко за межі звичайного приведення законодавства у відповідність до норм ЄС. Це докорінна зміна економічної моделі країни: від пострадянської ресурсної залежності до інноваційного розвитку, заснованого на високих технологіях, енергоефективності та верховенстві права. Основними перспективами є повна енергетична незалежність через інтеграцію в європейські мережі, трансформація агросектору в індустрію високої доданої вартості та створення потужного оборонно-промислового вузла, який посилить безпеку всього континенту [1].

Однак успіх цих перспектив безпосередньо залежить від здатності українського суспільства та влади витримати темп реформ у найбільш «болючих» сферах — судочинстві та антикорупційній політиці. Відбудова не повинна бути процесом механічного латання дірок; вона має стати трампліном для економічного стрибка. У 2026 році Україна має унікальний шанс використати допомогу партнерів для створення нової якості державних інституцій, що зробить її вступ до Європейського Союзу не лише політичним актом, а логічним завершенням успішної економічної трансформації. Лише поєднання внутрішньої політичної волі та системної підтримки ЄС дозволить перетворити виклики війни на можливості для історичного прориву [4].

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ІНТЕГРАЦІЯ УКРАЇНИ ДО ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОГО СОЮЗУ: ЕКОНОМІЧНІ МОЖЛИВОСТІ ТА ІНСТИТУЦІЙНІ ВИКЛИКИ

Європейська інтеграція є одним із стратегічних напрямів розвитку України та важливим фактором модернізації її економіки. Поглиблення співпраці з Європейським Союзом сприяє розвитку зовнішньоекономічних зв'язків, залученню іноземних інвестицій та впровадженню сучасних стандартів економічного управління. Надання Україні статусу кандидата на вступ до ЄС у 2022 році стало важливим етапом інтеграційного процесу та підтвердило стратегічний курс держави на європейську інтеграцію [1].

Європейський Союз є головним торговельним партнером України. За даними Європейської комісії, у 2024 році загальний обсяг торгівлі товарами між Україною та ЄС становив 67,2 млрд євро, що свідчить про значне поглиблення економічної співпраці між сторонами. Частка ЄС у зовнішній торгівлі України перевищує 50 %, що робить європейський ринок ключовим напрямом для українського експорту та імпорту [2].

Важливу роль у розвитку економічних відносин між Україною та ЄС відіграє Угода про асоціацію та Поглиблену і всеосяжну зону вільної

торгівлі (DCFTA), яка передбачає поступове усунення торговельних бар'єрів, гармонізацію законодавства та адаптацію українських стандартів до норм Європейського Союзу. Реалізація цієї угоди сприяє розширенню можливостей для українських підприємств виходити на європейський ринок та підвищувати конкурентоспроможність продукції [3].

Основні економічні можливості інтеграції України до ЄС наведено у Таблиці 1.

Таблиця 1

**Економічні можливості інтеграції України
до Європейського Союзу***

Напрямок	Економічні можливості
Розширення ринків збуту	Доступ до єдиного ринку ЄС та зростання експорту
Залучення інвестицій	Підвищення інвестиційної привабливості України
Модернізація економіки	Впровадження сучасних технологій та стандартів
Розвиток інфраструктури	Фінансування з європейських фондів
Підвищення конкурентоспроможності	Адаптація підприємств до європейських стандартів

**Складено автором за [2, 4].*

Водночас процес інтеграції України до Європейського Союзу супроводжується рядом інституційних викликів. Одним із ключових завдань є гармонізація національного законодавства з правом ЄС, що охоплює широкий спектр сфер, включаючи митну політику, конкуренцію, державні закупівлі та фінансове регулювання [3].

Крім того, важливими умовами успішної інтеграції є проведення антикорупційних реформ, зміцнення верховенства права, реформування державного управління та створення ефективних інституцій. Саме інституційна спроможність держави є одним із визначальних факторів ефективної економічної інтеграції до Європейського Союзу.

Попри наявні труднощі, інтеграція України до ЄС відкриває значні перспективи економічного розвитку. Поглиблення економічної співпраці з Європейським Союзом сприяє зростанню торгівлі, залученню інвестицій та модернізації економіки. За прогнозами економічних досліджень, подальша інтеграція України до європейського економічного простору може сприяти зростанню ВВП та розширенню експорту українських товарів до країн ЄС [4].

Таким чином, інтеграція України до Європейського Союзу створює значні економічні можливості для розвитку національної економіки, проте одночасно потребує проведення глибоких інституційних реформ.

Реалізація європейського курсу України може стати важливим фактором економічної модернізації, підвищення конкурентоспроможності та забезпечення сталого розвитку держави.

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РОЛЬ ЗЕЛЕНОЇ ВІДБУДОВИ У ФОРМУВАННІ ЕНЕРГЕТИЧНО НЕЗАЛЕЖНОЇ ЕКОНОМІКИ

Повномасштабна війна в Україні спричинила глибоку кризу енергетичної системи, що проявляється у руйнуванні генеруючих потужностей, пошкодженні електромереж та зростанні залежності від зовнішніх джерел енергії. Водночас ці виклики формують передумови для якісно нового підходу до відновлення економіки, який базується на принципах сталого розвитку, енергоефективності та впровадження відновлюваних джерел енергії.

Актуальність теми зумовлена глобальними тенденціями переходу до низьковуглецевої економіки. Світова енергетична система переживає період структурних змін, пов'язаних із необхідністю зменшення викидів парникових газів та досягнення кліматичної нейтральності. У межах європейської політики «Green Deal» країни Європейського Союзу активно інвестують у розвиток відновлюваної енергетики, модернізацію мереж та підвищення енергоефективності. Зокрема, Німеччина у рамках

стратегії Energiewende здійснює масштабний перехід від викопних видів палива до сонячної та вітрової енергетики, що дозволило значно збільшити частку відновлюваних джерел у загальному енергобалансі [1]. Цей досвід демонструє, що енергетична трансформація може виступати потужним драйвером економічного розвитку та технологічного оновлення.

Війна в Україні підкреслила вразливість централізованих енергетичних систем та залежність від традиційних джерел енергії. Масштабні атаки на енергетичну інфраструктуру показали необхідність переходу до децентралізованих моделей енергопостачання, які є більш стійкими до зовнішніх загроз. У цьому контексті «зелена відбудова» передбачає розвиток локальних енергетичних систем, використання сонячних панелей, вітрових електростанцій, біоенергетики та накопичувачів енергії. Такий підхід забезпечує не лише підвищення енергетичної безпеки, а й створює нові можливості для економічного зростання.

Світовий досвід підтверджує ефективність інвестування у «зелену» енергетику як інструменту післякризового відновлення. Після фінансової кризи 2008 року Китай реалізував масштабні програми стимулювання економіки, значна частина яких була спрямована на розвиток відновлюваної енергетики [3]. У результаті країна стала світовим лідером у виробництві сонячних панелей та вітрових турбін, що забезпечило не лише енергетичну безпеку, а й конкурентні переваги на глобальних ринках. Аналогічно, країни Європейського Союзу після енергетичних криз активно диверсифікують джерела енергії, зменшуючи залежність від імпорту викопного палива та стимулюючи розвиток внутрішніх енергетичних ресурсів.




Рис. 1. Частка відновлюваних джерел енергії у загальному енергоспоживанні (2024 р.)

Як свідчать дані Our World in Data, частка відновлюваних джерел енергії у загальному енергоспоживанні у світі поступово зростає, що відображає глобальний тренд переходу до сталої економіки (рис.1). Водночас в Україні цей показник у 2024 році становить лише 8,3%, що є суттєво нижчим порівняно з багатьма європейськими країнами, зокрема такими, як Ісландія чи Норвегія, де частка «зеленої» енергетики перевищує 70% [2]. Це свідчить про наявність значного потенціалу для розвитку відновлюваних джерел енергії в Україні, особливо в умовах післявоєнної відбудови. Низька частка ВДЕ пояснюється історичною залежністю від викопного палива та централізованої енергетичної системи, що робить її вразливою до зовнішніх загроз. У цьому контексті зелена відбудова відкриває можливість суттєво модернізувати її відповідно до сучасних європейських стандартів. Таким чином, представлений графік наочно підтверджує необхідність переходу України до нової енергетичної моделі, яка базується на принципах енергоефективності, децентралізації та сталого розвитку.

Для України зелена відбудова відкриває можливість створення нової економічної моделі, яка поєднує енергетичну незалежність, інноваційний розвиток та інтеграцію у європейський економічний простір. Розвиток відновлюваної енергетики сприяє залученню інвестицій, створенню нових робочих місць та підвищенню конкурентоспроможності економіки. Крім того, впровадження енергоефективних технологій дозволяє зменшити витрати на енергоспоживання, що є особливо важливим для промисловості та домогосподарств.

Крім економічних переваг, зелена відбудова має важливий соціальний та екологічний ефект. Зменшення викидів шкідливих речовин сприяє покращенню якості життя населення, а розвиток локальних енергетичних систем підвищує рівень енергетичної автономії громад. У довгостроковій перспективі це створює передумови для сталого розвитку та підвищення стійкості економіки до зовнішніх шоків.

Унікальність дослідження полягає у розгляді зеленої відбудови як комплексної економічної моделі, що поєднує енергетичну трансформацію з процесами післявоєнного відновлення. Запропонований підхід акцентує увагу на взаємозв'язку між енергетичною безпекою, інноваційним розвитком та інтеграцією у глобальні економічні процеси. На відміну від традиційних моделей, зелена відбудова передбачає створення нової економічної системи, здатної забезпечити довгострокове зростання та конкурентоспроможність.

Отже, післявоєнна трансформація енергетичного сектору України на засадах зеленої економіки створює унікальну можливість для формування нової економічної моделі, яка базується на принципах сталого розвитку, енергетичної незалежності та технологічного прогресу. Реалізація цієї моделі здатна не лише забезпечити відновлення національної економіки, а й зробити Україну важливим учасником глобального енергетичного переходу, що визначатиме розвиток світової економіки у найближчі десятиліття.

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СОЦІАЛЬНА ВІДПОВІДАЛЬНІСТЬ У ЗАСТОСУВАННІ НЕЙРОМАРКЕТИНГОВИХ ІНСТРУМЕНТІВ

У сучасних умовах цифрової економіки та зростання конкуренції на ринках підприємства активно використовують інноваційні технології аналізу поведінки споживачів. Одним із таких інструментів став нейромаркетинг - міждисциплінарний напрям, що поєднує маркетинг, психологію, біометрію, когнітивні науки та аналіз даних для вивчення механізмів споживчого рішення. Його застосування дозволяє підвищувати ефективність рекламних кампаній, прогнозувати реакції аудиторії та підсилювати вплив маркетингових стимулів. Проте одночасно виникає питання етичних та соціальних обмежень,

пов'язаних із доступом до підсвідомих реакцій та можливістю маніпулятивного впливу на поведінку людини.

Ідеї пояснення поведінки споживачів за допомогою психологічних концепцій виникли ще у першій половині XX століття. На той час рекламна індустрія активно використовувала елементи класичного та добровільного навчання, формувала емоційні асоціації та застосовувала принципи гештальтпсихології. Ці методи дозволяли досягати певних результатів, проте їхній потенціал був обмеженим. Вони не враховували складні підсвідомі нейрокогнітивні процеси, які значною мірою впливають на прийняття рішень

Значний прорив у цій сфері став можливим наприкінці XX – на початку XXI століття завдяки стрімкому розвитку технологій вивчення мозку [2]. Зокрема, функціональна магнітно-резонансна томографія (fMRI), електроенцефалографія (EEG) та інші сучасні інструменти дозволили отримувати емпіричні дані про мозкову активність у відповідь на різноманітні стимули. Це дало змогу дослідникам заглибитися в механізми прийняття рішень та зрозуміти, як працює мозок споживача в умовах вибору [3].

Нейромаркетинг охоплює наступні методи дослідження підсвідомих реакцій споживачів за допомогою технологій [1-3]:

- Eye-tracking (відстеження руху очей).
- EEG (електроенцефалографія).
- fMRI (функціональна магнітно-резонансна томографія).
- GSR (шкірно-гальванічна реакція).
- Facial coding (аналіз мікромімічних реакцій).

Нейромаркетинг використовує знання про роботу мозку для створення більш ефективних маркетингових стратегій. Наприклад, за допомогою fMRI можна визначити, які елементи реклами викликають найбільшу емоційну реакцію, які кольори, звуки чи образи стимулюють позитивне ставлення до бренду. EEG дозволяє відстежувати рівень уваги споживача до певного продукту або повідомлення [3].

Одним із ключових завдань нейромаркетингу є виявлення так званих «тригерів» – стимулів, які запускають підсвідомі процеси, що впливають на вибір. Наприклад, певний запах може асоціюватися з комфортом і затишком, а музика – стимулювати почуття радості чи ностальгії. Завдяки цьому компанії можуть створювати більш персоналізовані та емоційно насичені комунікації.

Ці інструменти дозволяють оцінити залученість, емоційні реакції, запам'ятовуваність та рівень інтересу без необхідності вербалізації зі сторони респондента. Їх застосування формує суттєві конкурентні переваги для бізнесу, але водночас створює соціальні ризики.

Питання соціальної відповідальності виникає у зв'язку з кількома ключовими аспектами [2]:

- Персональні дані та приватність. Нейромаркетингові дослідження оперують біометричними та нейрофізіологічними даними, які належать до найбільш чутливих категорій персональних даних. Їх обробка потребує особливої форми захисту та інформованої згоди.

- Маніпулятивний потенціал. Оскільки методи працюють із підсвідомими реакціями, існує ризик впливу на вибір без участі свідомого рішення споживача, що ставить питання про межі допустимого впливу.

- Вплив на вразливі групи населення. Особливе занепокоєння викликає орієнтація маркетингових кампаній на дітей, підлітків, людей з низьким рівнем медійної грамотності або когнітивними обмеженнями.

- Асиметрія інформації. Підприємства отримують доступ до механізмів прийняття рішень, недоступних споживачу, що створює структурний дисбаланс сил на ринку.

- Відсутність єдиних регуляторних стандартів. На глобальному рівні досі немає чітких етичних протоколів використання нейромаркетингових технологій, за винятком локальних рекомендацій окремих професійних організацій.

Для зменшення ризиків і розвитку цивілізованих практик застосування технологій пропонується дотримання таких принципів:

- добровільність та інформована згода респондентів;
- прозорість цілей застосування технологій і збору даних;
- обмеження маніпулятивного впливу та недопущення шкоди;

- захист персональних та біометричних даних відповідно до міжнародних норм;

- етичне таргетування аудиторій, особливо вразливих груп;
- відповідальність за наслідки впроваджених рішень у сфері суспільної комунікації.

На сьогодні в світі вже формуються підходи до етичного регулювання, наприклад [4]:

- Загальний регламент про захист даних діє в ЄС;

- Інститут інженерів з електротехніки та електроніки (IEEE) розробляє стандарти етичного використання AI та біометричних технологій;

- США активно працюють професійні асоціації, що пропонують етичні кодекси практики.

Хоча ці механізми ще не формують повноцінного законодавчого поля, вони створюють базу для професійного саморегулювання.

Нейромаркетинг відкриває значні можливості для підвищення ефективності маркетингових комунікацій, але водночас потребує усвідомленого підходу з позиції соціальної відповідальності. Етичне застосування технологій передбачає захист прав споживача, прозорість, добровільність участі та недопущення маніпулятивного впливу. У перспективі очікується посилення інституційного регулювання цієї сфери, розвиток етичних кодексів та інтеграція принципів відповідального маркетингу у корпоративні політики компаній.

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ГРОМАДЯНСЬКА УЧАСТЬ У ПРОЦЕСАХ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОЇ ІНТЕГРАЦІЇ УКРАЇНИ

Європейська інтеграція сьогодні є одним із ключових напрямів розвитку України. Вона передбачає не тільки адаптацію законодавства та економічної системи до стандартів Європейського Союзу, а й суттєві

зміни у політичній та соціальній сферах. Важливу роль у цьому процесі відіграє громадянське суспільство, адже саме його інститути забезпечують реалізацію прав і свобод громадян та сприяють їх участі в управлінні державою.

В умовах повномасштабної війни РФ проти України, а також складної соціально-економічної ситуації, питання розвитку громадянського суспільства набуває особливої актуальності. З одного боку, курс на євроінтеграцію та зобов'язання, взяті в межах Угоди про асоціацію з ЄС, стимулюють активізацію громадських ініціатив і зміцнення відповідних інституцій. З іншого боку, існує ряд проблем, зокрема недостатній рівень фінансування, низька довіра до інституцій, обмежений вплив громадськості на процес прийняття рішень, а також негативні наслідки війни [1].

Розвиток інститутів громадянського суспільства та їх взаємодія з органами публічної влади нині належить до найважливіших напрямів досліджень. Значний науковий доробок у цій сфері представлено як українськими, так і зарубіжними дослідниками, серед яких Б. Андресюк, М. Бойчук, М. Кельман, М. Месюк, Л. Даймонд та інші. Їхні праці поглиблюють розуміння специфіки функціонування громадянського суспільства та окреслюють його ключову роль у процесах демократичного розвитку держави. Водночас, попри велику кількість наукових досліджень, окремі аспекти взаємодії держави та громадянського суспільства залишаються недостатньо розкритими та потребують подальшого вивчення [2].

Розглядаючи процес європейської інтеграції, варто відзначити, що він безпосередньо впливає на кожного громадянина України. Цей вплив має як позитивні, так і негативні сторони. Зокрема, серед негативних аспектів можна виділити неготовність частини суспільства до змін, які необхідно реалізувати перед тим, як Україна зможе стати повноправним членом Європейського Союзу. Водночас позитивним є те, що євроінтеграція відкриває можливості для формування розвиненого громадянського суспільства на основі демократичних принципів.

У першу чергу важливим є приведення національного законодавства у відповідність до норм ЄС, а також проведення реформ у сфері судочинства. Окрему увагу слід приділити створенню ефективної нормативно-правової бази для боротьби з корупцією. Якщо говорити про економічний аспект, то необхідно забезпечити відповідність української продукції європейським стандартам, а також розробити механізми підвищення її конкурентоспроможності на ринку. Крім того, важливим є підвищення інвестиційної привабливості українських підприємств, що

передбачає покращення як якісних, так і кількісних показників їх діяльності [3].

Таблиця 1

Форми громадянської участі у процесах європейської інтеграції України [4]

Форми участі	Характеристика
Участь у виборах	Забезпечує вплив громадян на формування влади та визначення політичного курсу
Громадські організації	Представляють інтереси різних соціальних груп та беруть участь у реформах
Електронні петиції	Дають можливість громадянам ініціювати зміни та звертатись до влади
Громадські консультації	Дозволяють брати участь у розробці державної політики
Волонтерська діяльність	Активізує суспільство та сприяє вирішенню соціальних проблем
Громадський контроль	Забезпечує прозорість діяльності органів влади

У процесі європейської інтеграції України важливу роль відіграє громадянська участь, яка реалізується через різні форми взаємодії між суспільством і державою. Як показано в таблиці 1, громадяни можуть впливати на державні процеси як безпосередньо, так і через інститути громадянського суспільства.

Зокрема, участь у виборах забезпечує формування органів влади та визначення стратегічного курсу розвитку країни. Важливе значення мають громадські організації, які представляють інтереси різних соціальних груп і беруть участь у реалізації реформ. Окрім цього, такі інструменти, як електронні петиції та громадські консультації, дозволяють громадянам долучатися до процесу прийняття рішень.

В умовах сучасних викликів особливого значення набуває волонтерська діяльність, яка сприяє вирішенню соціальних проблем та підтримці держави. Також важливим є громадський контроль, що забезпечує прозорість діяльності органів влади. Таким чином, різні форми громадянської участі сприяють розвитку демократичних процесів та наближенню України до європейських стандартів.

Попри наявні труднощі, загалом вплив європейської інтеграції на розвиток інститутів громадянського суспільства в Україні можна оцінити як позитивний. Подальший прогрес значною мірою залежить від зміцнення інституційної спроможності громадських організацій, налагодження конструктивної взаємодії з органами влади, розширення джерел фінансування та адаптації їх діяльності до умов воєнного стану. Саме ці чинники є визначальними для посилення ролі громадянського суспільства в контексті успішної євроінтеграції України.

На нашу думку, сьогодні простежуються суттєві перспективи подальшого розвитку інститутів громадянського суспільства в Україні:

1. Європейська інтеграція виступає важливим стимулом для їхнього розвитку. Вимоги Європейського Союзу щодо залучення громадськості до процесів формування та моніторингу реформ, а також необхідність впровадження європейських стандартів у різних сферах відкривають додаткові можливості для участі громадських інституцій. Посилення їх експертного потенціалу, активізація адвокаційної діяльності та здійснення громадського контролю сприятимуть більш ефективному просуванню України на шляху до ЄС.

2. Важливе значення мають подальші зміни у законодавстві, зокрема спрощення процедур реєстрації та звітності для громадських організацій, забезпечення прозорості їх фінансування, а також формування дієвих механізмів співпраці між державними структурами та громадянським суспільством.

3. Розширення співпраці з європейськими громадськими організаціями, обмін досвідом і залучення міжнародної експертизи сприятимуть підвищенню інституційної спроможності українських інститутів громадянського суспільства та впровадженню кращих практик. Участь у міжнародних проєктах і мережах також дозволить розширити їх можливості щодо впливу та залучення додаткових ресурсів.

4. Події війни засвідчили значний потенціал волонтерського руху в Україні. Підтримка, систематизація та подальша інституціоналізація волонтерських ініціатив, а також залучення нових учасників і координація їхньої діяльності сприятимуть посиленню можливостей громадянського суспільства у вирішенні актуальних соціальних проблем і підтримці процесів європейської інтеграції [1].

Спільність цінностей і принципів громадянського суспільства України та ЄС є важливим чинником, який забезпечує практичні результати співпраці та сприяє консолідації підтримки України у протидії російській агресії. Водночас позиції громадянського суспільства в ЄС дедалі частіше враховуються у рішеннях євроінституцій. Проте зосередження лише на внутрішніх питаннях не дозволяє повною мірою реагувати на виклики, що постають перед сусідніми країнами [5, с. 38]. У цьому контексті європейським громадським організаціям доцільно активніше виходити за межі ЄС, сприяючи зміцненню інституційної спроможності громадянського суспільства України та його розвитку як самодостатнього учасника транснаціонального політичного простору.

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Матеріали XL Міжнародної науково-практичної конференції
молодих вчених та студентів

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